
r,in...Tl( ' 2. a^ 

Unnk . OS" 



PRESENTED BY 



\9.2.3a. 



NAPOLEON 



AND 



THE GRAND ARMY IN RUSSIA. 



-.0^ 



•» Noil loiivci'ti lit interpreSi set! ut orator, sententiis iisdem 
ot oaruiii loiinis, tanqiiam figuris, verbis ad nostram consuctii- 
diiiom aptis : in ^uibus non vcrbum verbo iiecesse habiii red- 
dex'O, sed omnium verboriim vim servavi. Non enim me ea 
annumei'are lectori putavi oportere, sed tauquam appcnderQ." 

Cicero. 

PhihiklphUt, Oct, 1825. ©• 









NAPOLEON 



THE GRAND ARMY IN RUSSIA; 



A CRITICAI, EXAMINATIOiN 



COUNT PHILIP DE SKOUll'S WOUK 



BY GENERAL eOURGA LI), 

V.ATE FIHR'C MIl-ITAtlY SBt'-UETATllf ANll AID-DG-OAMJ? TO THK EMPKllOll NAl'ni,F,0>r . 



" Render unto di-snr the thim-s ivhk/i are Cicsar^s." 



Translated from tlie Franch by a Gentleman of Philudclpliia. 



r»UILADEU'HlA; 

PUBLISHED BY ANTHONY FINLEY, 

\OHTU-K\ST CORNER OF CHKSNUT AND FOURTH ST R KK I S. 

/'. .^nhnwad aj Co, T'rinti''-:i. 

18^35. 



4^/ \w«/ <ii>- V,^ "w^ 



CX.^^.' 



Sasiern District of Pennsylvania, to wit : 

BE IT REMEMBERED, That on the fourteenth clay of October iri 
the fiftieth year of the Independence of the United States of America, A. D. 
1825, Anthony Finlet, of the said district, hath deposited in this office the 
title of a Book, the right whereof he claims as Proprietor, in the words fol- 
lowing-, to wit : 

" Napoleon and the Grahd Army in Russia ; or a Critical Examination of 
Count Philip de Segur's Work. By General Gourgaud, late First Officer 
of Ordnance and Aid-de-Camp to the Emperor Napoleon. " Render unto 
Caesar the things which are CxSar's." Ti'anslated from the French, by a 
Gentleman of Philadelphia," 

In conformity to the Act of the Congress of the United States intituled, 
" An act for the Encoui-agement of Learning, by securing, the copies of 
maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, du- 
ring the times therein mentioned;" — And also to the act, entitled, "An act 
supplementary to an act, entitled, ' An act for the encouragement of learn- 
ing, by securing tlie copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and 
proprietors of such copies during the times tlierein mentioned,' and extend- 
ing the benefits thereof to the arts of designing, engraving, and etching his- 
torical and otlier prints." 

^ D. CALDWELL, 

Clerk of the Eastern Disti'ict of Pennsylvania 






TO THE READER. 



Four editions of the work we are about to examine have al- 
ready appeared, and until the present time we have retained in 
our port folio this criticism, long since prepared. Why has it 
heen so long withheld ? Why is it now published ? We shall 
answer these questions in a few words addressed to the reader. 

The form of the Count de Segur's work, its high price, 
the portraits and emblems with which it has been successively 
enriched, induced us to think it destined to classes of society, 
who, having seen the men and things of which it treats, near 
at hand, would require no one to judge between them and the 
author. We have also remarked, that the journals which 
have spoken most encomiastically, have referred principally 
to its literary merits; that they have compared it to the fic- 
tions of the illustrious Scotchman; and, that in reading the his- 
tory of the Grand Army, the name of Walter Scott has 
spontaneously flowed from their pens. We wish not to dispute 
this sort of merit accorded to Count de Segur. It is of small 
importance to us, if his work were greater than the Iliad; or 
had it been said of him, as has been said of a marshal of the 
empire, the quorum pars magna fui, that he had forgotten no- 
thing of that great period but his services ; the irony would be 
too evident, and leave us nothing to say. The public, through 
whose hands the four editions passed, were placed on their 
guard, and could not receive as a history, that which was 
given to the world as a romance. 

But having learned that a fifth edition is in preparation, a 
small and unadorned volume, whose price places it within the 
reach of multitudes who have been too distant from the occur- 
rences, not to be drawn into errors, to which the readers of the 
first edition were not exposed, we have felt obliged to publish 
this work, which, however imperfect it may be, will not be en- 
tirely unavailing. 



Vi TO THE HEADER. 

A parallel instance presents itself to our recollection : — 
Courtilz tie Sandras, published at the end of the 17th century. 
The conduct of France from the peace of MimSguen ; the Life of 
Coligny ; Memoirs of the Count de Rochefort; the History of the 
War of Holland, from 1672 until 1677; the Life of Marshal 
de Turenne, <^c. <^c. Sfc. "His prolific and frivolous pen," 
says the New Historic Dictionary, "poured forth a host of 
romances, published under the title of histories, which were 
the more dangerous, because the fables they contained, being 
mingled with a little truth, were in consequence accepted." 

These romances had also a prodigious sale. For a long 
time no one deigned to refute them j and for a long time, also, 
Sandras was regarded as an authority. 

" We place his name here, only to warn Frenchmen and fo- 
reigners, how much they should mistrust these fictions, undef 
the name of history." (Voltaire Age of Louis XIV.) 

The application is self-evident j we add ^Gthing to the sen- 
tences quoted. 



INTRODUCTION. 



Whoever desires to write history, ought, after becoming 
thoroughly acquainted with his subject, and even before form- 
ing his plan, to deduce from all the facts, the moral aim of 
his work, unless he has resolved to subject them to a system. 
Readers who undertake to examine such writings, should en- 
deavour to ascertain in which of these situations the author 
places himself. 

The dominant opinion of Count de Segur manifests itself 
from the first chapter. He wishes to show JYapoleon filled 
with the vast project of remaining sole master of Europe, 
He is little concerned, whether by this imputation he echoes 
the superficial and malevolent spirits who have judged a great 
man after his fall, or of enemies, who during his reign, em- 
ployed it as an instrument for his overthrow. He is sure to 
please the former, and not to displease the latter. JJe flatters 
party spirit and cotemporary mediocrity ; he will be read, he 
will be praised. ^ 

This is not all. After having shown so great, so universal 
a genius, rushing wantonly into a ridiculous enterprize, he 
attempts to prove, that if S7iccess did not crown his rashness. 
it was caused by the untimely decline of his health; and, that 
the great, was nothing but an ambitious man, who had grasp- 
ed more than his physical strength could retain. 

As to his plan, we flatter ourselves we can demonstrate that 
he has none — that he writes almost at random, mingling facts 
and bringing them together without connexion or order ; con- 
founding the affairs of one epoch with those belonging to an- 
other; disdaining to justify his accusations or eulogies ,• adopt- 
ing without examination, and without that critical spirit so 
necessary to the historian, the false judgments of prejudice, of 
rivalry or of enmity, and the exaggerations of spite or bad 
feeling 5 attributing actions to some, and language to others. 



8 cm rioAL examination, &c. 

iiicompiiiihlcwiili llunrHljitions and (■hiii'acicrs ; never quoting 
any witnrsH but hiinseli'; nor bbttcr authority than liis own as- 
sertions. 

lie irpeatedly niirifi;l(\s ])oliti(al atul nulitary matters. Who 
has revealetl politics (o him ? Unacquainted with aftairs, liaving 
never approached, either the cabinet, the councils or oiUcers of 
state, with whom his duty at liead qiiarters gave him uo con- 
nexion, whence has lie drawn his documents ? From thft 
jiamphlets or convei'sations of Napoleon's detractors. 

In relaticm to military facts in the work we are to examine, 
tliey are (onliued to a succession of unexact recitals, of pic- 
tures without truth, of little anecdotes, for the nu)st part forged, 
or frejjuentl}' literally copied from some writings, which have 
ahuost uuilVu'mly been dictated by a spirit of malevolence. 

Without doubt it would l>e unjust to demand of Count do 
Segur, in relation to military nuitters, what he has not given 
in his hook. I'he rank of General he has indeed, but where 
did he acipjire the experience of one ? All his grades were 
received while discharging civil ollices, to which the usage of 
the palace has consecrated epaulettes and embroidery. At 
first joined to the adjutants of the palace,* he became Quar- 
ter-nuister, from the time his duties were designated by his 
new title ;| he perforuuMl no others during the Russian cam- 
paign, and shared them with Mr. Ernest de Canouville, 
auditor to the council of state. Mr. de Segur, who from a 
Colonel of light horse in the I'arisian National Guards, be- 
came a Major (Jen«M-al,t ceased it is true, on his return 
from Russia, his duties as Quarter-master, but nevertheless 
did not engage in any active military career; he was appoint- 
ed governor of the pages, a civil employment, which has no- 
thing military about it, except the dress. If, sometime after, 
he was chai'ged with the organization of a regiment of Guards 
of Honour, formed at Tours, he owes to that circumstance the 
advantage of making the campaign of 1814 with this corps, 
and the power of otfering the lUlelity of these guards to the 

» The 6tlj October, 1802, | The 24tti September, 1806. 
.\ The 22(1 Febvuary, 1812. 



CRITICAL EXAMINATION, 8tc. -g 

prince of Bcneveiito, (Talleyrand) while the Biinpcror was 
still at Fontaiiiebloau.* 

These details are not inopportune. A new f^cneration who 
were little more than infants wiien our days of glory were 
finished, and the iidiabitants of drawing-rooms to wliom that 
glory was for a long time hut a troublesome rumour, when 
reading on the title page of a work, trumpeted by the jour- 
nals before it had a reader, the following words — by the 
General Count dc Srgur, have believed that this general 
who constitutes himself the judge of a great man, has fought 
by his side, when he has merely been employed in ju'cparinghis 
quarters. I'hey may believe, him to be the emulator, the rival, 
or at least the comi-adeof those old generals, wliosc Idood and 
high deeds have marked, during thirty years, so many fields 
of battle. They may see in him, according to his own account, 
one of those veterans of the grand army, which JVl. the ((uarter- 
master, calls his companions, in his dedicatory epistle, without 
dreaming how slight are his titles to be regarded as a veteran 
and a meinbei* of this illustiious coiilVaternity. if it be useful 
to inform the readers of Count dc Scgur, that his pen is not 
that of a nulitary man, although his sword, on the rare occa- 
sions in which it has left its scal)bai-d, lias been that of a brave 
soldier, it is efjually just to absolve liim from numerous errors 
whicli a more expeiieuccil ollicer would not have committed. 

Might not the military abilities in whicli Count de Segur 
was deficient, have been supplied by his situation at head (piar- 
ters, -amd by the relations which the civil service he was 
charged with, gave him during the campaign of 1812? To 
answer this question, which we have hcretofoie touched on, a 
few words are necessary to explain the nature of this service. 

When a march is to take place, the quarter-master receives 

* Extract of" a letter from tlie Count de Scyur to the I'rovisioiial Govern- 
ment. 

" 1 oflTcr to-day, my six hundred guards and myself to the successor and 
descendant of the king's of my ancestors. 

" 1 swear fidelity to him, in the name of my olficers, of all my guards, and 
in my own name, which answers for my oaths." 

Muidteur, Monday^ Jpril 11, 1814. 

B 



10 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

from the Chamberlain of the palace, or from whoever acts in his 
place, an order to precede the Imperial head quarters, for 
some hours, to the point where they are to be established; 
There, having under his orders two messengers of the palace, 
who compose the personal of his command, he prepares the 
Emperor's lodgings and that of his suite ; superintends the 
establishment of his health service, of that of his table, of the 
office and the stables. This duty done, the Count de Segur 
during his leisure, could see what general officers arrived at 
or departed from the Imperial quarters ; he could collect the 
rumours which were floating around, or the conjectures form- 
ed in the midst of officers who were sent on or returned from 
missions ; the more or less animated conversations, and often 
the indiscreet clamours of the guard room, where some officers 
relaxed themselves after the fatigues of the day, by venting 
their ill humour on men and things. Such are the witnesses 
of Count de Segur; such are his sureties; such the sources 
from wliicli he has drawn. It is this which caused a very 
witty man to remark of his book, that it was the process verbal 
of the tittle-tattle at head quarters. 

An expedition as important and difficult as that of Russia, 
demanded an historian who joins discernment to a knowledge 
of facts, who is inaccessible to all extraneous influence, and 
placing himself in an independent situation, sees only times and 
circumstances, and knows how to escape from the dominion 
of every new affection. Deficient in these indispensable quali- 
fications. Count de Segur could only produce, and has pro- 
duced nothing, but an ill-contrived romance, which he has 
decorated with the name of history. Bewildered by the suc- 
cess of his striking phrases and romantic descriptions, he 
has not perceived the incongruities into which he has fallen. 
That grand army, with which this young veteran pretends to 
associate himself, is, under his pen, a horde, which combats 
for plunder. The great man, of whom he wishes to be believ- 
ed a grateful and faithful admirer, and who poured out on his 
grand-father, his father, and himself, the treasures of his fa- 
vour and benefits,* is a madman, rushing blindly upon his own 

* M. Philip de Segur was endowed by the Emperor on the 24th of September, 




CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. H 

ruin. The prodigious genius which heretofore had crowned 
himself with so many laurels, and signalized his name by 
the reconciliation of parties, and especially by the pros- 
perity of his country, is nothing but a weak, uncertain, ir- 
resolute man, without energy, without courage ; borne down 
by the weight of fatigue and disease. He is dead before the 
supreme hour ! ! 

Notwithstanding, in a few months he repaired all his losses ; 
his creative hand recomposed that army, which under his or- 
ders, conquered at Lutzen, at Bautzen, and Dresden. Re- 
duced afterwards to a handful of brave men, he held all the 
forces of Europe in check, on the plains of Champagne, and 
if he fell by treason, it was still amid the songs of victory of 
Champaubert and Montmirail. Scarcely had a year elapsed 
after liis fall, before he restored himself, by an enterprise, the 
conception of which was not more daring than its execution, 
and will be the astonishment of future ages. But, once more 
abandoned by fortune, he gave to the world, during six years, 
on the Rock of St. Helena, a memorable example of heroic 
firmness and unconquerable character. 

Will Count de Segur inform us, by what prodigy this ge- 
nius depicted by him in decrepitude, preserved that vigour and 
power, which remained so long a time the terror and admira- 
tion of his enemies ? Had he written such things after his 
return from the Russian campaign, we might have attributed 
his errors to a diseased imagination and a melancholic spirit, 
disturbed by the effect of such great disasters ; had he written 
it after the events of 1813, 1814 and 1815, he would have been 
inexcusable; yet it is in 1825 he publishes his book ! 

Had he published before the death of the hero, this work^ 
hailed by ephemeral applause, doubtless an eloquent protesta- 
tion, arising from amid the Atlantic Ocean, would have placed 
a great testimony in the balance ; and, that posterity which 

1806, with a revenue often thousand francs upon the great book, on the oc- 
casion of his marriage. 

On the 15th of August 1809, an endowment often thousand francs. 
On the 1st of Januaiy 1812, with a supplementary endowment of a revenue 
of four thousand francs, &c-. 



12 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c, 

will preserve the words and actions of Napoleon, that posteri- 
ty which will have nothing to settle with the historian of the 
Grand Army, might have known one day that he and his 
work, once existed. Mr. dc Scgur feared such a celebrity ; 
he shall not obtain it from our criticisms. It is to cotempo- 
raries alone that we pi*etcnd to speak. 

An officer of ordnance under the Emperor, during the cam- 
paign of 1812, the orders we have transmitted, and the dis- 
cussions at which we have assisted, have left us some grand 
recollections ; but we have been even to St. Helena itself, to 
amass historical documents. We have there lived three years, 
we have there been able to collect precious information from 
the conversations of the great man, who admitted us to his in- 
timacy. 

These considerations, hut still more, our admiration for the 
Emperor, have induced us to undertake this work. It is highly 
necessary, when a detractor counts upon the silence of the 
tomb, that one voice, at least, however feeble it may be, should 
cause the accents of truth to be heard. 

We have drawn on the recollections of our friends, and have 
been principally aided in our enterprise by a man, who, hav- 
ing been placed in the Emperor's cabinet, from the peace of 
Amiens, till the end of his reign, was constantly honoured 
with his confidence. 



Note. This criticism was written on the first edition of 
^ount de Segur's work: our subdivisions into books and 
chapters, refer to those in his book. 



CRITICAL EXAMINATION, ^c. 



BOOK 1. 



CIIArTER I. 

THE Author of the pretended history of JV'apolcon and the 
Grand Jlrmyy commences by a serioiiH error and a gratuitous 
sii]t|)o^sition. 

"By tlic peace of Tilsit, the Emperor attacked the lionour 
and interest of llussia." 

Had Count de Segur read that tr(5aty, he would have seen 
that never was a victory less abused. liMssia had b(;cn van- 
fjuished on her own territory, a part of whose inhabitants 
o])ened their arms to us. She came out of a struggle in which 
she would have sunk, greater and more ])owerful than she was 
hcfcu'e slie engaged in it: she owes to the moderation of Na- 
j)()leon the ghny of having re-created Prussia, after I'russia 
%vas no more. Jn what tlien, was the honour of Umda attack- 
ed l)y the peace of Tilsit ? 

In relation to her m/y^rcs/ she Judged correctly, that it would 
he injured by the adoption of the continental system ; but she 
was convinced also, that the continental system was the onl)' 
method of forcing England to ]»y.iVAi; and as England was in 
the interest of Russia, tlie Kti])ulatioiis at Tilsit w«^re founded 
thereupon. "lam as much the enemy of England, as you 
are," said Alexander to Napoleon, on entering the bark on 
the Niemen. This sentiment reconciled the two sovereigns, 
and peace was made. 



14 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

" France has alienated nations by her conquests, and kings 
by her revolution and new dynasty." 

Belgium, the Rhenish provinces, and Italy, partook of the 
benefits of her administration ; the people of these countries 
are still attached to as much of it as the policy of their sover- 
eigns have preserved. 

The revolution was not produced by Napoleon. He recon- 
ciled kings to its consequences; which the Republic could 
never have done. The Emperor and the new dynasty had as- 
sured them against the destruction of the monarchical system 
in Europe, proclaimed by the republic. The assertion above, 
and the following, that France could have no more friends, but 
subjects only, is intended from the beginning to establish, that 
Napoleon could fix his power upon universal monarchy alone ; a 
false imputation (we remark in passing, and once for all,) to 
which the experience of the last ten years, and time which 
wears away passions and discloses truth with his wings, have 
already in part done justice. We begin to blush at being the 
echo of foreign cabinets, who have intentionally made Europe 
ring with their clamours against the ambition of Napoleon, be- 
cause he employed all his efforts to defend and fortify France 
against them | an obligation bequeathed to him by the revolu- 
tion. The Emperor made war to force England to peace, and 
England excited the continental sovereigns against him, to 
keep up the war. Hired by her gold, these sovereigns became 
her tools. 

Should Napoleon have remained on the defensive with means 
disproportioned to the attack ? It would have been to betray 
the hopes of the nation, and compromit the deposit of glory 
and prosperity she had confided to his hands. Disposing like 
a man of genius, of the resources France offered to him, he 
triumphed over his enemies, who could not pardon him for the 
high rank on which he had placed her, but concealed their re- 
sentment under.the appearance of submission. Napoleon was 
obliged, in order to secure the nation against the future, to 
seize the profits and means of pacific exchange, at the same 
time that he lessened his enemies' power of doing injury. 

" The vast project (of an universal monarchy) Napoleon 



BOOK I. 15 

with so much difficulty concealed, that it already had begua 
to escape from him on all sides." 

The description of the immense preparations demanded by 
so great an enterprise, is traced with much emphasis j but the 
epoch of its execution is not assigned. We should be tempted 
to conclude that Russia until now, was in profound security, 
executing faithfully the conditions of the alliance, without sus- 
pecting the storm which was preparing against her ; yet, it is 
proved by th*e avowal of colonel Botourlin, in his history of the 
campaign of 1812, that it was Russia who first prepared to 
make war on us.* 

After having spoken of the necessity of an alliance with 
Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and Turkey, Mr. de Segur adds, 

* " Austria did not move ; Prussia no longer existed ; the Swedes too weak 
to be of any assistance to their allies, could scarcely sustain themselves at 
Stralsund. England placed in difficult circumstances, did not seem disposed 
to push the war with activity. These considerations engaged the Emperor 
of Russia to procure a reconciliation with the enemy. The famous interview 
which occurred on the Niemen, resulted in the treaty of peace signed at Til- 
sit." (Military Historj^ of the Campaign in Russia, in 1812, by Colonel Bo- 
tourlin, Aid-de-camp to H. M. the Emperor of Russia; Paris, 1824.) "The 
Emperor Alexander could not mistake the spirit of these dispositions ; (of 
the Tilsit treaty) but the unfortunate circumstances of Europe forced him at 
any price, to avoid war. He exerted himself especially to gain time to pre- 
pare to sustain the struggle properly, which it was welLknown would proba- 
bly be renewed." Page 24, vol. 1. 

" The sacrifices which had been torn from Austria by the treaty of Pres- 
feourg, were too great for the Cabinet of Vienna to be able to resign them 
patiently. But the disorganization of her armies, the inevitable conse- 
quences of the multiplied reverses she had experienced, prevented her hith- 
erto from devoting herself to the realization of the projects she secretly che- 
rished. The Emperor Napoleon sincerely desired to avoid a new war, which 
might make an unfortunate diversion in Spain. But all his endeavours to af- 
fect an accommodation, were considered by the Austrians as nothing but an 
avowal of his weakness. She (Russia) could not refuse to assist France, 
without openly violating the engagements contracted with her, and whose 
sanctity had not been diminished by any infraction on the part of Napoleon. 
Moreover, whenever the Cabinet at Petersburg, over-leaping moral consi- 
derations in favour of high political views, decided to sustain Austria, she was 
enabled to do it efficaciously, because of the distance of her armies, which 
were occupied with the affairs of Sweden and Turkey." Page 35, 37, vol. 1. 

" The first indications of coolness which began to arise in the relations of 
France with Russia, had not escaped the penetration of the Emperor Alex- 



16 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

" dustria precipitated herself t (into the enterprise) neverf/tttoi", 
she (lid not do it blindly." She threw herself into it with the 
Ijope of iit^ejrantlizement.f It was not after vague promises, 
but by a treaty signed March 4, 1812. Austria for a long 

andcr,* l[e felt that the alliance concluded at Tilsit, and confirmed at Er- 
furt, being' no lonijcr to the interest of Napoleon, would not long subsist. 
From that time lie employed himself covertly in the org'anization of all the 
means of defence, which tlic immense resources of his vast domains gave him, 
to maintain the struggle," &c. Page 45, vol. 1. 

" The Cabinet of Petersburg did not conceal, but that under such circum- 
stances, the Turks ought to be constrained to make peace, in oi'der without 
distraction, to be enabled to concentrate all their military strength on the 
western frontier of the empire." Page 46, vol. 1. 

"The Emperor Alexander thought it necessaiy no longer to delay his pre- 
parations for defence, and collected the greater part of his forces on the west- 
ern frontier of his empire. A division which had remained in ancient Fin- 
land since the last war vviti\ Sweden, received orders to march upon the up- 
per Duna. The army of the Danube, which, at the end of 1810, were nine 
divisions strong, now only had four divisions, the remaining' five having been 
removed to the Upper Dniester." Page 56, 57, vol. 1. 

"From the day after the signing of the treaty with Prussia, Napoleon sent 
it to Petersburg, with a proposition intended to remove the grievances of 
both parties. 

" The Emperor Alexander felt too deeply that the avowed grievances, 
bore only u|)on accessory circumstances, but the foundation of the quarrel 
which divided the two empires, was not to be removed except by appealing 
to arms," Page 71, vol, 1. 

"Tlie Emperor Alexander soon after quitted Petersburg and went to Wil- 
na, where the head-quarters of the grand army were established ; at the 
same time he sent an order to Prince Kourakin, Russian Ambassador at Paris, 
to make known to the French government, that the conservation of Prussia, 
and its independence of every political league directed against Russia, was 
so very indispensable to the interests of the Emperor Alexander, that solid 

* Tlie only indications of coolness, of which Colonel Botourlin speaks, 
consisted in a pretence that ^Yapolcon had been shocked by the difficulties luhich 
his project of marnage luith one of the Grand Duchesses had met with, at Pcters- 
burif ; and, that he ardently desired an opportunity of being revenged, by mahing 
the Jimperor Alexander feel all the weight of his enormous power. No other is 
alledged. 

f " It is we who have sought It, (the alliance of Austria with Fratice) and 
we have reUected well before concluding." (Words of M. Mctternich to M. 
Otto, contained in the despatch of that Ambassador to the Minister of Forelgni 
AHalrs, dated Vienna, Feb, I5tl), 1813.) 



BOOK J. 17 

time troubled by the enormous aggrandizement of Russia, had 
addressed representations to Petersburg, relative to the arma- 
ments prepared on her frontiers; yet Russia was decided and 
paid no attention to them. Austria in discontent, concluded a 
treaty of alliance with Napoleon, and anticipating tlie proba- 
bility of the re-establishment of Poland during the war, de- 
manded as an indemnity for Gallicia, the Illyrian provinces, 
which were granted her. 

By the same treaty, Austria engaged to furnish 30,000 men. 
If we may credit Count dc Segur, she secretly prepared for them 
prudent instructions. When such a fact is stated, some proof 
is necessary, and no other exists but his assertion. The in- 
structions of the Austrian General might have been to keep as 
near as possible to Austrian Poland. What would have be- 
come oi thcHG prudent instructions, if Napoleon, listening to a 
sentiment of distrust, which he never felt, brought into Russia 
the corps of Prince Schwartzcnburg, by leaving in Poland the 
Polish army? The only engagement made, was that the Aus- 
trian army should not be divided, and should remain under the 

and stable relations could not be established with France, unless there was 
between her and Russia, a neutral country, which should not be occupied by 
either of the two powers ; consequently, tliat the first basis of all negotiation 
must be a formal engagement for tlie entire evacuation of all the Prussian 
territories, and all the fortifications of that country, whatever might have been 
the epoch or motive of their occupation by the French or allied troops. Rus- 
sia moreover demanded the reduction of tlie garrison of Dantzic, to the foot- 
ing on which it had stood anterior to the 1st of January, 1821," Page 72, 
73, vol. 1. 

"Before his departure for Dresdcrt, Napoleon liad sent CJeneral Count de 
Narbonne, his Aid-de-camp, to Wllna, with propositions of peace. Tlie an- 
swer he brought back to Dresden was, that the Emperor of liussia referred 
him absolutely to the communications which his ambassador had made at 
Pari.s, and it was only on obtaining these prcliininary bases that he could con- 
sent to treat." Page 74, 75, vol. 1. 

" The magnificent festivals which were given on this occasion, (the pacifi- 
cation of Dresden) continued until the return of Count de Narbonne from 
Wilna. The next day, that is on the 17— 29th of May, Napoleon left Dres. 
den, and took the road to Thorn, wliere he arrivcdon the 5 — 24th of June. 
He resolved no longer to delay taking the field, for fear of Icsing in fruitles."; 
negotiations the most favourable season for military operation^."* Page 76, 77, 
vol. I. 

c 



|§ CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

command of its own generals, without ceasing on tbis account 
to be iitidcr the absolute orders of the Emperor Napoleon. If 
it were a fault to leave this corps too independent, and too near 
to their frontiers, it was the result of generosity and confi- 
dence. The same fault may be alleged in relation to Prussia; 
it resulted from the same source. 

"The success of the war did not depend on the cession of 
Gallicia, and on tlic conduct which Austrian jealousy pre- 
scribed for this possession ; from the time of his entry into 
Wilna, Napoleon, then might have openly proclaimed the li- 
berty of all I'oland, instead of deceiving her expectation, as- 
tonishing and cooling her by uncertain words." 

<^ustri.nn jealousy prescribed no management, since the treaty 
was formal, and Austria had never more completely assented. 
In case the kingdom of Toland had hecn re-established, Austria 
would have willingly ceded a great part of Gallicia to recover 
lllyria. The first of these provinces was an acquisition with 
which his conscience reproached him. lllyria on the contrary, 
was an ancient, hereditary country, which Austria had not 
lost without keen regrets; the wound was always rankling. 
Faithful to his treaties, Napoleon could not lay claim to Gal- 
licia until the kingdom of Poland should be established, in con- 
sequence of the War, that is to say, by the peace. He would 
have been untrue to his ally Austria, who was already alarm- 
ed to see an ambassador to the confederation of Poland, if at 
the commencement of the war he had verbally sanctioned the 
re-establishment of this kingdom. 

This re-establishment would have produced the insurrection 
and violent re-union of Austrian Gallicia. It was a very dif- 
ferent thing to tcnipori/c, by leaving circumstances to take 
their course, or by saying as the Poles demanded, that the, 
kingilom of Foland cuistcd; which would have been equivalent 
Hi an acknowledgment of this kingdom. But Napoleon had 
no other object than to remove every subject of uneasiness to 
his ally ; ])eace was the object of the war. It would have 
been compromiting the object, if he had made a determination 
which woujd have rendered peace impossible. A little farther on,, 
the author supplies the Emperor with words to this amount ; 



BOOK L 



19 



he had no need then to seek elsewhere for the motives of his 
opinion. 

In general, the Emperor feared nothing more than to engage 
himself for the future, hccausc no one knew hettcr than he did, 
the importance of allowing events to ripen : one of the great 
characters of his policy was to he always prepared to seize 
them, so to speak, at a bound. 

Count de Scgur reproaches Napoleon with having neglected 
to free the southern Polish provinces from the feeble armies of 
enemies who restrained their patriotism. 

Would he have wished the Emperor, having the whole of 
the Russian forces in front, to draw out his right wing into 
Podolia, where the Russians were engaged with the Turks? 
This inadvertence is too striking to require a serious exami- 
nation. 

The following sententious reflection, ** that such is the weak- 
ness of great men, that they always act in imitation of them- 
selves or of others," is not more judicious. Observation has on 
the contrary, thus far, demonstrated that what characterises 
great men, is the resources of their genius, and that inexhaus- 
tible fecundity which always presents them new means cither 
for escaping from difficulty, or for marching rapidly to suc- 
cess. 

The author adds in support of this sentence, that ** Napo- 
leon confided to the destiny of battles — that he expected every 
thing from victory ; instead of sacrificing every thing to ar- 
rive at that victory, it was by it he wished to attain all things ; 
he used it as a mean, when it should have been his end.'* 

We shall not follow Count de Segur in the developement of 
this singular idea, which lie disentangles painfully enough. 
But we shall ask him, if, when the sword was drawn at Wil- 
na, it was not to the destiny of battles he should have confided ; 
and whether there is in war, any other arbiter of destiny, ex- 
cept victory ? What ouglit he to sacrifice to win that victory ? 
To sacrifice all is a very vague idea. Does the author under- 
stand what he wished to say ? Let him explain himself. Is it 
for time to complete the insurrection of Poland, that he wishes 
sacrifices had been made ? he ought to tell ; and since he rea- 



20 



CRITICAL BXAMINATION, Lc. 



sons upon sucli j^'oat cvonta, it was an opportunity of examin- 
ing wliy Napoleon decided upon attempting to accompliHh his 
♦iX|M^di(i(»ii in a single year, instead of making two (-anipaign». 
The (jiiestion was impoitant. The author has not even per- 
ceived it. 

"The expedition woidd piohahly have succeeded, if the nn- 
tinudy decline oC his health, had left the physical force of thiis 
great man a vigour ecpnil to that p«issessed hy his intellect." 

'Vlw [ivrW'clhi'MU ol" the Kinperin- at tliis epoch, was never 
before doid>ted lor a single instant. Inih^pendently of the time 
he devoted to business, he rounil opportunities lor hunting on 
h(U'sel>ack during lour or live hours, reviewing troops, ike. 
7low are we to rinalif)' this Irick of the author, who, not daring 
to atta<-k the genius of JNaptdeon in fr<»nl, supposes a prema- 
ture decline of his health, to Justify himself for attributing 
faults to this grj'at nnui wliich he never (ronnnitted ? He ex- 
tends his hei'o on tlni bed of Procrustes, ;ind, contrary to the 
custom of histoi'ians, who love to ennoble their hcroos» Uo 
degrades bis, places him in vicious or ridiculous situations, 
and without d()ul)t to debase by exc'usinghim, linall)' says that 
he was sick. Is it also io absolve the authors of his prema- 
ture end i" JNapolron sliowed (hiring the campaign of Russia^ 
as nuicb of sup(M-i(H*ity and activity, as be displayed in the 
campaigns (»f IH13 and J KM. His constitution must have 
been extrenudy sti-ong, since, it was able for six years to re- 
siat the tortures of rrometheus. 

Few persons have capacity, courage, and time enough, to 
judge (»f things tliemselves, and accoi-ding to their eftects. It 
is found to be a much shorter way to adiiere to received opi- 
nions. Mr. de Scgur favoure<l on one side hy those natural 
dispositions which especially belong to the mobility of our cha- 
racter, and on the olher, by Ihe inlluence of a name rendered 
illusti'ious by the talents and ijigh places filled by his father, 
determined to write two volumes u]K>n the Kmperor, well per- 
suaded that the title of his woi'k alone, would cause it to be 
sought by tlie multilu«le. Those who read with rellection, 
will perceive he has taken as the basis of his system, a course 
entirely opposite that of the w riters who have openly declared 



BOOK I. 21 

thciYiHclvcH ilic cnomic's of Napolron. By tlic aid of Hoin«i ora- 
loricjil |)r(iCiiu(ioriH, which HJirvfi him jih a Hhcl(<M- from Ihc oh- 
HcrvsilioriHof all parlJcH, ho hetfiiiH Uy rHiahliHhiiif^ tiiat all llio 
faults of the Kniporor had their soiirc(5 in his hahitiial bad 
health. 



riiAPTKir II. 

Wk Hliall \)HHH rapidly over tlio commencement of tliiH very 
obscure chapter, and the nllectionH which the authoi" phicew in 
the mouth of the Kmp(;ror, tonchiup; the policy of I'ruHHia, in 
relation to the French Re|)ul)lic; hut we HJiall take up thiH 
Hcntcuice. 

** Kvery time that Napohioii tra<;«',d on hin maps thn line of 
the I'ruHHiari lVonti<'.rH, he was irritalcd to Htui th«'-ni Htill ho cx- 
tcnHive, and cried out, * Can it he that I iiave hift thiw man ho 
much t(!rri(,ory !* "* 

Wlio could have related tliiH to Mr. dc Scf^ur? Where Iirh 
lie heard it ? Tlie Quarter-maHter of the palaci^ was never hi 
the confidence of tlir, Kmprj'or, he nevi'r .set foot within hJH 
cabinet. If he had ocr;;i,HionaIly heard Napoleon speak of ,so- 
vercipjns, he would Uav<i known that he never applied to them 
Hucli inaiipropriafe exprciSHions, ;i,nd that he con hi not say 
of a crowm^d head — " that man." 'l'ru«i, it in customary in 
certain halls, to employ thiH term to «leHi}i;na(e the Krnperor 
Napolcoti. It is without d<»uht, through r-eminisrentM^ that 
the author makes ap|)li(ation of it to the kirip; of I'ruM.sia. 
'JMiis prince, conliruMl hr^'ond the KIhe, iind whose territorii'w 
border on the Miiltic, to the nu>uth of the IVienn'n, wan vulnera 
ble at all points, and one cann(»t sec what Napoleon could 
envy him. 

" 'I'his aversion to a mild and pacific prince, aHtoniHliCH — 
we must seek for the causrs." 

Jf the> king of Prussia wa;^ always diH])ONed to peace, he was 

• A» Mr.dc fi6gHt lookn alwiiys to <:i]'c,cA, i(, liiiu appeared (o liim Uiaf, tiic 
wordd ** cried out," or excluimad, liiive HoiricUting mure than llic ordiiiiuy 
iticaning- j he alwiiys prcfcro thorn to " he HuiJ." 



22 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, kc. 

ever ready to make war. Napoleon knew it ; this prince in- 
spired little confidence, but he had no aversion to him. Not- 
withstanding our author points out two causes ; one is, the re- 
fusal of Louis XVIII. to the propositions made him by the in- 
termediation of the king of Prussia. In 1803, the Prussian 
Cabinet felt that it would be advantageous to the tranquillity 
of Europe, to draw the princes of the house of Bourbon from 
the situation they wei*e in. Instructions to this effect were 
sent to M. Meyer, President of the Regency of Warsaw, a 
city where the Count de Lille then was. This prince made 
on this occasion a noble answer, which is known to all the 
world. How could Napoleon have entertained resentment 
against a proceeding which he had not provoked, to which he 
had not consented but from deference to his ally, and which 
moreover, in no way compromited his authority, since there 
was no question of his right to the throne of France ? Na- 
poleon, in fact attached little importance to this negotiation ; 
the love of the French, and the national interests appeared 
sufficient to him for the security of his power. 

As to the other cause, that of the expostulations of Prussia 
on the subject of Mr. de Rumboldt's arrest; that agent, as well 
as Messrs. Wickham, Drake, Spencer, Smith, &c. profited by 
his character of English resident to the Hanseatic cities, to 
contrive machinations against the First Consul. 

Napoleon had nobly signalized his indignation at the viola- 
tion of the right of nations, in the persons of the Irish refu- 
gees, who were given up by the Senate of Hamburg. He 
showed his respect for the same right of nations, in refusing 
to set at liberty a diplomatic agent, in whose favour the king 
of Prussia solicited. The proceeding of this monarch, which 
in no wise offended against the principles acknowledged by 
the Emperor, could not be a cause of enmity. If we did not 
know that aversion never enters for nothing into the policy of 
a man of Napoleon's disposition, we might cite two, far other- 
wise efficient causes of such a sentiment ; the projects and en- 
gagements of Prussia, anterior to the battle of Austerlitz, and 
the aggression of this power in 1806. But Mr. de Segur, who 
writes history, appears to be ignorant of all this. 



BOOK I. 23 

** Nevertheless, at the commencement of 1805, Russia, Aus- 
tria, and England, sought, still in vain, to engage Frederick 
in their third coalition against France." 

A third coalition took place. England succeeded in hring- 
Russia and Austria into it. Its avowed ohject was to drive 
the French out of Germany and Italy, to re-establish the king 
of Sardinia in Piedmont, and to deprive France of her allies. 
The means of the coalition appeared immense j five hundred 
thousand men, and considerable fleets, were to have supported 
those pretensions which the sun of Austerlitz caused to vanish 
away. 

Thus three months after its formation, the third coalition 
was dissolved, Austria was forced to sign a peace, and it was 
solely owing to the generosity of the conqueror, that the Em- 
peror Alexander owed the safety of the ruins of his army. 

Prussia, which by the treaty of Berlin, signed some months 
before the battle of Austerlitz, had taken part in the league, 
owed to the address of her minister, Haugwitz, the conclusion 
of an oflfensive and defensive treaty of alliance with France. 

** At first, the possession of Hanover tempted Frederick, but 
when it was necessary to sign, he seemed ashamed and hesi- 
tated. Napoleon could not conceive of so timid a policy. This 
prince, cried he, dares theix, neither to make peace nor war," 
&c. &c. 

Does the author, who never saw the Emperor, unless when 
he traversed the guard-room, who never heard him, except oc- 
casionally at public audiences, obtain the words he places in 
his mouth, from his own imagination, or from his recollection ? 
To have drawn them from recollection, they must have been 
said in public, and therefore his relation stands for nothing. 

" It is asserted at the same time, that perfidious or mis- 
taken men, persuaded Frederick that Napoleon was obliged to 
appear pacific, because that warrior did not wish for war ; 
they added, that he treated for peace perfidiously with England, 
at the price of the restitution of Hanover, which he wished 
to take again from Prussia." 

The following were the negotiations to which the author ap- 
pears to allude : 

The death of Pitt, had opened tlie way for Fox to the mi- 



24 CniTlCAL EXAMINATION, he, 

nistry. II. nviih llui ainhitroii ol" ilic latter to cstabliali a peace 
between (Jreat liritaiii ami Ki'aiiee, ami he made the lii'Ht 
liioveuHMitM on thin subject. In l^'ebruary, IBOG, an active cor- 
veHpondence was estahliHlicd between the two cabinets. An 
equal (lispoHilioii was Tell to open the negotiations upon ho- 
nourabU"! foundations; but they could not agree as to the mode 
of negotiatin.s^. This (lilllculty was removed. Kngland 
yielded to (he prop«>sition of Fi-ance, that they should, preli- 
niinury to every thing else, adopt this basis, that either power 
might nuMliate in all continental and maritime allairs. This 
circumstance, and the arrival of Mr. D'Ouiiril, at Paris, on 
the part of liussia, dec ided Fox to send I-«oi'd Yarmouth with 
the necessary |)o\vers to treat. This Lord had regular con- 
Terences with the French cabinet. They agreed on all j>oints ; 
Kngland retained Malta and the Cape, nnd relinquished all 
tiMi other colonics. Hui at the moment the treaties were to bo 
Higned. Fo\ Icll «hingei'ously ill. His death was I'oreseen, and 
Lord Lauderdale was despatched to Paris, to retard and break 
oirihe negoiiaticm. Scai'ce had he arrived beCore he dennvnd- 
e«l his passports, if France refuseil immediately to acknowledge 
the false and uidu^ai'd of assertion, that the uii jwssiddis was 
the basis agreed upon with Lord Yarmouth, excepting Hano- 
ver therclVom. Thus Fngland would have letained all her 
compiests, and Fraiuu>, who held nothing of Fngland but 
Hanover, would have kept nothing. 

JNotwithstanding all Lord Lauderdale's menaces, France 
refused to acknowledge this basis. At dillerent conferences 
the general principle was separated fi'om this basis, in order 
to go to (lie bollom of the cpicstion. IJut at this epoch, En- 
gland was not desirous of peace, because she had hopes of 
forming a fourth coalition. Already had she prevented Alex- 
ander IVom ratifying the treaty which his envoy, (Mr. D'Ou- 
bril.) had signetl, and gave rise to misumlerstandings between, 
the cabinets of Berlin and the Thuilleries. The envoy, Lord 
liauderdale, a violent, adroit, and unscrupulous man, had 
^)rincipally in view <o e\tt)rt from France a declaration rela- 
tive to Hanover, which should serve to excite the anger of 
Prussia. The fourth coalition was formed, and tenniuatcd the 



BOOK I. 25 

negotiations. Tlic enemies of France hoped niucli from tlie 
aiUiuice of FnisHJa, Auslria, and Enufland. Tt'hc Prussian 
troops had preserved all ilieir rejjulation^ 

At a last conference, the French jilenipotenfiarieH reasoned 
thus wiili Lord LaudenhUe : '* Sup]>ose tliat I'mssia should he 
beaten as Austria has l>eeti, a)id that the Flniperor shouUI he at 
Berlin tliree months alter o|)enin.t^ the <^ampaiu;n, as he wan at 
Vienna. Would yon not regret to havt*. allowed the hulwark 
to he destroyed which secured Ihmover) Holland, and all the 
mouths of the KIhe and theWeser, so important to your com- 
merce? Moreover, the Russians are still far distant; be- 
fore the middle of 0('t(»her, the shock hetweeu the Prussian 
army covering IJcrlin and the French troops who wish to 
I'each there, will have taken place. Jf, as is probable, the 
Prussian army should he comjuered, it will he destroyed as 
the Austrian army has been ; and the Russians can do no more 
for Prussia after hei- (h'feat, than they could do for Austria, a 
monarchy whicli had far greatei* i-csourcM's." 

Lord i^auderdah; compn^hended the justice of these ohsiirva- 
tions. He foresaw so well that the fourth coalition was dead- 
born, since it could not In'- declared until (he ariival of tho 
Russians between the Vistula and Oder, that he demanded 
** that in case Kngland made |)eace, the Kmpcror should not 
march against Prussia." I'o this an ailirniative was given. 
Hut the Hritish ministry saw nothing hut the new chances 
France was to he subject to, witliout calculating the probabili- 
ties of the issnii of the campaign: the war with Prussia en- 
sued. 

Count de Siigur reproaches Napoleon, " for not having dis- 
membered I'russia." 

So serious a c|ueHtion which M. the qnarter-maHter of the 
palace skims over thus lightly, deserves a long examination. If 
Napoleon drew back before this dismembermeFit, it was with- 
out doubt iVom far more important consideiations than tJio 
frivolous motives imputed to him by the authois such as the 
elFcct of the Fmperor Alexandei's |)reHencc, Hco. If the weak- 
ening of Prussia had produced such an exaltation in this king- 
dom, xvhat would have ensued on its total dismemberment ? 

I) 



20 OUnU^Al, I LAMINATION, &c, 

'' Tliisi v:is<: coiispii^Ky, wiis lliat of tli<^ friinids of virtue. Its* 
(iiirf — Mils Stein. IVrliaps Napoleon might have gaiiRHlhim; 
ho choso to punish him." 

"^^I'he Miiron de SicMii was an enemy ; NapoUv)n knew it. But 
he also Ivnew that a man of this cliaracter was ahovc corrup 
tion. Ho had no dioico ; ho demanded tliat an enemy should 
he rem«)ved fi'om the coiiit of a friendly ])rinre. 

" In 1S()9 — it was the Prussians who first dared to raise the 
standard of independence agjfinst Napoleon. He threw them 
into clinins destined foi* ii;-alh\v slaves.'* 

Major Sciiill had viohded the law of nations. In the eyes 
of civilians and men of honour of all countries, Schill and his 
companions, traversiniu; a part of Germany, pillaginp; and kill- 
ing; Frenchmen, while Trussia was at peace with France, ren- 
dered themselves culpahle as rohhers and assassins. Their 
crimo was tho same as that of pirates, who without letters of 
marque, or dui-ini;- entire iieace, attack the vessels of a friendly 
power, '.riie l^lmjK'ror did not " send ilicm to the gallciis;^' 
tlioy wore tried and condemned hy leg'ally constituted trihu- 
nals. 'I'his satisfaction was duo from Prussia : it was Prussia 
who gave it. 

** At the approach of 1812 — Frederick, unquiet and fatigued 
by his suhjectitni, wished to escape from it hy alliance or hy 
war. It was in March, 1811, that he ollered himself as the 
auxiliary of Napoleon in tho expedition ho was preparing." 

lie was not then pre])aiing the expedition ; Russia was arm- 
ing, and had concentrated lonsiderable forces upon the Dneis- 
ter; and Prussia who foresaw the storm approaching, sought 
a ])owerful ally to shield her IVom danger. But France w^as 
still unarmed : explanations had been demanded relative to 
these armaments ; negotiations were pending. To have ac- 
cepted the alliance of Prussia, would have been to exhibit hos- 
tile intentions, would have been to conunit a political error. 
Napoleon then, did not actept it; but he did not refuse it, re- 
serving the dispositions of Prussia ibr an opportune moment. 

That Prussia in her disquiet should have secretly treated 
with Alexantler, as the author subsequently says, proves no- 



nooK I, 27 

ihinj^, except that the king ol' Prussia did not understand all 
that j)rudence had rendered necessary to Napoleon. 

The author reveals a curious anecdote; it is, that in 1810, 
Alexander was ahoutto fall unexpectedly upon Napoleon, and 
on this suhject Mr. De Segur lias hirnscH'sai*! a thing suflicient- 
ly piquant. If Alexander changed his resolution, it was &t'- 
cause he wished to have the justick ok iibavkn and human 
opinion on his side, hij not appearing to he the ai^gressor. Mr. 
De Segur might well sujjpose tliat the promoter of the Holy 
Alliance wished to deceive men ; hut to suppose that ho wislied 
to deceive the Almighty, is rather too had ! ! 

If the King of Prussia, wlien he proposed his alliance and 
fortresses to the Em])eror Alexander, had heen refused hy this 
sovereign, as the author still says, what should have resulted ? 
That he would have insisted on his alliance, with France;, which 
never happened. Whence we may conclude, that the suhaUern 
witness, who quotes the answer of Alexander to Frederick, 
has not told the ti'utli. For, we repeat it, if Russia had re- 
fused the alliance of Prussia, Prussia would have persisted in 
going to France. However, when the moment arrived in 
which Napoleon perceived that in s}>ite of all his cfTorts for 
peace, the prohahilities were all in favour of war, he had to 
choose between the alliance or destruction of Prussia. He 
chose the alliance more easily than Frederick himself had de- 
termined on it. The author agrees that this prince hesitated; 
and he connects witl^^this circumstance, the occupation of Po- 
merania, and the order given to the Prince of Echmiilh to 
hold himself ready to seize suddenly upon the whole kin(;dom and 
the King oJ'JYus.sia. The occupation of l*omerania was an im- 
politic action, which resulted from no combination, but solely 
from the character of the general who undertook it, and from 
an exaggerated zeal for the execution of the continental sysr 
tem. He believed, upon false reports, that vessels loaded with 
colonial produce had entered the ports of the isle of Rugen and 
at Stralsund. He saw an opportunity of finding the Swedish 
government in fault, and making a sensible blow upon the in- 
terests of England. Marshal Davoust invaded the Swedish 
provinces without other order than l)is instructions against 



28 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, kc. 

British commerce. It was not disavowed because the evil was 
done, and a disavowal would have done no good j it was ex- 
cused as an excess of zeal. 

This operation had nothing in common with the measures 
taken to decide the court of Berlin. One cannot tell from what 
motives Mr. De Segur imagines the order for the seizure of 
the person of the King of Prussia. It should be recollected, 
that after the defection of the corps of York, that Napoleon 
had 20,000 men at Potsdam, and as many at Berlin ; that policy 
and the agitation of the public mind in Prussia, would have 
given him at that period just motives for taking the king as a 
hostage ; who, nevertheless, had not done it, and had ordered 
Augereau, who commanded at Berlin, to pay the greatest re- 
spect to that monarch. 

The Prince of Eckmiilh was ordered to be ready to enter 
Prussia if the treaty were not signed. In fact, under such 
pressing circumstances, it was necessary that Prussia should 
be either friend or enemy, and the refusal to ally herself with 
France, could have left no doubt of her connexion with Russia, 
which the most ordinary prudence would have ordered the 
prevention of, since the war was so imminent. 

** This submission did not altogether satisfy Napoleon ; to 
his strength he added artifice ; his suspicions still led him to 
covet the occupation of the fortresses, which he was ashamed 
not to leave in Frederick's hands — he commanded every degree 
of respect to be shown both to the king and his subjects ; but at 
the same time that every sort of arms should be taken from the 
people which might be of use to them in an insurrection, and 
he pointed out every thing of the kind, even to the smallest 
weapon." 

We only cite this passage to show the spirit in which Count 
De Segur has composed his work. We will take no notice 
of the words stratagem and shame employed in relation to so 
powerful a man as Napoleon, whose character was always su- 
perior to such littleness. Were the assertions advanced cor- 
rect, precautions against a power wliose friendship could not 
be counted on, would be justified by prudence. The event 
shows that Napoleon was too confident in Prussia, leaving hey 



BOOK I. 29 

a numerous army in Silesia ; and what proves that he had not 
deprived her of every thing, down to the least iceapoUf is the 
rapidity with which, after the treason of York, she armed a 
hundred thousand militia with reserved fusils, and furnish- 
ed them with the necessary artillery. 

It is beyond doubt that the Emperor Napoleon refused the 
twenty-five millions which Prussia demanded at this period by 
Mr. Hatzfield, since this power still owed nearly four millions, 
and besides she had not inspired confidence. In regard to her 
numerous magazines placed at the disposal of Napoleon by the 
treaty of the 24 th February, it was only done because of the 
im|)ossibility of delivering them to the Russians, to whom they 
were originally destined. 

Such are the facts. From want of acquaintance with them, 
the author wanders amid conjectures ; it is the condition of 
every writer who speaks of what he is ignorant, and it is that 
of Mr. De Segur, who treats of diplomacy without any know- 
ledge of negotiations, and who talks through all the rest of his 
hook about strategy without any knowledge of war. 



CHAPTER III. 

« Russia is mistress of the heights of Europe — her govern- 
ment can only with great difficulty be driven into a strait and 
forced to submit, in a space almost beyond the imagination to 
conceive — without the concurrence of Turkey and Sweden, 
Russia is less vulnerable." 

If by these singular expressions the author wishes to say, 
that Russia could only be attacked by a power allied to Swe- 
den and Turkey, we reply : 

The alliance of Sweden, without doubt, would have been 
very advantageous, since she menaced Russia with a very 
dangerous diversion in the north. By an alliance with Turkey 
one important end would have been attained, that of keeping 



30 cniTlCAL EXAMtNATION, 8tc. 

her at war with Russia, because this war would have made a 
powerful diversion in the south j such are the real aids it would 
have been useful to obtain. Nothing was neglected, whatever 
this author may say, led by the false rumours which he has 
taken as guides. 

When Mr. De Segur says, farther on, that the meanest sol- 
diers in the ranks expected to hear of the Grand Vi'zier^s march 
towards MoWf he shows us that lie was one of the number. 
The Grand Vizier being in front of a Russian army, he must 
have been beaten more than once before marching uponKiow. 
Independent of the alliances which had been concluded with 
Austria and Prussia, (which were the most important,) and 
with the princes of the Rhenish Confederation, negotiations 
were at the same time going on with Denmark and Sweden. 
That with Denmark succeeded, it was otherwise with Sweden. 
The negotiation with the last named power failed, because 
she made one condition which could not be honourably agreed 
to. Political success then, was obtained wherever it was pos- 
sible. The alliance subsisted at Constantinople j it was only 
necessary to maintain it, and it was maintained. It was not 
offensive against Russia, because England, by a lucky fraud, 
hurried it to the camp of the Grand Vizier at the moment when 
success seemed certain to the Divan. The sultan Mahmoud 
was in the French interests ; he still supported them until he 
learned that peace was concluded by the Grand Vizier. He 
hesitated long before he ratified it. The Grand Vizier had 
been deceived by the English, who persuaded him that the 
Count de Narbonne sent to the Emperor Alexander at Wilna, 
was an ambassador ready to sign a treaty which would place 
the Porte at the mercy of Russia. British cunning gave the 
assurances, and even furnished the proofs j the deceived Vizier 
deceived the Sultan. 

"The Turkish ambassador was treated with the greatest 
distinction in the French camp ; he accompanied Napoleon in 
all his reviews ; the most flattering attentions were paid to 
him, and the grand equerry (Caulaincourt) was already treat- 
ing with him for an alliance offensive and defensive, when a 



BOOK 1. 3£ 

sudden attack by the Russians interrupted the negotiations. 
The ambassador returned to Warsaw." 

Mr. De Segur who is only partially acquainted with things, 
who is guided by incomplete notions, and frequently by ill- 
digested recollections, rarely his own, and who moreover was 
prisoner of war at this period in Russia,* had heard tell of an 
oriental ambassador arrived at head quarters. He only makes 
mention of a Turkish ambassador, and he attributes to him a 
reception which was obtained and merited by another. Had 
he taken the pains to ascertain the fact, he would have learned 
the following circumstances. 

On the 25th of April, Mirza Rizza, a man of eminent merit, 
and one of the most illustrious personages of the court of Tehe- 
ran, arrived at Finkenstein, in quality of ambassador to the 
Emperor Napoleon. The Duke of Bassano was charged to nego- 
tiate with him the conditions of an alliance offensive and de- 
fensive, between France and Persia ; and at the end of a few 
days the negotiation was brought to a happy result. It was 
this ambassador who accompanied JSfapoleon at his reviews ; it 
was to him the most caressing attentions were paid. On the 
7th of May he took leave to return to Persia. The circum- 
stance of a Persian embassy was sufficiently novel, and an 
alliance between France and Persia sufficiently important to 
be mentioned. All Europe was occupied with this event, ex- 
cept Mr. de Segur, who has found no trace of it in his pro- 
found historical knowledge, nor sought any indications of it in 
cotemporary documents. If he had only read the bulletins, 
which an author writing on war ought at least to consult, he 
would have avoided this omission.f This fact shows with 
what slightness Mr. de Segur writes history. Some persons 

* He was taken prisoner in December, 1816, while preparing the Empe- 
ror's quarters in the village of Nasielk. 

f Sixty-third Bulletin ; Elbing, 8th May, 1807. The Persian ambassado 
has had his audience of leave; he brought very fine presents to the Empe- 
ror from his master, and received in return the portrait of the Emperor, en- 
riched with beautiful jewels. He returns directly to Persia. He is a con- 
siderable personage in his own country, and a man of talent and sagacity. 
yis return home was rendered necessary," &c. Sec. 



32 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, 8tc. 

wlio have remarked the odium which the author in the course 
of his book throws on the minister who was then charged to 
negotiate with Mirza Rizza, have thought that he omitted to 
speak of the Persian ambassador, in order that he might avoid 
naming the French negotiator under circumstances where 
nothing disadvantageous could be said of him. If the- grand 
equerry, who for a long time protected the quarter- master of 
the palace, who protected him in liis turn, had been charged 
with this mission, Mirza Rizza might have obtained some 
mention. 

The Persian ambassador had left head-quarters three weeks 
before the arrival of the Turkish envoy, on the 27tli May. 

In the beginning of 1807, the Porte sent Emin Wahib Effen- 
di to conclude a treaty of alliance with France. This envoy 
fruitlessly negotiated a long time at Warsaw with Talleyrand. 
Tlic Emperor impatient to terminate the nogotiation, caused 
the ambassador to come to Finkcnstein, where he arrived eight 
days before the Emperor at head-quarters. The Duke of Vi- 
ccnza was charged to confer with him, but the negotiation ad- 
vanced no better. The Emperor wished to speak with him 
himself; but fatigued with his want of capacity, he sent him 
to Caulaincourt, not wishing to lose his time in useless con- 
ferences. The Emperor quitted Finkenstein, and the Ambas- 
sador followed the Duke of Viccnza and Minister of Foreign 
Aifairs to Dantzic. There, after three days of conference, as 
fruitless as the preceding, the Duke of Vicenza departed from 
Dantzic to go to head-quarters, and Emir Wahib was sent to 
Paris. 

The mission of this Turk, who was found to be a stupid 
man, and the choice of whom is thought to have been influenc- 
ed by the Russians, was intended to obtain an engagement 
that France should make ho treaty with Russia, without the 
concurrence of Turkey. In vain was it represented to him 
tliat France could not thus tie her hands ; that this complica- 
tion would produce nothing but diflicultics and obstacles ; and 
that according to the relations subsisting between the two em- 
pires, Turkey ought to repose on France the care of her in- 
terests. Wahib Effendi remained immoveable. Napoleon 



BOOK I. 



33 



tjntlcd by saying to him, " you are wrong j the Emperor 
Alexander has already made propositions for peace. If you 
will not come to a conclusion with me, I will make peace with 
him, and without you." This was the only thing which the 
Ottoman envoy appeared to comprehend. He proposed to send 
a courier to Constantinople, to demand instructions, hut events 
pressed on each other, and the peace of Tilsit soon followed 
the victories of Heilscberg and Friedland. The Emperor 
wished heartily to conclude an alliance with the Porte, as an 
ambassador had been sent to him, and he di-d all in his power 
to conclude the negotiations. If his efforts were unavailing, 
the cause is altogether in the choice of tlie envoy. 

For the rest, the alliance with Russia and the deposition of 
Selim, which happened at the same time, gave another direc- 
tion to the policy of Napoleon, and was a sufficient reason for 
his coolness relative to Turkey. 

"But, a deputation came from Wilna, soliciting the resto- 
ration of their independence, and professing the same devo- 
tion to his cause which was shown at Warsaw,*' &c. 

Tiie Prince of Eckmiilh received these deputies, and the 
Duke of Bassano, to whom they were referred by the Empe- 
ror, fulfilled in relation to tJicm,the duty of an honest man, by 
withdrawing them from the observation of the Russians, by 
disabusing their hopes, and deciding them to return in haste 
to their fiiends, whom a fruitless effort would have exposed 
to the animadversion of their sovereign. In 1812, they 
strongly manifested their gratitude towards that minister. 

"The Emperor of France continued thercibre to negotiate 
with Russia; and the Turkish ambassador, neglected and for- 
gotten, wandered about our camp, w ithout being summoned to 
take any part in the negotiations, which terminated the war j 
he returned to Constantinople soon after in great displeasure." 

The Turkish ambassador, did not remain in our camp. Hav- 
ing gone to Paris, he soon learned the deposition of the Sultan 
Selim, and departed for Constantinople. The death of a prince 
destroys the powers of an ambassador. He could not have 
been disple>ased with the French government, since the cause 
which had deprived him of his power, was entirely independent 



34 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

of France. All the world knows that these things occurred 
in this manner. Selim was deposed on the 29th of May ; 
there could not have been on the 7th of July, a plenipotentiary 
to assist at the peace of Tilsit. 

*» If we must even tell the whole truth, it is asserted that 
at the interview of Tilsit, and subsequently, a treaty for the 
partition of Turkey was under discussion." 

A historian, without doubt, should tell the whole truth, hut 
he should not repeat unfounded assertions ; as it is untrue that 
any treaty for the partition of Turkey was discussed. 

•* What is certain is, that shortly after the interview at Til- 
sit, Alexander's ambition was very sensibly moderated." 

What is certain is, that the ideas of dividing the Ottoman 
empire, were brought forward long after the interview «f 
Tilsit, and were discussed between France and Russia. France 
renounced it completely, from the first moment that a misun- 
derstanding began between tlie two countries. The words Mr. 
de Segur attributes to the Emperor, are of his own invention, 
or of the persons he has consulted. 

It is the same with the conversations related in his subse- 
quent pages. General Sebastiani and Napoleon, whom he 
brings on the scene, knew the geography of Europe too well, 
to make such a partition as Mr. de Segur has done, and to say 
that the Emperor Mexander should be allowed to take Turkey to 
the Danube^ as if Wallachia and Moldavia were in Turkey, 
and as if Turkey were not on the other side of the Danube. 

Mr. de Segiir has the laudable ambition of imitating the 
great historians of antiquity, who place in the mouths of their 
heroes, beautiful, noble, and justly admired discourses ; this 
has procured him from some complaisant friends, the title of 
the modern Thucidydes and Tacitus. Certainly this is a grand 
culogium ; but in our opinion, very little merited. Indepen- 
dent of the eloquence and elevation which characterise their 
harangues, these historians aim at introducing true, just and 
reasonable things, corresponding to the rank and charac- 
ter of the speakers. Mr. de Segur does not seem to have 
profiteu by the study of his models. 

In one of the particular conversations which the author has 



BOOK I. 35 

attributed to Napoleon, after having supposed the idea of his 
uniting Spain to France^ he malces him say, as toJosephf I will 
make him amends. Does the Quarter-master of the palace 
seek by this insinuation, to make it believed that Napoleon 
wished to take possession of Austria to give it to his brother ? 

**The Congress at Erfurt took place just after this. Na- 
poleon was therefore anxious to make sure of the dispositions 
of Alexander to conclude an alliance, offensive and defensive.'* 

Such were, according to our author, the motives of the in- 
terview at Erfurt, which he calls a congress. It had been 
positively agreed between the two sovereigns at Tilsit, that 
they should again meet within a year. The bombardment of 
Copenhagen by the English, the events in Spain, and the new 
attacks made against the independence of neutral flags by the 
British Orders in Council, (of the 11th November, 1807) ren- 
dered this interview more necessary. It had no other ob- 
ject than to agree upon the me?ins of obliging England to make 
peace, the constant aim of Napoleon's efforts. 

** Napoleon had then to keep upon terms with Alexander, 
and felt too much regret at the death of Selim, detestation of 
the barbarities of the Musselmans, and contempt for their un- 
stable government, to allow him to notice the communication. 
For three years he had returned no reply to the Sultan, and 
his silence might be interpreted into a refusal to acknowledge 
him. He was in this ambiguous position, when, all of a sud- 
den, on the 21st of March, 1812 — " 

It seems that the Sultan Mahmoud had not been recogniz- 
ed by Napoleon, and that he had not replied to him for three 
If^ars previous to March 1812. There was, however, a French 
embassy at Constantinople, and an Ottoman embassy at Paris. 
How will Mr. de Segur explain such relations between sove- 
reigns who did not recognize eacli other ? Will he inform us 
how it happens, that an answer was not given for three years, 
to a government with which we treated by ambassadors ? 

Mr. de Segur was not with the army in 1807, when the 
Persian ambassador was seen by all the world at Finkenstein. 
In Paris, his functions as Quarter-master, did not require of 
him any service at the palace. A stranger to all that passed, 



36 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

whether in the circles of the Thuilleries, or in the Cabinet, he 
is very cxciisiible for not knowing the simplest things. But he 
is not so for having neglected to seek for information, since 
he has assumed the office of historian. If he had even taken 
the jiains to open the almanac, he would have seen that we had 
at Constantinople in IROR, and 1809, General Sebastiani, and 
in 1810, 1811, and 1812, Mr. de Latour-Maubourg ; and that 
during all this time, Mouhib Eftendi was an Ambassador at 
Paris. The latter did not obtain his recall, which he had re- 
quested, until in the beginning of 1812. Having been treated 
with great distinction during Ins sojourn in France, his dis- 
position, which was hy no uieaus favourable at first, was so 
much changed previous to his departure, that on his arrival at 
Constantinople, he was, in the divan, the zealous promoter of 
the most intimate union between the two nations. His politi- 
cal views were so well known, tliat the Sultan Mahmoud, 
who participated in them, gave him admission to the council 
which discussed the ratification of the peace of Bucharest, and 
where, in spite of his assistance, the influence of the Mufti and 
Janissaries prevailed. 

** It can hardly he supposed that he was ignorant of the in- 
variable customs of the Musselmans, which prevented the 
Grand Seignior frotin ever appearing in person at the head of 
his army." 

What one could hardly have supposed, is the ignorance 
which tiie author sliows on a historical point, which it would 
have been so easy to elucidate. Had he taken the trouble to 
open the histoi'y of the Ottoman Empire, he Avould have seen 
that from the time of Othman I., Emperor of the Turks, down 
to Mahmoud the present occupant of the throne, that four- 
teen Sultans liave commanded their armies in person,* and 

• othman I. in 1299. Selim I. in 1512. 

Oi'chnn II. in 1325. Soliman 1. in 1520, 

Amurat I. in 1359. Mahomet III. in 1595, 

Bajazct I. in 1389. Osman I. in 1617- 

Maliomet I. in 1413, Amurat IV, in 1622, 

Annirat II, in 1421. Solimun II. in 1687. 
Mahomet II. in 1451. until Sophie in Bulffaria. 

Bajazet II, in 1481. Mustapha II. in 1695, 



BOOK I. 37 

that the Sultan does a meritorious act, according to his creed, 
and one which recommends him in the eyes of his people, 
when he throws off the luxuries of the Seraglio, to march at 
the head of his troops against the infidels. 

All that Mr. de Segur has said relative to Turkey, is as 
exact as could he expected from a historian, ignorant even of 
facts to be found in the almanacs. 



CHAPTER IV. 

This chapter, which treats of our relations with Sweden 
and with Bernadotte, contains some truths. But, as the au- 
thor has no positive data for any thing, and writes only from 
hearsay, without giving himself the trouble to verify them, 
he frequently blunders. Yet, when an author retraces cotem- 
porary occurrences, it is not asking too much, that he should 
know at least, nearly, what has happened. 

** In the course of the same night, a conventicle, consisting 
of ten deputies of the. council of Five Hundred, met at the 

house of S . Thither Bernadotte repaired. They settled 

that at nine o'clock the next morning, the Council should hold 
a sitting, to which those only should be invited, who were of 
the same way of thinking ; that there a decree should be pass- 
ed, that in imitation of the Council of Ancients, which had 
prudently named Bonaparte General of its guard, the Coun- 
cil of Five Hundred should appoint Bernadotte to command 
theirs ; and that the latter properly armed, should be in readi- 
ness to be summoned to it. It was at S 's house that this 

plan was formed ; S. himself, immediately afterwards, ran to 
Napoleon, and disclosed the whole to him. A threat from 
the latter was quite sufficient to keep the conspirators in order; 
not one of them dared to show his face at the Council, and 
the next day the Revolution of the 18th Brumaire was com- 
pleted." 

It was on the 18th and not the 17th, that the Council of 



;^8 CRITICAL F.XAMINATION, 8ic. 

Ancients gave General iJonupiirto the command of the troops 
of the iirsl; military (iivision, which coniprised the guard of the 
h\e;iHhi(ive hody. 'V\w C'ouncil of Five Hundred had no guard 
in paiticuhir, inoi-e than the ('ouncil of Ancient^. There was, 
therefore, no command to give to Bernadotte. Mr. de Segur 
does not even know the date of the event, which founded the 
power of Itonaparte, whose historian lie has made himself. 

After having H|)(dven of the coiiHpiracy of Bernadotte in the 
west, he athls, ** on that occasion Bernadotte's ruin was scal- 
ed, if NapohM)n had l>een ahh^ to convict him of it.'* 

The First Ct)nsnl liad more than sullicient proofs to condemn 
Bernaihdte. He had the goothiess to yield to the intercession 
of Joseph and of his wife: he forgot all. As for Bernadotte, 
he never fin-gave Napoleon for this mercy. IMiere are some 
houIh in which henelits produce notliing hut hatred and a de- 
aii-c to do injury. 

»» But fortune favoured Bei'nadotte, who was already at 
Bochefort, by delaying his (unharkation, until the war with 
England was renewed, lie then refused to go, and Napoleon 
Ctnihl no hmger compel him.*' 

Fortune, which aids hy delaying an embarkation — what a 
style ! it is douhtless by a rhetorical figure, that the author 
takes an embarkaliou for an tmharknifnt. It is taking the cause 
for an ellect. It is eipially certain that it is by a figure of rhe- 
toric that he pretends an Fnglish declaration of war, render- 
ed it impossible f<u' Napoleon to make a general obey. The fact 
is, tliat Napoleon, seeing war breaking out, felt the necessity 
of keeping Oeneral Bernadotte in France, and did not wish, 
by sending him to America, to expose him to be captured by 
enemies who already covered the seas. 

»' Soon after, Nap()leon was heard reproaching Bernadotte 
wilh his envious and treacherous iiniction, during the battle of 
Auersladt, and his order of the day at Wagram, in which ho 
had assumed ihv honour of that victory. Bernadotte on his 
side — demandoil wh)' tlie Emjieror had placetl him in such a 
dangerous and false position, atNVagram? AVIiy the report 
of that victory had been so disadvantageous to him ?" kc. 

At the battle of Auerstadt, Bernadotte, placed by tlie Empe- 



BOOK 1. 39 

t"or (it Dornbourg, througlijcalriusy against Marshal Davoust, 
and witliiiii/; any motive wlii«;li nlal*-,*! io Nupolo.on, wouhl not 
aid )(i,s collcai^uc to gain tlir, victory, and thus in .some tU'greo 
compromitcd the fate of tlie battle. At Wagiani, by an or- 
der of the day, in contradiction io tlie ti-iith, of whi(;h the wliole 
army was witness, he gave th(; most extravagant praises to 
the Saxon corps which he commanded, and which had behaved 
cowardly. Napoleon contented himself with establishing tlieso 
facts ; it was liis duty ; he ought even to have ])unished such 
inHolcnco. He had not placed Bernadotte in a situation more 
false than \vas that of Massena. Iloth found t[ie,mselv«;s upon 
the left, when by the fault of tlie Saxons, an unex|)e(;ted move- 
ment of the enemy had nearly succeeded. Mapoleon by chang- 
ing the front of the whole line, came to the succour of Massena 
and llcrnadotte, and re-establislied affairs. 

** Bernadotte also felt that he owed his crown to the chance 
which had n^ade him be born and educated in a religion similar 
to that of the Swedes.'* 

Who can be ignorant that Bernadotte publicly professed the 
Catliolic religion in Franco, and that he was obliged on his ar- 
rival at (lottenburg, to abjure it, and embrace Lutheranism, 
by a solemn ceremony. The folhjwing saying is related of 
him : ** Henry the IVth consented to go to mass to recover a 
kingdom; 1 may well for the sake of gaining one, do without 
the mass." ' 

The details given by Mr. de Segur, relative to the elevation 
of Bernadotte, are inexact; this is the truth. In 1 H()7, after 
the evacuation of I'omerania by the Swedes, two brotlusrs, ta- 
ken prisoners, named Morner, olUccrs in the regiment of this 
name, were ])rcsented to Bernadotte, who made his house their 
prison, and about a month alterwards sent them to Sweden. 
In June, 1810, one of these oHicers, then a Colonel, announced 
himself at Bernadotte's house. Rue d'Anjou, in l*aris, request- 
ed to speak particularly with him, and made known the 
Tiews which some Swedes had in relation to him, to supply the 
place of the Prince Royal, who was dying from an apf)plectic 
stroke. Bernadotte r<;ceived this overture jocularly, and with- 
out attaching any importance to il, resolved to nrake no ar- 



40 CRITICAL EXAMINATION. &c. 

rangements with the French government until he should be 
more seriously addressed on the subject. Four or five 
days after, the Swedish minister at Paris, (Baron de Lager- 
bielke) came to see him, confirmed what Colonel Morner had 
stated, and demanded an answer. This was on Saturday : 
the next day Bernadotte went to St. Cloud before the levee, 
and gave an account of what had passed, to the Emperor, who 
replied, " I know the whole ; you have liberty to accept or re- 
fuse ; I will do on that score, whatever you wish. I have, 
however, other views ; I have charged Alquier to propose a 
regency, and to wait the events. The son of the late king 
may be hereafter recalled ; but they wish no more of that fa- 
mily in Sweden. — Thus, accept j I would rather see you there 
than any other ; I will support you with all my heart. Make 
your arrangements." Bernadotte sent a young man to Stock- 
holm, a cousin of Signeul, the Swedish Consul, to advise with 
his partisans, and authorised him to propose all the money 
necessary. But nothing was given. The five hundred thou- 
sand francs advanced by the Emperor, and about a million 
lent by General Gerard, were the only sums which Bernadotte 
placed in the Bank of Sweden, instead of fourteen millions. 

Definitively, the choice of the Swedes was provoked by no 
intrigue ; they only thought of Bernadotte, because he was al- 
lied to the Emperor, because they were ignorant of the secret 
misunderstanding, which the envious character of this general 
had caused, between Napoleon and himself; and because they 
hoped to gain by it, the good graces and protection of the so- 
vereign of France. 

*^ At the reading of a letter, conceived in this new and un- 
expected style. Napoleon was seized with rage and astonish- 
ment. He exclaimed, striking violently on the letter and on 
tlie table on which it lay open — " he ! the rascal ! he presume 
to give me advice, to give the law to me, to propose such an 
infamous act to me !" &c. From that moment his instructions 
to his ministers, bore the impress of that disposition ; the lat- 
ter it is true, lessened the bitterness of them, but a rupture 
became inevitable." 



BOOK I. 41 

i< Whenever Mr. de Segur speaks of negotiations, he confounds 
every thing. The language he attributes to the Emperor, 
is absurd. The arrangements he imputes to his Cabinet, are 
not those which were made. He places the proposition for the 
©ession of Norway, at the heginning of the negotiations | 
while it was the very last act. It appears that it was at Paris 
it reached the Emperor ; it could not have arrived until after 
he had left Dresden for the expedition to Russia. Every one 
knows, that to the diplomatic, the minister of foreign relations, 
had joined confidential communications, of which the princess 
royal became the intermediary, with a feeling entirely French. 
She wrote under the dictation of the minister, and the officers 
attached to her person were her couriers. A last letter 
■which announced, after new exhortations, the desired conces- 
sions, was sent to Stockholm, and carried by Mr. de Signeul, 
Consul General of Sweden, to Paris, chosen and sent for that 
purpose. This agent returned from his mission, and rendered 
account of it to the minister at Dresden on the 29th of May. 
He brought a note dictated by the Prince Royal, which made 
the alliance of Sweden exclusively dependent on the guaran- 
tee of Norway. Bernadotte thus deceived Alexander, with 
whom he had treated two months before. Napoleon was in 
his cabinet when he received the letter from his minister ; he 
was not violent, and all he said was confined to this answer. 
'* I will not buy a doubtful ally, at the expense of a faithful 
friend." This simple recital is, perhaps, more interesting, is 
above all, truer, and more probable, than the grand storm, for 
which Mr. de Segur has invented the thunder. 

We cannot insist too much upon the ignorance the author 
has shown of the Emperor's character, and unceasingly pre- 
sents him to us, as venting a blind rage, in misplaced aud im- 
prudent expressions. It is disagreeable to us to suspect the 
good faith of Mr. de Segur ; we are inclined to believe, that 
if he had approached this prince, if he had heard him con- 
verse with his ministers, he would not have transformed into 
an insehsate lunatic, the man who was most entirely master 
of himself in serious affairs, and whose deep penetration 

F 



43 nnnicAi- examimahon. ^. 

throw a hikUIci) illuiiiiitatioii on thv, jiiHlicit and flinCHH of n 
(|uesfioii. 



I5()0K ll.-CII AI'TFJi L 

" NAror.woN, incaiiwhilo, wu{< hUII at PariH, in i\w mirlHt oF 
h'lN f^irai o(ll( rrs, who were alarnuMl l»v llic (orrible oncoiiiitor 
\vlii( h was pn^pariug." 

Wo Hhall Hoo the ^roat olliccrs who woi'O silent, ami iiiiiar 
diaUiIy al'liTwanls, IImi t;i'»^Hl uniciTH who s|(o1;(\ or whom Mr. 
dti Hegui' has laa(h^ spinik. How coiihl lir have liraril thoiii t' 
Ho fieither onterod into tho cabinet nor flie counciln^i and liad 
no \Aiiri' ti\("»'p( iu the hall orH(n'vico. 

Tiic iirst who afipeai's npon thr Hcono is Cambaceres, who, 
jlrst of all, wished that IS ap«)loon would d'tvitlt'. amlpurlUmt 
iirhnt vuiH nnint'tUnlflij iiniiniil him; that is, very prolnihl^'. 
the (Hinrcderatinii of the Itliine. and a [lart of I'russia, with 
Avhonii an alliance existed. 'To have addi-essed Huth discourse 
to tiie Kuiperor, Cantbact^u^s nuist have been a tool, and sup 
posed that the Kni|>ei'or was not lunth wisei*; but this nowise 
endniriasses Mr. de St^iir- Me niaki^s Najiohtni answer, and 
sa)' what ho nover could have sai<l or thon,^'ht : — '* that such 
luid been his project in I HOI), but the inist'ortuno of Ksslin^ 
had derauj;c«l his [)lan." It is certain, that after the niisfor 
tuno ot Hsd'mgt tho Kniporor could «n»ly employ himself in 
ropairini;' his losses, and beatiuti; the enemy. Hut the <lay al- 
ter the battli- of M aj;rani, the exectilion of the plan was stiU 
oaslor than the eveninji; boforo that of Kssling. Tho victory 
Avas ct>ni[dett> ; tlu> Austrian sirmy was nuthint^ but a ruin ' 
their dispersed militia refusetl to resume their anus ; the Arch 
duko Charlos was turned back upon llohomia, and tho AixU 
duke Jolin upon Moravia ; they wtM-e lu^ar losiuf, all cominu 
nication with Hungary, and a battle mi};;ht have thrown them 
(m tho conilnew of thoir western frontiers ; disafftTtion had 



«ooK u. 48 

made a rapid jn-of^rrwH, and I,lu5 huI»J(m;(n oI" Adsti ia, raliKiud by 
«o hmuy tiuuovx'tMivy and inji^ltuioiiH wars, liad arrived al. the 
noiiil, ol Iddkiiij:^ upon llic^ disMoliil,i<ni <d Ui«, nuniiiri li)' v\ illiollt 
diwinay, by tlio Hiiparalioii of the provinucH of which it w/m 
I oinpoNod. Such was ih<) inli rnal Hiiiiatioii of AuHlria ; cxtci*- 
nully Hhc I'onnd hcirHtdl' wilhoni, roniincniiil allicH. NolwiUi- 
standinf^, the mnrning al'tcr tho batth', ol" Wafi;rani, the- Kuipc- 
ror(-onH«'nti',d tn an iirmisticc, htraiiHr, <-n<>ii,(:;h of Idood liad 
been Hpilt, and b< rsiuHr hii winhctl for pran^* ll«', did not 
then wiHh to divide and partition wliat wa» around him; he 
rouhl not then have said in iHl<% that tituch had been luH pro- 
ject in IMO!). 

** Alter tJjo treaty ol'Tilwit, and through the intermediation 
ol' Murat, hr, H(JU}^ht to ally hinimdl' willi KuHHia, Uy a mar 
Hage, hut that the refuHal ol" tlir, RuMMian princiiHH, and her 
precipitate union with tin'. Dukr, of Oldfohur}^, had induced, 
him to marry an Auntrian princess.'* 

The intermciliati«Mi of Murat was unne<,cHnary. IJ" Mapolcon* 
who so(Mi ioiind hiinrst-H'on terms of intimacy with Alexander, 
did not chooNC durinf^ their lun\t; convei'sations to throw out 
Home insimjations relative to a family alliance, he had with 
him the< I'rince of lienevento, ('ralleyrand,) the most proj)er 
person to examinti the ground, in couHeipience of hJH relatione 
with I'rince. Kourakin. Hut the Itjissian princess was not re- 
fused at Tilsit, where she could not have, heen denia,nded ; he- 
cauHO at this period there wm no mention of a divorce. It waH 
not until a luu^ time afterwards that an audu( ions eflTort of 
l^'ouchc awakened Home, suMpi<;ions among tint pe.ople on Ihib 
»uh ject. 1 1 was not sjioken of i n 1 809, at the time of the prccipl- 
talc union of the (iirand Ducln-ns of Oldetdmrg, a, precipitation 
all-ogether lort-ign to a project of njarriage with the Kmperor 
Napoleon, lie knew the decided charactitr of that princeHN^ 
and would ha,v<' discovenul leaHonw for not dreaming of an 
union with hei*. If, moreover, he had thfHight of ity there wm 

* lUiiti'c /iiayii), al. 11i<- irioiin iH llml |*niicf .loliii of l/ichtensteil), < imui to 
pr(>\n»i<- lui iirnuHtuif, Murislial M(-h!*iere8 liiMisUtd thai Nupoleon tjlionltJ join 
battle : iio» aiiHwci'ed llie Enipcrui', ciiuiii^li lilupd huH l^e^o 0l><:<^» u^'mI ii^^ 
Higucd Uic litiiiiulicc^ 



44 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

nothing <o prevent the proposition being made at Erfurt, where 
the rchitirms between the two sovereigns had assumed the cha- 
racter of IVicndshij). 

Tn 1 8 10, aflrr tl»e divorce was resolved upon, Napoleon 
thoii!;;ht ol' the (Iraiid Duchess Anne. He must have a very 
false idea of his cliaractcr who can suppose that if the Grand 
Duchess Catherine had i-efused him, that ho would have de- 
manded her sister. The negotiation thus begun did not suc- 
ceed. The Emperor Alexander demanded time for his mother 
to decide; hut anotlier negotiation, commenced at the same 
time with the Austrian ambassador, at Paris, succeeded com- 
pletely. Thus the tergiversations of Russia caused the Em- 
peror to espouse an Austrian princess. 

**Tlio pride of JNapoleon had been wounded by the refusal 
which Russia, in 1807, bad nradc of his hand, since he liad ex- 
posed hiuiself to a war, by dispossessing the Russian princess 
of Oldenburg of her duchy." 

In this allegation there are as many errors as words. We 
have e\j)laincd liow much credit is to be given to this pretend- 
ed refusal ; we have no need to show how ridiculous it is to 
suppose that through vexation Najioleon had included Olden- 
burg in the thirty-second military division. The author him- 
self adds immediately afterwards, "those passions which so 
despotically govern otiicr men, possessed but a feeble inlluenco 
on a genius so firm and vast as that of Napoleon," What then 
does the preceding signify? 

TUl) Duchy of Oldenburg, by its geographical position, must 
f(dlow the fate of the Ilanseatic cities by which it is locked in. 
The continental s}stem, established by the treaty of Tilsit, 
could not etlectually injure England, unless it was completely 
executed by the interdiction of the ports to the English com- 
merce, nevertheless the whole of Germany received English 
merchandize tlu'ough the ports of the Baltic. The possession 
of Oldenburg having been guaranteed to the Duke by the 
treaty of Tilsit, the Emperor olfered as an indemnity the prin- 
cipality of Erfurt and the seignory of Blankenhayn ; but this 
exchange was refused, as not presenting an equivalent. Russia 
seized with eagerness this new pretext for a rupture, and ad- 



BOOK u. 45 

dressed to the ministers of the European courts a protest, which 
by its form, as much as its real object, was a serious offence 
committed against an ally. 

Nothing was easier than to agree by negotiation relative to 
the Duchy of Oldenburg. But Russia, instead of beginning 
frankly, and in the spirit of the system which closely connected, 
the two empires, seized with avidity this occasion to conceal 
her intention of breaking with France, in order to yield her- 
self to British influence. 

** One obvious fact sufficed to hurry him sooner or later into 
that decisive struggle ; that was the existence of an empire 
which rivalled his, &c. It was obvious that war alone could 
decide this great arbitrement, this great and eternal struggle 
between the poor and the rich," &c. 

The author has heretofore explained that the cause of the 
war related to England, and the maintenance of the continen- 
tal system, the only mode of bringing the British cabinet to 
peace. Had he added to this true motive, that the result of 
this war would be advantageous to Europe, and glorious for 
the Emperor, whom it would constitute the defender of civili- 
zation against barbarism, he would have been comprehended 
by men of good faith. But what signifies this vague and rather 
vapid declamation, before such high interests, in spite of his 
philosophic pretensions, that this war was a struggle of the 
poor against the rich ? 

** The great officers of his court were alarmed by the double- 
headed character of the war." 

These officers were the ministers of the treasury and finance, 
who arc very singularly confounded with the courtiers. The 
author, according to his custom, makes them talk. Tlie one, 
Count Mollien, says that his finances have need of repose; 
very insignificant language from the mouth of so positive a 
man. The other, the Duke of Gaete, says, that the state of 
finances was never more satisfactory. It is true that the 
Duke of Gaete, who understood his business well, and em- 
ployed himself with nothing else, speaks like a minister of war 
about rations of bread and forage j and like a minister of ma- 
rine about canvass, tar, and masts. How well imagined is all 



46 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

this ! But the most beautiful invention is that which the Em- 
peror lias the honour of. His allies, not his enemies, were to 
pay the expenses of the war. We sec clearly the motive of this 
invention; but the absurdity is equally evident. The allies of 
Napoleon were Prussia, still indebted for considerable sums, 
and of whom nothintj could be asked ; Denmark, who liad no- 
thing to give, and Austria, who, very probably, would not suf- 
fer it to be done. 

** It was that perhaps which drew upon him the reproach of 
having availed himself of a method which he had rejected in 
the Austrian war, and of which the celebrated Pitt had given 
an example in 1793." 

Does the author wish by this to insinuafc that Napoleon 
counted upon a method which morals do not allow, but which 
policy has occasionally employed? History, it is true, re- 
proaches the memory of Frederick the Great, and Pitt, with 
not being scrupulous in this respect. Even in our days, we have 
seen agents at the instigation of those on whom they were de- 
pendent, devote themselves to these practices. The openness 
of Napoleon's character was always repugnant to the employ- 
ment of similar frauds. If he had intended to distribute in 
Russia counterfeit notes on tlie Russian banks, it would have 
been easy to him who could have disposed of half of Europe, 
and had more than one point of contact with the Russian ter- 
ritories. The author Mho says at the same time, that Napoleon 
did not employ this method, might well have passed this sub- 
ject in silence. We are tempted to believe that he is unwilling 
to lose an opportunity of casting odium upon the hero of his 
history. 



CHAPTER II. 

'' Meanwhile Poniatowski, to whom the expedition appear- 
ed to hold out the prospect of a throne, generously united his 



toooK II, 47 

exertions with the Emperor*s ministers in the attempt to de- 
monstrate its danger. — He depicted Lithuania as an impracti- 
cable desert; its nobility already become half Russian, &c." 

The opinion of Prince Poniatowski was entirely contrary to 
that which the author has imagined for him. To depict Lithua- 
nia as desert and impracticable, it was necessary that he should 
have been unacquainted with it. What a desert, in fact, is the 
rich and fertile Samsgitia, which forms part of the government 
of Lithuania ? To suppose the author correct, he should not have 
made the Russian campaign. The prince well knew that the 
whole of Lithuania remained at heart attached to Poland ; and 
Mr. de Segur himself quotes the arrival at Tilsit of a deputa- 
tion from Wilna, coming to demand independence at the hands 
of JVapoleon, and offering the same devotion to his cause that 
had been shown at Warsaw, The quarter-master of the palace 
having none but vague notions, it is not surprising that he 
should occasionally say one thing for the other. But how does 
it happen, that wishing to write history, he has not souglit to 
know the truth, and especially to avoid every instant contra- 
dicting himself. 

" He addressed himself to his three great officers," &g. 

The author gives us here the process verbal of a sort of 
council of his own invention, where he makes the actors 
brought forward, talk in his own way. We recognize in it a 
cold copy of the dialogue of Sylla and Eucrates, which he em- 
ploys without quoting, and which is the most piquant of this 
part of the work. When he makes one of his three interlocu- 
tors speak on the subject of the bad condition of the army, he 
attributes no answer to Napoleon, on so grave and important 
a point. Without doubt he thought the Emperor would have 
answered sufficiently by the first bjvttle. For the rest, the 
reader may easily appreciate the importance which Mr. de 
Segur wishes to bestow on the councils of these three persona- 
ges. One of them, the Duke of Frioul, had twice travelled 
the route between Petersburg and Memel, as a courier. Ad- 
mitting that one may know a country by riding post, the 
Duke of Frioul could only have known Esthonia, Ingria, and 
Livonia, which are not Russia, properly speaking. Another 



48 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, %;. 

person,* the Count de Segur, ought to have known the Russian 
politics of the time of Catharine ; but his knowledge, which 
went so far hack, was inapplicable to circumstances. As for the 
third, (the Duke of Vicenza,) he had resided several years at 
St. Petersburg, and his opinion would have had far more 
weight, if his prejudice in favour of the Russians, had not 
been perfectly known to Napoleon. 

The author, after attempting to establish a resemblance be- 
tween the expedition of Napoleon to Russia, and that of St. 
Louis to Africa, adds, 

" The latter (the expedition to Russia,) was indispensable 
to the accomplishment of a great design, on the point of being 
accomplished : its object was not out of reach ; the means for 
reaching it were not inadequate." 

Singular conclusion to a chapter intended to prove directly 
the contrary. The great design almost accomplishedf was to 
constrain England to peace by the continental system. To 
say that its achievement was indispensable^ that the object was 
not out of reach, and that the means for reaching were not in^ 
adequate, is to justify this great design under all its aspects. 
' Notwithstanding, Mr. de Segur did not write his book with 
this view. 



CHAPTER III. 

We have seen Napoleon at variance with his great dignita* 
ries, his ministers, and chief officers j we shall now see, " this 
mysterious man, giving to those features, so formidable to others, 
the expression of a mild and affecting benevolence; employing 
the irresistible impulse of the most frank and confiding disclosure ; 
affecting a caressing voice, exercising in short, a magnetic influ- 
ence upon the military man, and upon the minister of the old 
school; finally with superficial and inexperienced individuals, 

* Father of the Author. 



BOOK II. 49 

to whom he Wished neither to explain nor dissemble, he cuts 
matters short by saying, " you understand nothing of all this ; 
you are ignorant of its antecedents and consequences." 

We are tempted to believe, that the Quarter-master of the 
palace counts himself among those who assisted at this council, 
as these latter words cannot be better applied to any one than 
to the author of the campaign of 1812. 

Next comes the turn of the princes of the family, of the Em- 
press Jo8e])liinc, and of Cardinal Fescb, who is keenly rated 
for not wishing to sec a star at noon-day. 

The author makes these last interlocutors speak according 
to his fancy, and he places words in the mouth of Napoleon, 
which no one ever heard, himself least of all, since he more 
rarely approached the Emperor. This prince, always imper- 
turbable at tiic as|)e(;t of the gr-eatcst dangers, and more than 
ever indefatigable, he represents in this chapter, as pre-occu- 
pied witli the idea of his death, and liis strength declining so 
far that he could scarcely sustain a short ride in huntingf or 
the gallop of the easiest horse. 

At the same time, the author informs us, **one great inquie- 
tude possessed Napoleon ; it was the idea of that same- death 
which he appeare*! so much to brave," he shows us that his 
mind, at once too firm and englightened, to allow such great 
destinies to depend upon a weaknes^. 

At the same time that he shows him resolved upon war, " to 
consolidate the great empire, by confining the Russian power 
beyond the Boristhenes," and makes him say, "that peace was 
at Constantinople, that is, at the end of Europe," (mark well 
this charitable insinuation) he makes him api)ear as only en- 
tering Russia to attack the English during a sliort campaign, 
after whicli, France could rest. 

At the same time that he indicates his predpitation to com- 
mence this terrihle war, he states that he only decided on it after 
a painful hesitation; and when he burst forth, at the audience 
of August 1811, "this burst of indignation, which was the 
presage of war, was an additional proof of Ids repugnance to 
commence it — a menace which might arrest the preparations 
of Alexander." 

a 



50 OlllTlCAL EXAMINATION, &c: 

The reflecting reader passes liastily over such pages, which 
teach him nothing, hut that tlieir author knows not to what 
opinion lie shouhl incline. 

To finish hy a striking sketch, he relates this dialogue hc- 
tween Napoleon and an ambassador, returned from his post, 
whore he has not seen the preparations of Alexander, although 
they have met the eyes of all Eurepe. " You too, have be- 
come a Russian; you have been seduced by the Emperor 
Alexander." " Yes, sire, because 1 consider him in heart a 
Frenclnnan." Napoleon would have had cause to think the 
Duke of Viccnza a Jlussian, had he thought like the Emperor 
Alexander; but is it prol)able, that this ambassador would 
have agreed that he had been seduced during his stay at St. Pe- 
tersburg, and that he had seen a French Emperor in the Em- 
peror ol" Russia ? The author who does not feel how impro- 
bable and ridiculous such a recital is, still believes himself to 
he writing histoi'y ! 



CHAPTER IV. 

In a chapter of five i)ages, devoted to the negotiation, whose 
object was to conciliate the two parties, and prevent the war, 
the author shows us Napoleon lieeping his perplexity a secret, 
without perceiving that ho who deliberates, has not decided to 
hecome the aggressor. The Einpci-or whom he has depicted 
hitherto so ardent to pursue tliis entej-prizc, and who, two 
pages farther on, thinks of nothing but Moscow, discovers all 
at once, wliat he had not before suspected, that the state of 
his alfairs will not jiermit him to make war. Reverses in 
Spain, misundej'standings with the Pope, interruptions pro- 
duced by the Turks, troubles relative to subsistence in France, 
which contained nothing but "old men, women, and children, 
who, weeping, b()wed in sadness to the earth, which, without 
their aid, would remain uncultivated," all this was revealed 



BOOK U. 5£ 

to him during " one of these long winter nights, when his star 
seemed to enlighten his foresight with its most hrilliant illu- 
mination." The ruling genii of the people he had conquered, 
appeared to him with menacing aspects. Trouhlcd hy this 
phantasmagoria, " he hecame thoughtful and agitated. He 
collected accounts of the different powers of* Europe, and or- 
dered an exact and complete summary of them to he made." 

Can the genius of Napoleon, which comhined so much of 
bravery with so much circumspection, attempted nothing which 
he had not thoroughly examined, and executed rapidly, be- 
cause he had long and profoundly meditated on it, be perceived 
in the above phrases ? Has the author intended to write his- 
tory or a mclo-drama ? Napoleon keenly felt the necessity of 
terminating affairs in Spain. He regretted being constrained 
to abandon tliem, in order to repel a powerful enemy, which 
excited against him the indefatigable enmity of England. He 
could not have been exposed to compromit his character for such 
brilliant but untimely glory, as that of adding to his surnames 
of conquest, that of Russian, unless we suppose him afflicted 
with madness. If this be not what Mr. de Segur wishes to 
prove, it is at least the moral to be drawn from his book. 

He places himself by his side, as a witness of his agitation. 
** During those long winter nights, when individuals are left 
more than usually to themselves," forgetting that the nights of 
Napoleon were in great part consecrated to labour, and that 
beiiig alone, he could not have spectators. However, the au- 
thor has seen him " half reclined upon a sofa, starting up con- 
vulsively," and exclaiming, " who calls me ?" like tlie Orestes 
of Crebrillion, or like the drunkard, from whom it is thought 
the tragedian has borrowed this sublime movement. 

We yet see nothing of the negotiation : here it is^ — 

" On the 25th of March, Czernichpff" transmitted new pro- 
posals to his sovereign. Napoleon offered to make a declara- 
tion, that he would neither directly nor indirectly, contribute 
to the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland." This de- 
claration had been consented to, a year before, in proper 
form. 

On the 1st of January, the Duke of Vicenza, had agreed 



52 CHiriCAL IIXAMINATION, Stc. 

with M. rlc IJomair/oflVm utrcaty, which was sent to Paris with 
the ratilicsitioii oC ilw Kmpcror Alexander. By the first arti- 
cle, France engat^ed that the kingdom of Poland should not he 
re-t'stahlished. Many other articles wei'o (avourahle to the 
Jliissian pi-oject of extension. But it was the first especially, 
that shocked the Kmperor. " I am not fate," said he, ** all 
that I can do is to en.«;age not to contrihute directly nor indi- 
rectly, to the re-esi,ahlishment ol" the kingdom ol' Voland." 
The first article having heen thus modified, tlie Emperor mado 
no change in the others. Jle signed the treaty, and sent it to 
Petershurg. Alexander appeared hurt tliat Napoleon refused 
his jnire and simple ratification to a treaty pi'eviously ratified 
by himself. 'J^hese discussions, the augmentation of the Rus- 
sian arm}' on the frontiern of the Diu'liy of Warsaw, the iu- 
Bistance of Russia on ohtaiiiing Dantzic in exchange for 01- 
denhiirg, conlinned the suspicions of TMapoleon relative to the 
wish of Alevander, to profit hy th«^ dilUculties in Spain, to po- 
sess himself of Poland. 

JNcgotiations were pending during a year; and Mr. de Se- 
gur, who says the whide in a page and a half, makes the nego- 
tiation comiiK^nced on the 17th of April, to terminate in a few 
days. It is true, that in these few lines, he shows Napoleon 
always ready to treat. The Russian Kmperor eluding the nego- 
tiations, and the Muscovite ainhassador presenting almost at the 
same moment thenltimatunh or, in other words, his master's do- 
rlarationof war. The author, who is not often embarrassed, ne- 
vertheless paints ISujioleon as the aggressor, lie moreover 
takes care to say, that hot being able to make the ambassador 
come out of the circle of I'opilius which he l)races round him. 
Napoleon caused his minister to write to Mr. de Romanzolf, 
to endeavour to bring about a reconciliation by this direct com- 
munication ; that he sent with the same view. Count <le Nar- 
bonne to Wilna, with a letter for the hiinperor Alexander ; that 
not disgusied with <he failure of his pacific ellbrts, he ordered 
Count liauriston to [ireseiit himself at the Russian head-quar- 
ters, to renew his instances and propositions ; and that it was 
only after the friiitlessness of these multiplied attempts, that 
ho acquired the certainty, that bis enemy would notbeappcas- 



BOOK II. 53 

ed, and that from the jmpoHsibiliiy of nct^otiation, war became 
the only means of obtaining peace. Driven, pushed to ex- 
tremity by the Empeior Ah5xand(;r, Na[)oh:on at length sets 
out; he departs with regret, and niarcheH in front of thiK 
struggle, which his persevering efforts could not prevent, and 
against an ailversary, who two months before luid declared 
wai- against him. 



CHAPTER V. 

Mr. de Segur gives six pages of this chapter as the wind- 
ing up of all the negotiations ; it might have been shorter, as 
there is not one word in it relative to negotiations. It is lilled 
with little fabricated anecdotes, collected for the purpose of 
praising several persons in whom the Emperor placed some 
confidence. 

First comes Talleyrand, " who was to have been sent to 
Warsaw, but the jealousy of a rival, and an intrigue, again 
involved him in disgrace. Napoleon deluded by a calumny, 
adroitly circulated, believed that he had been betrayed by him. 
His anger was extreme ; its expression terrible. Savary [the 
sole protector of Talleyrand] made vain efforts to undeceive 
Jiim." 

The author does all he can to guess at this jealous and in- 
triguing competitor ; who was the Duke of Bassano. The 
anecdote is about as true as the imputation made against the 
character of that minister. Napoleon in fiict, had an idea of 
sending Talleyrand on an embassy, to effect the revolution of 
Poland. lie hesitated j and it was still a H(!cret when he learn- 
ed by private advices from Vienna, tfiat this secret was l<nown. 
Ih did not believe that he had been betrayed ; hi8 anger was not 
extreme, nor its expression terrible ; it was not worth the trou- 
ble. He renounced his project, and tfiat was the end of it. A 
letter written by Talleyrand sometime after, was sent to Wil- 



54 CRITICAL KXAMlNAllON, 8cc. 

ml, and NHjiolron did not force, (as the author says) ** liis se- 
cretary to scud that letter t(» the very minister who stood 
most in dread of Talleyrand's influence.'* What need was 
then^ tliat (he Secretary of Napoleon should [n\forccd to semi 
a letler on political allairs to the minister, whoso department 
was politics, hecause this minister dreaded the iniluencc of 
Talleyraml, who for several years had heen without iniluencc. 
History is mcM employed in making such stutt'. 

The lollowing is similar, and relates to the same minister : 
lie was heard (o repeat, '* that tlu». Em])eror was not snfli- 
cieutly great; that it was necessary (or him to become greater 
still, in order to be able to stop." Who heard him ? Was it 
Mr, de Sei;-ur? The Dnke oC Itassano may have often treat- 
ed him with kindness; but no one thinks that he would have 
mentioned to him his political ideas. It is possible that minis- 
ters have been known to approve (he plans of the Emperor in 
public, and blame them in private, since events have pronoun- 
cod against them, 'I'hey have also been knt)wn to oppose pro- 
jected resolutions, courageously, but solely in presence of Na- 
poleon, and to interdict themselves from all censure, as soon as 
it was decidetl that they wore to become Jtcra's of the sovereign. 
These latter doubly performetl their duty. But perhaps they 
are not vaunted, and we can conceive that Mr. de Segur, who 
had no connexion with ministers, except when invited to dance 
or dine with them, did not share deeply in ministerial se- 
crets. 

lie knows, however, ho says, that one minister was silent ; 
that if another //<i//fn'(/ the Kmperor, there were some who did 
not withhold the truth ; one hy sighing, another by turning pale, 
and a third by reddening with anger ; tliat the ministers and 
aids of Napoleon, " were often soon to end their altercations, 
by abruptly retiring and shutting the door after them with 
violence." 

Could the Quarter-master of the Palace, (who perhaps 
sometimes saw the outer door of tin's Cabinet from afar off,) 
have seen these fine things, since no one else has seen them ? 
Mr. de S^gur, who stops at nothing, joins to this list of oppo- 
sei'S, generals llapp and Lauriston. Tln.»re is but one difficul- 



BOOK ir. <^5 

ty — tlio one was at Dantzic, and the other at St. Petersburg. 
For the rest, uU llic world knows tliat tlie ministerH Jiiul aids 
«r Napoleon, were persons of too good breeding, and Najio- 
leon too well acquainted with what was duo him, to allow ol' 
such pranks. One might believe, tliat the author had never 
approached neitlier JNapoleon, nor his ininisters, nor liis aids- 
de-camp. 

** He gives tliese details, because they are either unknown 
or imperfectly known; because Najioleon in his closet, was 
quite different from the Emperor in [)rd)lic ; and because this 
part of the palace has hitherto remained secret.'* 

If it has remained secret, how came it to the knowledge (»f 
Mr. de Segur, who, Adjutant, or Quarter-master of the palace, 
has never, by any title, entered the interior? The idea whicli 
the auth(»r wishes to give of this court, is new, and will en- 
tirely derange the idea which has been formed of it in Ku- 
I'ope. 

** In that now and serious court, little was said.** In that 
new and serious court, the Emperor was always addressed 
with respect, and confidence was not rejjosed in such as by the 
nature of their olliccs were strangers to it. 

*'' All was rigorously classed, so that one saloon knew not 
what passed in the other." How then could Mr. de Scgur 
know, what was not known in the saloon of service ? 

** It is diilicult to comprehend the great events of history, 
without a perfect knowledge of the characters and manners of 
the principal personages." By this reHection the author 
passes judgment on the picture he has delineated; but he is 
persuaded of its fidelity : let us felicitate posterity on having 
this assurance of it. 

** Meanwhile, a famine was announced in France. Napo- 
leon was compelled to suspend his de])arture — that war, in 
which the loss of every hour was irreparable, was delayed for 
two months." The author states in the following phrase, that 
these hours were not lost, since " the delay gave tlie new har- 
vests of the Russians time to grow," but no matter. Mr. de 
Scgur will tell us in the first chapter of the following book, 
that Napoleon, imruediately after having icgeivvd the ultima ■ 



56 citrncAL examination, he. 

tiiin of tlio Russian Ambassador, quitted Paris on the 9th of 
May. Ill fact, this iMuy of two inontlis, no more existed, than 
its alh\i?cd cause. From the 18th of August, 1811, in the 
midst of the festivals of that day, Napoleon was warned that 
the appearances of the harvest were unfavourable, and had 
unex|)er.tedly united and formed with many of his counsellors, 
Avhieh <lie soleniiiitiesof the occasion had brought to St. Cloud, 
a council, in which the subsistence of France was the first ob- 
ject. The same day he determined on precautionary measures, 
the successive devehniement of wliic^b, procured abundant rc- 
soui'ces to France, aji^aiust the foreseen calamity. Those 
measures were such, that at the end of the same year, all the 
assistant Hnp|)lies for Fi-ance were assured, in such a manner, 
that before cpiittinii^ Paris, their execution was complete. It 
cost France but twelve millions, and the scourge was stayed. 
This fact was possibly worthy of history ; but it did honour to 
the p^overinneut of Napoleon ! ! ! 

If the author really believed that Napoleon ought to have 
left Paris sooner, he might, instead of supposing an imaginary 
cause of delay, found a very plausible one in the utility of al- 
lowing Austria and Russia time to prepare themselves for the 
execution of the treaties signed in March, in the necessity of 
allowing the troops which were on the Oder, time to arrive on 
the Niemen ; in short, in order n«)t to neglect the last hopes of 
reconciliation. While the answer to Prince Kourakin was 
deferred, because it could not have been done, but by accept- 
ing tbe war, the minister of foreign relations, treated di- 
rectly by letter, with Count tie Romanzoft*. His answer was 
waited for ; it was antici()ated that he would disavow the hos- 
tile injunctions of kourakin. 

However this may be, Mr. do Segur decides on allowing 
Napoleon to leave Paris ; but it is only to seek a battle, 

*• Such were his anticipations. — Such was Napoleon. The 
l\>unders of empires press forward to their object, like fate, 
whose ministers they seem, and whoso march, neither wars 
nor earthquakes, nor all the scourges which Providence per- 
mits, ever arrest, without deigning to make the utility of their 
purposes comprehensible to their victims." To this trite re- 



HOOK HI. 57 

flection, wliicii pr^etiindH to be philosophical, and wiiich by its 
nature rather belotigH to a Hcrinon thsm a hiHtorical work, wo 
content oursclvcH by r('-j)lyinj;^, that the founderH of cmpircHf 
the scourges, and earUiquakcs of which M. the Quartrr-mastcr 
upcakH of, have n()t been unproritable to him nor his family. 



BOOK III— nilAPTER 1. 

The departments of France which Napoleon traversed in- 
loxicated him with tcstifnoiiicH of conliihiricc and <h",votion ; but 
in (Jmnanij ixt J'oimd k.ss ajfcrlion, Hnyn Mr. de Scftur. Mo 
one will accuse this rcllcctioii of hcjnf^ (iehcient in innocence. 

The (yon^^rcHS of Dresden, for which a historian worthy of 
tjte name, slutuld have, Hoiii^ht hi^^h and serious motives, had 
but one object for Napoleon, according to the, Quai ier-inaster, 
of showing and enjoying Ids po'wer* I Jut farth(^r on he is of 
another opinion, when he makes the Km[)eror say to (leneral 
1)( SHolle, that the congress of Dresden, not havini^ determined 
Alexander to peace, nothinf; more was to be expected but war. 
I'owcrful considerations had then |)roduced this conj^rcss at 
Dresden. A man as well inlormed as Mr. de Sci^ui-, njight 
have given us on this great circumstance in the life of the Km- 
l)cror, something less pueiih^ : especially as Mr. «le- Segur i« 
an universal man; at l*aris, he; penetrates into the counfiils; 
he Judges, aflairs and men ; at Dresden he seen all things ; he 
assists at the congress of Sover(^igns, at iUv'ir lianijuets, at their 
most intimate conversations ; he enters into the recesses of 
their hearts ; he there seizes upon their humiliation, resent- 
ment and hatr(;d. Even the secrets of (Mopresses do not es- 
cape him : one is jealous of the /tcafZ-f/ra.s of her daughter-in- 
law, the other wcq^v if Maprjieon asks her to retrench some- 
thing of her drcHS, to avoid humiliating her mother-in-law. 

U 



58 (ilMTlCM- KXAMINA HON, Sec. 

TliriH (h(^ Qiiiirtor-iiuiHlt'i' pliu'cs liiiiisiilt' as tliinl poraou be 
iwoiMi lliii ICniporor and liis ( (iiiNi>r(. 

*♦ Mmiitiiiir, dininp; the carl} da^H ol" incoiiiiju^, Hiirpriso was 
oxpiTssiid at (lir abNciuc (tC lliti kiiifi; of Prussia IVoiu iUr linpo- 
I'ial Coiit't; but it was hooii iiiidfrsloitd, Uial be was [indiibi- 
(.«'(1 fidiii ( (uniiii;-. This |niiu'(i was thti tunvv abii'inod in pro- 
(mrtioii, m br liad Iosh dcHCi'vod hiu b (rcattuout. His pro- 
Ncncr wiuibl liavr. hvru cmbai'i'aHHing. N(nri*tbck\ss, cncou- 
i'ai;-od hy Narboiiiir, be iT.s(dv(Ml uu making' liis appraranco. 
His arrival was uunonucod to tbe Kinperor; tbe latter grew 
uiipjry, and jit bi-st rornHod lo .sre biui." What did that ])rince 
want «>r bini i* >VbtMeloi'«' di«I lu^ |n'rsi'iutr bini wi(b liis pre- 
sence ? What nerd bad be of bini i* Hut Duroe iiiHiHted ; b(« 
reiiiinibid NapobMui id' tbe want be woubl experience of I'rus- 
sda, in a war willi l{uHsia, and tbe diiois of tbe Knipeeor were 
opened to tbe nionareb/* 

Tbe antlior, aec oitliii)!, t(» liis cnsloni ol" loi^^i'ttini;" iiotbing, 
(juote.s tbi^ vl^^} words and names tbe s])ectalors. 'Ilie hitter 
will not eoutnulict binu since they are dead; but we have no 
need of tlu^nj ; Uiere are (acts sulbeitMit to pr(»vi% Ibat in all bis 
line pai^es on tbe sid)ie(-t, tber»i is not u w<m(1 ol" tmilh. 

Naptdetm was expected at llerlin : tbe palace ho was to oc- 
cnp} was {U'epared. lie relinipiislu d bis intention ; but with 
a view ofsatisl} inj;' tbe Kinf;-or I'russia, be earefullv intorm- 
od hint of tbe nn)tiveH which bad cbani;ed bis plans, and in- 
vited hinito j(nnat Di-ivsden, tbe Illustrious quests t»r the king 
of Saxony. A perscni belonp;in,!;- to the minister of Ibrei^-n re 
latious, Mr. IStMioit, was sent to Herlin with a letter of tlir 
Hidve of Hassant* to tbe kinji;, ami despatches lor M. de llar- 
denlieri; and M. d«> St. Marson. These letters weri\ received 
with attention. Tbekini;- bastenetl to accept of the in\itation ; 
bo set out tor Dresden, and the reception be met with on his 
arri\al, was such as it t>uj^bt t(> have been, after such antece- 
dents. In theemoti(Mis ln^ e\peritMue<l at the tinus he t>l!ered 
his son to a( ((Mnpanv Napi>leon as his Aid, presented bini to 
(lu> Aids-tie-camp of tbe riin|)eror, and denn\nded their IVicnd- 
sliiji for this illMslrit)UM companion in ai'ins. 



HOOK III. 59 

What ihori l)o,(oiTuw of the intervontion of the (Jonni ilo 
Niul»(Miiui, and tlic! resistanrr of ^,\^^^ irrUatvd Knipciror? Wliat 
l)C(U)iriuM of the pci'Histaiici'! of Diiroc, wlio lr(,tiir<^(l liin niaHU^r, 
and of the charitable iiiHiniialiori that tlii'- kiiij;^ of I'niHHia was 
Ihi: more alarmed in propurlion^ as he had lesn deserved Hueh treat- 
ment ? 



(511 A in Kit U. 

Ix thiH chapter, Mr. de Segiir appears to have for ob- 
ject, the repreH<uitation of the ariuy an a horde of piMap;erH. 
lie e-ven goes so far as to sa)-, that mrme nj' the leadrvH set the 
examptef and were emulous in doinji^ evil. The author ch'picts 
Napoh'on as always threatetiiiii^-, but in vain, and not Ivriow- 
in;^ bow to make himself oliejrd. ILe pretenils that the V\m- 
poror, " might reproach himself as the caiiso of the irregula- 
rities whicli irritated him." What does Mi', de. Sigur mean 
by that? Does he mean that the Kmperor excited the-m, or 
neglected the moans of preventing them ? No, because he says, 
that Napoleon desired order; that he, ket^nly re|)roacbed a 
strange |)rince, a king's son, for tlie, disorders comntitte.d by 
his troops; that " imnn'Mse tjuantities of |n'ovisions, ade(|uate 
to the immt^nsity of the und«'.rtaking, were ther*', accinniilated. 
No dt;tail had Ijec^n neglected. 'I'he active and impassioned 
genius of Napcdeon, was then lintirt'ly directed towai-ds that 
most important and diilicult department of this ex|)(tdition. In 
that he was |)i'ofuse of <>.xIiortalions, (M'<lers, and evjin nutney — 
that his days were occupied in dictating instructions on this 
subject ; at night ho frcfjuently rose to repeat them." 

It was not enough to r<"present the arhiy as disoigani/ed, be- 
fore (^ommeru'Jng the campaign, but tlie, marshals must Ite shown 
quarreling together, lie supposes an oxtrouiely sharp alter- 
cation between l)av<Mist and IJertliier, whose enmity he dates 
from many years back. ♦' in IHO'J," says hr,, " IJertliier was 



60 (Utl'lirAr, KXAMINfA HON. he. 

IitH Miiperior, Coi* hhuw days, during:; wliirli, DavoliHt gained a 
liaUir, hikI HiiVi^d Uiti iivuty Uy diMolicj'iii^ liiiti, IliMire arose 
u UMTildc hatred." Tlio author again grossly deceives liiiu- 
Hoirnhoiii facts known lo iill th<- wtn'hi. In IKO'.), th«^ T^nipe- 
roc joined the arni}' in the night of the Kitii and lythofApriK 
The Austi'ians had passed tite Inn and were marching on tho 
liser. There vv<'re no liatlh^H, s(del;y sonn-i Nkirnlishl^M luid «>c- 
curred hetweeii the Anstrian and llavarian troops. Napoh^ni 
did not appr(»ve of the arrangements Herthier had previouMly 
made ; and he hastened to send orders to the ditl'en^nt corps of 
the arni} . Tlte exiniition of tliese onh^rs prodnc-ed the atlair 
of IMniifenliolt'eiu and the hattle of Tanse on the 19tli; that of 
AlMiisliert;- on tlie rolh, tlie linjhtof Landsliilt on tlie 'Mst, and 
the liatth^ of Mc linitilh on ihv 'C\2d. It nmy he said of Napo- 
leon, that th(^ hattle of Ahensherg, the nuintenvrci <iif l^andshuf; 
and the hattle <d' Kckmiilh were the holdest, most skilful and 
most heautiful of his operations, llow then C(Hild the autinn- 
assert that Davoust jf<i/«c<i <f hattle and savtHl the armij^ bij 
dhobajing JttrtJdert Hiuce as we have stated, no hattle occurred 
hehtre the arrival of the Kniperor, and th(»se which hapju^ned 
mlYerwards were fonglit l>_v liis «>rdirs, and under his innnediato 
ctmimand ? Yet ho makes Davoust accuse Uorthier of ti-oason 
in order io hring forward this incredihie exclamation. 

** It sonietinu's luippens, tluit I entertaiin donl>t.s of the iideli- 
ty or my oldeMt companions in arms ; hut at such times \uy 
head turns round with chagrin, ami I do my ntnuist to hanish 
so licart-rending a suspiciiMi." It re»iuires a hea«l organi/.tMi 
like that of Mr. de Segur, to coneoive such thoughts. Wo 
plainly see that he has written his hook siiue IHl I. 

Here is sometiiing still stronger. The army of Davoust 
was completely proviiled with every thing. " He had antici- 
pated every want, all nuMins of sn|)plying them were ready," 
and the author adds, *• such great exertions ought to have 
pleased ; they, however, displcasi^tl." Ui)w are we to charac- 
ieriKO such a rellection? >V[nit! Could Mapolcou bo dis- 
pleased hy the executimi of his orders ? 

*• riiis marshal, it was said, w ishes to have it thought that 
he has foreseen, arranged and executed evwy tiling. Is the 



flOOK III (il 

KifliMMVU' tluirii no mom Unm «. H|)«c(,ator of iliiH e xptMliiiou ;' 
Will IJmi glory ol' it tlt'^volvci on DavoiiNl, :'" Wliit docH iiol i'\ 
pi'i'l io liiMii' Nu|iiil«M»ii cjuirk any oiir wlio mIkmiIiI liavc iHtlil 
sikJi a laiiju;iiajj;(i to liiiii i Hiil. il. ih iioi no. TIm f^iMilJo Km- 
pn'or, as W illinniiiiitoil liy n llaMli of liji^liU iiifs;4>iiiioiiMly rx 
clalliiN, ** ill I ill I, oiiii would Uiiiik il. wiim Ik- Unit i oiiiiuaiiiliMl 
Uki army." 

Kiioiif^li of (his; all ItiH goHNip iHiiltsiinl. Na|H»l«-oii at kiuivv- 
Iciljj^tMl Willi HUM II Mai iHl'ai lion, Iho sliill willi ulii( li Davoiisl; 
<()ii(lii( :I(mI Iiin Ij'oo|ih, ami anlit ipalrd llioir waiilH ; lir |ioiiilrd 
out tli(4 admiiiiNlnilivu taleiit of IJiiH fi;cinri'al, aH a mo(l»l» and 
tlioNc who havr nally approached Ihc Mmpin'or, hilv<^ ol'loii 
Imai'd liiiii <lvv('ll with (-oinplaihaiirii on nikIi roniiiM-ndaUonM ol 
him. IL wuH tliu peculiar murit. ol' llavoiiHl ; no one Imih evci* 
(onlcslod il ; and il, would have hern niiifi^nlai', had Naptdcon, 
((» whom il. was ho advitnt.ap;('>oiiH, vvcv shown any diMconliiiil. 
in relation thrrrto. 



ciiAr^i r:ir iii 

TiiiH ( hapter lK>jj;'itiH with a tniu pictiii'e, which relievim the 
l'cadei'*N mind, afti r hciii;^- ratif;;-iM'd hy the painl'iil sriitinients 
wlilcli taUi' |KiHHrHHi<»ii of him, rnini the (-onimencejnent of the. 
work. TheHii paf^e.H mak(^ us rej/jret lluit Mr. de St gur has not 
writteii his whole hook in the same tone of truth ; hut he soon 
hastens to (piit this Crank and iiiiairectt^d course, to rii-entei 
the tortuous route, of ((nijei ture and di;j;-ressiou. 

The ac(umnt he ji^ives <d the I'orees ol the arm)', is very in 
exact. Oliieial doeume.nlM in our pos.seMsion, charj^ed with 
iMd.eH in NapohMin^s own liaud, show, that at. th«^ passaj^e ol 
the Niemeii, the army contained 325,1)00 men under armN, ol' 
which, I. ').'), loo were I'^reiuhinen, and I70»f)00 allies; Kr. 

Mr. «Ie iS( f;;ur ^;wells (Im^ iiuuihei' of IroopM eiilrriiiti; IliisMia, 



(52 CIMTICAI. KXAMINA-TION. kc. 

Jit the I>(^})jimiinj^ (>r (lie ciunpaii;!!, to 445,200 men. His ac- 
count is still higher thiui that procui'ed by O/AiniicherT for the 
RuHHian stalF, by hrihini; a writer in the war oflico, who lost liis 
life l»y his treason. This account amounted hut lo 414,000 
nu'u. However, if we suppose that this last statement is that 
of the complete (M)rps, and then calculate the necessary losses 
these (orps nmst have su(rer«'«l in their march to the Russian 
ri*ontier, we shall discover how much cxagt^era ted the state- 
ment fj;iven hy Mi'i de Set?ur is. 

In his chemical ami metaphysical analysis of the sentiments 
which animated the arujy, we vainly seek lor the two most 
nalural sentinuints in tl»e bosoms of French soldiers, lumour 
and love of country, whose names are not so much as men- 
tioned. Is it an «)missi(m ? Or is the author sulliciently tin- 
fortunate, not tt> have felt their power? He speaks of none 
but frivolous and pitiful motives. ** To tliis nmst be added," 
says he, *' the expeclation of plunder ; f(»r the exacting and»i- 
lion of Napoletni bad as often disj;;usted bis soldiers, as the 
disorders of the latter tarnished bis ij^loiy ; a compromise was 
necessary ; ever since 180:> there was a sort of mutual under- 
stamliii!:;; <>n his part to wink at their plunder, or their's to 
suller bis ambition.'* 

How could the pen of a Fi'encb soldier ti'ace this hope of 
plituilrr.' and of what odious transaction does it .«;ive an idea! ! 
On readini; such lines, what need is there of repeating that 
French velei-ans repel with indi^'uation, the dedication of a 
book in which the author has so horribly outraged them. Our 
rankest enemies have never brought forward an accusation so 
disgraceful to the Firncb name. It was reserved for M. the 
([uarler-mastei" of the palace, to take on himself the responsi- 
bility. 

Have we not remarked with what solicitude the Emperor 
strove to correct tlu^ disorders in the army ? F/ager to ascer- 
tain the truth, he (|uesti(me(l the inhabitants and the olUcers. 
No one came to him from a division or corps of the army, or 
from the roiite the troops bad passed over, without being ques- 
tioned as to what happened in the rear. As soon as the truth 
was known^ bis resolution wiis taken j be formed Hying columns- 



HOOK iV. O;} 

Ho wrol(i to ihtt gnuiijnilH, and to tlic cotniuaiidnntH jilaccd on 
iiici'oiitiMtrtiinai'niy; lie. incnaciMi tlM^ii with piiiiisliinc.til in ('as«'. 
thcso «lisoi'(l«ii'.s w(5r<5 not innncdiatid}' clujckcil. lie. incessantly 
rc|K5atcd that pillat^jr, disliononrud th(5 troops and dcstnjycd tli«- 
n^sourccH ol" the discipIiniMl sohlitir. 11" wt5 vvdi'o, to .state, any 
|)(;riod in whicli Iiis solicitude was (;s|)e(;ially reniaikahle, it 
was that which our anthor assij^ns to th(; Hhanielnl transaction 
with which he eiideavoiu'H to tarnisli the }^h>ry ol' th«', l^iUincror 
and soldi(;rs ol" Krance. Mr. de. Scf^uf was i]ii;norant olall this, 
because Mi-, de St;};;ui- was not in a situati«>n to see any thirif^. 
His subaltern situation confined his little ol)sei'vatioriN to too 
narrow a circle. Itnt how couies it that he is iii;'U<»rant of the 
terrible, oi-ders oi' the day at St. I'oelU^ns in I80[), Kc, hr.i 
Why is he ignorant that ainon|j; (»ther examples, that at Ih^'liu 
in IKOG, the Kini|>eror conde.inned a grenadier (d' the p^tiard, 
c<»nvicte,d «d' plunderinp;, to lie. shot; and at IVIatlrid in IKOH, 
two voltigucurs ol'tlic same p;uard suH'ered lor the same criuKi ? 
How can we reconcile the.se odious imputations with what 
the author Hubse«pu',ntly says in tiiis stiikiriji; disavowal. " We 
lovod him as the companion of our labours; as th(; chief wh(» 
had ccmducted us to renown. The astonishment and admira 
tion he inspired, llattered our self-love. — I.N;riod of intoxication 
and prosperity, durinjj; which the French soldier, lord of all 
thinji^s by victory, considered himself j^nater than the noble- 
man, or even the sovereij^n himself, whose lamls he travers<'d. 
To him it appeared as if the kiuf^s of lOurope only reij;5:ned bj 
pcrmifciMiou of Iiih chief and of liis arniH.'' 



nOOK IV.— (^MArTKIl I. 

>*Mapoleon satisliod with his pre[»arations, at huit^th de- 
clared himself?" 

Tbtis bef^ins the chapter. The jwithor fort^ets that in the 
prcce<ling pages ho has abown us the Emjicror *' incessantly 



(i4 rmricAi- iaaminai ion, nr 

ii'i'iiiilcd uihI (liH( onlcnitrd," Of vvlial (hen was Ihi Halislici), 
NiiMc all his rirorLs l,<i ohl.ain piiact^ wrrr uiiavailiiij^', niiil he 
WiiH olilig(i<l to uppual Ut Hi'iiiH? DooH Mr. <lo 8(ipi;iir nvihU i«> 
iiiNiiiiiain thai vvhiMi Na|iol(MMi ho archMiU}' (IcHirnl io prrHCU'vit 
|MMu-(% (hat it was in Iho liopr oi' ohi.aiiiiiiji; war :' II' \w (h\sii'(Ml 
io ni'ilo hiHtory iinpailiall}', he would not. Inivo paMSiMl hy in 
Hilcncc an important la (I luiown to all lOnropiv It. is tlnit, th» 
i'(^lin-n of Mr. I'l'dvost, l.ini Si'crctai'y of li«^fi;alion, who anivrd 
on tlici I '.Mil ot'.lnnr, at. <inuihinon, niono int'oi'niud the Knipi^roi- 
that tli(^ «ndri- j^ivrn to (MMUM-al LaniiNton, to p^o to iJKvKui- 
|)(Moi' Alcxundor, \va,s inrllot-tnal, as paHNport.s wcrr rcl'uHcd to 
liinii tmd tIniH ilui IhnI; liopo ol* proHorving prac.o was dtvMlroyod. 
II wa,s not iMitil lluiMi dajH alYor that, the Kniporor made his 
proclanuiticni to the arniy« 

** At 'rilwit Uuswia Hwore eternal alliance with Fnuiee, and 
war with h-nj;land. Slu^ now violates her oatlis. Shr will 
give no e\planati(ni of her capriciions eonduct, until tln^ Krench 
eagles Inive I't'pasMiMl th(^ Ithine; hy that means leaving"""' 
allies at her nuM'ey." 

Iler«i aiHi thr tine nioliv«>s of lln^ Mar IVankly ('xjiosed. Tho 
author does not. speak of thr proclamation of the l*jnperor Al- 
exander, except Io give it IIm^ superiority «)ver that of Napo- 
leon : he llnds it to lici siini>lc and motUnile. Simple! and the 
Kmpi^ror .\lc\ander made a ptdilical, religious, ami fanatical 
war. Moderate! yes, hut why wa.s it ho"? Heiuiuse this princ*-! 
AVilM alarmed at the false positi<ni in which he had placed him- 
seir. 

From th<i year IMK), all his actions had for object the invu- 
Hion of the I>nchv c»f Warsaw. Tlui arrival of the Kussian jU- 
vision from Moldavia «n« the frontit^rs of INdand ; the extraitr- 
dinary recruiting oarried on throughout tho whole Uussian 
empire, at a period when, with the exci>plion of tlie garrisons 
in the Prussian fortresses, there was throughout all (Jermany no 
French army, hut a weak one iit Uamhnrg, and tho private 
intrigues with the cabinet of Herlin had sullicicnlly disclosed 
liis plans. If these C(tuld have liet^n doubted, tho dispositiitMi of 
tho Jtussitin armies, jdaced on the borders of I'russia anU IV»- 



JiOOK IV, (J5 

land ; the iminmiHo iimf<a'/.iricN ('(tllnrldil ui Wilna, MhiHk, kc. 
would liav(^ cojiviinnd llni iriosi, iiu icdiilitu;,. 

Ill riMilHy. iC Alr.xundn* liiid wiHiiid lo itiikiiii ,,iiii|ily on IIki 
drJ'tinHJvr, Ik*, would noi liiivii Biationcd IiIh IroopM itl, a, diHlanco 
of Hixty Ifd^iM'.s IVoni Iiih iVonl.i(4rH, nor cHJaliliHlu d on (lie, (Ii'hI, 
line HU<'li 4-ii(M'iiiouH niiip;a7,inrM. HurpriNiMl liy IJki HkiU'iil uia- 
nii'iiviTM of IIk^ lOniiM'i'or, and liy llio i-a|iidil,y of Iiim niai-f Ih m, 
iK^Haw h'lH ccnti'c driven in, and IJio fate of U\h U'Xi win}j;,i(Miii- 
ai'drd. W<-. nuiy add, dial, at llMiHain(> liini^ lie. iiiado. IiIm pro- 
clamaljon, Ik) hchI. Iiis luiniMl.C;!- of |Mdi<;c., Italaclioll', fo ilir 
iMMid-quaHcfH of Napolron l,i» iirrcHi IJio inai'ch oi' I In-, l^'roncii 
army by rripjiicfl ii(if;olJa(iouH. Siicli wvnt (,li<'. raiiHcs ol' I he 
nioih'j'ale lone, of lh<-/ lOnipcrdi- Ah-x:indr.r\s proclainaiion. 



('IIAI'I Kit II. 

We now conu' lo Uie paHHaj:;*'. of Ihr, Nicitn'ii. — *' Nap(d<-oii, 
(HayH our anlhor,) who had (ravcllrd in a, carriage, (ill iJial 
linu^ now niounl,e,<l Imh liorHe." Doew Mr. de S(p;ur wish (,o 
have it believed (hat INapoieon dindainrd lo |»ar(i(;ipate in the 
f'ati/^iK^H of :i Holdicr, and theii'lore made war at Imh cnw) in a, 
rarriaf^e, :' ThoHe, who have, known him, are, well aware, that 
when any im|)ortant object did not demand hiH attention on u 
march, hi^ Nought in the eurriafj;'e, that repOHe, which bin miiiti 
liiriouH occupatioiiH preveiit<'.d him iVom ohtaiiiinp;'. liut mowt 
fre(|uently he waH e,n^aju;e,d in hiiHineHH while, in the (carriage 

" NajKdeoii rc,(otmoilr<<| the IJuHHiaii rivci-, (the, Nieinen,) 
without diH^^uiHin}^ liimHelf as ban be,c,n lalHcly aHHertcd." Hincr, 
Mr. de Hegur attachcH ho much iinportanct*. to appearing par- 
ticulai'ly adpiaiiitcd with a. very tiillirip,- cir<umHtaiu;e, ho 
Hhould havciniormed hiinHeH' better. It would have been cor- 
rect to Hay, that on the 9/Mi of June, the hiinperor clothed hirn- 
seir with a cloak and fatigue cap ol" a l'«diHli ligbt-horHeinaii, 
behmging to a H(|Uadron werving in biw giuird, to niconrioitre 

I 



gg CRITICAL EXAMINATION, fee. 

the Niemen. Napoleon did not cross this river under cover of 
the night, because he could not have chosen his point of passage 
in the dark 5 finally, because in June daylight begins in that 
country at two o'clock in the morning. How then can Mr. 
de Segur assert that Napoleon, during the reconnoitre crossed 
this boundary, when it was only at ten o'clock at night of the 
23d, that the army commenced its passage? Would he have 
allowed himself such a license unless for the sake of bringing 
forward the following remark: "that five months afterwards 
he was only able to repass under cover of the same obscurity," 
•which is as incorrect in fact, as it is malicious in intention. 

One might believe, from our author's description of the pas- 
sage of this river, and of the night during which it was effect- 
ed, that no one had ever before slept in a bivouac. What 
singular ideas would soldiers form of him while reading his 
jercmiades on passing a beautiful summer night under canopy 
of the stars ! Happily the French troops were not so much 
demoralized by that night's bivouac as was Mr. de Segur. 
Their courage was not chilled, since ** so great was their ar- 
dour, that two divisions of the advanced guard in disputing for 
the honour of being the first to pass, were near coming to 
blows." 

Further on, he stations Napoleon at the end of a bridge he 
had passed tvithoiU hesitation, to encourage the soldiers by his 
looks. These are the same soldiers who were near coming to 
blows, as he informed us, for tiie honour of crossing first. 

"They appeared indeed more animated than he,- whether 
it was that he felt oppressed by the weight of so great an ag- 
gression, or that his enfeebled frame could not support the ef- 
fect of t!ie excessive heat, or that he was already astonished to 
find nothing to conquer." 

Mr. de Segur is not aware, that when an army attempts 
to pass a river by surprise, that it manoeuvres in such a man- 
ner, as not to have an enemy to encounter. When this has 
succeeded, how can there be any astonishment that nothing is 
found to conquer ? The only obstacle to conquer was the river ^ 
and this was conquered. 

Mr. de Segur, however, is not. He has inore than one re- 



nooK IV, df' 

dorvc prepared ; *''tli© onrecbled frame of Napoleon could not 
suHliiiii (he. vtt'vii <»f llie o-xccwhIvc^ Im.uL" TIiiih, (he £»;<'H«'riil, 
wlio luid MO often liravi'd ilie rliinalc «>f Ktily in Uie doj^-dayn, 
wlio, amid the Sands of the desert, had Hiipported the ardours 
of a Syrian sun, could not, on th(^ 'Mlh of June, on (he hanks 
of th« Nienujji, resist the heiit of the nortli of Europe. Tho 
nuider may h»b tempted to believe, that it is another Napoleon 
who is uM^ant. In fact, the portrait traced hy Mr. <le. He/^ur, 
throughout his work, no niore rescuibhs the f^eneial of the ar- 
my of Itiily, (Juin him, who in the followin,^' year con<pa^red at 
liUt>:en, ai I'hampauhert and Montniirail. 

Our autlior agrees, that what he says is not piohiilih-, Itnt is 
not at all rmhari'iissed hy this. It is no longer the heat nor 
the aNlonishment at not linding the enemy, which deproNscg 
Na]»oleon, hut a moral cause : he J'fids this great aggrcHslou 
■/(udghing npim hin heart. The phrasct is not French — the sc-n- 
timentHtill lesH ho. Mr. de He^^ur forgets that in his preceding 
chapters he has sliown tlui princi*, Kourakin illctating an utti' 
matiiiUi which left no alt« ^•llativ«^ hut war; he IVngets that the 
RuHHian army was formed long before the French army, and. 
that the Kmperor Alexander was aJ. the head-ifaarters of this 
i^rand army, even before Napoh^on had quitted i'aris to go to 
Dresden J ho forgets these circumstances, detailed by himself, 
and which are all connectiMl wi(h the nifusal of keeping peace. 
By the conjunction atthongh., and by his multiplied alternatives, 
however^ ligures which ho is particularly li»nd of, he oft'ers 
nothing Intt riddles to the reader. But unfortunately, among 
all the words he gives, he never makes known the true. 

" He suddenly ilashed intc» the country, and penetrated the 
forest which girts tho siiles of the river. He set spurs to his 
horse ; he appeai'ed «mi fire to come into contact with the ene- 
uiy ahnu'v." 

How dares a writer, who holds a military title, travesty by 
an extravagance worthy of Don Quixotte, (he obvious action 
of a general in chief, who reconnoitres thegrciund on which he 
is to act? The Kmperor did not, as Mr. de Segur represents 
him, madly ride alomt through (,he, woods. He himself leaded 
a Hti'ong reconnoi(,erjng par(y of cavalry, and sejit odiers in 



i;^fi CmiUAI. ISHAMINA riON, i''i. 

M. Ilic (^iitti'lci* UiiiNl(M', knew noUiiu//, oi' l.liiN j il. in prolMiltlc 
itt^ iTiriiiiiK'.il iiciii' IIk^ U'hiM wUiWf. Witi liiiNJiirHK ai\U,t\ liiin. 

In giMicnil. iJii/i (:liii,|il('i' in ii inoi'fit'l lor i-fl'tH I, on wliirli Un* 
unllior ii|i|ii'Mt'fi lo Intvr. cfHinl.i il niniili. II, conliiinit nuilijM* Joi* 
a uK^IO'dntiriii. KicHl, wo liavt^ Uirt (Mnpi^nu' lying in IiIh tnnli 
r.flnidril in fivlmnnlUtn, 'iMili ti Hta^niml air in Uir wiihil <if mi 
iil>itriHHivi' heal i IJuMt vuuuh Uit^ niglil. % iir>nn^ iiii|>|ii 114 ci-onm U 
tim olJici- ItiinK J I,ln7 (Itiil a dngk (hitHack, v>ho dt',mmi,diiit'wlit> 
l/u'li urr I* rem linicn, jinnwci- liny. Il'/iahlii ijnu. wanlV Mayw 
lliiu olli( ( I', iinil inliy dit ijiin runic inlit IIuhhUi'^ A Mii,|i|(('.i- IniMJi- 
ly niplicH in liiiii, U> malm varm //«« / (,» lalw H^ilma, io lUim'' 
ale 1'ol.and. A(. Uh'mh wor«l»t llir (hnnuvk dlH(i,pjn'arH in llir 
■hxhhIh } Kircr miiHkrl nhtdn art- heard ; il in Ihr nii^nai llml Ihc, 
grand immdmi wan cmmmur.d. 'I'ho l^'rnncJi ( olnninw «l«ijU«. 
'* 'V\m yvti'twi tA' ( oii(|ii*-hI. iiilJiiniiMi llii-ii- iniiiginiiUonM." W<i 
tm-, Nii|Htl<-,oii IntfiMii (o |)liti.i-. l\^n I'nl on ihr UiiHHinn Irmforyt 
mid nnhrHilal.ingl'fl mako Ihr Jlrnl nlrp limumU hid ndn. 
To Ilic f/.criinn of « o»MjnrM(n, nut t rnln IJiiil, ol' ((MnpfulM. (hii* 
jiulJior <|ourt noi lorgrl, Mio onnuiK. 'I'hr hiirHr,oJ Mriinlriin Hhiin 
ItkH-^lhii day grown mnrki/, Ihr, wind rims, and a nlorm mntin 
on an ^rral an Ihr nilrrjiriHr f Tlie iirniy ift unwilling (o luv 
Imowhidgn (In^ rrjindiaiUm ol' ho f^nal. itn «if!;|j;r«iMHion. Tlic 
lu•Hlg'(^ ov(M' lln^ VIIIhi Iw bt'olion down.- Nii|ioI<i(mi Ihuumiu^m aw- 
grfi at i/ - II. Im Xim-hi'm, wlii|t|»iiif.v (iio llnlltviiionl. willi i-oiIn ; 
*' \wi iiHi'C.U (o (InHpiNi' il. likn I'viry lliing wliit li [o|i|iofii'.H liini, 
mill or(|(M'r4 it. HiiniMlion of ('olinh rtiviilry lo llirovv l.ln'niHrlvrM 
inio dm i'lv(M'." 1*liiM (innc.liiHinn nuikciN odinni HncciMMJ I'idi 
culr. 'I'ln^ iiitl.lMM' ciiHlH on l.lu^ niiMnory ol' llic. Mnipri'or. Illn 
lu I nHiilion ol liitving hik ril)r«Ml llir livoti oI'ho niiiny hnivn mini 
1.0 n N^inNidoNN iingor: lln^ lollowing In I.Iio tnilli. 

Nii|ki»loon iMiiving on llii'> Viliii, roiiinl (liiiliridgn ilriiLroyr.*!. 
WiMliiiif; 1.0 liiivi- iii-.WM of llir. riirniy, lio t»nliin.d a rii|iiailron ol 

,1'oliiMli liglil. lioi'Hn ol' l.liii gniii'd^ to |iiiMK ilic fivci* liko tlin Cun- 

* K \nwti iin- ili'ui m|iiuili'tiii, • iiuidril by the oliloi' Kotmlotulilili Klul 

i.nniiiiiinpd III ttu^ lii'Ml I iiiii|iMi)v, riiiilulii /iiliiHkl, iiiiil III!'. liHh it(iiii|mii>', Oup 
luiii H^i.iijityokl. Ui'iidiul Ki'UHiiiMki win* iMiniiimniliMl II11-. iTH'tiocnl. Utfaw 
toiiimvU' lutu tUo walut- in huv« uito ul' itlit muMIoi'm. 



HOOK IV (i«) 



iyHf;N, l»y nwiininin^. Home, ol (lirui, nol, nn p,uo«l lim ihum ii iiri 
tin? ichI, Mc,)mrii(,«(l IVoin (In-- HijUiulron ; ii lif^lil, lioiw, liiiicor id 
tlm fti'Nl, <;onn;iiii)'» fiaiiHMl Tr/r,liiwkl, w»iH lh« (inly orm who 
|ii^i'iHli<'(l. All ollicir III' IJi«', Miuut Hi|iitMti'oiu <'<him(; loHCipli 'An 
liiMlii, IIm'I) <'ii|iliMti, ill. pn-Hiwil, liiil III Uii? Mill/; ol i'ltlitiiil, liiiv 
iii^iiliiiniloMitl U'iH Uiivm uimI whh iif^iii' Ih^Iiik' ilrowiii.il : lie wiin 
mjivimI liy l,liiwiii|»|ii iH iiriil hoIiIii'ih itl'lJii-, llfrlil, liirmiljy. Wliiil, 
tti'c to Ih;i:oihi5 i>(' Mr. il<' Htji^uv'h liiiiu nlnUoiiH f Wliiil, \n; 
coifiuH of ll»« mnolinm i\f' hmrur md admiralim with wlilcJi Im 
NiipplicH till' tumy t 

It iw the Muiiir- with Uu;Hlarm Kvml an l/u; mUfiVprlMi It mmi. 
hn irAucMi Ut Ji wlinpli', k"m'' What l«(l our liiMtoi-larr iiiUi 
iJiTof, JM, that he hail I'l-ml in Lahaiimi-, that a fitorm hrold*, out 
at the moiiir,iit wIh'-ii tin-. lorjiH ol' thr, Vicr.roy paMHi-il the Nie 
men, on tin- '.iOth olMiine. lie hati applied it to the pa«Ha(<e of 
thivNIimien, hy the Knipi-i-or at Kowno, on the y,4th, wiMioul 
tronhliiif^ himwrll' with the live ilayw whieh oreniTeil hi'tweeii 
the, two oprnitionti. Hut Mr. lie Hef^ur iloew not loolt Hoelone 
ly, Moreove-r, hy hrewlnff thiM wtoriri at the Vi'.vy pawxa^e, ol' 
the Kinperor, he- it,\\/m IiIh Mtory a iniieh more ilramatie air, 
unil taki'/ii oeeaHion to ^rooji aroiinil thin pr<-le,iiih',il plniiome- 
nm, thoHO myMtic lelteetionM, whi(;ii ho wnW a,ii;rm with the 
eliuraeter ol' hiii minil. ft \mih only after the, i^^reat torrentw of 
rain mi,ntioni,il hy Lahanme,, that ho laif^e a niiniher of hori>ii')>4 
\m'Mm\, in conMe/juence of the Hiiihlen eohlneNH of the air. 

Hueh Im the, ili-,fi(;ription of the panHaj^e, of the NIemen, writ- 
titn, ah till-, phraHi- it*, in tin-, minanlii; (ilyh,, ninee. it i» lilled 
with (leMeriptionH anil little details, t'elaU'-d in Houndin;^ wonhi. 
Kor oiiriiidvi'.t^, we- qualify it am rowmwHt/uc, i thnw whonid a hl« 
tory III-, i.itllr.il, wlni'i'/ (lif, rir,;ir« I'.dt intrn-ilicnt in truth. 



70 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, Sec 



CHAPTER III. 

The author next transports us to Wilna, wliich he repre- 
sents as in a delirium of joy ; but he is careful to warn us 
that " this enthusiasm, unreflecting in some, and the mci'c ef- 
fect of excitement in others, was but of short duration : this 
unreflecting enthusiasm, is presented in the same page as the 
effect of a still living patriotism ; thus a patriotism, which has 
lived for a long time, is not an unreflecting patriotism. This 
patriotism was excited, according to our autlior, and notwith- 
standing, he says it was manifested by an universal effusion. 
But an CeTci/eJ sentiment cannot be anything but factitious. Mr. 
de Segur should inform us how it was produced. Had the 
police of Paris then preceded the advanced guard, to prepare 
applauses for the army when it entered Wilna ? 

Tlic Emperor there received an address from the Diet of 
Warsaw, to which he replied. Mr. de Segur hastens to ac- 
cuse him of having diilled by his answer, the zeal of the Poles, 
** they were unable to comprehend the cause of the circum- 
spection of his reply. They began to doubt tlie intentions of 
Napoleon ; even some of those around him asked what could 
be the motives of a prudence which appeared so unreason- 
able." 

If, by the persons who were around him, we are to under- 
stand the Quarter-masters of his palace, and some oflicers, 
who saw nothing in this campaign but a privation of the plea- 
sures of Paris, it is of little importance in history, to know 
what was asked by those around this prince. These gentle- 
men were very far from having the importance which they 
take upon themselves at present, and it is not according to 
their judgments the Emperor is to be judged. 

Docs any one wish to know why Napoleon did not say " the 
kingdom of Poland exists,'* as the deputies of the Polish con- 
federation requested of him ? They arc the following : the 



BOOK IV. 7 j 

Emperor had many interests to conciliate, and duties to dis- 
charge. His first duty was to procure peace, and his first in- 
terest to enter into no engagements, but such as should be 
subordinate to the interests of France. If hcy whose every 
•word was a decree^ had said, " the kingdom of Poland exists," 
he would not have laid down his arms until it actually existed. 
If this kingdom owed its existence to the unanimous efforts ol: 
a population which covers countries so distant and extensive, 
nothing could liavc imposed on him the obligation not to ac- 
knowledge, still less to destroy it. It was a dilfercnt thing to 
be bound by circumstances, or his free will. He had not 
bound Austria to the cession of a part of Galliciaf except in case 
hy the event of a war, the kingdom of I'oland should be re-estab- 
lished, (terms of the treaty of alliance.) What arc we to un- 
derstand by event of a war ? It was peace, which by termi- 
nating, would have liberated Poland. This could not be, since 
the war was scarcely commenced, the insurrection, which at 
the single sentence, Poland exists, would have burst fortlt in 
Austrian Gallicia, a province containing a.s many hearts de- 
voted to their country, as those where the sentiments of inde- 
pendence is the most enthusiastic. Austria know and feared it. 

Was Napoleon, at Wilna, in a position to say the solemn 
wordsr which would have justified the fears of this power, and 
to withhold those alone which could have satisfied her ? Arc 
his duties, his interests, and conduct, sulUcicntly explained ? 
These are not conjectures, nor the rumours about head-quar- 
ters, but the substance of instructions then given to Count 
Otto. In the campaign of 1806, against Prussia, when Rus- 
sian Poland only was in question, Na[)oleon maintained the 
same reserve, because then, as at all times, ]>eace was the ob- 
ject of his wars. 

Mr. dcSegur, after having laid before us the politics of the 
guard-room, depicts the coldness of Lilhndnia, to which was 
attributed even the expressions of her patriotism, and whence re- 
sulted, both to Napoleon and her, " a false position, wherein 
every operation terminated in errors, contradictions, and half- 
way measui'es." 

To complete the whole, he adds, that Napoleon suffered a 



72 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

provisional government to be formed, " the choice of which 
was unlucky in some points ; it displeased the pride of an aris- 
tocracy, at all times difficult to gratify." It is unfortunate for 
the historian that none of this is true. The Lithuanian govern- 
ment, composed of seven members, counted six chosen from 
their highest nobility ; Count Soltan, Prince Alexander Sa- 
pieha. Count Potocki, Count Sierakowski, Count Prozor, and 
Count Tysenhaus. The seventh, Mr. Sniadecki, had been de- 
signated as representing the celebrated University of Wilna, 
of which he was president. The election of these persons waa 
unanimously approved, 

"Napoleon counted on four millions of Lithuanians, of 
whom only a few thousands joined him." The whole popula- 
tion joined him and served in his cause. 

** A guard of honour had been decreed to him, (says Mr. de 
Segur) three horsemen alone followed him." After Napoleon 
had quitted Wilna more than a month, the Prince Sapieha 
proposed to him a guard of honour, of which he sent him the 
list, and the Emperor, little disposed to receive it, had only 
accepted of fifty persons. It was found to be much more con- 
siderable, and by order of Napoleon became the nucleus of 
the second regiment of Polish light horse of the guards, the 
command of which was given to the brave General Koriopka. 
Mr. de Segur never saw them ; he was never informed of their 
fate, for he would without doubt have informed us, that several 
hundred young men, belonging to the most distinguished fa- 
milies of Lithuania, were surprised by a division of cavalry 
commanded by General Czaplitz, Aid-de-camp to the Empe- 
ror Alexander, and fell into the hands of the enemy at Slonim. 

This event should not have escaped the historian, who takes 
note of three horsemen, according to the Quarter-master, who 
were three Polish gentlemen whom the Prince of Neufchatel 
had attached to the staff as interpreters. There are few pages 
in this history without some such blunders. 

We say nothing of the great debate between the Polish ge- 
nerals accompanying the Emperor, and some officers in his 
service. The imaaination of our author has, according to his 
system, only arranged these conversations, to show the cool- 



jgaOK IV. 73 

ness of the Lithuanians. The devotion, the sacrifices., and 
misfortunes of that noble country might have inspired him 
with more elevated ideas. 

** That victory was postponed by the flight of the enemy. 
The Emperor might have waited for his convoys — but he did 
not wish to forego his grasp. He therefore pushed forward 
400,000 men [he emphatically adds, for fear that we should 
not praise such activity] in a country which was incapable of 
feeding the 20,000 Swedes of Charles XII." 

The plan of the Emperor completely succeeded. From the 
opening of the campaign he had cut off the left wing command- 
ed by Prince Bagration, the corps of Doctoroff, as well as the 
Russian division Dorokow,* from the centre of the army, 
which was obliged to fly near the Duna, upon his camp at 
DrissV, abandoning the immense magazines collected in Li- 
thuania and Samogitia, leaving us master of these provinces. 

Having arrived at Wilna, the Emperor did not push forward 
400,000 men upon the track of the enemy. He manoeuvred 
the first and fourth corps to prevent the separated coi'ps of the 
Russian army from reuniting on the Duna, at the same time 
that with the principal corps, he marched against Barclay d© 
Tolly. We might have expected from these operations the 
destruction of Bagration, who, fronted by marshal Davoust, 
having the Viceroy on his flank, and pushed by the King of 
Westphalia at the head of more than sixty thousand men, could 
not have passed the Dneiper without giving battle to forces, 
which by their superiority would have crushed him. 

• This division, forming the advanced guard of Count Schouwalcf, was sta- 
tioned at Orany, which the disorder at head-quarters, after the movement of 
the Emperor, caused to be forgotten. It was forced to follow the movement 
of Bagration upon Smolensk. The corps pf DoQtorofF alone, gained the 
citmp at Drissa, by abandoning its baggage and a great pum|)er cf carriages, 



K 



74 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 



CHAPTER IV. 

Mr. de Segur gives himself ample scope in this chapter j he 
enumerates the pillages, hurnings, disorders, and miseries 
which he says, signalized the march of the army. We shall make 
but one remark, that during the wars of the fine times of Louis 
XIV. of those of Marshal Saxe, or Marshal Broglio ; in the 
brilliant campaigns of Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, and Wagram. 
if a writer had amused himself with minutely describing what 
passed in the rear of the army, he would have made pictures 
similar to those of Mr. de Segur, and caused the same emo- 
tions in the drawing-rooms of Paris, as have been excited by our 
author. This historian deliglits much in scenes of disorder 
and pillages ; he has really a vocation as painter of disasters. 
Here follows a specimen of his style, which without doubt will 
not open for him the doors of the academy. To avoid fatiguing 
the reader, we shall only extract from a single page. 

** A position of so much excess, engendered fresh excesses. 
These rude men, with arms in their hands, assaulted by so 
many events, could scarcely remain moderate." 

** They took their revenge of the proprietors by destroying 
their property." 

" There were some who actually destroyed themselves rather 
than proceed to such extremities." 

'•^ Many became callous, one excess led to another, as people 
often grow angry with the blows which they inflict." 

** In the midst of so inauspicious an aspect of nature they 
became denaturalized." 

" They imagined that their sufferings authorised them in 
making others suffer." 

Faithful to his habit of self-contradiction, Mr. de Segur 
tells us some lines farther on, " in other respects, these disor- 
ders were very rare in Lithuania." 

3oon after, he pretends that a marshal tells the Emperor 



BOOK IV, ys 

that several soldiers of the young guard were dead of hunger. 
He makes Napoleon suddenly interrupt this report, and ex- 
claim, (because the Emperor always exclaims^ never speakSf 
in Mr. de Segur's book,) " It is impossible, where are their 
twenty days provisions ? Soldiers well commanded never die 
of hunger." 

This answer was very just. But the palace officer attri- 
butes it to the desire of escaping pain by incredulity. 

Next we have as usual, the fictitious gossip of head-quar- 
ters. Those to whom the marshal returned from Spain went 
to make his complaints, and who without doubt had a mission 
to explain them, ought indeed to have been named. It is 
doubted whether they would ratify the words the author places 
in their mouths. As to the conversations, made up long af- 
ter, in which it is stated, " that the health of their leader was 
impaired — that he could not survey the difficulties without con- 
tempt — in order to preserve the energy requisite to surmount 
them — that already disturbed and fatigued by the new and 
critical situation into which he had thrown himself — he march- 
ed, always pushing forward, in order to put an end to it as 
soon as possible"^ — are only remarkable as displaying the inco- 
herence of ideas natural to a writer who does not know what 
he wishes te say. 

He terminates the chapter by saying, that the dispositions 
of Napoleon ** were dictated by the most clear sighted pru- 
dence ; but that he had suffered himself to be carried away by 
habit — ^by the necessity of short wars, rapid victories, and 
sudden peace." This reflection is wrongly founded. When 
a serious question was presented to the mind of Napoleon, he 
examined it on all sides with that great perspicacity, which is 
the eagle glance of genius ; and when he perceived its advan- 
tages, his decision was as quick as lightning. It was this 
promptitude in execution which led superficial observers to 
believe, that he allowed his passions to run riot, and trusted 
too much to chance. 



76 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c 



CHAPTER V. 

The Russians were retreating in every direction. Soon after 
Mr. dc Balachoff presented himself at "Wilna, with a message 
from the Emperor Alexander ; ** however, (adds de Segur) there 
were no fresh overtures, either verbal or written, presented by 
Balachoff. Napoleon did not hesitate ; he would not stop at 
Paris, liow could he retreat at Wilna ?" 

The author appears not to know that Mr. de Balachoff came 
to propose to Napoleon an armistice, and to negotiate a peace, 
on condition that the French army should repass the Niemen. 
The Emperor did not hesitate^ and ought not to have hesitated, 
to reject these propositions. Nevertheless, his great desire foi" 
peace made him reply, that he would voluntarily negotiate 
without concluding an armistice, and by preserving tho^ coun- 
try which each occupied. Would the Quarter-master have 
■wished Napoleon to repass the Niemen with all his troops, 
abandoning all the advantages which his successful plan of 
the campaign had procured him, aiid thus have given to the 
Russians time to reach their entrenched camp at Drissa? 
Such, indeed, would have been the result of the acceptation of 
the propositions brought by Balachoff. 

Our author has seen in the mission of Balachoff what no one 
has. discovered except himself, " that Alexander never would 
address or even answer Napoleon any more." ^Ir. de Segur 
seems to have but one object ; that of presenting our enemies 
always under the most favourable aspect, and casting on us 
the reproach of aggression. The injurious expressions he at- 
tributes to the Emperor, speaking to Mr. de Balachoff on the 
subject of Alexander and his generals, refute themselves. 
. *' Then, pointing out Caulaincourt to the Russian minister, 
* there,' said he, * is a faithful knight of your Emperor j he is 
a Russian in the French camp.' " Titen follows a long quar- 
rel between Caulaincourt and Napoleon. The recital cannot 
be otherwise than inexact, since it is not in character, and be- 



p 



BOOK IV. 77 

cause no one about the Emperor could permit himself to be 
wanting in the respect due to him. Moreover, how are we to 
explain this pretended anger of the Duke of Vicenza, because 
the Emperor had called him a Russian^ when Mr. de Segur 
says, in the third chapter of his second book, that this Duke 
answered Napoleon firmly, (who accused him of having be- 
come a Russian, and having been seduced by the Emperor 
Alexander) Fes, Sire, because I believed him a Frenchman at 
heart. It appears that the Duke of Vicenza would not have 
refused a title at Wilna in which he had gloried at Paris. 

After a superficial sketch of the march of the King of Na- 
ples towards the Duna, and that of our right against Doctoroff 
and Bagration, Mr. de Segur thus expresses himself: ** se- 
veral persons have pretended that there was too much circum- 
spection, or too much negligence, in the first operations of the 
invasion." Thus, the author accuses Napoleon of tardiness^ 
forgetting that until now he has accused him of precipitation. 

Like those who, to give more weight to their assertions, im- 
agine details and circumstances, Mr. de Segur, in order to 
convince his reader that he has studied the Emperor minutely, 
physically as well as morally, describes him at Wilna as ** ly- 
ing down to inspect his maps, which he was obliged to do on 
account of the short sight which he shared with Alexander the 
Great and Frederick the Second." 

Napoleon was not near-sighted. M. the Quarter-master 
knows not that to examine a map militarily it is necessary to 
look at it very closely. We should not have taken notice of 
this, were it not a new proof that Mr. de Segur has never seen 
Hie Emperor in his privacy. 



7S CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 



CHAPTER VI. 

Our right wing " had in front of it a general and country 
difficult to conquer." But from the opening of the campaign, 
this general, ** difficult to conquer,''* endeavoured to retreat to 
the centre of the Russian army from which he was cut off. The 
skilful manoeuvres of Napoleon rendering his efforts vain, he 
had no other choice than that of plunging into the morasses in 
his rear, to arrive on the Dnieper before the French. If Da- 
voust on one side, and the King of Westphalia on the other, had 
executed the orders they had received, the exit from these 
marshes would have been closed on Bagration. Napoleon ex- 
pected every moment to hear news of the surrender of the Rus- 
sian general and his forty thousand men. He was at Wilna 
with a strong reserve, prepared to receive the reports from his 
right and left, and those of the movements of the enemy op- 
posed to him. He could not relinquish this central situation, 
before he knew what Bagration would attempt, so long as this 
general threatened to attack him. He was employed at the 
same time in organizing the government of Lithuania, erect- 
ing fortifications around its capital; gaining acquaintance 
with the plans of the enemy; hastening the arrival of his 
equipages of bridges, of bis parks of artillery, and his nume- 
rous convoys of provisions ; in short, in keeping alive the en- 
thusiasm of the Poles. 

To these powerful motives, which detained the Emperor at 
Wilna, Mr. de Segur judges it opportune to add that of a pre- 
tended loss of strength. This opinion, which he repeats in- 
cessantly, and whence he deduces the origin of the faults which 
he attributes to the Emperor, and, as we have already stated, 
entirely without foundation. ^ vigorous constitution no longer 
seconded him as heretoJorCf he says to those who approach 
this genius so vast, &c. his corpulence, and the baths lie used, 
form a subject of regret and sad reflections to them. 

Napoleon, from his youth, was accustomed to use baths, not 



BOOK iV, 79 

'< as an indispensable relief from bodily ailments, which his 
policy carefully concealed," but first, because habit made them 
necessary ; and, moreover, assiduous employment in the cabi- 
net, and fatigue, rendered them of service to him. The man 
was never more wanting to the hero, than the hero was want- 
ing to the man. Our author often sacrifices truth to the desire 
of making brilliant antitheses. 

This enterprise, which until now he has represented as un- 
timely, and which he here calls perhaps the most useful to 
Europe, did not fail in consequence of a stormy day and a sud- 
den fever. All that was humanly possible, was attempted and 
accomplished. The battle of Morkeva had all the success it 
could have had. It was not the ill health of the French leader, 
more than the skill of the Russian generals, which caused this 
European enterprise to fail : it was the premature cold. 

By the emphatic description which the author has given of 
the Berezina, he seems to fear that the sufferings experienced 
by the army on its return, will not be sufficiently known ! 
The geographical knowledge he displays is still defective when 
he advances ** that all the rivers which in this country flow in 
a direction from one pole to the other, have their eastern banks 
higher than their western, as in Europe." The northern part 
of Europe forms a plain, of which Moscow may be taken as 
the centre. Hende, beyond that capital, the descent of the 
plain makes, on the contrary, the eastern banks of the rivers in 
this country lower than their western. 



CHAPTEH Til, 

As soon as Napoleon was certain that Bagration coulrf not 
reach Wilna, and learned that tlie army of Barclay de Tolly 
was concentrated in the intrenched camp at Drissa, he moved 
upon the central point of Glubokoe. From the time the Rus- 
sians knew of this movement, they feared lest Napoleon should 



80 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &,ff. 

arrive before them ut Witcpsk, where they hoped to join Bn- 
.t^i'iition, Jind took that direction in j^reat haste. Naj)oU«oii, 
learnini;- Ihe evacuation ol' the canip at Drissa, guessed tlicir 
proj't'c t, and marched in that direction. 

'riie l^iUiperor Alexander* tbrcod to abandon the great niaga- 
•/linrs he liad Cornicd on the line of (►periition by rck(>\v, (piitted 
his army to return to Moscow, jIn order to create new resour- 
ces, botli ol' subsistence and nnm. The pi-oclamations he then 
made were not distinguished by the s]>irit ol" moderation, so 
much vaunted of by Mr. de Scgur, in speaking ol" tiiat which 
was ]»ublished at Wilna. Must we conclude that the charac- 
ter of Alevander was changed ? 11', as our historian says, the 
th'sl depicted his character, the last slionid eiiually do so. Na- 
pi)h'on is (U'signated under the name of Moloch, and the French 
to a race of locusts tvhich scorched the earth, and which the 
cartk rrinilsiul,, Jtndini; Ihem loo Ju'avij for her oulrai^^cd hosoni. 
^Vhat is this dillerence to be attributed to ? Did it not arise 
from AlexamhM's not being under the same necessity of dis- 
sinmlatiiig ? These are the darts which the Parthiaus launched 
while Hying. 

Najtoleon directed his central force upon Bczonkowiski. 
lie went to Kanien "always in a carriage, except during the 
night, eillior from necessity or i|)erhaps with a view to keep 
his soldiers in ignorance of the inability of their chief to par- 
ticipave in their fatigues." 

M'liese insinuations show that this author is either absolutely 
ignorant of the details of the Kmperor's mode of living during 
war, or prove against him a feeling of injustice which induces 
him constantly to represent this |)ri!ice in an unfavourable 
light. We (^innot answer his allegations to greater advantage 
than by making knoNX^ how JNapoleon spent his time whilst he 
was with tlie army. 

The active lif(> lie led in the lields was subordinate to nnli- 
tary operations. Habitually he marched on horseback with 
the army when it was in motion and near the enemy. When it 
Wiis performing great evolutions, ami the operations took 
place at considerable distances, he waited mitil the corps which 
were oil thomiU'cU were near the positions indicated. He re- 



BOOK IV. 81 

maincd then at head quarters. There he devoted his attention 
to the internal administration of France, and answered the re- 
ports which were daily addressed to lum from I'aris by his 
ministers: for he governed the empire at the same time he di- 
rected his army. Economical of his time, he calculated the 
moment of his departure, so as to he at the head of his corps at 
the moment when his presence was necessary. He then tra*- 
veiled rapidly in his carriage. But even during such a jour- 
ney, he was not idle. lie was employed in reading <lespatches, 
and most generally he received the reports of his generals, and. 
expedited his answers immediately. The despatches from 
Paris were sometimes sent to him at the same time. A lamp 
suspended in his carriage enahled him to work during his 
journeys at night, as if he were in his cabinet. At the doors 
always marched his aides-de-camp and secretaries, and a bri- 
gade of his saddle-horses follow<^d with the escort. 

It was thus he remained at Wilna while a part of his army 
marched upon the Duna. He did not quit this town until the 
16th, at ten o'clock P. M.* Early on the I7th. he was at 
Swentziani, where, having received a report which informed 
him that the ejiemy had repassed the Duna at Druia, and sur- 
prised the cavalry commanded hy Bchasliani, he sent new 
orders to the corjjs of the army and arrived amidst his troops 
at Glubokoe on the 1 8th at noon. He did the same in his march 
upon Kamen and Ilezenkowiski, where he arrived at the very 
moment the corps ordered airivcMJ there. - 
* Such was the privileged organization of this great man in 
every thing, that he could sleep an hour, lie wakcrl to give an 
order, and again address himself to sleep, without injury to 

* We have seen above that the corps of Marshal Duvousl had marched in 
the direction of Minsk. He an-ived there on tlic 8Ui, and departed on the 
13th, always flanking- BagTation's left ; passiiifj by Yg-umon, he crossed the 
Berezina at Bcrcslrio, and arrived at Mohilof on the 20tl), tiiua preventing the 
junction of Bagration's amiy with tliat of Barclay on llic Duna. 'Die corps 
of the viceroy had quitted tlie environs of Wihia (Neutroki) on the 7tii, and 
passing by Ochmiana, arrived on tlie 17tli at Dokszitzi. Marshal Morticr ar- 
rived with tlic guard and with the Bavarian cavalry on the 16th at Cilubokoe. 

h 



g2 CltrncAI. K.^:AMINATION, &,c, 

Ilis repose oi- health. Six hours of sleep m ere enough for him., 
whether lie tt)ok theid iu succcssiou or at diflcrcnt intervals 
in the twenty-four hour's. 

On the (lay preceding a great haltle, he was constantly on 
horsehack, to reconnoitre tlic force and position of the enemy, 
study the field of hattle, and visit the hivouacs of his army. 
Even dui'ing the niglit he visited the line again, to assure him- 
self of the enemy's force by the number of his fires, and in 
some hours he would tire down several horses. On the day 
of battle he placed himself at a central point, whence he could 
sec all that passed. Near him were his aids and secreta- 
ries, lie sent them in all directions with orders. At some 
distance in the irar of him, were four squadrons of the guard, 
two on each hand, but whcji he quitted this position he only 
took a squadr(ni as an escort. He commonly pointed out 
to his marshals the j)lace he had chosen, in order to be more 
easily found when they sent messages to him. As soon as his 
presence became necessary at any point, he set out for it at full 
gallop. 

How can Mr. de Scgur have the simplicity to say, that it 
wus not a jmcrile Taniiif which induced Napoleon to pass tiie 
Duna? To whose nuud coidd such a puerility present itself? 
The Emjieror passed tlie Duna to reconnoitre personally, in 
ordei- to discover whether the army of Barclay dc Tolly had 
already passed this point, in his march upon Witepsk; of this 
5ic assured himself. 

Aftei* having eulogised the precision of the marches of sAl 
the corps, which at the end of a month's separation and a hun- 
dred leagues from the point they had left, arrived at Bezen- 
Ixonviskl on the mmc day and hour. Mr. de Segur gives an 
exaggerated account of tlie tumult produced in the town, by 
this junction. He cannot be ignorant, however, that all the 
armies in the world show the same aspect, when a great num- 
ber of ti'oops are concentrated at a capital point. Is this cir- 
cumstance peculiar to our troops, or does he seek to pass them 
for an undisciplined horde ? 

« On the 25 th of July, Murat proceeded towards Ostruno 
with liis cavalry. At two leagues from that village, Domont, 



BOOK IVi 83 

Dii Coetlosquet, Cai-ignan, and the 8tJi hussars, were advan- 
cing in column.'* 

In reading this passage, might not one suppose that Messrs. 
Domont, Coetlosquet, and Carignan, were all generals at 
least, since he names them as he does Murat, without giving 
them any title ? It would he a great mistake ; these gentlemen 
were simply officers in the 8th hussars, and we may know why 
he hrings forward their names in this manner, by inquiring 
to whom they are related. 

The corps of Osterman attempted to defend the defiles of 
Ostrouno j produciug a sufficiently sharp action. Mr. de Se- 
gur docs not perceive that he attacks the honour of one of our 
brave regiments, (the 24th of the line) by saying that " many 
others, who under the pica of sup]>orting the wounded, or of 
being wounded themselves, successively abandoned their 
ranks'." It is a gratuitous stain he has cast upon the French 
glory- The Quarter-master of the palace was not ir#that af- 
fair. He could not for the same reason, say that he saw Mu- 
rat at the head of a regiment of Polish lancers, charging in 
spite of hincisclf, pushed by the " Polish lances, couched and 
condensed behind him." The author should have known 
enough of military matters to have been aware that the inter- 
val between the squadrons, must have been quite sufficient to 
have allowed the king of Naples to retire, had not his personal 
bravery induced him to make the charge. 

The following assertion is another attack upon the reputa- 
tion of a French regiment. The Russians defended a wood, 
" the 92d regiment intimidated by the heavy fire which issued 
from it, and bewildered by ashower of balls, remained immo- 
vable, neither daring to advance nor retreat, restrained by 
two opposite fears — the dread of danger, and the dread of 
shame." 

How can the Quarter-master of the palace thus assume the 
office of tarnishing the honour of our regiments ! As he was 
not present at the affair, he should have read the report of 
prince Eugene ; he would have found that prince, in speaking 
of this regiment, thus expressing himself — " It required the 



^4 ( UlTfC/VL KXAMTNATION, ^c 

vsihmr nl" ihc iioops, juhI ilic stcjuirasiiicss of tlio t^onerals who 
(-oiniuaiulcil (liciii, to succeed in no dilUcuIt an attack." 



( iiArrFji vrir. 

'I^ii". Kroncli army, niivv liaviiii^ I'cpniscd ilie Uiissiaiis in 
the liijfhl of Oslrovvno, contiiiiiod to march upon Witcpsk. On 
the 27th, the Russian army was discovered in order oF hattle 
near lliat town. The Firiuh advanced guard made it«tdispn~ 
MJtious Ibi' approac hint;' (he riuMuy ; tlie presence of the Empe- 
ror also aiignuuited tlie ar(h)urof his troops. 

•♦ 'V\w Kinp; of Naph's, whose hrain was intoxicated hy the 
i;eneral<lnotice he attracted, yiehlins;' liiniself to liis usual im- 
petuosity, ur,4?ed the Chasseurs of the 16th upon the Russian 
cavalry. All eyes heheld with terror, that feeble Firuch line 
broken on its march by the deep ravines which intersected the 
ground, advancin:;' to attack the enemy's masses. These un- 
fortlnlat(^ men, sooint;- themselves about to be sacrificed, pro- 
ceeded with liesitatius;- steps to certain destruction. — In conse- 
quence, at the first niovement made by tlie lancers of the Rus- 
sian guard, thoy took to llight — but the ravines, which it yvas 
necessary to pass, obstructed tlu^ir llight — they were precipi 
tated into them, where many perished." 

This circumstance is represented yvith as much inexactness 
as partiality lor tlie Russians. AVe see with regret the injus- 
tice «lone to a handful «d" brave men. 

After having passed the little bridge which separated us 
fnnu the eiuMn> , the Kith Chasseurs, preceded by two compa- 
nies of liglit infantry, of the Oth regiment of the line, were to 
form in front of the detile, in order to facilitate the passage to 
the other corps which followed. The left of the UUh Chas- 
seurs supported the light infantry, who had gained the hank 
of the Duua. The UUh did not advance to charge the enemy, 
but only to gain the ground and prevent the bridge from being 



BOOK IV. 85 

encumbered. It was at this moment tliat the cavalry of the 
RuHsian guard, |)rotc(;ted by the (ire of a battery of 12 pieces, 
charged this regiment, wliich was led by General Pire. The 
J Gib CbasHeurH endeavoured to employ a marueuvro which 
had already succeeded several times; it received the charge 
without moving, and at thirty ])aces distance dis(;harg(',d their 
carbines. Tlie velocity of the Russian cavalry was not check- 
ed by this fire, and the ranks of the 1 6th were necessarily 
thrown into confusion. This regiment was driven back upon 
our infantry, but its loss was inconsiderable, and much less 
than that of the Russians. The latter lost a great many men, 
by attempting to carry the two com])anies of V(dtigeurs, who 
had been passed liy, and who by th(;ir lire, made a rampart of 
the enemy's horses and horsemen j such is the fact. Where 
then did the Quarter-master of the palace learn, that the; brave 
Chasseurs of the iGth, marched wilh kcHUalion to a certain tU;- 
strudion, about to ha sacriJUxd^ and Jlyins; on the first movement 
of the Russians. '^I'ljese pusillanimous sentiments could never 
have entered into the hearts of confjuering French soldiers. In 
a work dedicated to the veterans of the (Irand Army, and in 
which we remark so many minute details, Mr. de Scguishould 
have mentioned the names of the two brave captains who com- 
manded the companies of the ninth, (iniilard and Havary ; it is 
true, however, that these are ph^beian names. 

The author represents Napoleon as hesitating to attack the 
enemy in the position they occupi(id. " Tbe.sohliers were as- 
tonished," says he, " at this inactivity, at the moment of hav- 
ing overtaken an army." lie shows us Murat " unalile to 
convince his chief, rashly proceeded to pitch his tent almost in 
the midst of the enemy." That our troops, animated by the 
sight of the Russians, expressed the; great(!st d<',sire of attack- 
ing them at orjce, may be conceived, but that the king of Na- 
ples pressed the Emperor to attack an army of nearly a hun- 
dred thousand men in position, with tlu; few forces he had in 
line, is to attribute to this prince, language and opinions, 
which his warlike habits could not have given rise to. 'Vu re- 
connoitre an army well, which occupied more than a league of 
swrfsice, th<! most skilful man, with the greatf-st activity and 



S(i (iniKlAL KXAMINATION, he. 

goiiiiis (toulil not lijivc dono in loss than a day. A first rccon- 
noit^«^ vvcmhl Ikivc only given a ij;('iici'al idea ; a second rccon- 
noiti'(^ at midday, was necessary to decide his plan of attack, 
of tho which the third, made in tlic cveninj^, would confirm the 
arriiiif^enients. It was only then he i^ave his orders for the 
next day, and he iiassed (lie nijjjht in judging, hy the arrange- 
ment of the fires, whether the (iieiny had not chan^'ed his line. 

(lenri-al liarclay altei'iid his determination, and during the 
night the jlussian army retired in all directions. 

Listen to Mr. de Segiir's description of the Russian camp : 
** Every thing ahont that camp exhihitod the science of war ; 
the aymmctiy of all its parts; the exact and exclusive nicety 
in the use to which each of them had heen applied ; the order 
and neatness which theme resulted ; there aj)peared more or-' 
dor in their defeat than in our victory!" &,c. 

It appears that Mr. de Scgur, whose duties call«>il I'im ^o 
AVitepsk to prepare the Kmperor's quarters, never saw this 
much vaunted camp. We, who were charged with its exami- 
nation in iletail, found it in extreme irregularity, great un- 
cleanness, and so confused that it was impossible to estimate 
the number of men and animals who had bivouacked in that 
place. 

In relation to the lessons which the Quarter-master gives 
us from tlie Hying U.Hssians, we nuMition only to show in what 
spirit his hook is written, and what nation ho wishes to 
please. 

*' As soon as the Emperor had made up his mind, ho returu- 
ca\ to Witepsk w ith his guard. There, on the 28th of July, in 
entering the imperial head-epiarters, he laid down his sword, 
and abruptly depositing it on tiie maps with which his table 
was covered, ' Here 1 stop ;' here I must look round me; ral- 
ly ; refresh my army, and organize Poland. 'JMie campaign 
of IRIO, is finished ; that of I8k> will do the rest." 

The Emperor, in advancing rapidly upon AVitepsk, had a 
double object, that of reaching this city before the army of 
Barclay, and of preventing a re-union with the division of Ba- 
gration. As soon as he was apprized of the prec ipitate re- 
treat of Barclay on Smolensk, in order to rejoin Bagration, 



HOOK V. 87 

who Ijad escaped the pursuit of the filth aud eighth corps, he 
shouhl liave halted. The reasons for this halt, as given hy 
Mr. dc Segur, arc just ; hut as if it cost the author too much 
to he always consistent; he makes the Emperor ohserve, *Hli£ 
campaign of 1812 it Jinished ; that 0/ 1 H 1 3 will accnmjdish the 
rest;" and he devclopes this idea in the following chapter. 

It surely would never occur to a military man that Napo- 
leon would wish to take up winter quarters in the month of 
July. 



BOOK v.— CHAPTER 1. 

♦* With the conquest of Lithuania the ohject of the war was 
attained." The author forgets here all that he has said in the 
first chapters of his work, that the war on England was to he 
carried on in Russia; that it was necessary that the Russians- 
should he driven into Asia ; *' that this expedition was Iiidis 
pensahlc to the completion of a great design, now cJHiost ac- 
complished, that his ohject was not unattainahle, and that the 
means for fulfilling it were amply sulfH^icnt." I'hc true ohject 
of the war was to ffjrcc the Emperor Alexander to make peace, 
and to enter into that alliance he once had sworn to, against 
England. But Mr. dc Segur only lays down these maxims 
that he may draw this conclusion, that the Emperor ought to 
halt at IVitepsk. 

After speaking of the difllerent cstahlishments formed in this 
city, he adds, *' neither was the useful alone attended to, em- 
hellishment was also considered. Some stone houses spoiled 
tlie appearance of the square of the palace; the Emperor or- 
dered his guard to pull them down and clear away the ruh 
hish." Would it not he helieved from this, that JSupoicon 
really occupied himself in emhellishing the city of Witepsk C 
If he ordered the demolition of these houses which encumher 
ed the place before the mansion he occupied, it was in order 



HH ORITICAL EXAMINATION, &.c. 

Unit llic iroopH should have space to jiass in review. Added to 
which, it is alway.s pioper that the environs of head-quartcri* 
shoiihl 1)0 iiniiuiinihered. 

Mural hrini^s the Kmi)eror information that " \hv Russian 
army was panic struck, which his lit^ht cavalry alone was suf- 
ficient to put to llii^ht." To this ehuliition of ardour lie makes 
.Naj)ohM)n repl;y jpiite seriously : " Two threat rivers mark out 
our position, let us raise hlock-houses on that line ; let our fires 
cross each other m\ all sides ; let us form in square battalion ; 
cannon at the angles and at the exterior ; let the interior con- 
tain our quarters and inaga/jnes/' 

The author shouhl have ^t^iven us some details respecting this 
a^irat stiuare haUnium, iviih lis fins vrossiiii^ on all sides. He 
iievertheh^ss leallj a])])ears to compreheiul these arrangements, 
since he adds, ** It was thus his genius conceived every thing 
in masses, and his eye expatiated over an army of 400,000 
men, as if it were a i-egimont." « 

Hut Mr. de. Segur represents Napoleon to us as issuing no 
order, if we except that of coiumanding the ,s/<'i,T <)/* Jfohruisk, 
(situated in the midst of a marsh,) to be undertaken ivith ca- 
valrii. Such absurdities contradict themselves. The division 
of Dombrowski, which the author supposes reduced to 1200 
men, really consisted of twelve battalions, and one brigade of 
liiijht cavalr.Y, Ibrming together about DOOO men. It was em- 
ployed in watching the Russian division of General Ihertel, 
and the fortress of Hobniisk. General Dombrowski was to 
surround this place, which was in a bad state of defence, with 
his inlmitry, whilst his cavalry were to clear the environs. He 
had with him twenty-four pieces of artillery. Besides, Mac- 
doniildf to tchom /w had transmit led neither instrueiions nor 
means to take liigat had under his command the numerous ar- 
tillery used at the siege of Dant/ick, and to whom, before 
leaving » ilna, the Kmperor had communicated his plans. 

Hut our author soon forgets what ho has said of the inten- 
tion of Napt)leon to plant his eas;les at Witepsk, and recollects 
tlnit this prince exclaimed on entering the tow n, " Ho you 
think, then, that I have come so far to conquer these huts V 
Mr. do Segur, who loves to draw pictures, should have 



/ 

/ 



BOOK V. / 8f^ 

flketchcd one of the imposing ceremony that took place, on I'lic 
reception of a new colonel of the foot grenailiei's of the guai\'l. 
But he touches on this lightly, as if it were a mere reception^ 
of an oi'dinary ollif^er, whilst it related to one of the most dis- 
tinguished generals, advanced to one of tlie highest commands 
in the army. The author, who has so (►Itcn (piotcd the names 
of 'inferior officers, might have named (hut of (jleiieral (%)unt 
Friant; less seen at court than them, it is true, hut so well 
known to the ai-my. Fie might have said, that the Em])eror 
drew his sword, ret'eived liim himself, and emhraced liim, say- 
ing, " It is a reward foi* your many and glorious services, but 
I yet want you. Remain in command of your division during 
this campaign, you are more useful to me than at the head of 
your grenadiers, whom I have always under my own eye." 

Who would recognize tlie Emj)eror by the following por- 
trait ? " lie was seized with impatience ; he was observed to 
grow restless ; the image of captive Moscow besieged him j 
the state of great irresolution which tormented his mind af- 
fected his whole IVame ; he was observed to wander about liis 
apartnjents as if pursued by this dangerous teniplation; he 
v;alked about without any object; imjuired the hour, and look- 
ed at his watch; c<>m|)letely absorbed, he stopped, hummed a 
tune with an absent air, and again began walking aliout: — 
well what shall we do ? Shall wc stay where we are, or ad- 
vance ?" &c, 

Mr. de Segur represents him one moment in bed, the next in 
merely his shirt, and after the precious reasoning in the ])re- 
ceding chapter on the necessity of irinaining at Witepsk, he 
tells us, " tiiat the same danger which perliaps ought to have 
recalled him to the Niemen, or kept him stationary on the Du- 
nn, urged him towards Moscow, having at last detej-mined, he 
hastily arose, and fired with this prospect, his spirit replete 
with tlie energy of his mighty conception, apj)ears possessed 
by the genius of war; his voice deepens, his eye flashes fire, 
and his countenance darkens; his attendants retreat from his 
presence, struck with mingled awe and respect." 

The historian of the grand army has, without doubt, taken 
his model at Charenton. 

M 



\ 
K 



90 ' cmncAh examination, kc. 



CHAPTER 11. 

/ 

I Mr. de Seg-ur, witliout alluding to new events, which may 
have induced Napoleon to change his plan, represents him- as 
thinking of nothing hut leaving Witcpsk, and advancing 
towards Moscow. 

" His resolution once taken, he was anxious that it should 
satisfy his friends,* it was by their sentiments that he was en- 
abled to judge of those of the rest of the army; surrounded 
by disapproving countenances, and opinions contrary to his 
own, he felt himself uncomfortable." From this it would be 
supposed that he was censured by all the world, and that he 
alone was in opposition to them. The Emperor regulated him- 
self very little by the opinion of his courtiers. He never pos- 
sessed the weakness of being harrassed by disapproving coun- 
tenances, or the folly oi judging the sentiments of the army, by 
those of persons who were only of consequence from the ser- 
vices they performed about his person. He could have lower- 
ed aAvay every disapproving countenance by a frown. As to 
his inquietude, it sometimes existed, it is true, but was rarely 
manifested. Napoleon was well aware that courtiers are cen- 
surers by nature, when i-emoved from the eye of their mas- 
ter; and knew what apology to make for human weakness; 
and if he overlooked the discontent caused by fatigue and 
privations, and was too just to be irritated at it, he pos- 
sessed wisdom enough never to permit it to influence his de- 
terminations. He was, above all, certainly aware that the 
sentiments of persons holding no command in the army, and 
who did not even live among the troops, were no criterion of 
those of the army. Napoleon knew how to appreciate men 
and tilings, a knowledge of which the chamberlain appears to 
he entirely ignorant. 

The author here recommences the scenes he had already 
played at Paris, and with the same actors. If he is to be be- 
lieved, the Emperor was wholly surrounded by tattlers and 
men without education. In spite of all the observations made 



BOOK V, 91 

for him, " he would march on both capitals at the same time, 
in order to destroy every thing in the one, and preserve every 
thing in the other." Here is truly an extraordinary specimen 
of distributive justice. It is to be lamented that the Duke of 
Frioul, to whom such a secret was revealed, is no longer in ex- 
istence to explain this wonder. This conversation with Duroc 
is introduced in order to make the Emperor reply, " that on 
that supposition, as the Russian war no longer offered him any 
advantageous result, he ought to renounce it; and if so, he 
must turn his arms against Prussia, and compel her to pay the 
expenses of the war." How can it be supposed, that whilst 
the Prussians were marching under the eagles of Napoleon, 
he was meditating their ruin ? General Yorck may have as- 
serted it to extenuate his defection, but what motive can have 
induced Mr. de Segur to credit this invention. 

He makes M. Daru say, that this war was not national. M. 
Daru could never have used such language. The deliverance 
of Poland rendered it more national than all the other enter- 
prises of Napoleon. After the war on the boundary of the 
Rhine, it was the most national which had been undertaken. 

In all this chapter the author represents Napoleon to us, as 
occupied in convincing the great, in combatting their objec- 
tions, and trying to ascertain whether they still wished to 
make an effort to reach Smolensk. Napoleon sooths them, and 
when he interrupts them it is "with subtle arguments. — 
Throughout this discussion, his conversation and whole de- 
portment were remarkable for affability, simplicity, and good 
humour, &c. a circumstance which sufficiently explains why, 
notwithstanding so many misfortunes, he was so much be- 
loved by thoS^e who lived on terms of intimacy with him.' 
The quarter-master never lived in this intimacy, and he proves 
it by the spirit in which he has dictated his work. 

If this picture of the confidants of Napoleon was faithful, it 
must be avowed that this prince possessed courtiers who not 
only were but little attached to him, but were wonderfully re- 
fractory. There never was a general, thus advanced in a dis- 
tant country, who could have succeeded, meeting with such 
opposition. 



92 CR(T[CAL EXAMINATION, &.c. 

The soldiers even murmured "that they no longer saw him, 
except on days of battle, when they had to die for him, but 
never wlien they required the means of existence." What has 
become of the great attention the Emperor paid to the proper 
nourishment of his ti'oops ? Where those " maga<X/ines as im- 
mense as the enterprise was daring,^^ that he had collected ? 

Great metamorplioses take place under the magic wand of 
Mr. de Segurj all his characters change masks, and are to 
be recognized no longer. Napoleon has lost the power of 
will, and of making himself obeyed. Berthier is no longer the 
zealous messenger of his orders ; nor Monton,the haughty mili- 
tary tribune, that Csesar alone conquered ;* Caulaincourt,isno 
more that punctual and exact attendant, who forgets his own 
sentiments, and remembers his duties alone. Duroc is no 
longer the discreet confidant, who is silent when it is not ne- 
cessary to repeat the orders of his master. And the part of 
the laborious and severe administrator is taken from M. 
Daru, and he fills that of a political tattler in the presence of 
the very man who imposed on him the necessity of more re- 
serve. 



CHAPTER III. 

On the route to Selez the second division obtained a con- 
siderable advantage over a Russian corps, and drove it back 
upon Drissa. Mr. de Segur estimates the loss of the enemy 
at only two thousand men, and eight pieces of cannon, when 
in fact, it amounted to three thousand men, and fourteen pieces 

• When the Count de Lobau was colonel of the third regiment of the line, 
his vote was in opposition to the elevation of Napoleon to the imperial 
throne. The Emperor, who wished to attach him to his service, commanded 
his attendance ; a single conversation won the Colonel, who soon after be- 
came his aid-de-camp. 



BOOK V. 93 

of cannon. A Russian general, who was killed in this affair, 
furnishes the author with an opportunity of making a pom- 
pous eulogy J he died, says he, like a hero. He then enters 
into details of his death, which could only have been furnished 
him by the Russians. We do not reproach the quarter-master 
with the praises he bestows on our enemies, although the 
Frt^nch generals, who fell in this campaign, never appear to 
excite his regrets ; for he scarcely even mentions their names. 

The author supposes that it was only towards the conclu- 
sion of the Emperor's halt at Witepsk, that he received infor- 
mation of the proclamations of Alexander, dated at Polosk, on 
the i8th of July, and of which we have already spoken. He 
says, that Napoleon was mortified at the gross calumnies they 
contained j he is deceived, they only excited a smile. 

In his position at Witepsk, Napoleon hoped the hostile ar- 
mies, now re-united near Smolensk, would make some false 
^novements of which he would take advantage. The attack of 
the Russians on General Sebastiani at Inkown, confirmed him 
in the belief that the whole army of Barclay had left the en- 
virons of Smolensk, in order to attack him. His decision is 
immediately taken, and Mr. de Segur has reason in observing, 
that it ** was grand and bold, like the enterprise itself." He 
was in hopes of marching rapidly to the leffe^bank of the 
Dneiper, and by advancing up this river, to reach Smolensk 
before the Russians, a movement which would place us on the 
flank or rear of the enemy's army ; four days sufficed him to 
throw Davoust's corps, and those under his command, before 
Liadovi. The boldness of this manoeuvre, admired even by 
the Russians themselves,* and the rapidity of its execution, 
refute most positively all that the author has said of the inde- 
cision and inertness of the Emperor. 

* See Military History of the Campaign in Russia in 1812, by Colonel Bou- 
tourlin, Aid-de-Camp to the Emperor Alexander. (Page 252, vol. L) 



94 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 



BOOK VI.— CHAPTER I. 

The author, who has no fear of repetitions, has again de- 
scribed the fine manoeuvre of Napoleon, of which he spoke at 
the end of the preceding chapter. This movement, even by 
the admission of our enemies, one of the finest military opera- 
tions performed by Napoleon, nevertheless, furnishes the quar- 
ter-master with a subject for censure : he always distributes 
his eulogies with great parsimony, whilst he scatters his dis- 
approbation with an unsparing hand. Here is a division, that 
** owing to an ill-written order, had been wandering for twen- 
ty-four hours in marshy woods :" a movement of no impor- 
tance, and which a judicious historian would have passed over 
in silence. But when the Emperor does not afford our author 
any point for criticism, he finds one in the army, which he 
represents as marching in great disorder. 



CHAPTER 11. 

In our movement on Smolensk, by the left bank of the 
Dnieper, we fell in with the Russian division of Newcrowskia 
at Krasnow, and for whose situation at this place it is diffi- 
cult to assign a reason. This division was on the point of 
being destroyed ; Mr. de Segur supposes that it would have 
been taken, if it had not been for the tardiness of Grouchy. 
The fact is, that in the rapidity of its retreat, it could only be 
overtaken and attacked by cavalry. The artillery had been 
delayed in the passage of a defile at Krasnow, and could not 
be employed, notwithstanding the assertion of our author. If 
it had arrived in titne, this division would have been totally 



BOOK VL 95 

aestroyed. Our historian, faithful to his system, never men- 
tions, that in one of the brilliant charges of our calvary, 
Colonel Marbeuf was mortally wounded. 

On the 15th of August,* Prince Eugene considered it his 
duty to carry the Emperor his good wishes, when Napoleon 
observed, *' Every thing is preparing for a battle, I shall gain 
it, and we shall see Moscow." According to our author, 
Eugene kept silent, but in going away, he returned for answer 
to the questions of Marshal Mortierj "Moscow will be our 
ruin." Duroc, the most reserved of all, loudly declared, that 
*' he could not foresee the period of our return." " Thus," says 
our author, "did disapprobation begin to be expressed." 



CHAPTER III. 

Napoleon had availed himself so ably of the hesitation and 
false movements of the Russian generals, in their march on 
"Witepsk, that it was only at Smolensk that they became aware 
of the danger which menaced them. This place was taken at 
once. Mr. de Segur represents Marshal Ney as infiamed at 
the sight of this city, and reproaches him with having attempt- 
ed to take possession of it immediately. ** A ball struck him 
on the neck, incensed, he despatched a battalion against the 
citadel — nothing could stop them but the Russian walls." 
Marshal Ney was too much accustomed to balls, to be irritated 
at receiving one in his clothes ; it v/as not then to revenge 
himself that he marched a battalion of the forty-sixth to the 
attack, but to drive the enemy opposed to him into the citadel, 
in order to reconnoitre it. It is to be regretted that he had 
not followed up his first idea, and made at once a vigorous at- 
tack j for the city would have inevitably fallen, the citadel being 
only faced with earth. The quarter-master, who pays little 

* Napoleon's birth-day, 



96 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

attention to military operations, does not give with exactness 
the position of the French army around Smolensk : the follow 
ing is his account. ** Davoust, and next to him Count Lobau, 
w^ere to deploy on the right of Ney, the guard in the centre 
as a reserve, and further off the army of Italy. The place of 
Junot and the Westphalians was indicated ; Murat and Ponia- 
towski formed the right of the army." 

The author should have told us which division was com- 
manded by Count de Lobau, since Marshal Davoust had re- 
assumed the command of the divisions formerly under his 
command. A little further, he says j " The French army thus 
posted had defiles and precipices in its rear, but Napoleon 
concerned himself little about retreat, he thought only of vic- 
tory." The quarter-master, who, it appears, wished to give les- 
sons of tactics to the Emperor, ought to have known, that 
two great roads were open for the retreat of the army j (that 
of Prince Eugene, as well as PajoPs division, had been posted 
at Goritnia, to protect the banks of the Dneiper on our left, 
and that our right was flanked by the corps of the Duke of 
Abrantes, a little in the rear. Mr. de Segur, who appears to 
understand so well the plans and character of Barclay de Tol- 
ly, should have told us why he despatched Bagration, not to 
Elnia, as our historian has asserted, but to Dorogobow; "and 
why he himself remained with his army at Smolensk. One of 
two things is certain ; either Barclay wished for a battle, or 
he did not. In the first case, he should have united his forces, 
instead of dividing them j in the second, he ought to have eva- 
cuated Smolensk. Mr. de Segur gives us a motive for the halt 
of Barclay in this town ; "that having to cope with a gigantic 
foe, he felt authorised to expect from him gigantic movements." 
We candidly avow this is beyond our comprehension. If Bar- 
clay had to cope with a gigantic foe, ought he not to have con- 
centrated his force instead of dividing it ? 



BOOK VI. 97 



CHAPTER IV. 

IVapoleon after being assured tliat a portion of the Russian 
army had quitted Smolensk, and posted themselves on the 
route to Moscow, determined to attack it. 

Here we find the brave " Murat prudent, when not heated 
by the presence of the enemy ; disapproving of this resolu- 
tion." The author even adds that, " he threw himself at the 
feet of his brother and conjured him to stop — this Moscow will 
be our ruin.'* 

Mr. de Segur certainly does not vary in the ideas he at- 
tributes to his characters, nor in their mode of expression. 
Murat only repeats here, what the author, a few pages back, 
has given as the expression of Prince Eugene. To make the 
King of Naples express himself in such terms, is to hold 
him up as a general of little experience. How could the Em- 
peror halt before Smolensk? Did Mr. de Segur suppose 
that he would retrace his steps ? The only plan left was to 
carry this place ; besides having passed a part of the night 
with the King of Naples and in the tent of the Emperor, we 
can safely assert that no such conversation took place. The 
whole army was eager to see Smolensk in our power. The at- 
tack being resolved on, Napoleon invested this city both above 
and below the bridges, in order to destroy these avenues, and 
thus force the enemy to evacuate. 

It was in one of the batteries thrown up for this piirpose 
(that on our right) that Mr. de Segur supposes that Murat, 
*' despairing of the issue of the war, sought death to escape 
from them" — a complete absurdity. 

The author, who has no clear ideas on military movements, 
tells us that Napoleon gave orders, " that at the same time, 
the artillery of the guard should batter the great wall with its 
twelve pounders ; it was disobeyed." This accusation of diso- 
bedience would be disgraceful to the guard, but it is unfounded. 
The Emperor, at the same time that he ordered a vigorous 

N 



98 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &r. 

cannonade to be kept up on the bridges, directed a few shots 
against (he walls, in order to sec what effect they wonld pro- 
duce; iinding that it required too great a waste of time and 
ammunition to cftect a breach. Napoleon ordered the engineers 
to attack it by mining. *' In mounting to the assault, our at- 
tacking columns left a long and wide track of blood, of wound- 
ed and dead." At the assault of what, Mr. de Segur? there 
were m) outworks, the suburbs were occupied by troops, but 
they were !U)t entrenched ; there was no place to assault. 
" The same bhimler which Noy had made a battalion commit, 
the j)rcceding day, Mas repeated by the whole army." Who 
could have believed, that a man holding tlio rank of general, 
would write such absurdities ? what other means were there, 
to take the place, without first driving the enemy out of the 
suburbs ? 

*' The Count de Lobau, who had made himself master of the 
ditch, but could no longer maintain his ground there, ordered 
shells to be thrown into the city — he was dismayed by so great 
a disaster, which he believed to be his work." 

IMiero are tWo circumstances difficult to comprehend. The 
first is to know what corps Count Lobau commanded j for by 
the account of the author himself, we see in the environs of 
Smolensk, Ney on the left, with his right on Davoust, whose 
right was supported by Poniatowski. Where then is the corps 
of tiie Count de Lobau ? Mr. de Segur should have informed 
MS. In the second i>lace, we would ask, how the Count de 
Lobau, who ordered the shells to be thrown into the city, 
could be lUsmniii'd that they should fire it ? Can Mr. de Se- 
gur be ignorant of the effects produced by shells ? The brave 
Polish (Tcneral Grabowski was killed in entering the city, yet 
our author makes no mention of it. 



BOOK VI. 99 



CHAPTER V. 

The Emperor traversed the field of battle, ** melancholy 
review of the dead and dying ! dismal account to make up 
and render." Thereupon Mr. de Segur gives us to under- 
stand that our dead had been previously interred, to prevent 
unpleasant impressions being made upon our soldiers. But 
was it possible to conceal their number, when the whole army 
were on the spot ? Does he wish us to believe that French 
soldiers fear deutli ? The puerile vanity of shining in school- 
boy amplifications, outweighs with him all other considerations. 
He gives us a side scene of Napoleon's, when surrounded by 
Ney, Davoust, Mortiei', Duroc, 6i.c. and adds that it is " to 
relieve his heart from the load whicii oppressed it — helaunched 
out against the enemy's general and army, as if he could have 
destroyed it by his reasoning, because he could not by victo- 
ry." "Every word the Emperor had uttered, merely proved 
his disappointment." 

All this tirade against the Russians, that he makes the Em- 
peror give way to, is that he himself may utter a flourishing 
eulogy on that people. " They had arrived at that point," said 
he, "at which nations still possess all their primitive virtues, 
in addition to those they have already acquired." A short 
time after this, an aid-de-camp brings information, that on the 
right, Ilegnier and Prince Schwartzenberg had gained an im- 
portant advantage over Torniasoff, and driven him in Volhy- 
tiia. Napoleon immediately exclaims, *' there, you see, the 
poltrons ! tliey allow themselves to be beaten even by Aus- 
trians," Is it probable that the Emperor would have carried 
imi)rudcnce to such a height, as to insult the Austrians, at the 
very moment when they deserved his thanks ? In joining this 
assertion to that our author made him utter at Witcpsk, " that 
he must turn his arms against Prussia, and compel them to 
pay the ex])enses of the war," arc we not tempted to believe 
that our historian wishes to justify in advance, the after con- 



100 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

duct of these two courts, and diminish the odium attached to 
their defection. 

He makes those generals most in the confidence of Napoleon 
observe, " if Europe were to rise against him, he would have 
no subjects hut his soldiers, no empire but his camp, even tlien, 
one third of them being foreigners, would become his enemies." 
Could sucli ideas have arisen at this period in the mind of any 
one ? This anachronism is a new proof, that this romance was 
written under the influence of a new order of things, and in the 
total forgetful ness of the past. 

The author retraces scenes of discontent, which are but re- 
petitions of those at Wilna, Witepsk, &c. His inventive ge- 
nius might surely have furnished him something more novel. 



CHAPTER VI. 

In what a state of unhappiness is the Emperor Napoleon.' 
As if it were not enough to hear continually about him, the 
eternal complaints of Murat, Caulaincourt, Daru, Berthier, 
Ney, Lobau, kc. he is now beset with two new counsellors, Rapp 
and Lauriston. Rapp is the orator ; he arrives from Dant- 
zick, but this does not prevent him from detailing the disor- 
der prevailing among our troops, in Germany, from the Elbe 
to the Oder, and from the Oder to the Vistula, he terminates 
by saying that the troops complain of being kept always on 
the march. Not satisfied with the eloquence with which he 
has endowed Rapp, Mr. de Segur himself gives the following 
statement of the situation of our troops. "Agitated by a 
vague inquietude, they marched on amid the dull uniformity of 
the vast and silent forests of dark pines; they crept along 
these lai-ge trees,* bare and stripped to their very tops, and 

• Docs our author wish to say that the soldiers climbed the trees? 



BOOKvr. 101 

were affrighted at their weakness amid this immensity ; they 
then conceived gloomy and absurd notions," &c. 

The most hackneyed writer of melo-dramas for the boule- 
vards, would have hesitated to put in the mouth of one of his 
fools such an absurd speech. 

The abuse lavished on the soldiery after their departure from 
Wilna, will be recollected. Here our author gives us another 
terrible picture of the number of victims, strewed along the 
route, which he calculates as amounting to at least one quarter 
of the French troops, and one half of tlieir allies. 

Rapp does not spare details, but the Emperor does not enter 
into any explanation with him ; another general, however, ob- 
tains more confidence; this is Sebastiani, he appealed to the 
very words of Napoleon, " that he had declared to him at 
Wilna, that he would not cross the Duna ; and like the others 
laid great stress on the state of the army : It is dreadful, I 
know, replied the Emperor j from Wilna, half of it consisted 
of stragglers, now they form two thirds of it ; there is no time 
to be lost, we must extort peace." From this calculation it is 
evident, that Napoleon would be obliged to march rapidly, if 
he wished to carry a single soldier to Moscow, for from Smo- 
lensk, when only half the distance had been traversed, only 
one third of the troops were able to carry arms — a ridiculous 
assertion, which refutes itself. 

Mr. de Segur finds out that the Emperor contradicts himself 
in the different conversations held with his generals. The 
evils apparently increase, for in the preceding chapter, this 
historian makes the Count de Lobau observe on entering Smo- 
lensk, "What a fine head for cantonments: this was the same 
thing as advising him to stop there, but the Emperor returned 
no other answer to the counsel than a stern look." Some pages 
afterwards. Napoleon repeats to Davoust and his generals, 
the observation of Count Lobau, " he considered that city as 
an excellent head for cantonments, &c. JVow," continued he, 
in speaking to Davoust, " my line is well covered, we will stop 
here.^' But at the same time, he sends reinforcements to Ney 
and Murat, in order to carry on the pursuit of the Russian ar- 
my. He wishes to avoid " amj serious affair,^' and yet he 



102 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

commits the pursuit of the enemy " to the two rashest of his 
officers.^* Davoust, *^ that prudent and methodical marshal," he 
places under the orders " of the impetuous King of JYaples." 
Thus, says our author, " the contradictions in his words 
were communicated to his actions." 

It is easy in Mr. de Segur to clothe a creature of his imagi- 
nation, with such contradictions in his words and actions. 
But it is not on his frivolous representations that Napoleon 
will be judged in history. This prince never said that he 
ought to halt at Smolensk, for such an idea never crossed his 
mindc 



CHAPTER VII. 

As soon as the bridges were re-established, Marshal Ney 
passed the Dneiper in pursuit of the enemy, but not as Mr. de 
Segur asserts, " with anxious eye and attentive ear." How 
can this author affirm, that in not finding the enemy, troops 
so brave, and led by so intrepid a chief, " were relieved from 
the weight of great apprehension ?" Let him eulogise the Rus- 
sians, when they merit it, if he pleases j but let him not insinu- 
ate, that French troops ever feared them. This campaign, 
disastrous as it was, has sufficiently proved the reverse. 

We have seen in the preceding chapter, that General Bar- 
clay had despatched on the 17th of August, the corps of Ba- 
gration, towards Dorogobow. He himself, (Barclay de Tolly) 
abandoned Smolensk on the 18th at day-break, and retreated 
on the road to Poreczie, whence he marched his corps in two 
columns, by cross roads, to gain the route from Smolensk to 
Moscow, the left column by Prouditchi, the right by Lubinow. 
Each would therefore traverse an arc of a circle, the chord of 
which was formed by a portion of the road to Moscow, on this 
there only remained, to harass our advance, the four regi- 
ments of Cossacks, left by Bagration, under the command of 



BOOK VI. 103 

General Karpoff. This feeble rear guard had the great charge 
of covering the two points, by wliich the columns were to re- 
gain the great road. 

The Russian general, engaged in these defiles, was sensible 
of the danger to which he was exposed, he therefore hastily 
ordered an advance guard under General Touczkof, to regain 
the great road by forced marches, and afterwards to advance 
in the direction of Smolensk, to sustain the Cossacks under 
Karpoff. 

*» At length," says Mr de Segur, " after an arduous march, 
the head of the enemy's convoy came in sight of the high road, 
at the moment when the French had but to force the height of 
Valoutina, and the passage of Kalowdnia, in order to reach 
that outlet. Ney had furiously carried that of the Stubna." 

Marshal Ney, after having passed the Dneiper, had advanc- 
ed towards Gorbounowow, between the two great roads lead- 
ing to St. Petersburg and Moscow, whence his light troops had 
driven part of the Russian right, whom they met there. This 
Marshal having learnt that the Russians had retreated on the 
Moscow road, regained it in order to pursue them. The enemy 
as we have observed, having only left some regiments of Cos- 
sacks to defend this route, Ney experienced but few obstacles 
until he approached Valoutina. "But Korf driven upon Valou- 
tina, had summoned to his aid the column which preceded 
him." This fact is inaccurate: General Korf commanding the 
rear guard of Barclay, after having defended the suburbs of 
Smolensk against Ney, retreated by the same route as Barclay 
(that of Poreczie) towards Paloniewow. He did not retire 
as our author asserts, by the great road to Moscow, and he did 
not fight at Valoutina.* 

About 11 o'clock. Marshal Ney attacked the enemy, whom 
he met on the Moscow road, and rapidly drove them behind a 
marshy stream, where, on other Russian divisions coming to 
their assistance, he made a decided stand. General Barclay 

* When the troops of Marshal Ney, attacked Gorbounowow, they cut off 
this rear guard, and to relieve it, Barclay sent the division of Prince Eugene 
of Wirtemberg to its assistance, this division retook Gorbounowow, at the 
moment that Marshal Ney adviinced on Valoutinsl. 



101 CHITICJAI. EXAMINATION, 8ic. 

was fully ftwarp of tlio imimi'trtiice of arrcstinp: tho advance of 
Mu' FiHuif'h, ntmiy price, llr flow ((» (his |iosi(i(>ii and onlcnul 
up sii((iiHsiv«>ly dm nlhri* tlivisioiis as tliry ("aimi nut fi'oin the 
croHH roads into tho grand lunir. 

'V\iv Kinp* roi" lun inj;' lirni iiiloiiiu'd thai Nt-y nut with some 
resiNtancr, scnl him \hv, division of (indin and plat od it iimlor 
his ordei'H. 

Towards I «ii'<hM'k Ihisdivisiim arrived on theha(tlc-,i;round ; 
bring formed into a (olnnin of platoons, it iidvamed upoii^ihe 
enemy who occupied a lu>isht, ccnnmanding the road, and Vio- 
vered hy a marshy stream, over which was a small woodou 
bridge, that it wais necessary to pass in order to reach them. 
This nari'ow ilefile was protected in every direction by tho 
Unssian artillery. The 7(h light infantry, headed hy (ieneral 
iJncIin, nlarch(^d with shonldered jirms to force the |)assage. 
EiuU platomi as it passed the hrook, replied to the Russian 
cannonade with hmd cries of vive l^Kmpntur. 'i'his i-egimeut 
was followed hy the Iv'th, the '^Ist, and the 10.7th, hut at thi« 
monuMit the brave tieneral ({ndin. hml hoth h'gs shattered hy a 
cannon ball. He was iH>placed by the Conot <ierard; tho 
action became very warm, nevt^rtheless, the Frencli gaimMl the 
«»pposi(<i height. Four tinn>s the columns of the enemy rushed 
upon them, and weiv as olYen repulsed. The winde corps of 
naggovvout, the divinion of AInewief, ami that of Vrince 
Fugen<^ of » irt<Mnherg, were engaged in this struggle, which 
lasted till M) o*olock at night, at this time the enemy finding 
they couhl not retake the position wrested tVom them by 
(Jerard, ci>mmenied a retreat. 

"There wftvS almost as nuich glory in their defeat as in our 
victory." RiMtig present ourselves at this battle, we are aware 
that the Kussians displayed great courage, but tin* author 
ought to have stated, that besiides being superior in numbei's 
to the corps of ISIai'shal Ney, a\ul the tlivisiim »»f (uM*ard, the 
enemy occupied a superb position, autl that his numerous artil 
lory gave him still greater advantages over us, aa IVom tho 
nature of the ground we were unable to use ours. Yet, in spite 
of these obstacles, the attack of Uerard's divisit>n, made UvS 
mastm-s of this formidable position ; and which French tiH>oi)8 



JIOOK VI. 105 

alone could have carried. Wo do not fear lioing con<ira»IicUid 
hy iiuy uiiliiary nisin, ulicn w<'. jishciI tliul, IJiis was one ol" the 
inoHt f^loi'ioiis cx|»h)its jK'rloinn'd Uy our iiini}'. 

♦< One of the onoiny's gcncralH, the only one left unhurt on 
this (u^ld of carnage, endeavoiii-ed to esr apt', from ainonp; our 
noldierH l»y re|»<alin|u;" the Krench vvoi'd of coniniiind ; h«5 wan 
rccof^niHed hy the llaHhe.s of Iheir fire arniH and He.curi-d." 

It was not hy accident, as the author appearH to indi< ate, 
that (lentiral 'roiie/kof was niaiU', prisinier. In on«'/ of the, last 
attacks, a larf^ti column of Jtussian ,ti;rcna<lierH char;j:;ed a hat- 
tallon of the 7th ii|;ht infantry and a hattalion of tho l!^th (d* 
the line at the point of the hayonet. The shock was vi(dent, 
hut the enemy was repulsed willi }:,reat vigour. In the s(,i iij^j^le, 
a lieutenant of Voltifjjeui-s, aUapked tho lluHHian general, and 
after twice \voundin(^' him on tlie head wilJi a sahie, took him 
priHon<M' in the> midst of his (»wn troops. 

"Tho JluHHians astonished at having heen attacked only in 
front, styled Murat the gem'ral of tlie high roiids." This re- 
proach, if the Russians ever applied it to Ihe King <d" Naph^s, 
ought to have heen hotter refule.d hy Mr. de Segur. Murat 
Avith his cavalry, was not on the^ high road, hut considerahly 
on the right of Ney (when he made the aU,a( k,) in order to 
communicate' with the corps (d.lunot, which passed the J)neiper 
at Frouditchewow, and was intended to turn tho left of the Kus- 
sian division. Our soldiers w^ith more reason ntight term llar- 
clay a i!;t:ii,ira,L nj' lii^k rtuiiis. 

Mr de Segur seoms to reproach tho Kmjjeror, with not hoing 
])reseiif, at the hatlle of ViiloulJna, and in the< reasons he us- 
uigns, he does not overlook that (d' fatigiu*.. One of his moist 
predominant points, is roprosenting the Empei'ur, as overcome 
with fatigue, ami hoth physically and moritlly worn out. It 
may easily he conceived, that some remains of shame has pre- 
vented Mr de Hegui", fr<tm attacking the Kmperor, with the 
same arms as his (au^mies; hut, it is hase, thus t<) disguise, an 
outrage under the i^emhlance (d' |tity ; the intention, and we 
say it with regret, is as manift'st as the ellect. 

Tho two great Russian armies had retreated, as wo hav<5 
already stated, one hy the Moscow road, and tin; other hy f,h« 

O 



m 



HI. I'rloiMltmiv iniul. Ill lit fi|»iij(liln)j» ilir t iii|iri oC MurMliii) 
N(^V, mill Mii^ ni villi'}' ol llio Iviiii), of INiiploM. on llir IMohiiiw 
ntiiil 1 wliirli, by hiM onlri'M. (ho Diiko ol' AhraiitoH ought (o 
roinli iinir l<iiili'!iliil. hi' Uiniii>,hl lliiil IIioho corpM iiiiiliMl, m 
|lii\V riMilil Miily liiivr iiii iillair mHIi ii nivr giiniil, would lip 
Nlroiijy^'iMioug'h In ovtM'ihi'ow It) tiiiil (Juii hh pi'ONC^nor wiin nioro 
iin iviMiii'v III MiiioIoihIv, hh ii mil nil piMiil, I'im* dm riving' i\(V 
roiiiilM lidiii nil (|iiiirloi'N. Allot' having- wiiiUmI, ahoul a loagiu*) 
IVnui ihlN clly. In a (hmiIiuiI imihKIoiii brtwooii Iho roadM iVoin 
Hniiilnifilt iniil IMomiow, Nnpolniii iliil iiol I'oliirn lo hiM hoail 
quai IriM lill iilioni !^ o'lliu k in llir rvrning. at which liiiio ho 
(honghl Ihr iiiUili' niiiNt lio conrluiloil. lint lirCiii'o ioavhig (hln 
pliu r, ho iiriil liiM iilil do ruin|i, (lonoral (jiMirg'uiiil, lo Iho Ivlng 
ol NiiploM. hiiving wllh him ninloi' IiIn oi'doi'H. Movonil olUrorM 
(and itniiiniv oIIioi'm, !SI. Itohnii Chiihol.)''*' Ho onloiod liiin to 
loMow n|i Iho alliioU, on Iho Momoow road, and Ui oauNO IJir> 
lUovonionl.M of Miii'mIiiiI Nim. Iho Kiiip, of Ntiphvt, iind Iho l>nk(« 
ol' AhninloM, (o hoNiniiilliiiiooiiM. riiiN ollli or was In hniig iho 
Mnipoi'oi' atHMMiiitN or iho hatilo i II waM not until allot* lliiH, 
thai Niipolooii lolnonod lo SiiioIoonK. 

l*Voiii (ho di'ipo'olioiiH oi'doi'od hv Iho ICniporoo. Iho UuMNiaii)* 
would nol hiivo hoon ahio (o doCond (ho poMilioo id' \ iilonlina* 
Uo hud I'oiiMiMi lo hrliovi'. Ihiil Iho DiiKo ol' VhninloN. iil'lor 
liiiving- paMNod Iho IMilrpri', would liiiv<> ooiiliou(>d hiM niai'oh 
iowaotlH iho lilgii ooadi and otilllankiiig' (ho UitMioian poNilion 
on (ho loH, \MMild huvo Con'rd (hi'iii li» ii pnMipi(u(t> i'oln>ai» 
Ho know Ihut tlio diviMion ol' IMorand. oi huvouMi'M loopM, 
nuuMdiing* tut (ho lotY ttf (ho high ooad. would oi|nall.v ouitlaitk 
(ho UuMrdan po>il(ioii on Km right. ( 'onid ho Coitnoo thai liU 
oodot'M would nol lia\ohooti ovonitotlf 

Notwilh^^titniling Iho onlt'oalios of (ho King of Nuplos, and 
iho ootloom atid itiNlOnolionN td' tho Mtnpootir, which woih> oum» 
muniottlod hy (ho aid tlo iMiuip. .lutiot wouhl tiovtM* advanoo 
on (ho I'oivd ill ooar oC (hi^ UiiN.'tiiiiis. 1( ti|ipoi)t's um iC ihh« 
g-t^tioinU who hud f\ivoii no nmny potuds oC (ho moMt ciKuH> 

* M> \M\M\ Otwkliot wttn hUU(Io>«?muih t« t^ieivctftiil Oovuvi do NioIhmuvo 



«(1 coiiriiffM, iiliMMidy cit|Mii'ltMi('(Ml IJin cl)\^('iM of ilin ()Imim(no 
Willi li iU'idroyvA liiiii rioMM-ilinr nl'l«'i-\vtu'il'i. 'I'lir tilil <!•■ « iiiii|i 
gcrni^ Hull IIiIm ^'ciirrnl woiilil iiuU'Hrriil,^ IJiiMtiili.t- lir liroupjit. 
Iiliii, Miiiil, " My lord, wliiii aiti I !;(» Niiy io Uiii l^,iii|iiM'oi'f" 

'I'lir hlllu- of Alll'Kllil^^ WIIM Nlinoiiiiilril liy IiIm ftUill, iiMll ll|l 
pllHtTll Vni'V illlK ll lIl^pn^NHCll. Il<i l'('<|»i|l'>ll Wllll MMII|ini', " Yull 

will Mii,v, Hie, IJiiii I tiitv<^ liiilhMi, UN IJin iilglit Ihifi iii'i'tvivl. 
Tli<<i nil! (Ir <'iiiii|i lUif^wi'i'iMl liiitl IImm'i^ yt*l i'niuiliHil lour litMii'n 
ol' llglil,. Ilitil Miii'hIimI Nry liiiil fitin'niiMl iiiiii ji In llio tilliirli 
III) wiiM olili^iMl ill iiiiiki'i III IVoiiL All iilfi rtolJrllHlliiiiM wnrn 
In vitlti, iliii Oiili*^ ol' AlininidW would nol iiiiiKr iiiiy iiiovt«*< 

IIMMlf,. 

Tlic tiiriili' lirliig ovci'i ilin Hld-(liv(!Hmp nrrlvtid iil. inidnlglil, 
(ll Hinolctmit, io liiy lliii (locdiini ol'll; lii^rorn (ltd fOiiiptn'Oi'. INh^ 
(lolroii i^n-iilly < liitf^riiM'd iil llir iiii'Ii'mm Iomm ol' Idood nl Vuloii- 
iiiiii, iitid Uy IIm' dciilli ol (iitiniil (liid)ii, d* Miiindrd wlij .In- 
iiol, liiid fiol, iixi^nih d IIk oi'diM' iliaf littd Ixmiii givnri liliii. TIim 

olllciM' I'cIii(<mI witiil, liiid |()i<(M«d { (liri l*'-iri|M'ioi' wcnl, loi- Hit 
ltil(M% and oliKi'i'vrd Ui liitii, " Uitii il/ «i|i|M'urn .hinol. N Iim ii" 
|Hililii. iui Um nol, iiiiintipl,<Ml 1^1 l/iii'n IJin WiiMMtiiii pinllJon, owiii//; 
hi liliti wi'i litivr, II bloody iiM'iiii-, luid luivc lord iiiidlii. I do 
nol, wInIi lliiil' lio rdioiild < iMtiititiiid IIk'i WcMlpliiillMiH lii' iiiimi, 

Im*' ITpltM'I'd l»y Ullpp. Wlio MpCMttM (ilM'lllllll, illld will lllil»lll|$«t 

tlimn widl." TIm^ Pi'lnc^ ol' Ni'iil'i hulid wroln IIm uviUwh I'«v 
lailvc io (IiIm (;hiiiif;,r, lull iirii'i'wiirih, Miirf^loil Diil'oc ttnil 
olJicr olll* I'i'w oi'liigli i'diili, old roiiiiiidcH ol' .liiiiol,, PHUtvvtUu] 
in (tfiimlnfi; Niipoinon, iind ilit^ gcnrriil rt^itiliifd U\h ('.omniiiiid. 
*' Mr. Iiiiini'dhilidy ofdri'cd Mirvoiitd, Io iiiippofl, Niy mid Mil 
ral." In I III', pi»< rdliig ilntplirr, Mr. dr H«j/in* liiiw tiln iidy 
NC/nl, lilni on IliU iindi'j'lHkin;^, and liaM oliMicvud Miai, il wi\n 
iinpi'optM' llitil IIm-. motil priulrnl niiii'^iiiil tdioiild Itc piii, oiidi'i' 
tlm ordr»')( ol IIm- miml nmhi, 'V\mw Iwo < luiplrif), wIm*it Imi 
Mpimki^ ol' iliii mtm uwsmw\\\n hayi^ mo IttUii ari!oi'(lHn(!ii» Unti 
ll, ini(i;lil III! fitippoMfd hi-, \n (ir»il,ln<r ol' dillrri'iil, iviinli, wlii< It 
f,ooK plior, at iwo nioiiUni inlrrval \ liiii all Mii^ dilalln ol Mr. 
(I» Hi'i^iir tti'o UM coni'imi.'d hm ii)» frcolli^csUonM. 



JOS CRITIOAI, liXAMINATlOISf, 8cr 



niAn i:i{ VII I. 

The skotcli wliicli the author gives of the (listribiilion of the 
rcwai'd.s (lonT«3il hy Niipolcoii, is intcicHliiii;', but It wiints do- 
tails. Mi*. i\c Scgiir, who is in ^mMii'ial ililluHc, has omitted 
the following among othci's. The Empi^ror in visiting the po- 
siiiou of \'al(nitiiii\, said to (leneial (Jerard, " this is a field of 
battle that I adMiir(>, four IJiissians for one l^'renchman ; (iene- 
ral, this is as it shonhl lie." He afleivvaids piaised the cou- 
rage of tho troops, ii( onuneniled smeral times, oi'der and dis- 
cipline to them, and on aiiiving before tlie 7tli light infantry, 
he said, — Point out to me the best olHcer in the regiment. Sire, 
they are all good. I'liat is no leply, answer me like IMiemis- 
to(;les, the best is myself, the next, my neighbour. Captain 
Monc^ey at this tim*^ woumled and absent, was named to him. 
What, said the ^^m|)eror, Moneey, who was my page, the sou 
of the Marsiial, designate another. — Sire he is the first — Well 
then, 1 will best(»w the decoration on him. 

Mr. de Segur does not permit the mind of the reader to flag, 
lie follows up this review, with that of the hospitals, where 
liis taste foi- distressing scenes displays itself; he does not halt 
at Smolensk, but reverts to AVitepsk, and oven to Wilna, 
where he paints them in Ihe most sombi-e colours. lie appears 
to attribute to the Kmperoi- all tlu'. siilferings and deprivations 
of the soldiers, and of wlfu li he gives a most exaggerated ac- 
count. 

To do Justice, we would observe, and without fear of being 
contradicted, Ihat of all commanders, whether ancient or mo- 
dern. Napoleon was the most humane and attentive to the 
wounded, that he never foi-got them in the enthusiasui of victo- 
ry, that his first thought after a battle, was always for them. 
If his soldiers have sometimes been in want of food, of beds, 
of medicine, all necessary objects in the treatment of the 
wounded, the autlior may rejiroach the cmninissary general of 
the army. The Emperor bad given all the orders^, and placed at 



BOOK VI. 109 

llie disposal of tlic military stalVus ample means both in horses 
and men, as wete rnrnislied lor tlie aitillerj. This last wea- 
pon, n(»twitl»standing the battles which took place, has never 
been in want of ammnnition. AVhcn the commissariat conld 
lind means of conveyinij;' snpplies in such qnantity as to re- 
<[iiii'o several thousand vva!:;ons,* surely they could have had 
little dilUciilty in furnishing some travollin.i^ wagons for the 
use of the sur!;«MMis, the neglect of this was the cause of the d(5- 
maud made by the nuMlical sialf at Smolensk, to (ienc^ral La- 
I'iboisiere, commandant of the artillery, to give up to them the 
tow lining of the caissons, for dressings for the wounded. 



CHAVTEIi IX. 

TiiK author says that "Napoleon had employed two olU- 
cers to sound the sentiments of the Russian people," to excite 
thorn to an insui-rection, " but this attiinpt had only served to 
put tliem (HI guard against him." lie then immediately adds, 
"this expedient was I'epugnant to Napoleon. Subsecpu'.ntl^ 
at Moscow, he received several addresses from dillerent heads 
of families, ofl'ering to head partial insuri'cctitms, which were 
rejected." Thus the same page [ucsents two material contra 
dictions. We need not be astonished, as th(; author has accus- 

• The artillery oftlif army l)of()rt: HrnolcnHk, viz. 1, :1, 4, 5 ami Kth corps, 
•iiid iUi: reserve of cuvulry liud a trulii coiii|K).4ecl of 
57 eaiiiioii 12 ijouiulors. 
2G7 (llUo 6 (k). 
32 do. 4 do. 

2 do. 3 do. 

16 mortnrs 6 iiidi 4 Uiie.s. 
122 ditto, 5 do. C> do. • 

490 
and 2,477 caiHSoiiH of :imnmiiilioi), wliir.li foniicil a total of 2,967 carriftgeS/ 
not coiuprisiiifj' the travelling' forj^cH, j)OutooiiH and upareg'un carriajfCH. 



IH) CRITIC AI- EXAMINATION, Sec. 

tomed us to it. He says farther on, " that our looks excited 
horror" — that then " the Emperor perceived the enormous 
niai^nitude of the enterprise — that so long as he encountered 
nothing hut kin,a;s, their defeat was but sport ; but the kings 
being conijuered he had now to do with people, and it was 
auotlier Spain which ho had found, at the other extremity of 
Europe." In Spain, the people rendered lanatics by the monks, 
among whom each family counted one of its members, rose 
against us. They were the principal party in the war, and if 
we may use the expi'ession, they made it in person. At our 
entry into Russia, on the contrary, there wei'e no combatants 
but regular troops. It was the government which made the 
war; the government had commatuled the nation to retire be- 
fore us ; or rather it had ordered the soldiers to burn the 
dwellings as they retreated, which was a sure mode of forcing 
the inhabitants to retire. This is what occuri*ed, and what 
Mr. de Segur ought to have known. But where has he seen 
Russian guerillas/ In what engagement had our troops to 
fight w ith peasants ? Let Mr. de Segur inform us, and we 
may see with him this Spain ^vhich he found at the other cx- 
tremiin of Europe ; but nothing of this existed. As in all other 
parts of his book, we have exaggeration, confusion, and sup- 
position ! It was not until after the battle of Moskwa, and 
during our retreat, that we saw some peasants, excited by 
hopes of booty, massacre several of our wounded, who had 
fallen into their hands. 

*• He (Napoleojj) was perplexed, hesitated, and at a stand — 
a fever of hesitation attacked him ; his eyes turned towards 
Kief, Moscow, and Petersburg." ** At Kief he should enve- 
lope Tchitchakoft' and his army. By marching with St. Cyr 
upon St. Fetersburg, he should envelope Wittgenstein. On 
the other hand, it was at Moscow he should strike Russia to 
tlie heart." " Of these three plans, the latter alone appeared 
practicable" — ami yet, adds the author, •• he had the history 
of Charles the XUth before his eyes," 

Would not one infer from tliese words, that Charles the 
XUth was his guide, in this plan for attacking Moscow, when 
on the contrai'v, the fault of the Swedish monarch was that of 



BOOK VI. llf 

not havincf marched against that capital. There is no need 
of boiue; a Holdier to know this ; it is suHicient to read the lus- 
tory of Chai'Ics tlie Xllth, not even that written by the Cham- 
berlain Alderfeld, but simply that by Voltaire. 

It is well known that from his ariival at Smolensk, having 
his line of operations and communications secured, since he 
was master of Poland and of Riga, the march of Charles the 
Xlltli, was conformable to all the rules of strategy. The er- 
ror this king committed, was that of quitting the route of 
Moscow to move upon tl»e Ukrain, which in causing him to 
lose his line of operations, and preventing the arrival of Lew- 
enhaupt with reinforcements of men and provisions, was the 
cause of all his disasters. 

The position of Napoleon at Smolensk, which he made a 
great depot and point of su])|)ort, peimitted him to direct him- 
self with greater security upon Moscow, from which he was 
but ton marciies distant. Moreover, it wmH only on leaving 
Smolensk tiiat he entered an enemy's territory. Eight 
marches in the rear were the magazines of Minsk and Wilna ; 
in the thii-d line those of Kowno, Gi'ido, and Bialstock. Those 
of the fourth line were at Elbing and Marienverder, Thorn, 
Warsaw, kc. Still farther in the rear, those of Dantzic, 
Bromberg, and Posen ; in short, in the sixth line, upon the 
Oder, the magazines established in the fortifications we oc- 
cupied. 



CHAPTER X. 

The author gives the detail of a victory gained at Polotsk j 
it was of such importance that the Emperor might have been 
trantpiil at this point and assured that the enemy would nof 
move for a long time. This victory obtained for General St. 
Cyr the rank of Marshal. " Notwithstanding this success, 
the determination to proceed beyond Smolensk was too peril- 



112 CKiriCAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

ous foi' Napoleon to decide on it alone; it was requisite that he 
should contrive to be drawn into it." IIow can we suppose that 
the Emperor, once master of Smolensk, would have stopped 
there, when the ai'inies of Bagration and Barclay were retiring 
upon Moscow, and no good reason prevented his following and 
attacking them ? For the Em])eror was certain that the enemy 
would give battle in defence of his capital. Our author him- 
self, in the conversations he attributes to the Emperor with 
his generals, in the preceding chapters, on the disorganiz^ation 
of the army, the great number of men remaining in the rear, 
&c. makes him say, that he had no time to lose; that he imist 
compel apeacCf "which was at Moscow. If we admit these perpe- 
tual hesitations on the part of the Emperor, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that this great man had lost his mental faculties. 
But facta continually invalidate Mr. de Segur's insinuations. 
At Wilna and Witepsk, Napoleon is represented as a being 
Avithour energy, will, ajul even reason, not knowing what to 
do, nor what course to take, giving no order, and expecting 
every thing from chance : and yet we see him providing for 
every thing, and directing, at the same time, both policy and 
war. We have seen him from his first march, overturning en- 
tirely the Russian plan of campaign, forcing them to abandon 
their line of operation, their magazines, their intrenched camp, 
and their communications, ami so to speak, delivering up to us 
without a battle the whole of Lithuania. At Witepsk, at the 
moment when Mr. de Segur represents the Emperor sunk in a 
profound lethargy, the re-united Russian generals coming to 
attack him ; which was what he desired. They believed that 
he wished to move with the French army upon their right : 
they manwuvred in consequence, while with the rapidity of 
lightning he passed the Dnieper, and was on their left flank. 
These important movements were so well combined, their exe- 
cution was so precise, that Barclay and Bagration, in spite of 
all their light troops, their numerous agents and partisans in 
the country, were not warned of their danger, except by the 
attack made on their rear against Smolensk, by that great 
captain whom they hoj)ed to surprise upon their right, in scat- 



BOOK VI. 113 

tered cantonments, and as Mr. de Segur exhibits us, in an al- 
most continual state of torpor and indecision. 

We have established how false is Mr. de Segur's assertion. 
May we be permitted to offer our personal testimony ? We re- 
ceived directly the orders of the Emperor j we saw him inces- 
santly, both when they were given, and when an account of 
their execution was rendered to him, and we have never seen 
him such as he is depicted by M. the quarter-master of the 
palace. 

[Extract of a confidential letter from the Duke of Frioul, fi-and-mar^chal 
of the palace, which is in our hands, 

** The Bivouack before Witepsk, July QSth, evening. 

" The army, after three days fighting and repulsing the en- 
emy, has arrived before Witepsk. All the corps are united 
this evening; to-morrow we shall have a battle, unless, as is 
feared, the enemy quit the position they have taken before us, 
to cover Witepsk. Yesterday and the day before, in the dif- 
ferent combats which happened, and in which but few of our 
troops were eng.iged, the Russians were always vigorously re- 
pelled. We have taken prisoners, and many pieces of cannon. 
The Emperor enjoys the best health. We have lost General 
Roussel, of the army of Italy, who was accidentally killed by 
a patrol. Colonel Liedot, of the artillery, was mortally 
wounded while reconnoitring. Fcrreri has lost a leg. We 
impatiently wait for news of the Duke of Tarcntum having 
passed the Duna, and put in march the besieging equipage."] 

Is it not injustice to say at the beginning of this chapter, 
that his lieutenants had done more than him ? Ought the gene- 
ral in chief of an army of nearly 400,000 men, to be present 
at all the engagements which take place? He could not be 
every where at once, which was unfortunate. He gave his or- 
ders and instructions, made known the general character of 
his plans, and it was for his officers to conform to them as 
much as circumstances and localities would allow. 

Certainly, if Napoleon had been wilj^i the 5th, 7th, and 8th 
corps, Bagration would not have passed the Dnieper ,• him and 

P 



114 CUITICAL EXAMINATION, Stc. 

his army would have been lost to Russia. If Napoleon had 
been with Schwartzcmberg, the corps of Tormasone would 
have suffered the same fate ; had Napoleon been with Ney, the 
Russian army would liave paid dear at its sortie from Smo- 
lensk for the error its generals had committed in making a cir- 
cular marcii in the midst of traversing roads almost impracti- 
cable, to regain the grand route from Moscow and the Dnieper 
to Soliowno.* 

Marshal Davoust, who, in the seventh chapter, was placed 
by his o-ivn wish under the orders of tlie King of Naples, ap- 
pears in tliis to have escaped from his ignorance ; he obeys with 
a bad grace. Happily, as *' Barclay," says Mr. de Segur, 
** having retreated, without resistance, as far as Dorogobuje, 
Murat had no need of Davoust." We do not sec any other re- 
sistance which could have prevented Barclay's flight, except his 
honour j certainly Mr. de Segur<llid not wisli to say this. 
The enemy soon appeared to stand ,• the King of Naples made 
his dispositions to attack. He wislied to place Davoust on the 
left, but the latter wished to remain on the right. 

** Discord reigned in the Russian camp, as well as in our 
advanced guard." The avowals made by Mr. de Segur are 
worth remarking. " Confidence in their commander, that 
strength of ai-ms, was wanting ; his e\ ery step seemed a blun- 
der ; each resohition that was taken the \evy worst. The 
loss of Smolensk had soured all." These few words of the 
author's appeal* to us to refute all the eulogies he has given of 
the skilfulness of the leaders, and to the order which reigned 
in the Russian armies. Mr. de Segur falls from contradiction 
to contradiction, because he constantly knows no better what 
he says than what he wished to say. 

When Napoleon learned tliat the Russians were willing to 
give battle, he quitted Smolensk. The author appears to re- 
proach him for having " neglected the hostile armies of Essen 
at Riga, of Wittgenstein before Polotsk, of Hoertel before Bo- 

• A general wliom some persons have long' opposed to the Emperor, (Mo- 
reau,) consvilted by our aUies on tlie best plan of attack against him, answer- 
ed, " Combat Napoleon wherever he is not present." It seems that M. tlie 
|>alace officer is not of this opinion. 



BOOK VII. H5 

bruisk, and of TchikhakofF in Volljynia ; the whole number 
making 120,000 men, by whom be allowed himself to be sur- 
rounded with indiflerence. But according to his custom of 
not agreeing with himself, a few lines further on he says, " but 
157,000 men were sufficient to destroy the Russian army, and 
take Moscow ;" and he hastens to make a calculation which 
shows us throughout superior to the same corps of the enemy 
of whom he has above spoken. " He should thus have 280,000 
men, including the Lithuanian and Polish levies, to rest him- 
self upon, while with 155,000 more, he had made an incursion 
of ninety-three leagues, for such was the distance between 
Smolensk and Moscow." All this grand enumeration of forces, 
acting upon several points, has no other object than that of 
bringing forth this reproach ; " but these 280,000 men were 
commanded by six different leaders — and the most elevated of 
them, who occupied the centre, was a minister of peace, and 
not a minister of war." What, then, would Mr. de Segur 
have? Could a single army, under the immediate command of 
a single leader, have occupied a space so extensive as from the 
Baltic sea to the confines of Turkey ? The minister of peace 
had no military command. His duties, as well as the title 
given him by Mr. de Segur, were purely pacific. The actual 
leader of all those armies was the Emperor. He communis 
nicated immediately with them, and had no need of an inter- 
mediator. 



BOOK YIL— CHAPTER L 

At its departure from Dorogobuje the army marched 
towards Moscow, the Emperor, with Murat, being in the cen- 
tre, Davoust, Ney, and Poniatowski, on the right, and the 
army of Italy on the left. The central column following the 
same route as the Russians, had very few resources. " In or- 
der to live oetter it ought to have set out later every day, halt- 



j^^Q CKITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

c(l earlier, :inil then (extended itself more on the flanks during 
the niijfht.'' The (juestron was not only how to live hettcr, but 
to march in a military manner. Mr. de Segur cannot hero 
resist his disj)osition to censure, although he himself knows 
that what he indicates was not at: all possible. 

" It was a curious sight to observe the voluntary and conti- 
nual efforts of so many men to follow a single individual to 
such great distances." The author well knows that in all the 
armies throughout the world, a great number of men are led 
by a single pei'son. What object has he in making this re- 
flection ? It is ti-ue that Mr. de Segur sees in the French army 
an army of voluntecivs, commanded by the Emperor, who was 
not accustomed to consider as volunteers the troops under his 
orders. 

This chapter contains details relative to the soldiers' mode 
of living whose existence appears a prodigy to our author, and 
ui)()n the pains taken by the military administration. Such ex- 
aggeiations, familiar to the author, are to be remarked, as the 
hatred of the soldiers to one another, "which would infallibly 
have led to most sanguinary intestine conllirts, had not all 
been subsecjuently overtaken by the same misfortune, and in- 
volved in the horrors of a common disaster." Nothing is want- 
ing to the above sentence but the woi'i\ fortunately , 



CHAPTER IT. 

Here again Mr. de Segur refutes himself. In the precedinsj 
chapters he has represented Napoleon without foresight ; and 
from the commencement of this, we arc told that near Dorogo- 
buje, this prince sent an order to Marshal Victor to move upon 
Smolensk. 

The author reproaches Napoleon with having ** dated IVom 
the heart of Old Knssia a number of decrees." Does he not 
know that the Emperor, in quitting France, had left no regcn- 



BOOK VII. 117 

cy, and that his government was so well organizcti, that from 
the heart of Russia he governed France as well as if he had 
been at the Thuilleries ? 

What does this circumstance mean of the bridge which the 
guard burned through heedlessness, though charged to guai'd it ? 
In relating such a fact, does not the autlior wish to have it be- 
lieved, that tlie disorder was such in the French army that the 
most disciplined corps in it behaved thus iUr(ius;h heeMessncus? 

In an affair of the advanced guard, in which the King of 
Naples, hurried on by his boldness, was for a moment compro- 
mitted, the author says, "At the moment of the most immi- 
nent danger, a battery of the Prince of Eckmiihl twice re- 
fused to fire. Its commanding officer alleged his instructions, 
which forbade him, on pain of being broke, to fight without 
orders from Davoust." A marslial had no riglit to break an 
officer. All he could do was to request it of tiie Emperor, by 
laying the facts before him,* and, certainly, Napoleon would 
not have broken an officer for having obeyed the King of Na- 
ples, and fired on the Russians, being in battery before them. 
Moreover, the fact is about as true as that of the refusal of 
the artillery of the guard to fire on Smolensk, related in the 
fourth cliapter of the sixth book. 

Has not Mr. dc Segur related this pretended insubordina- 
tion of a chosen corps, in order to make it be believed, that 
the greatest disorder reigned in tlie army ? It is more pro- 
bable that he has only presented this incident as a subject of 
quarrel between Murat and Davoust. He has profited by it 
on one hand, to make a pompous eulogium on the Russians, 
whicii in the mouth of Marshal Davoust, is at least misplaced ; 
and on the other, to satirize the manner in which Murat con- 
ducted his troops! What he says of it is inexact; for the 
cavalry thus used could not continue the march for many days. 
It is unfortunate that the author does not give us Murat's an- 
swer; but he adds, "there was something in the misunder- 
standing between these chiefs, which did not displease him." 
The Emperor, doubtless, saw with satisfaction an emulation 
which was advantageous to the service, but every misunder- 
standing, if any had existed, would have afflicted him. 



11§ CRITICAL EXAMINATION, Stc, 



CHAPTER III. 

The author falls into a new contradiction. He has stated 
that the quarrels of the leaders had something in them that did 
not displease him ; here he says, " that the quarrels of his 
leaders disturbed him,^^ (Napoleon.) 

The quarrel of Murat and Davoust, which already fills 
nearly the whole of the second chapter, recommences in, and 
fills the latter part of this. These rivalries, related with such 
complaisance, are ridiculously exaggerated. They might have 
occupied the idler's of the guard-room, but they are so unim- 
portant, have so little influence on the march of affairs, that to 
mention them, at such length, may lead to error, and give a 
false idea of our army. It is, moreover, a parody of the quar- 
rels of Achilles and Ajax ; Patroclus himself plays a part. In 
the Emperor's army every one obeyed. One would believe, 
that Mr. de Segur's heroes, like those of Homer, were princes 
bringing troops, who were their subjects, to the train of the 
king of kings, which they commanded as masters, and who 
ceased to combat as soon as any phantasy induced the leader 
to shut himself up in his tent. 

The fact is, that General Compans, whose division appeared 
to be the cause of quarrel between Murat and Davoust, had 
never, directly nor indirectly, any discussions with that prince. 
Murat, pursuing the enemy, managed his cavalry like a good 
general, and not as M. the palace officer relates. In many 
circumstances the infantry were necessary to him. Marshal 
Davoust had some differences with him on this subject near 
Biazona. The king sent General Bclliard to the Emperor to 
explain to him the need he had of a division of infantry. Na- 
poleon, after hearing Belliard, sent for General Compans, and 
said, General, what does this quarrel mean ? it will retard our 
march. Compans answered, that he knew of no misunder- 
standing between the King of Naples and Marshal Da- 



BOOK VII. 1 19 

voust; but that he thought the advanced guard would march 
faster, if the infantry accompanied the cavalry of the king, 
who often was stopped by the least defile, or the repair of a 
bridge, and that with some infantry such inconveniences would 
not take place. I am of the same opinion, said Napoleon : it 
is well ; return to your division. A few moments after, the 
Prince of Neufchatel was sent to Marshal Davoust, to inform 
him, that in future, Compan's division would march with the 
advanced guard, under the King of Naples. The good effects 
of this arrangement were soon apparent. 



CHAPTER IV. 

The author attributes to the Russians a bitter censure upon 
Barclay de Tolly, to reply to it by a brilliant apology for the 
conduct and character of this general of the enemy. He agrees 
that Barclay had failed in suffering himself to be surprised at 
Wilna — but it was remarked, that subsequently at M'^itepsk he 
had forestalled JVapoleon. We pray Mr. de Segur to explain 
to us the manoeuvres of this Russian general which he vaunts 
so much, when he quitted the environs of Smolensk, to come 
and attack us in our cantonments at Witepsk, which he mistook 
so far as to believe us on his right, while we were moving on 
his left flank. We ask him to explain all these comings and 
goings of the Russian army at this period, ft-om Smolejisk to 
Roudnia and Nadeva. We request him to explain if Barclay 
had well formed his plan of retiring before us, why he fought 
at Smolensk, instead of occupying that town only by 
a rear guard, having already sent the corps of Bagration 
towards Dorogobnje. We further demand of him to explain 
why Barclay exposed all his army to be attacked and destroy- 
ed by ours, in his retreat by the cross-roads to move upon So- 
loniewo, while the great route to Moscow, which was a much 
shorter road to this point, was only defended by a rear guard 



120 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

of Cossacs. This conduct was so imprudent, that if the move- 
ment of the Duke of Abrantes had been executed as ordered, 
the troops which Barclay subsequently caused to return by 
the Moscow route towards Smolensk, to sustain this rear 
guard, would have been cut off, and the rest of his army would 
have with very great difficulty have reached this road. 

In the same chapter, Mr. de Segur expresses himself thus 
on the subject of a flag of truce: Our out-posts were badly 
guarded — the same negligence was perceptible — every one nvas 
asleep. We make but one observation in relation to thisj 
which is, that the quarter-master of the palace never went to 
the out-posts, and consequently he cannot be sure of what he 
has advanced. Moreover, this episode is deficient in suitable- 
ness : for if we guarded ourselves so badly before so experien* 
ced a general as Barclay de Tolly, why did he not carry off 
the Emperor from head-quarters? 



CHAPTER V. 

From the time that Kutusoff took the command, every thing 
announced an approaching battle. — However, the Emperor is 
no longer the same man to Mr. de Segur. He is not a worn 
man, without energy, borne down by the weight of his enter- 
prise, or pushed by fatality towards his ruin — but a superior 
genius, making his arrangements " with that tranquillity of 
mind peculiar to extraordinary men ; beholding the whole coun- 
try with that eye of a conqueror which sees every thing at 
once, and without confusion ; which penetrates through obsta- 
cles, sets asides accessaries, discovers the capital point, and 
fixes it with the look of an eagle." In short, despairing to 
pourtray all the grandeur of the hero, he exclaims, "How 
much the historian is at a loss for words to express the name 
of a man of genius." However, as his rare eulogies must 
always have a corrective, he shows us humanity as the slave 



BOOK Vll. 121 

who daily reminded the kings of Persia, that they were men ; 
and says, " but at the sight of the Gjatz, which poured its 
waters into the Wolga, he who had conquered so many rivers, 
felt anew the first emotions of his glory ', he was heard to boast 
of being the master of those waves destined to visit Asia, as if 
they were going to announce his approach, and open the way 
for him to that quarter of the gh)be." Tliese are the hyper- 
boles of a rhetorician, and Napoleon was not one. 

** Compans skilfully availed himself of the undulations of 
the ground ; its elevations served as platforms to his guns for 
battering the redoubt, and it screened his infantry while draw- 
ing up into columns of attack. The sixty-first marched fore- 
most; the redoubt was taken by a single effort, and with the 
bayonet. But Bagration sent reinforcements by which it was 
retaken. Three times did the sixty-first recover it from the 
Russians, and three times was it driven out again ,• but at 
length, it maintained itself in it, covered with blood and half 
destroyed." 

This relation contains nearly as many false assertions as 
words. But perhaps the author is excusable j he saw nothing 
of what he describes. He has no other guides than the narra- 
tives published relative to the Russian war, for the most part 
by persons who have neither seen nor participated in the mili- 
tary movements they detail. 

This redoubt, armed with twelve pieces of heavy cannon, 
had been thrown up on a hillock, situated between the village 
of Schwardino and the wood which covers the old road from 
Smolensk to Moscow. 

On tlie side next the village, the ascent of this hill w^as the 
least steep, but between this ascent and the wood, was a plain 
of some extent. In front of the redoubt, and distant about 
sixty toises, rises a small knoll. General Compans, whom 
we have seen in the preceding chapters, marching with the ad- 
vanced guard, was ordered by the Emperor to attack this re- 
doubt. Napoleon considered it highly important to gain pos- 
session before night of this position, which covered the left 
centre of the Russian line. For this reason, without waiting 
for the other divisions of the first corps to arrive, he ordered 

Q 



IJie iliUuU. in iHw nur nnd on tllft fliinhfi ol IIk', r(MlouI>(, wnt 
«»^fiii wlriMig « oliimMH »»(' KuHHiiiiiH, iiiriiiili7, ri(Vitli7, itrid ur 
tniery, Hmountiiig to fii'imn filiouHflnd inon. 

(iciK'.i'itJ ('(litipiiiiH Hiioii t\f(tVi: ilic <'ii<'iiiv IVoiri IIk. villhf^CM 
of r'oiiiliiiio tiiiil Doi'oriino, iiimI lori imI IIhim io nJui ii It) Ilii'Jf 
lioHltlon pn the sWe oC the hilt. U<* ItMHtenml to throw (Ive or 
six fiompaMicH of VollifAciuH on liic, liiM»ll wlii« li wf have imin" 
tjoniid. 'riietsc ft( (illcird ov<^r il,, itml (;ov«-rinjii UicjiiHrlvciM fts 
much fts poBslhle, were ordered to keep up a constant fir© on 
the urUllri'y nun id the f/;iiMfi on lin*. n-douht, in whicJi thero 
WHH h'll- hilt few inftinli'y. A InilUlion wni plii* cd in llm n-iir 
of IIm^. liiioll Io wiippoi't the VoltJj^iMU'H. 

'I'lir, iirlilli'iy of ('oin|)iiii'H dlvinion took i<|) a pohiljon which 
itoiihlrMJ iheni tit idlw'U Unit of the trdoiiht siiiii Mir. ItiiHHiunHi 
who Ihiiikt'd it. (ielweirn the cif^ht of ('onipitnw iiiid the wimd, 
iMlvjineed part of the vnvi\\vy of the Kln|;f of Niiph*n ; hut the 
eneiny'/i iiililli'i'y iinil rjivuli'V ki'pt thiH in check. 

4;«nrriil (onipiiiiH ill. Ilii- liiiiil of Ihc /i7th and the GlNt I'Q- 

glmentft, directed his niureh on the rlglH; of the hill on which 
WftM lJn', irdoiiht. At the Haine nionicnt he Hcnt (icinvral Dupe- 
lain with Hit irilh to llm hl'l, <mi IIi»*. hidn of Hi hwanlino— ho 
poHJed II. • I I Hit Htill farther Io Uni lift, in onli-.i- In torn the 
rifi;ht ol III*- liiiMhianH.>^ In hii^ lii-psl, moviinrnl. <«nni'i'al i'oiii- 
naiiH WHM iiMiK kcd liy niiifiHi^H of Uni iMirin^'n i iivalry, Init he 
sklll'iilly availed hiniNelf of the clrcumHtanoes of the ground 
and of a fence, which enahled him to ronliniie. Imm inovetnent, 
llotwitliHtandiiifii- the cavalry, an<l even to repulne then» with 
eonidderahle Iohh. A nmrderon« (Ire Hoon took place on this 
wide, hetween the two rej^iinenlM of ('oinpaiiM, and the Uiih- 
Hian infantry, which Hupporled the left Hank of the redonht. 
They were not more than ten toineM diidant, and the tritopH on 
two jjfiillieH op|HtHile to the ground, were covered up to the 
breaHl. M'hiH hloody lire, lanted three qnarterH of an hour; 
the excitement and noiHe prevenled the. ordi tm of the general 
to advance witl» the hayonet from helng heaid, a manoeuvre 

wliirh would have. rOMt UH IcHS. 

On tliiir wide, the. KiifiHiiin generals limllnH? that they sud'er- 
ed ^dill more than m (Vom this close firing, in vain endeavoured 



Hinm VII, i%i 

to Urinp; u\t ih«if' troops for' iiitt nmnti ituvim^i riiK>i< «|> 
|M'0!i(Jif,<l iirul nolliifiJ^ wtci «l«ri<lc,(|. 

<:orii|m(ii4. willing it)/ id) UtmuiU Ui f^fii (mi of tUU Uit'vMti 
HiiuAiUni, Un>U a indUilUm oC Um 07f;li* find rttt^kiri^ art o|)»rting 
(Iii'ou^Ij Mu'- (V,iir,<', oh liii^ i'\y;\d, Im' onl<'n'»| ii l/o a«lvHri(;«', !»y <1U 
vJ«»Jon« in rlrx**-, i;olumn, «;ov«*,i'J»(fi; l'o«r pi«'-(;«'-t» ol' aiUllf-l'y 
<;liarfi;>i(l willi jirn«p(»/ ttliot, wli)( li liiMi UAUtWfA in liit^ ir.ar'. Hit 
U.i\ (,lil« liMll.rtlion f^» Uitt «',x(,n'rrM', li^ft oC IIm: [limwJariw, WuuhUit'^ 
J.Im', ri^rloubt WIk'M, al, Mi.y U^nm Croin fli«:in, Jm*- i<ini»a«k«'il 
l«it* l»a(,l,» 17, wliirli ciiuhrd a (lirsMllWI «l»'«(,nir;Uon ol' IJ»<*/ i'lUMuy. 
iUmiimnH |><'o/lU»i{4 ''/ ""' <J •«»"»•''<'»' wlildi h« oliwi'i'v^'-^l In iUi'h' 
tnitUH, f;liai(^(',(l willi liiii l>aMiilloii a(, (,Im^ (joIhI, of lUf- l»ayo»M',l. 
'I'Ui. t'lttMiiy K*^^"K way at Miiti poini,, (Jir, ilidonlcr was* tjoou 
^enem), tli«y adandorM^-d il»« powKlori thwy ha<l «o long; Mtmd 
ill, arnl i'f:l.ln',(l 00 l,l»<'(»' M'-rood li»M'-, Uhi« l«:avifii/ (Ik- irdoidil, 
in our pow«'r. Tliifi l»aM,alion ol' Mm*- ft7Ui vvlii'h dcioh-rl llii*, 
a/fall', lo«l ilM MmJoi', and had 200 men killed and wonndttd in 
.nlvan/ini^ o»i lli*-, »^n<tfny. Wliiln (lii« p(i>;«^;d on our «J{/li(, Ui*'' 
iiil.li, who WM'c on lin, h'.n,, IoHowcjI II/<v g«,ni',ral iiuiviMnid, 
hul, ill*', llamf« of the village of Hr;hwardlno, which wa« on Wi'e. 
p«'i'n»il,U'«l tl»<'- Un««Jan general f^> «ee that he wa« followed hy 
♦inly a <5Jni^h', I't't/^imt'M on thU ttlde— he, Inmiedlal^dy iitmU; a 
< (ijuf^c on it wllli hi« eavaley. Thlw ref^^inirnt tmotaim-d tlm 
s^lioek wUh DrnuM'fjw, but in thl« ehar-^e It lofst ite two ee/^lmer^- 
(al pj«'<^<'-fi. TIk', Knjperoe c.iukuUu] tliat reinr;*', I*oni(il/»w«5ki'*j 
ni(ir<;l(in,^ on tli<'. rj^ltt Vfould li^nuily afjtjitjt the at('.i> l» on tin-, 
redoubt, lint notwithwtanding all the elfoH^ of il«i« Pflnm, 
\h(- iiiutiy o\tf^UtJ \i',H he c^neoiatf/'red in tl«e wood, i'<',ta»'d<-d hi** 
oiaf'Ji, and only one of U'iH UniMi'im mmir4 in the, l<atth;. 
'Che I'edonht wm not uttmnmit tim UuHHiMm ahandoneil ii 
wiii'.ii i.Ui', Httjt/k of tli<*, 107th ol>IJ,wd tliern Ut yt^rmi. We 
toond all Um aetilh-ry in it, The ar'tilleeet>(,«, the horw^, all 
had Utum destroyed hy the iSt'^ of one Volti/^enit^. It it* falw'j 
Uiat thl« r<',<lo(d»t, one,e iu one j|»owei», «vei» wjm* I'etaken hy the 
«-.n«',njy j It wa«, ihe/rfor<c, imj<o<',f-,llil<' tlxifc, fdionld lic found 
.iity of our d«',ad in it. 

*'Ne«t«);)y, wlK'.n the Koijxr'or' review«<l timt regiment, he 



124 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

inquired where was its third battalion ? In the redoubt ! re- 
plied the Colonel." 

From the account we have given of the events which took 
place at this point, it is seen how ridiculous is this answei-, at- 
tributed to the Colonel of the 61st; but to tell the truth, Mr. 
de Segur is not the author of it. He has taken this trait from 
Labaume, who has derived, nobody knows where. The fact 
is, that no French battalion entered the redoubt by main force, 
for as we have explained, it was the brilliant attack of the 
battalion of the 57th, which induced the Russian corps, to 
whom was intrusted the defence of the hill on which was the 
redoubt, to retire ; a movement which left it in our power. 
The author says that it was the bravery of a Spanish regiment 
which caused the defeat of the enemy — this fact is also incor- 
rect ,* when the 111th advanced towards the right of the ene- 
my, and was cliarged by the Russian cavalry, the regiment of 
Joseph Napoleon, forming part of Friant's division, came up 
to support it, but the fire of the 11 1th was sufficient to repulse 
the Russians. All this chapter partakes of the ignorance of 
the author, as to what took place in the aff'air of the 5th. 



CHAPTER VI. 

The first rays of the sun, on the 6th of September, showed 
us the Russian army, in the same posititions they had occupied 
the evening before, and we concur with Mr de Segur, that 
there was a general feeling of exultation. He deduces the 
motives of this, in the following w ords. " At last this vague, 
languid, and wandering war, where our eflbrts destroyed us, 
and into which we plunged, regardless of consequences, was 
arrested; we had reached a goal, a limit, and every thing was 
about to be decided !" 



BOOK VII. 125 



CHAPTER VIT. 



Whilst the Emperor was occupied in examining the Russiaij 
positions, the Prince of Echmiilh came to him, to announce 
that he had reconnoitered their left, and begged that he might 
be allowed, to turn it with his five divisions and the corps of 
Poniatowski. Napoleon refused to accede to the plan, Davoust 
insisted, on the feasibility of it, but in vain. Now, this plan 
is probably a subsequent idea of Mr. de Segur's, deduced from 
the opinions of others, of what might have been effected, at the 
battle of Moskowa. He ordered Davoust, to return to his 
post, *' murmuring against a prudence, which he thought un- 
reasonable." Among a host of reasons, which might be adduc- 
ed for the refusal of the Emperor, what need was there, of 
saying, that "age had rendered Napoleon less enterprising 
than he was?" Was Napoleon an old man at 43 years of age? 
The fact is, that even now, when we know exactly the force of 
the Russians at this battle, and their position, no one can decide 
what might have been the result, if the movement proposed by 
Davoust, had been carried into execution. For, to succeed, it 
should have been performed during the nighty but it is well 
known, how hazardous such marches are, made througli a 
wooded and unknown tract of country, and almost without a 
guide. Even in cases of much more simple manoeuvres, and 
where the results would be less important, we have seen what 
took place near Smolensk, with Junot's corps ; added to which, 
it is extremely probable, that the enemy having an immense 
number of light troops, would have soon been apprised of this 
movement, and hence, would either have frustrated it, or have 
retreated, and thus, the battle we so anxiously sought, would 
have been retarded. 

How Mr de Segur, after having represented the army as 
disorganised, dyingof hunger and fatigue, feeble and disheart- 
ened, can tell us, " that it was sound, supple, nervous, like those 
manly bodies which having just lost the plumpness of youth, 



126 CRniCAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

display forms more masculine and strongly marked ; still, dur- 
ing the several days he had marched in the midst of it, he had 
found it silent, from that silence which is imposed by great 
expectation or great astonishment, like nature, the moment 
before a violent tempest, or crowds at the instant of an extra- 
ordinary danger. 

** The temerity of the situation, into which he had urged the 
the army," appears evident to the author, " but there was no 
rest for it, hut in death or victory." But on what did he rely ? 
**on the curiosity of his soldiers to see Moscow j perhaps to 
plunder." 

Always plunder. When man is in youth, he finds it difficult 
to avoid entliusiasm on some subject, and it is seldom that 
glory, friendship, and gratitude, do not sway our actions. But 
the officer of the palace, is above these feelings j neither the 
glory of the army, feeling for his associates, or gratitude to 
his benefactor, prevent him from viewing the army and the 
soldiers composing it, in any other light than as plunderers, 
and, in the chieftain who commands them a disposition to 
permit it. 

The proclamation to the army, ** will some day be deemed 
admirable," says Mr de Segur, but why is it not so at present ? 
whatever is great and excellent, will always be so. 



CHAPTER Vm. 

Our author represents Kutusof, as endeavouring in the name 
of religion, to excite the fimaticism and enthusiasm, of his half 
barbarous troops. Abuse is heaped on Napoleon. Let the 
two proclamations be compared : Mr de Segur tells us, that 
"this rude and simple people, who had not yet advanced 
beyond sensations, but who for that very reason, were so much 
more formidable as soldiers, less diverted from obedience, by 
reasoning, confined by slavery to a narrow circle, in which 



BOOK VII. 127 

they are reduced to a small number of sensations, which are 
the only sources of their wants, wishes, and ideas." 

Mr. de Segur has a singular idea of a sohlicr. What! that 
he is efficient in proportion to the debased state of his native 
country ? This maxim is contradicted by the history of Greece 
and Rome, who, at the moment of their most gh)rious tri- 
umphs, were the most civilized nations of the world ; but alas ! 
this will not be confirmed by the example of the French troops, 
who, although belonging to the most polished nation of modern 
times, arc only the less formidable. Trusting tliat Mr. de Se- 
gur will not take offence, we assert, that the glory of the 
French soldiers is attributable as much to their innate bravery, 
as to a multitude of feelings arising from a state of perfect 
civilization, producing a bias to glory. 

A few lines lower down, he supposes that the Russians are 
rather idolaters than Christians, and ** that they had convert- 
ed that religion of the soul, which is wholly intellectual, and 
moral, into one entirely physical and material, to bi'ing it to 
the level of their brute and short capacity." 

These reflections may be exceedingly beautiful, but it is not 
a metaphysical and ideological dissertation, that the reader 
would anticipate from the pen of the historian, who is describ- 
ing the battle of Moscow ; a simple recital of facts would pos- 
sess much greater attractions for him. 

To the just representation made by the author of the recep- 
tion of the portrait of the King of Rome, he should have add- 
ed these words of the Emperor, which testify his deep emotion, 
and the feelings which agitated him in the midst of the enthu- 
siastic exclamations of his troops. Take it away, he will but 
too soon witness a field of battle ! 

Colonel Fabvier, aid-dc-camp to Marshal Marmont, having 
announced to the Emperor the loss of the battle of Aropiles, 
Mr. de Segur tells us, that ** the Emperor received graciously 
the aid-de-camp of tlie vanquished general ; on the eve of a 
battle, the fate of winch was so uncertain, he felt disposed to 
be indulgent to a defeat." This fact, and the conjoined reflec- 
tion, are wholly incorrect. The Emperor testified the most 
violent disappointment, when he learnt that Marshal Marmont 



128 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, 8cc. 

liad compromised the French army, to satisfy a personal am* 
bition, in giving battle without waiting, and in the face of the 
orders he had received, for the arrival of Soult, which would 
have insured him the victory. 

Colonel Fabvier, who was imbued with the most noble and 
elevated feelings, conceived his honour compromised by these 
reproaches of the Emperor, and the next day saw him fight- 
ing on foot, as a volunteer, in the most perilous situations, as 
if to prove, that the soldiers of the army of Spain did not 
yield in courage to those of the army of Russia. 

The details that our author gives of the manner in which 
Napoleon passed the night, are a mass of unconnected ideas, 
misapplied words, broken conversations, and of interrupted 
soliloquies. Who would recognise, in his representation, the 
general who had commanded in fifty pitched battles? From 
his statement it would be supposed that Napoleon had never 
been engaged M'ith an enemy. This passage must have been 
written from notes, furnished by some valet-de-chambre, to an 
historian too little acquainted with the Emperor to appreciate 
their truth. 

Napoleon, who is encouraged b^'^ finding " his army sound, 
supple, nervous, &c." *' became frightened at the destitute state 
of his soldiers;" "weak and famished as they werej'* Mr. 
de Segur makes him say, " how could they support a long and 
terrible shock ?" Observe that he is speaking on the same day, 
and of the same army. A similar contradiction exists in the 
portraiture of the Emperor, whom he figures, in the day, 
"calm and with the look of an eagle;" during the night, 
"overwhelmed with the fears and solicitudes of a weak child, 
thrown unexpectedly into an unforeseen situation." 



BOOK VII. 129 



CHAPTER IX. 

The 7th of September, at 5 o'clock in the morning, Napo- 
leon posted himself near the redoubt which had been taken the 
preceding day. From this central position, he despatched 
many officers to carry into execution the orders he promul- 
gated during the night. The author says, that " the Empe- 
ror's attention was then directed towards his right, when, all 
at once, near 7 o'clock, the battle began upon his left." This 
is altogether incorrect. The firing commenced from a battery 
on our right. Does the officer of the palace, in thus making 
it commence on the left, intend to open his account of the bat- 
tle with the partial attack of one regiment, (the 106th) which 
owed its safety to the 92d, " voluntarily running up to its as- 
sistance." It might be inferred, from such a commencement, 
that there was no general present to give orders, and to be 
obeyed. We will remark, by the way, that this 92d regiment 
is the same of which Mr. de Segur had attacked the reputa- 
tion at the battle of Ostronow. 

" It was Napoleon himself who had just ordered his left 
wing to make a violent attack — he multiplied Iiis orders, used 
the most violent excitations, and engaged a battle in front, the 
plan of which he had conceived in an oblique order." 

According to the general orders for the battle, Prince Eu- 
gene should have attracted tlie attention of the enemy to their 
centre and right wing, by an attack on Borodino, in order, 
1st, to facilitate the movement of Prince Poniatowski, in the 
direction of tlie old road from Smolensk to Moscow : 2dly, to 
prevent the enemy from weakening his right, in order to rein- 
force his extreme left, which wa's to be attacked by Marshal 
Davoust. 

<* Rapp, rushing to replace Compans, again led his soldiers 
on, with fixed bayonets, and at a running pace, against thp 
enemy's redoubt." 

The Emperor, pleased with the mode by which General 

R 



130 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c, 

Compans had made himself master of the redoubt of Schwar-* 
dino, on the 5th,* confided to him the attack on the breast- 
worlis, at the extreme left of the Russian position. This ge- 
neral had under him, his own division, and that of General 
Dessaix. As soon as the cannonade commenced, he formed 
his division into two parallel masses. That on the right Was 
destined to draw the enemy from the copse, and thus to cover 
the movement of the brigade on the left, which marched di- 
rectly on the redoubt. The division of Dessaix was in a se- 
cond line, to act as a reserve. At the moment General Teste 
(with the 25th and 57th regiments) entered the redoubt, (at 
half past 7 o'clock in the morning,) Compans was wounded 
by a ball, in the shoulder. This general, who had replaced 
General Dupelain, in the command of the division, committed 
it to the charge of Dessaix, who was also wounded a short 
time afterwards. It was him that General Rapp succeeded. 
Marshal Davoust, who was on the right of the grand battery, 
was wounded about the same lime.f 

It was a great misfortune, that the whole of these officers 
should thus have been wounded, at almost the same moment. 

The wound of General Compans, who alone knew the in- 

* On. the 6tli, the eve of the battle, the Emperor sent for Compans, to In- 
inform him, that he destined him to attack the enemy's redoubt, placed at 
our extreme right. Marshal Ney was present, Compans proposed to march 
his division through the wood, to avoid the enemy's fire. Ney thought it 
would embarrass the attack, but Compans, who had reconnoitred the spot, 
declared that it was a passable copse; the Emperor approved of his plan^ 
General Compans added, that what he feared was, that the enemy would 
throw his right into the wood, and thus place himself between Poniatowski 
and his division. Napoleon answered, "you are right, but to counteract 
this danger, you may take the division of Dessaix." 

f General Sorbier, sent by Napoleon to the Prince of Eckmiilh, reached 
him at the moment a bullet passed through his horse. The hammer of one 
of his pistols, forced into the holster, gave the Marshal so severe a contusion 
that he was thrown down. General Sorbier, for a moment, thought he was 
dead, and announced it to the Emperor, who made no reply. But in a few 
moments an officer came up and informed Napoleon, that the Prince of IJck- 
Tniilh was again at the head of his troops: The Emperor exclaimed with 
fervour — God be thanked ! 



BOOK VII. 131 

tentions of the Emperor, was mortal ; this caused some inde- 
cision in the movement of the first corps. 

According to our historian, Rapp, who had been wounded 
whilst leading Compan's division, tells the Emperor, " that 
it would require the guard to finish." Mr. de Segur appa- 
rently believes that the wound General Rapp had received 
must have disordered his mind. For would he not have given 
a proof of insanity in proposing to the Emperor to call up the 
reserve at the very commencement of a battle? But he i^ay 
since have heard officers diacussing this action, and may have 
heard them observe, that if the guard, both infantry and ca- 
valry, had been brought up, the results of the victory would^^ 
have been more brilliant. In his system of always criticising 
Napoleon, he has laid hold of this idea, which he dwells on in 
the whole course of his narrative, without paying any atten- 
tion to the time that would be most favourable, and admissible 
for such a movement. This attack of the guard, which, in all 
cases, should only be resorted to, to decide or complete a vic- 
tory, the author thinks, should have taken place at the com- 
mencement of the action. He must possess but little military 
knowledge not to be aware that it is a principle, never to en- 
gage the reserve until the last extremity, and that the skill of 
a general consists, in part, in forcing the enemy to bring up 
his reserve first. If Mr. de Segur had studied the different 
battles in which the Emperor commanded, he would have seen 
that it was oftentimes owing to this maxim that he was victo- 
rious. 

**Ney then, with Ms three divisions reduced to 10,000 men, 
hastened into the plain." 

The corps of Marshal Ney was placed in the centre, having 
the corps of the Duke of Abrantes a§ a second line. His right 
rested on the left of Marshal Davoust ; " he did not hasten in- 
to the plain, to the assistance of Davoust." He executed the 
orders he had received from the Emperor, to attack conjointly 
with Marshal Davoust, tlie three redoubts that protected the 
enemy's left. The wounds of Generals Compans, of Dessaix, 
and of Marshal Davoust, having caused some wavering in the 
manoeuvres of the first corps, its attack did not produce all 



i;j2 ClMTtCAL EXAMFNATION, he. 

tlio cttVci iliai was unli(-i|>al(Ml. 'V\w, luovoinrnt of Noy's tlinu^ 
divisioriH wan cxcciiIcmI with jiHlonisliiiit^ iicconlance, and was 
Comijl«'t(dy siicccssl'iil. Kiuhui raided Uy this atlac'k, the two di- 
visifMiH of Davoust. ro-aUackt'd ihv lM'«'as(,\v(»rk, and (he tlirco 
rcdoidtts loll in our liandH ai *) o'clock in (lie inoriiiiiii;. 

Arcordinf? to Mr. do Softiir, the UiisNians iiiai'chcd up 
iowanlw noon, in order to retake the redoubts. ♦' The Firneh,'* 
HiiyH he, *' who were still in the disorder of victor)', were as- 
toiiishod, and retreated." This event appears to have been co- 
pied fi-oni the liiissiiin f^a/.ettei). It i,s Cilice, tliat the Fretu^h, 
dnrin^c; the whole c<nir,se of the battle, ever al)audon«Mj the ro- 
,doubts taken by them at its conimencement. Th(^ corps of Da- 
voiih( and Ney successrully defended them a]i;ainst the i-eitc- 
rated attacks of the lliissians. The enemy's genei-al perceiv- 
ing, from the moment of the first attackvS, that he had posted 
fiiH right in a disadvantageous p(»Mi(ion, hastened to bring 
u|) (he corps of Uaggowon( to his Wi'U alreatly weakened by 
the loss of the redoubts. 

The nn>veinent that Mr. de Segiir supposes in have been ef- 
fected by the >Vestphalians, the mistake he at(ribu(,es to thrm, 
that of (iring on our own troops, and the disorder, wliiib, ac- 
cording to him, this occasioned, arc circumstancos equally con- 
(rovei'tilde. 

'J'he Wtstphalians, as we have observed, were in reserve in 
the roar of Marshal Ney ; the Emperor, perceiving the failure 
of Havoust's attack, oidei-ed (hem (o the right of that mar- 
shal, thus uniting his corps to that of i'oniatowski, w hich was 
stationed near Dtilsa. It was, therefore, in the beginning of 
the battl(\ and n(»t at (he middle, as our author asserts, that 
this corps was posted on the right of Marshal Davoust, and to 
sustain his attaidv, not tg succour the Toles. It appears from 
the iletails Mr.de Segur gives'on this subject, that he did not 
go ni amitli'w to view the ba((le at this point. 

Who could havi- informed him that our soldiers, pushed by 
the enemy's cavalry, ** were running I'ound the parapet in a 
stale of the greatest panic, and that they only wanted an out- 
let, to run away :'" Again he tells us, " at the same time Mey 
had again formed his divisions." When was it, they were 



BOOK vii. 133 

ever broken ? All these assertions want credibility, as well 
as the portrait he gives of Murat: " with one hand he fought, 
with the other he elevated and waved his plume." The author 
liaving talcen no part in this battle, has suffered himself to be 
carried away by his recollections of the Iliad, and even to 
imitate one of its descriptions, without paying attention to 
changes of time and mode of warfare. 



CHAPTER X. 

" This vigorous action (the capture of the village of Seme- 
nowskow) opened us the road to victory ; it was necessary to 
rush into it, but Murat, Ney, and Davoust, were exhausted; 
they halted, and while they were rallying their troops, they 
sent to Napoleon to ask for reinforcements. Napoleon was 
then seized with a hesitation which he never before dis- 
played." 

It is a little singular to observe, Mr. de Segur, thus caus- 
ing Murat, Ney, and Davoust, to demand reinforcements when 
they were victorious, and at the moment he tells us, that Ba- 
gration had withdrawn his left towards Psarewow, that is 
three quarters of a league backwards, which would have left 
us masters of the field of battle, hitherto occupied by the Rus- 
sian left wing. The hesitation which he never before displayed 
of Napoleon, demonstrates a defect of memory, to say the least 
of it, on the part of the historian. For hitherto he has con- 
stantly held him up to us as tormented with a feverish hesita- 
tion. 

We are now presented with Bagration, who returns from 
Psarewow, to attack Semenowskow. Friant's division is before 
it. The officer of the palace informs us that, " his soldiers 
began to give way ; that Murat seized one of their leaders 
who was on the retreat, by the collar, and exclaimed, " what 



134 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

are you about ?" the colonel pointing to the ground, covered 
with half his troops, answered, ** you see well enough ; it is 
impossible to stand here." " Very well, I will remain," re- 
plied the king. These words stopped the officer, he looked 
Murat steadily in the face, and turning round, coolly said, 
" you are right ! Soldiers, face to the enemy, let us go and be 
killed !" 

Without asking by whom this conversation ^was related to 
Mr. de Segur, we will remark, that there was not for a single 
moment any disorder in Friant's division, which had hitherto 
been in reserve, and on that account, the Emperor had order- 
ed it to take possession and maintain Semenowskow. In this 
division, which contributed so much to the victory, as in the 
whole French army, there did not exist a colonel whom, at the 
head of his regiment, it was necessary to conduct against the 
enemy, by his collar, and who would have given birth to so 
stupid an order as Soldiers face the enemy, let us go and be killed. 
If all Mr. de Segur relates on this subject be true, this sole ex- 
pression, ** face to the enemy, let us go and be killed," should 
have convinced the king of Naples, that he who used such lan- 
guage, was incapable of Carrying his words into effect. 

" Meanwhile Murat had just sent back Borelli to the Em- 
peror, to ask assistance. That officer insisted, and the Em- 
peror promised the young guard, but scarcely had it advanced 
a few paces, when he himself called out to it, to halt." 

At the moment when our right wing was victorious, the ene- 
my passed the Kolocza, with the whole of Platoff' s cavalry, 
and that of General Ouwaroif, and made a vigorous attack on 
our left. The light cavalry of General Onnano were driven 
in, and our infantry at this point were obliged to be formed 
into squares, by regiments. Prince Eugene was in some dan- 
ger. It was at this time that the Emperor learnt the disposi- 
tion of the enemy to resume the offensive on our right. It was 
therefore natural that he should not have sent them the re- 
serve, before he ascertained the situation of affairs on our left. 
As to the solicitations of Borelli, a personage of whom the 
author has not even mentioned the rank, does he believe that 
any one will credit such tales ? 



BOOK vii. 135 

We shall not refute the ridiculous assertion that "the 
Count de Lobau made the guard advance by degrees, under 
pretence of dressing the line." 

Could a corps of such size, under the eye of the Emperor, 
steal a movement, if I may be allowed the expression ? 

" Fortunately the artillery of the reserve advanced at that 
moment, — Lauriston had obtained the Emperor's consent to 
that manoeuvre." 

If Mr. de Segur is to be believed. Napoleon would not issue 
any orders, if his generals had not forced them from him. 
The artillery of the guard, commanded by General Sorbier, 
had been in battery from the commencement of the action. 
The Emperor perceiving that the whole reserve of the enemy, 
infantry, cavalry, and artillery, had been brought up, for the 
purpose of retaking the position of Semenowskow, ordered the 
corps of Ney, the cavalry of the King of Naples, and the ar- 
tillery of the reserve, to the support of Friant's division. The 
division of the young guard, (Roguet) was also placed as a 
second line, in the rear of Friant's division : of this, Mr. de 
Segur does not s^ a word. It was the Emperor who order- 
ed this movement, and it never occurred to the mind of any 
one to advise or offer to execute it ', Napoleon commanded, 
and was obeyed. 

The author says, " the whole of that day the Emperor was 
sitting down or walking about leisurely — at a great distance 
from the battle." And he forgets that a few pages before, he 
makes mention of the bullets which fell at his feet. He says, 
** he merely made some gestures of melancholy resignation — 
that his calmness was dead, a mild and sluggish inactivity. 
Some fancied they traced in it that dejection which is gene- 
rally the follower of violent sensations." 

The author should have informed us what were the violent 
sensations the Emperor had experienced before the battle, to 
reduce him to the state he describes. " Others, that he had 
already become indifferent to every thing, even to the emotion 
of battles. Several remarked, that the calm constancy and 
coolness which great men display on these great occasions, 



136 CRITICAL EXAMINATION! Stc 

turn in the course of time, to phlegm and heaviness, when age 
has worn out their springs." 

Must we again repeat that Napoleon was then in the flower 
of age and of constitution. Does the ojflicer of the palace 
mean to speak seriously, when he utters such assertions, and 
which tend to make it believed that the Emperor was a man 
devoid of both moral and physical strength, a man fallen in 
a state of complete demoralization, and insensible to every 
thing. Would not the generals, and officers who approached 
Napoleon, all the leaders and soldiers of tlie guard perceived 
this, if it had been the case. Independently of these witnesses, 
do not facts speak. It is certain, that from two o'clock, on 
the morning of the 6th, the Emperor had visited every corps 
in his army, spoken to all the generals, reconnoitred and 
studied in detail, the situation of the enemy, and nature of the 
ground on which the battle would take place. In this manner 
he passed the day of the 6th j it was not until the night that 
he prescribed the manner in which the Russian army was to 
be attacked. After having issued all the orders to the differ- 
ent corps, he took repose for two hours, during the night of 
the 6th and 7th, the remainder of which he passed in receiv- 
ing reports and issuing orders. On the 7th, before 5 o'clock 
in the morning, he was on horseback, and before the redoubt 
of Schwardino, a central position, from which he could ob- 
serve all the events of the battle. In his rear, was the reserve 
(the old guard.) This, by his orders, was displayed in co- 
lumns by battalions, at the distance of sixty paces, which 
caused a belief in the enemy, that it was twice as numerous than 
it really was. The young guard was in advance. He thus 
kept his picked troops under his own eye, to be made use of 
according to circumstances, if the victory in spite of all his 
calculations should be undecided. 

In this position, the Emperor was placed in a salient point, 
from the enemy's line, which formed a kind of triangle oppo- 
site ours; from here he could hasten rapidly either to our 
right or left wing, at the same time be enabled to act against 
the enemy's centre. 



BOOK VIL 



137 



In an army of more than 100,000 men, it is impossible for 
a commander in chief to follow exactly all the movements on 
the right and left,- on this account such an army is divided into 
corps, which are subdivided into divisions and brigades, each 
division is organized in such manner as to manoeuvre separ- 
ately, and to depend on itself. The commander in chief is the 
soul of this army. Each of the commanders of the Corps 
d'J^rmee must follow up the orders he has received, in the man- 
ner that appears to him most suitable to place and circumstan- 
ces. Unity in action does not consist in the general in com- 
mand seeing and executing every thing, and the generals under 
him being mere instruments. If this were the case, an army 
should never consist of more than 6,000 men ; added to which 
the different commanders having to inform him what move- 
ments were necessary by the events which might occur, the 
general in command would be liable for the faults they might 
commit. It would be preposterous to wish the commander in 
chief of an army of 100,000 men, to be always inspecting his 
line, and not to depend on the generals under his orders. 

On the contrary, in a battle, a general must depend on all 
his officers, for then the original plan may be modified, and 
even entirely changed by circumstances, from the general down 
to the major or captain of artillery, who requires no order to 
place his pieces, to fall back or advance a few paces, in order 
to occupy an advantageous position. It may, indeed be said, 
that every one commands in a battle, even to the corporal who 
is posted with a few marksmen on a bridge or in a defile. To 
view a battle in a different point of view, or to suppose that so 
many thousand men are mere machines, that the general in 
command moves as hd pleases, is the height of absurdity. Thus 
as we have said, the commander in chief is the soul of the bat- 
tle; he overlooks all, and retains under his own eye a reserve 
in order to counteract any unforeseen occurrence; it is when 
hie wishes to effect too much that he destroys the unity of ac- 
tion. 

Mr. de Segur, who describes to us the Emperor as engrafted 
to the spot on which he had placed himself, ought to recollect, 
that it was from this central position of Napoleon's, that he 

S 



|3g GttlflCAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

despatched the order to Trince Poniatowski to commence the 
attack; that it was there that Marshal Davoust, slightly 
wounded, communicated to him the wavci'ing that had taken 
place in his attack, and that the Emperor, highly displeased, 
had remanded him to the head of his corps ; it was there, when 
by the vigorous co-operation of Marshal Ney, the three re- 
doubts on the Russian left fell into our hands, and that Napo- 
leon saw that the enemy was withdrawing troops fi'om his 
right, in order to march them on Semenowskow; it was from 
thence, we say, that he sent the order to General Friant to 
take possession of the village, advising him that he should be 
supported by the artillery of the reserve. 

Whilst the Emperor was giving these orders on his right, 
an irruption of Cossacks and cavalry took place on our left, 
beyond Borodino, he sent to this place the legion of the Vis- 
tula, (Claparede.) which had been in reserve with the guard. 
Afterwards, when he learnt tliat the enemy was vigorously 
assaulting our right, and that the attack of the Poles had been 
repulsed, he sent an order to the corps of Junot to post itself 
on the right of Davoust, to establish a communication between 
that general and the Polish corps. To replace the Westpha- 
lians of Junot, who were posted in the rear of Marshal Ney, 
he sent him Roguet's division of the guard. Finally, when he 
M as informed tliat tl»e attacks of the enemy on our right were 
repulsed, and that our artillery was making a horrible carnage 
in these masses ; it was from this central position he sent the 
order to tlie King of Naples to make a grand charge with his 
cavalry, in wheeling on his right wing. AVhilst these events 
took place, he despatched an order to Prince Eugene to make 
another attack, and to carry the great. redoubt. The execu- 
tion of these different orders had the result the Emperor anti- 
cipated ; victory decixled for us. 

This account sufficiently explains the reasons which deter- 
mined Napoleon to remain in t!ie position he had chosen, and 
not to change it without cogent reasons. 

Thus, he was seen to travei'se the whole of our line of bat- 
tle ; when the first line of the enemy was forced, by the cap- 
ture of the redoubt in the centre, what would have been the con- 



BOOK VII. 139 

sequence, if the Emperor had proceeded to tlie right, towards 
the Polish troops, when our left was attacked ? and what have 
happened, if he had been at Borodino, when our extreme right 
was outflanked by the enemy ? 

This short detail will enable the reader to judge for himself, 
why the Emperor remained at his post, waiting the execution 
of the orders he had issued. We repeat, that he had at com- 
mand a reserve to counteract unforeseen occurrences; this 
could not be made use of, since the victory had never, for an 
instant, been doubtful. All military men agree in the princi- 
ple, that during a battle, the general reserve ought never to be 
brought into action, except in cases of absolute necessity ; that 
is, to prevent a defeat. It was from having neglected this prin- 
ciple, that General Melay, almost the conqueror at Marengo, 
lost his army and all Italy. Believing the victory certain, he 
pushed on his reserve to render it more decisive. Dessaix's 
division arrived, the enemy's army could not rally, and it was 
annihilated. 

Still more remarkable examples might be adduced in support 
of this observation, if there was any necessity for them. Na- 
poleon had, besides, powerful reasons not to neglect this great 
law of war. Having before him an enemy backed by his capi- 
tal, and in the way of receiving reinforcements ; he himself 
eight hundred leagues from his country, what would have been 
the consequence if the battle had been renewed the next day, 
as was the intention of Kutusof ? The French troops, not- 
withstanding their victory, and perhaps from this very victo- 
ry, might have been repulsed. A fresh corps of 20,000 picked 
men alone might have gained the battle. 

Moreover, what are these "farther excitements that were 
not wanting," only that the Emperor had sufficient strength 
of mind to excuse them, and to appreciate their true value, and 
to feel all that was imposed on him by his duty as commander 
in chief. 

Mr. de Segur supposes that the movement by which our right 
wing advanced, in wheeling on the centre, was made by acci- 
dent, and without the knowledge of tlie Emperor. We cannot 
conceive who can have given him this information. This move- 



j^40 CRITICAL EXAMlNA'nON, &c. 

nient was ordered by the general plan of the battle, and took 
place in consequence of an order from Napoleon to the King 
of Naples. 

** In this manner, about midday, the whole of the French 
right wing, Ney, Davoust, Murat, — presented itself on the 
half opened flank of the remainder of the hostile army, of 
which they could see the whole interior, the reserves, the 
abandoned rears, and even the commencement of the retreat.'* 

The Russian left wing, after having seen all its efforts on the 
village of Semenowskow, completely fail, and being pushed by 
the vigorous charge of the cavalry of the King of Naples, re- 
tired on its second position. Its left was in advance of Psa- 
rewo ; its right was in communication with the corps of Doc- 
torof in the rear of Gorki, and protected in front by the grand 
I'edoubt. This position was still very strong. Our historian 
asserts, that it was at this period of the battle, that General 
Belliard came to the Emperor to request that the guard should 
be detached to this point. But this General could not have 
said, " that a ravine and thin copse separated us from the 
Moscow road, on which were to be seen a confused crowd of 
flying and wounded soldiers, and carriages retreating." For, 
as we have already observed, the Russian line which covered 
this road, was still formidable. *' The Emperor, however, still 
hesitated, and ordered that general to go and look again." It 
would appear that the zeal of this general had misled him the 
first time, for he speedily returned to announce that the enemy 
was making preparations to defend himself. Yet he insists on 
having the guard ; " otherwise," says he, '* it would require 
a second battle to terminate the first." 

The part that Mr. de Segur has assigned to General Bel- 
liard, does not by any means suit him ^ it should be that of a 
blunderer, and not of a skilful general. The speeches attri- 
buted to Marslial Bessieres and the Emperor fully demon- 
strate this. The marshal endeavours to impress on Napoleon 
" the distance they were from reinforcements, that the whole 
of Europe is between him and France, that he ought to pre- 
serve at least this handful of soldiers." Napoleon answers, 
" that nothing was yet sufficiently unravelled, that to make 



BOOK VU. 14^1 

him give his reserves, he wanted to see more clearly on his 
chess-board." It must be remarked that Mr. de Segur him- 
self confesses, that at this moment, "the efforts of Prince 
Eugene had been ineffectual against the grand redoubt." The 
reply of Napoleon victoriously refutes the kind of reproach 
that the author makes against him, for not having given the 
guard. 

If Belliard, on returning to the King of Naples and Ney, 
had conveyed to them the words of the Emperor, they would 
have perfectly understood him ; but instead of that, the author 
represents Belliard as informing them that he had found Na- 
poleon ** seated in the same place, with a suffering and de- 
jected air, his features sunk, and a dull look, giving his orders 
languishingly in the midst of these dreadful warlike noises, to 
which he seemed completely a stranger." What relation is 
there between these imprudent suppositions, and the clear rea- 
sons the Emperor had detailed to General Belliard ? But all 
this is to eUcit a brutal speech, which he attributes to Marshal 
Ney, whom he makes observe, " What business has the Empe- 
ror in the rear of the army ? Since he will no longer make 
war himself — since he is no longer the general, as he wishes 
to be Emperor every where — let him return to the Thuilleries 
and leave us to be generals for him." Marshal Ney's vivacity 
of character could never have misled his judgment to such a 
degree as to make him forget a circumstance he was so well 
aware of, that his fate, that of the army, the expedition, of 
France itself, depended on the person of Napoleon. Besides, 
we were ourselves several times with Marshal Ney, djiring 
this battle, and the zeal and devotion with which he executed 
the orders and instructions of the Emperor, have convinced us 
that he never entertained an idea of criticising them. 

But it is not enough, that the military operations of Napo- 
leon should be censured by his generals, they must also be 
corrected by his comptroller and secretary of state. Both in- 
form him, that *"the moment for sending the guard was now 
come." If Mr. de Segur wished his opinion, of the weakness of 
the physical and intellectual faculties of the Emperor, to be be- 
lieved, truly, he could not have imagined a stronger proof. Bcr 



142 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c, 

hold Napoleon reduced to such an extremity, as to he advised hy 
his comptroller and his secretary of state, that the time for push- 
ing on his reserve had arrived ! ! ! But he must have fallen 
very low, and without hopes of again rising, or Messrs. Du- 
mas and Daru would have taken care not to advise a military 
movement to so great a commander. What is the most singu- 
lar in all this, is, to ohserve that Mr. de Segui", notwithstand- 
ing his title of general, appears to partake of the opinion, 
" that he should have given tlie guard," and at the same time 
puts an unanswerable reason in the mouth of the Emperor, 
why it should not be given. " If there should be another bat- 
tle to-morrow, where is my army !" 

At the distance we were from France, the imperial guard, 
was, as it were, a fortilied place, under the shelter of which 
the army could always be rallied. Mr. de Segur, who has 
written since the occurrences took place, should have re- 
collected, that if the guard had been broken at the battle of 
Moskwa, the French army, of whicli this guard always form- 
ed the nucleus, and sustained the courage during the retreat, 
would have with difficulty recrossed the Niemcn. 



CHAPTER XI. 

In this chapter the author returns to the commencement of 
the battle and the first operations of Prince Eugene. He re- 
presents his attack as taking place in a partial and unconcert- 
ed manner. " The attack besides should not have been made 
so precipitately — the battle having been arranged to begin on 
the right wing, and pivot on the left." Since M. the palace 
officer, repeats this assertion to satiety, to take occasion to 
depreciate the Emperor, ^ve also repeat what we have said: 
1st, that the battle commenced by General Sorbier's batteries 
on the right, ordered to support the attack of Marshal Da- 
voust against the left of the enemy. 2d, that the Emperor 



IJOOK VII. 143 

sent Prince Eugene an order to attack Borodino, in order to 
draw the attention of the enemy that way. 3d, that Napoleon, 
seeing that the enemy with«lrew from his right wing all the 
corps of Baggowout, to carry it to his left wing, and fearing 
that Ney and Davoust were not sufficiently strong to resist, 
gave the order to Prince Eugene to attack the redouUt of the 
enemy's centre briskly, to prevent him from throwing nearly 
all his forces upon our right. 

Farther on, he tells us that the Viceroy, who could not carry 
the redoubt at the first attack, sent to inform the Emperor of 
his critical position, to demand assistance, probably the guard. 
Thus Marshal Ney demands the guard on the right, and Prince 
Eugene on the left j the Emperor refuses both, and yet Mr. de 
Segur blames him. These facts alone prove what reason Na- 
poleon had for keeping it in reserve for this moment. Besides, 
it is not the fact that he refused assistance to Prince Eugene, 
when it was necessary, since he sent him the legion of the 
Vistula, which formed part of the reserve. ** It was getting 
late, our ammunition was exhausted, and the battle ended. 
Then only the Emperor mounted his horse with difficulty, and 
rode slowly along the heights of Semenowskoi." 

This is altogether inexact j when this village was in our 
power, the Emperor moved there. He asked for General 
Friant, who had taken it. Having learned that although 
wounded, he still commanded his division. Napoleon, in pre- 
sence of his troops, said, smiling. In that case I am at ease, 
let him alone. But soon seeing the considerable forces with 
which the enemy were preparing to attack Semenowskoi, he 
established the 48th, 33d, and the Spanish regiment, on the 
little hill in front of the village ; he formed the 33d into a 
square upon the site of Semenowskoi, having the 15th on the 
left. It was from this place that he gave the order to Marshal 
Ney to unite Compan's and Dessaix's divisions, and flank the 
enemy by their left. These arrangements being ordered, the 
Emperor moved rapidly to the centre of the army, and sent 
an order to Prince Eugene to attack the great redoubt vigo- 
rously. 

In relation to the exhausted ammunitions^ no such thing oc- 



144 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

curred : animiinition was never exhausted. The French ar 
tillery, in tins hattle, discharged 31,000 and some hundred 
shots. But this enormous quantity of ammunition was re- 
placed as fast as it was expended, by the activity of Genera! 
IVcigre, the director of the Park, according to the measures 
taken ^tjL General Laxiboisiere. AVe could have fought two 
more battles witliout drawing on the magazines at Smolensko. 
The Emperor ordered the young guard to keep the field of 
hattle. The enemy might be reinforced during the night. Na- 
poleon took measures to sustain this corps. The battle being 
finished at all points, he returned, behind the redoubt of 
Schwardino, in order to despatch his orders to the difterent 
commandants of his ai*niy, where his tents were pitched j and 
it is there without doubt that Mr. de Segur saw him. 



CHAPTER XII. 

The scene lies in the tent of the Emperor. Instead of re- 
presenting him as occupied in giving orders, Mr. de Segur 
supposes him " in a state of great mental aVignish and physi- 
cal dejection. In iiis army, even in his very tent, victory was 
silent, gloomy, isolated, even without flatterers. The persons* 
whom he had summoned, Dumas and Darn listened to him 
and said notliiug; bnt their attitude, their downcast eyes, and 
their silence, spoke more eloquently than wards." 

What Messrs. Dumas and Daru should have done during 
the battle, was to be silent ; the author has made them talk. 
After the battle, the Emperor sends for them to his tent, to 
know what measures they have taken relative to the wounded, 
the ambulances, means of transportation, kc. necessary to the 
army. It was speaking to them of their duties and they were 
silent ! 

* These gentlemen will doubtless be unwilling to accept tlie denomination 
of flatterers, with wliich Mr de S^gur honours them. 



BOOK VII. 145 

111 tlie last chapter Mr. de Segur has supported by Daru 
the propriety of giving the guard. All military men even at this 
day, agree in acknowledging the inutility and danger of this 
resolution ; but as the author places this opinion in the mouth 
of a minister, we should not be surprised that it savours 
somewhat of his ignorance relative to military matters. Here 
is another counsellor introduced by the Quarter Master of the 
palace, and who has not the advantage of a similar excuse. 
It is Murat, who comes to demand the cavalry of the guard. 
"The enemy's army, said he, is passing the Mosiiwa in 
haste and disorder, I wish to surprise and extinguish it.'* 
This is to accuse the King of Naples of ignorance relative to 
the place and position of the enemy. If Mr. de Segur had 
taken the pains to look at the map, were it even a map of 
roads, he would have seen that the Russian army, whose re- 
treat was upon Mojaisk, could not pass the Moskwa, to reach 
that place. If he had read the reports of the enemy's generals, 
he would have seen that in fact they had not passed it 5 that on 
the contrary, they passed the night on that part of the field of 
battle which they retained, their right resting on the hill of 
Goski, and flanked beyond that by a division of light infantry 
and Cossacks, and their left near the woods, in the rear of 
Semenowskoi. 

The author finally perceives "that the Emperor had judged 
it indispensable to preserve a select and devoted body." These 
were powerful motives, but Mr. de Segur is doubtless one of 
those, who, according to his own words, was not satisfied with 
them. For in order to support himself, he creates a concert 
of murmurs and lamentations on the manner in which the bat- 
tle was conducted. Murat says that " he has not recognised 
the genius of Napoleon ;" Eugene " that he had no conception 
what could be the reason of the indecision which his adopted 
father had shown;" Ney "was singularly obstinate in advi- 
sing a retreat." 

We have several times asked how the Quarter Master of the 
palace could learn what the Emperor, the Princes, and Mar- 
shals, said. His place in the army, was such as by no means 
to make it probable that he was in their confidence. We e^- 

T 



146 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &.c. 

perience the same incredulity relative to the words which he 
puts in the mouths of the King of Naples, and of Prince 
Eugene. As for those of Ney we know wliat to believe. It 
is not that we think the Marshal said them, but we know 
wljcnce tliey were obtained ; it was from the St. Pcfershurg 
Gazette, the editor of whicli was much more ignorant than Mr. 
do Segur. This editor was necessitated to prove that the 
battle was followed with none but doubtful results for us ; and 
he does it, by supposing that one of the bi-avest generals, had 
advised a retreat. Should Mr. de Segur have supported him- 
self by such an authority? 

**TlieEm])eror could only estimate his victory by the num- 
ber of the dead ; the earth was so covered with Frenchmen 
extended on the redoubt, that they appeared more numerous 
than the survivors. It appeared that there were on the field 
of battle more slain, than living conquerors.*' 

One thing worthy of remark is, that the quarter-master of 
the palace, wlio takes such a dejjlorable care in exaggerating our 
losses, that we may fancy him searching every cornel* of the 
field of battle, to bring out the smallest details : who espies in 
the faces of our officers and soldiers the secret of their sensa- 
tions to interpret and clothe them in sombre colours, says no 
word of the losses and consternation of the Russians ! If he 
had wished only to qiu>te their relations, he migiit have made 
known that they acknowledged having lost upwards of a hun- 
dred tJwusand men lillled and icounded ; and that more than 
20,000 of their wounded were on the route to Moscow.* The 
number of French killed in the redoubts was very small, in 
comparison with the Russian bodies found there, which may 
be easily conceived, if we reflect that what Mr. de Segur con- 
vstantly calls rf</()»6/6', were nothing hutjlcchcs and redans. The 
Russians, placed behind epaulements, retained them until our 
soldiers penetrated them on all sides, and killed them with the 
bayonet. But these works being all open on one side, once in 



* See Botourlin, page 349, vol. I. At page 116 he says, that at Tarunti- 
no, Kutusof was employee! in rc-org^nizing the corps which escaped the mas- 
sacre of JBorodino. 



BOOK vir. 147 

our power, offered no protection from the enemy's fire. Thus 
no troops remained within them ; they were all placed either on 
the sides or in the rear of them. 

We mention tliis circumstance only to show how the author 
gives account of things he has not seen. If he had gone over 
the field of battle, he would not have dared to say that there 
appeared to be as many slain as there were survivors. Our loss 
was not a third as great as that of the Russians. Mr. dc Se- 
gur, who has a horrible collection of picture* in his portfolio, 
does not fail to find one in this place; it is the spectacle which, 
according to him, the field of battle offered. In another story, 
to frighten children, he tells of a Russian soldier who lived for 
some days inside of a horse which had been gutted by a howit- 
%er, the inside of which he gnawed. He should have added the 
size of the man, or that of the horse, 

** Seven or eight hundred prisoners, and twenty broken can- 
non, were all the trophies of this imperfect victory.'* If he 
had known that the select troops, and nearly half of the Rus- 
sian army, were destroyed ; that Bagration and his best general 
had fallen, and that the taking of Moscow was the result of 
that victory, however familiar he is with inaccuracy, he would 
not have asserted that this victory was incomplete. 



CHAPTER XIU. 

MuRAT is also attacked by the officer of the palace. He, it 
appears, was afflicted with the same disease as the Emperor, 
that of refusing all good advice. He commands a charge 
to be made; one of his aides-de-camp informs him that a deep 
ravine exists between our horsemen and the enemy, but " Mu- 
rat, in a greater fury than ever, insisted that they must march, 
and if there was any obstacle, they would see it. He then 
made use of insulting phrases, to urge them on." It must be 
allowed that the French army would have been an extraordi- 



148 CKITICAL EXAMINATION, &c, 

nary one, if the Emperor and his generals had been as Mr. de 
Segur has pleased to describe them. What he says of our of- 
ficers, that they were abused in order to force them to their 
duty, is so marvellous that we are led to believe the officer of 
the palace does not regard himself as a French officer. 

The author, adhering rigidly to his system, figures to us the 
Emperor "advancing at a still slower pace than the day be- 
fore, and so completely absorbed," that he did not know 
whither he was going, fortunately he was warned that he would 
fall into the hands of the enemy, on which he halted. 

As if what we have already undergone was not enough, 
**the Russian autumn now ti'iumphed over him." To explain 
this passage, Mr. de Segur gives us another tempest, which 
never occurred except in his own brain, but which, according 
to him, chilled Napoleon, and caused in him '* a burning fever, 
which dried up his blood and oppressed his spirits." If all 
those who had been around the Emperor on the day of battle 
were dead, and that there remained no recollection of this day, 
our historian might speak of this depressioiu this burning fever, 
with his usual confidence in the cr-edulity of his readers. But 
whilst a great number of individuals, such as his secretaries, 
physicians, officers, still live, whilst these persons are fully 
aware that Napoleon was in his usual state of health, labour- 
ed with his ordinary activity, and broke down several horses, 
when they can attest that it was only on the night of the 7th 
and 8th that he was seized with a loss of voice, caused by the 
exertions he used on the eveof, and on the day of the battle, 
how can Mr. de Segur dare to state circumstances which so 
many witnesses can disprove ? 

«♦ Some of our troops entered the town for the purpose of 
passing through it in pursuit of the enemy, and others to plun- 
der and find lodgings for themselves." The author should have 
informed us with wliich party he marched : was it with the 
first? Although he has hitherto forced us to admire the admi- 
rable order in which the Russians retreated, he is compelled to 
uvow that they left an immense number of their wounded in 
the city, which, however, did not prevent them from setting it 
on fire. It is true he has an excuse ready for them : " their 



BOOK VIL 149 

humanity had given way to the desire of firing on the first 
French they saw enter." 

The account of the brave action of the voltigeurs of the 33d 
raises a strong desire to ascertain the name of the gallant offi- 
cer who commanded them, but the author does not mention itj 
we will supply this omission, in stating that his name was 
Callier ; he had under his command the company of grena- 
diers, and the 3d company of fusileers, (Captain Sabatier,) 
forming at the most 100 men; these two companies belonged 
to the first battalion of the 33d of Friant's division. 

Notwithstanding the confession which escaped from Mr. de 
Segur, respecting the number of the Russian wounded, (which 
did not prevent them from setting fire to the city, where these 
unfortunate troops were lying,) he adopts his former plan, in 
asserting that on the two following days, ** without finding a 
single person or thing by which to discover the Russian army.'* 
He appears to have forgotten that all the villages, as well on 
the road as in the neighbourhood, were filled with wounded, 
marking the bloody retreat of this army. 

The Emperor, as he had promised in his proclamation, cal- 
culated on resting his army at Moscow, to repair the losses he 
had experienced, as well by the march as by the various bat- 
tles, and to com|)lete the different corps. But whilst he was 
making arrangements to bring up reinforcements of men and 
artillery, Mr. de Segur makes use of the circumstance to say 
that ** his mind was weakened," and to lament his distress. 

Marshal Davoust, according to our author, requests the Em- 
peror to deprive Murat of the command of the advance guard, 
and to invest him with it ; and Mr. de Segur appears to cen- 
sure Napoleon in permitting the King of Naples to retain the 
command, when he was aware of his " audacious and inex- 
haustible ardour." What can be wished for more, in the com- 
mander of an advance guard, pursuing an enemy's army, than 
" an audacious and inexhaustible ardour?^' 

But Napoleon learns " that the vanguard was already with- 
in two days march of Moscow. That great name, and the 
great hopes which he attached to it, revived his strength, and 



150 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

on the 12th of September, ho was snilicieiitly recovered to set 
out ill a carriat^e in order to join his vanj!;uard." 

The author insinuates that the Emperor was ill, which forced 
him to halt at Mojaisk. The loss of voice with which Napo- 
leon was attacked on the 8th, is an event likely to ha])pen from 
great fatigue; it is an extremely probable occurrence, after 
lour nicfhts passed in bivonaCf the 4th near Gridnowow, the 5th 
and (Uh, on (lie hei.e^hts of l^orodino, and the 7th on the field 
of battle. The author has nevertheless based upon this loss of 
voice all the fables which he relates of the illness of the Em- 
peror, \'uv which he hjis prepared us from the opening of the 
cam]>aign, and which he is about to extend to the termination 
of the expedition. He has said himself, that from the 8th Na- 
polrcoi traversed the field of battle, dispensing his cares on the 
wounded, whether French or Russians, which proves that his 
indisposition must have been slight. But it was not the cause 
of his remaining at Mojaisk, reasons of the highest impor- 
tance detained him there. After so sanguinary a battle, the 
general-in-command has many things to occupy him, a multi- 
tud«' of orders to give. 

In taking an account of his losses, and ofthe resources which 
remain, so important after so great employment of them, to 
gather provisions, to take measures that every regulation was 
attended to, to procure information of the enemy, to make 
himself acquainted with his movements and intentions, above 
ally when the reports of the advance guard, and information 
from prisoners, gave him reason to expect a second battle j* 
such wore objects that occupied every moment of Napoleon's 
time, and truly the vigilaiue of his active and penetrating 
mind, was not at fault.f 

• This vas the case, as the enemy appcarod disposed to give us battle be- 
fore Moscow, from which the French army was only five days march. It 
was then that the Emperor wrote to tlie Duke of Uelhmo to direct the batta- 
lions, squadrons, and stragglers, coming- up, on Smolensk, in order to pro- 
ceed from thence to Moscow. 

I Amid the numberless orders issued by the Emperor from Mojaisk, the 
following letter written by himself, immediately after his arrival at his quar- 
ters, proves that the disease with which Mr. de S^gur supposed him attacked, 
Jiad not benumbed his faculties. • 



BOOKVIII. 151 

When tlie Emperor received the report of General Lariboi- 
siere, stating tliat the {greater part of the ammunition consum- 
ed at the battle of Moskowa, had been replaced by that brought 
up from the intermediate depots, he left Mojaisk to join his 
advanced guard, in order to be jirepared if the enemy should 
offer battle. It would be believed from the statement of Mr. 
de Segur, that he was obliged to make use of his carriage. 
Never was this victorious hero so strangely caricatured, what 
is the motive for a supposition, which is destroyed by the in- 
controvertible testimony of facts and persons ? Does the au- 
thor believe in his error, or is it the echo of hatred and preju- 
dice ? Let the reader judge for himself. 



BOOK VIII.— CHAPTEli 1. 

The author goes back to Wilna, to recall to us that Nu 
j)oleon was the aggressor, and that Alexander " was surprised 
in Wilna, amidst his preparations for defence." Will he per- 
mit us to remind him, that all the preparations of Russia had 
been made, that their army was assembled on their extreme 
frontier, and that the Emperor Alexander was already at his 
head-quarters, at Wilna, whilst Napoleon was in Paris, direct- 
ing negotiations for a reconciliation, of which he could not 
relinquish all hopes. 

Mr. de Segur next drags us to Drissa in the train of Alex- 

FOU THE MAJOU Ol'^^KKAI-. 

Let inspection be made of the city, nnd trace a redoubt to comftiaiid the 
passage. Conatnict two bridges over the Moskowa. Write to Prince Eu- 
gene to hasten to Rouza, and construct bridges over the Serguiewow, to col- 
lect as many cattle and provisions as possible, and gain all the information he 
can. Write to the Prince of Eckmiilh to occupy Horisow, and to collect 
provisions and information. To the Duke of Elchingen, to march his corps 
to Mojaisk, to-morrow. Leave the Duke of Abrantes t© guard the. field of 
battle. Mojaisk, 9th September, 1812, 



152 (JRITICAL EXAMINATION, kc. 

antler. He tells us that, " it was there that he first consented 
to receive an English Agent, so important did he deem it to 
appear till that moment faithful to his engagements witli 
France." 

Thus to be and to appear to be, are not synonymous, and it 
seems to us, that when the Russian cabinet decided on receiv- 
ing an English Agent, it is natural to suppose that its under- 
standing with that of London had been fixed some time before. 
We willingly distinguish the Emperor Alexander from his 
cabinet. Who does not know, that for more than a year be- 
fore the rupture, that the agents of England exercised an in- 
fluence over Russia, which was not foreign to the after events.* 
" So much is certain," says Mr. de Segur, " that at Paris af- 
ter his success, Alexander affirmed on his honour to Count 
Daru, that notwithstanding the accusations of Napoleon, this 
was his first infraction of the treaty of Tilsit." 

If we admit the Russian court only makes an account of 
those acts which followed hostilities, we may believe this as- 
sertion. But is the author serious in relating these details ? 
Does not his duty as an historian impose on him the duty of 
establishing the facts, and of adding to his account some of 
those reflections, of which he has elsewhere been so prodigal ? 

The officer of the palace passes rapidly over the opinions 
entertained by the enemies of the Emperor Alexander, as "to 
his military talents;" but dwells with much pleasure on his 
political measures. " It was admitted," says he, "that they 
were singularly adapted to persons and places." Mr. de Se- 
gur might include "the addresses he caused Barclay to issue, 
designed to corrupt the French and their allies." 

" It appears, in fact, that in the political means he employ- 

* A praise worthy author, M. de Montveran, in his Histoire Critique et Rai- 
son^e de la Sittiatioji de I'Angleterre, printed in 1820, and written in a tone 
that is unfavourable to the system of Napoleon, thus expresses himself. " Rus- 
sia was excited, either by the agents of England con-upting the nobility of 
Russia, who were inimical to the French, or by its ministers about the Empe- 
ror Alexander, who although they had worked in silence since the spring of 
1811, were not on that account less active or successful." Vol. V. page 
358. 



BOOKVIII. 153 

ed, there was a very striking gradation ol' energy." For in- 
stance, " In the recently acquired portion of Lithnania, every 
thing had been spared. The most powerful of the nobles had 
alone been carried off. In tlie provinces of Lithuania, which 
had of old been incorporated with the empire, the men w^ere 
liurried away with all they could carry off. But in old Rus- 
sia, every thing that could not he removed, had been destroyed.'* 

The old Russians should be very grateful for the love mani- 
fested to them in these hnmane acts, but " he loves best who 
chastises the oftenest." 

The author then transports us to Moscow. He tells, that 
♦*the gift of one serf in ten," which was offered, *' imme- 
diately, without deliberation," by the nobility of Moscow, 
** was attributable to submission, and caused a murmuring 
among the principal nobles." As to their merchants, of whom 
he represents in horrible colours tlie fanatic enthusiasm, at 
the reading of the proclamation, which teemed with abuse of 
the Emperor Napoleon, " he was obliged to have recourse to 
restraint to obtain the succours promised with so much patri- 
otism." 

These circumstances furnish him with a reflection ; we may 
even say, a maxim, which, it is to be regretted, he did not some- 
times apply to the BVench army and its leader. ** The details 
are of little consequence — every thing in the world loses by 
being seen too near, and lastly, that nations ought to be judg- 
ed by the general mass and by results." 



CHAPTER II. 

Here commences the detail of what took place in Moscow, 
before the arrival of the French army. The Governor Gene- 
ral, Count Rostopchin, promised, in his proclamation, to 
march with 100,000 men and one hundred pieces of cannon, 
to defend Moscow ; but as soon as he learnt the French were 

U 



154 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

approaching, he disappeared, first having set fire to the city 
he Aras ordered to defend and protect. The author makes 
Count Rostopchin one of the greatest men of modern times. 

He talks of " this noble descendant of one of the greatest 
Asiatic conquerors." The edifice raised by the officer of the 
palace is destroyed, when we learn that Count Rostopchin is 
the son of Count OrlofF's steward, uncle to the historian of 
this name. His fortune commenced with the Emperor Paul, 
whose confidence he had obtained, before his ascending the 
throne. He was successively honoured by this Prince, with 
the management of the army, and in the counsel for foreign 
affairs. Afterwards he was created Count, as was also his 
father, and decorated with the grand order of Russia. A fa- 
mily alliance existing* between him and Mr. de Segur, explains 
the reasons of this writer, in endeavouring to elevate his birth. 

The resolution of Count Rostopchin was terribkf and of 
such a nature, that we must revert to the barbarous ages to 
find a parallel. " It was admirable," says a Frenchman ; it 
was atrocious, exclaims all Europe, and with her the Russians 
themselves. That it will obtain immortality for its author, 
there can be no doubt, but it will be the immortality of Eros- 
tratus. The passions may exalt this action, even now, but 
the motive cannot ennoble it. It is a crime with which his- 
tory will load his memory. " Though but a subject, he decides 
the lot of the state, without the countenance of his sovereign ; 
a noble, he decrees the destruction of the palaces of all the 
nobles without their consent j the protector, from the post 
which he occupies, of a numerous population, he sacrifices 
their fortunes. He conceives his plan without effort j he exe- 
cutes it without hesitation, and remains satisfied and tran- 
quil." This tranquillity, this satisfaction, which is so much 
admired by the oflicer of the palace, shocks and withers the 
soul. 

Instead of employing the plots of a drama, or the artifices 
of a fabulist, to mislead the judgment of our cotemporaries 
on this horrible event, he should have said, that a man exist- 
ed, eager for celebrity at any price, wlio, to a savage energy, 
joined an inexorable ambition ^ who made himself the willing 



m 



BOOK VIII. 155 

instrument of a cabinet skilled in corruption, a cabinet accus- 
tomed to sacrifice to its interests, friends as well as enemies, 
and who never scrupled as to the means ; that this man was 
emboldened to disregard the denial of his sovereign to the 
act, and was audacious enough to assume to himself the whole 
honour of this frightful catastrophe. 

When Mr. de Segur praises the sacrifice that Count Ros- 
topchin made of one of his palaces, it may be asked, if, in this 
great disaster, all the world had been ruined ; if these pre- 
tended sacrifices, made with so great ostentation, had not been 
repaired, even before they were effected -, if, in this great con- 
flagration, English gold had not insured some part of the pro- 
perty. 

Who has revealed to our author, that Napoleon had recourse 
" to the weapon of revolution in Russia ?" The Emperor has 
himself replied to this imputation, in his speech to the Senate, 
the 20th of December, 1812. "The war I undertake against 
the Russians, is a political war. I could arm the greatest part 
of her population against her, in proclaiming liberty to the 
slaves. A great number of villages have demanded it of me, 
when, knowing the debased state of this numerous class of the 
Russian people, I have refused a measure which would have 
devoted so many families to the most horrible punishment." 



CHAPTER III. 

The pretended historian of the grand army says, '' A vul- 
ture had entangled himself in the chains which sustain the 
cross of the principal church, and was held suspended in them." 
Does he partake of the credulity of the people of Moscow ? It 
was at day-break, that this bird was found attached to the 
steeple. It does not require much acuteness to divine that the 
governor, whose inventive powers had been exercised in many 
other tricks, had prepared this presage during the night. 



J 56 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

This observation may apply also to an action much less in- 
nocent: "He caused (Rostopchin,) the most diminutive to be 
selected from the prisoners taken from the enemy, and exhibi- 
ted to the people, that the latter might derive courage from the 
sight of their weakness." To render them still more pitifuU 
he maltreated, stripped and deprived them of nourishment for 
thirty-six hours, and in this state had them led around the 
city like wild beasts, exposed to the insults and blows of the 
populace. After which he threw them into a prison, where 
almost the whole perished from famine an<l misery. We saw 
some of the unfortunate men who had survived this brutal 
treatment, making their representation of it to the Emperor, 
when we entered Moscow. We were ordered to supply them 
with food and clothing. What a difference between the con- 
duct of the Governor of Moscow towards these unfortunate 
soldiers, and that maintained towards the numerous Russian 
prisoners, who traversed Paris, and other cities in France ! 
The commandants of each place gave them food, lavished on 
them every care, and spared them even humiliation. 

The force which Mr. de Segur gives as that of the Russian 
army at Fili, which he estimates at " 91,000 men, the relics of 
121,000 engaged at the Moskwa," only attributes to the Rus- 
sians a loss of 30,000 men at this battle, whilst Colonel Bou- 
tourlin, aid- de-camp to the Emperor of Russia, (writing under 
the direction of his master, and from notes furnished by the 
different Russian staffs,) augments this loss to 50,000 men. 
Thus Mr. de Segur makes a gratuitous gift of ::iO,000 men to 
the Russian army. But to compensate, he makes the loss of 
the French army amount to *•' 40,000 raenj" when it is well 
known that it was infinitely less than that of the Russians,. 
whose columns remained so long exposed to tlie fire of 400 
pieces of cannon, posted on heights, and ably directed by Ge- 
nerals Sorbier, Foucher, Pernetti, and Anthouard of the ar- 
tillery. 

The author states that Rostopchin, on the news that Kutus- 
of would abandon the city, devoted himself. The sacrifice of 
Count Rostopchin may be received with doubt, for when he 
fired Moscow, his own palace was spared. 



BOOK viir. 157 

The horror of the scene which terminated the day on which 
Moscow was evacuated, is disguised by Mr. de Segur. When 
Rostopchin opened the prisons, a Russian accused of treason, 
was dragged from the midst of the horde to whom the gover- 
nor had given liberty, and carried before him. *^ He was the 
son of a tradesman, and had been apprehended while exciting 
the people to insurrection." 

The son of a tradesman had not ** been apprehended while 
exciting the people to insurrection ;" all he had done was to 
translate a French bulletin. His father, whom the author 
compares to an old Roman, did not curse his soiu We know 
on the contrary that he cursed the memory of the man who 
snatched him from him. The unfortunate young man was not 
** struck down by an ill-directed blow of a sabre ; the first blow 
was given him by the governor himself, who then gave him up 
to the fury of the populace.* Rostopchin who declared, in 
addressing the people of Moscow, that " the tribunals were 
closed, but that was of no consequence, there was no occasion 
for tribunals to try the guilty," hastened to give this terrible 
example of arbitrary power, in thus sacrificing an unfortunate 
man without trial, and on his individual authority. Moreover, 
he was the first to strike him, and to deliver to a mob, in order 
to teach the people to administer justice for themselves, and to 
bathe themselves in blood. What shall be said of the coadju- 

* This detail was given us by an occular witness. Tlie Abbe Sm'ug-ues, 
an emigrant priest, and curate of the Parish of St. Louis at Moscom'-, thus 
details this event, in a letter addressed to Father Bouvet, a Jesuit ; which was 
published both in England and Russia. 

"The governor ordered the Sieur Vereachagin, the son of a Russian 
tradesman, to appear before him ; he had been convicted of translating a 
proclamation of Napoleon, in which he announces his speedy arrival at Mos- 
cow. The governor obliged this unfortunate man to advance, surrounded by 
the dragoons of the Russian police. " Disgrace to thy country," said he, 
" thou hast dared to betray thy native land, and to dishonour thy family ; 
thy crime exceeds all ordinary punishments, the knout or Siberia ; I give 
thee up to the vengeance of the people whom thou hast betrayed. Strike, 
and let the traitor die under your blows." The unfortunate man expired, 
pierced by a multitude of swords and bayonets. They tied his legs with a 
long cord, and his bloody corpse was thus dragged through the streets, ex- 
posed to the outrage of the populace," 



158 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, he. 

tors of Count Rostopchin! What a noble court docs this 
" filthy and disgusting crowd" present ! The galley slaves 
and criminals, he terms " the children of Russia." Such in- 
struments were truly worthy of perpetrating so atrocious an 
enterprise. 



CHAPTER lY. 

If it was not known that the work of Mr. de Segur, had 
been written for effect, that the ideas he gives birth to, origi- 
nated full ten years after the events took place, and that every 
thing that has occurred since that period, has tended to modify 
these ideas, the sententious reflections, the poetic images, the 
studied sensibility, scattered throughout this chapter, would 
substantiate it. The thoughts, the sentiments, he gives to the 
army, never occurred to any of us. The oflicer of the palace 
talks of our " abasemenV Why should we be humbled? We 
were not after our disastrous retreat, could we be so when we 
were victorious, and that we found ourselves before a conquest 
the prize of our toils and our courage ? The feelings which 
tiien filled the heart of every soldier, were those of the glory 
and renown that our enemies would bestow on us. Masement 
is the lot of cowardice and treason. 

" Murat," says the author, " was for a moment tempted to 
believe — that he himself would become another Mazeppa." 
What ! the king of one of the richest and most powerful coun- 
tries of Europe, envy the lot of an obscure chief of a few hordes 
of Cossacs ! Really this is too mucli ! Mr. de Segur has it is 
true, given words and actions to his personages, which are in 
entire contradiction with their character and station -, but this 
last license is too poetic. 

The love of satire again misleads our historian when he 
says, ** one of the oflicers of the Emperor, determined to gra- 
tify him, entered the city and seized five or six vagabonds. 



BOOK vra. 159 

drove them before his horse to the Emperor, and imagined he 
had brought him a deputation." It was mercliants and other 
citizens of Moscow, who seeing the city abandoned and deli- 
vered over by its governor to disorder and pillage, came to im- 
plore the protection and generosity of the conqueror. What 
other motive than the desire of pleasing the Emperor, decided 
Mr. de Scgur to solicit the favour of making part of the expe- 
dition to Russia, and to be employed there in duties altogether 
foreign to his station, and military character. We who have 
never served Napoleon but in a military capacity, can testify 
that every soldier in the French army desired to please their 
chief, and to prove to him their attachment. Those were ani- 
mated with this wish, who had not their table and lodging daily 
prepared for them, those who exposed themselves perpetually, 
to privations, to battles, to bullets, and who exclaimed to Na- 
poleon in the heat of the battle of Moskwa — "Be easy, your 
soldiers have promised to conquer, and they will do it !" 



CHAPTER V. 

Military men who read the pretended history of the 
Grand Army, cannot avoid a smile " at the secret shuddering 
of the French cavalry, when they heard the steps of their 
horses," on their entrance into Moscow. The same may be 
said of the melancholy, and all tiiose vague reveries that the 
author attributes to our soldiers. 

He gives his own feelings to the French army. All that is 
wanting in this account is, that of the nightmare, with which 
the soldiers ought to have been visited during their sleep, in 
Uvouac. But if the army had been troubled with such visions, 
would it have conquered at the battle of Moskwa ? 

"The savage and barbarous token of national hatred," that 
the author supposes was left for us by Rostopchin, were the 
galley slaves, whose patriotism was founded on the casks of 



bi'ftruly which had ln^i'ii given thcin. If, is wiihout doubt be- 
caiiHn <!(HiMt Jloiilopr hill liad iidoplixl fhcrn in U.vminfi; thnin 
chUdreu of HuHHiu, thai they are horti cited an r«*-iJ»'<*.H<niting th« 
nation. 



••Napolkon did not enter Mohcow till al'tei* dark." 
Althou,u;h the factoi' thiri noctiniial entry m of little iiiijkuI, 
anee, wv, notit e it, on account olitn h«Jn,^ lalHi*., and thr, author 
appearH to ileligjitin pre^entUijj^theKnipei'oraH intrudin^j^hini' 
Heir<V('ry where, in He(;ret and undre rover ofnif^ht. ThiH no 
Uoidit inakeH n. tin*', drNcri|itiiMi, hut trutit nnint not he Hacrilici^dl 
to romnnce. 'I'ht, King of Naples, pasned the brid|(e of Moflk- 
wa at noon, at th«'. lu^ad of the cavalry iind advanced guard. 
At two o'clock, Marshal Lefehvre, witli a diviHion of the 
guard, entered MoHcow—about thiw time, Najioleon took pos- 
HeHHionof an inn in the fiuburb of llowgoinilow, the fire had 
not yet madc' itn appearance in the city, A Mingle house in 
the Ma/ ar had heen burnt. On the t.'^tb at (i o'clock in the 
morning, the Kniperor repaired to the Kremlin. 

On a fact p(vrlectly rtimple and natural in itHcIf, the aulhor 
exercitjew Ium innigination, he emhelliMlieH, (uagniluiM, perverlw 
it, and deduces conHe(iuences, wliicli c(mld attach only to hi« 
nntde of vieu'ing ohjef^tH. An ollicei' oven onie with fatigue its) 
awoke by a glare id (Ire, lieaMcertaiuH that bin own corps is in 
a place of safety, and again falls asleep, leaving others to take 
care of themselves. On this «»ccasion, Mr. de Kegur makes 
the following rellection. *' Hu<,h was the unconi^ern produced 
Uy the mulii[dicity ui' events and mistoi'tunes, ami such the 
HeUiHJinesH arising from exceMsivo snllering ami fatigue, that 
they left to each only just strength and feeling HiilUcient for his 
pe.rMontU service and prcMcrvation." 



BOOK vm iQi 

In Tact, if Mr. tie Segm*, whose functions were limited to 
his ««trvi<;<5 in the palace, had Ij^e.n rwjM(',H(<Ml iM pcH^Jiin that 
»)j" an ollicer of the army, he would liave leiuned it, and thin 
without hein^ accused of unconcern or wtdhHhness. Why 
ini^ht it not have been the same case with the olUcer of whom 
lie speaks ? 

*' Tht'- Kremlin containe<l, unknown to us, a magazine of 
powder." The Kremlin contained no ma,4ja/ine of powder. 
In the arsenal, every thing testlhed the pri^cipltation with 
wlii* h tin-/ H^MSsiaris had evacuated it. 'I'he <;ourt was covered 
witli tow, with shells, and fragments of boxes. In the halls 
we, found 40,000 muskets (English, Austrian, and Hjissian) 
an l»undr<id pieces of cannon, lances, sabres, and a great num- 
hei' of trophies taken from the Tur-ks, hut no powder was to 
he foufid, there was in fact, none within the walls of the JCrem^ 
lin. Large magazines, of which we took possession, were si- 
tuated without lint city, in isolated huildings; and at tin; Ger- 
man barrier. 1'hese contained 400,000 pounds of powder 
and more than a million of saltpetre. Ro8l^>pchin had ne- 
j^hictcd to destroy th<*in. 

" I'lie guard* asleep and carefully posted, suffered a whole 
park of arfillery to enter and draw ujj uikU-i- (lie windows of 
Napoleon." 

The author constantly endeavours to represent the French 
:irmy as an unorganised horde. JJecause the imperial guard, 
jjosted in the Kremlin, had tlnJr artillery with thenj, Mr. de 
hegur tells us that tlas artillery was sulfered to remain from 
the negligenfMJ of the sleeping sentinels. Tliis attafik on a 
picked guard, where there always existed the greate'st order 
and discipline, in in the v(tiy spirit of defamation. 

During the night, several different parts of the city were set 
on lire, hut all of tliem at a distance IVom the Kremlin. To- 
wards four in the morning, an olftcer of tlie Emperor's awoke 
him to announce the circumstance, this prince had only a few 
moments hefV>re, retired te rest, afte.r having dictate'd ord^l'/s 
to the different corps of the army, and laboured with his secre- 
taries. We cannot understand how Mr, de Segur, wlio should 
be hc:tifir' acquainted with the interior service of the palace, 

X 



162 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c, 

should always represent Napoleon as disliking his repose to he 
disturbed. He ou^Iit to be aware, tliat officers of the lowest 
rank never hesitated to awaken him, to make their reports. 

The aid-dc-camp in attendance, who m ould have hesitated to 
announce the arrival of an officer, would have been severely 
reprimanded. The author might have recollected what took 
place at Glubokoe, when the aid-dc-camp in attendance, de- 
layed announcing to Napoleon, the arrival of an officer from 
the King of Naples. 

It was on the 16th that the conflagration approached the 
Kremlin, so much as to endanger its safety. At noon the fire 
seized on the stables of tbe pahice, and a tower adjoining the 
arsenal. Some sparks even fell in tbe court of the arsenal, on 
the tow which had belonged to the Russian caissons, those of 
our artillery were there. The danger was imminent, the Em- 
peror was informed of it, and he hastened to the spot. The 
ground where our caissons stood, was covered with burning 
tow. General Lariboisiere was giving orders to have them 
removed from the arsenal, when the Emperor arrived. The 
artillerists and soldiers of the guard, uneasy at seeing Napo- 
leon expose himself to so much danger, augmented it by their 
zeal. They seized the burning tow in their arms, in order to 
carry it out of the court. General Lariboisiere then begged 
the Emperor to withdraw, pointing out to him that the artil- 
lery men had lost their recollection fi'om anxiety at his pre- 
sence. This prince then returned to the palace. After his 
departure, the fire which might had so fatal a termination, was 
soon extinguished. 

This event took place in the moining, and it was not from 
it, that Napoleon decided on leaving the Kremlin, on the con- 
trary, the danger appeared to determine him to remain. Al- 
ready Prince Eugene, Marshals Bessieres and Lefebvre, had 
conjured him to leave this spot, they could not succeed. An 
officer* having reported to him, that the flames were surround- 
ing the Kremlin on all sides, he ordered him to accompany 
the Prince of Neufchatel to an elevated terrace of the palace, 

* General Gourgaud. 



BOOK vm. 163 

to verify the fact. The impetuosity, violence of the wind, and 
the rarefaction of the air caused by the extreme heat of the 
conflagration, occasioned so horrible a tempest, that the Prince 
of Neufchatel and the officer were neaily carried away by it. 
Although they confirmed to the Emperor tliat all was on fire 
around the Kremlin, this piince accustomed to dangers of all 
kind, hesitated to retreat from it, on wliich the Prince of Neuf- 
chatel observed to him, " Sire, if the enemy attacks the divi- 
sions of the army which are around Moscow, your majesty 
will have no means of communicating with them." 

Having decided on leaving the Kremlin, Napoleon sent M. 
de Mortemart, one of his aid-de-camps, to search for a pas- 
sage through the burning city, to the fourth corps, which he 
wished to join. He soon returned, to say, that the flames 
would not suffer him to advance. Some time afterwards, an- 
other oflicer, announced that the passage was freed. The 
Emperor then ordered his horses, and quitted the Kremlin, 
leaving in it a battalion of his guard to protect it. 



CHAPTER VII. 

" We were encircled by a sea of fire, which blocked up all 
the gates of the citadel, and frustrated the first attempts that 
were made to depart. After some search, we discovered a pos- 
tern gate, leading between the rocks, to the Moskwa. It was 
by this narrow passage that Napoleon, his officers and guard, 
escaped from the Kremlin. A single narrow winding street, 
all on fire, appeared to be rather the entrance, than the outlet, 
to this hell. Tiie Emperor rushed on foot, and without hesi- 
tation, into this narrow passage. We walked on aground of 
fire, beneath a fiery sky, and between two walls of flames.'* 

A sea of fire neither did, nor could block up all the gates of 
the citadel. There existed a large esplanade beyond the ditch^ 



H^l CUITICAI, EXAMINATION, Sec. 

and of coui'BO wo were not obliged to grope for a passage. Tlie 
Eiii|)«-i*<n* '•'ft tlM5 Ki-ciTiliii by our of the grciit gates, accompa- 
nied as on Ills arrival, by liis olticcirH, and did not (b'part by a 
passage between tbe rocks. 

11(1 descended iu Ihccjuay on tlic Moskowa wbere- be moun- 
ted liis boise. One of the police olliccis of Moscow, niarcbed 
ill front, acting as a guides \\v loHowcd tlie bank of tbe river 
for some tnie, and tbcn JMitered a i|uarter of the town, wbcrc 
Ibe liouses having been entirely <d" wood were totally oon- 
Hunied. 

Although WO accompanied Napoleon during the whole of 
this passage, we nevei- saw tbe inas;n}Jic('nl horrors described 
by Mr. de Segur, we traversed Moscow it is true, over cin- 
ders, but not nnder v«»//s of fire. Perhaps we did not take 
th(i light roatl, but it is false that in our passage, the Emperor 
was in any dangtir. It is e(|ually false that our guide "stop- 
ped in uncertainty and agitation:" and that it was to some 
inliaa^frs of tin', first coi-ps, that the Kiuperor owed bis life. 
'I'he touching mei^ting with Mai'shal Davoust '* who had de- 
Hired to be carried back among the llames, to rescue Mapoleon 
or t(^ perish with him," is n«)( more exact, liesides, Mr. de 
Segur enables the reader, to appreciate the truth of iiis descrip- 
tion by the circumstiince «d' the convoy of powder, " deiiling 
amidst the liie." The conllngration bad lasted for thirty-six 
hours ; what ollicer would have been mad enough, to expose to 
ini'vilalde explosion, a convoy of (lowder, in thus traversing a 
city, when be might have taken it outside the w alls ? 

The tdlicer of the palace has not found in bis numerous de- 
Hcriplions of marches and battles, a single occasion to speak 
of the order, with which these immense columns of artillery 
proceeded on their march, and in spite of all dilticulties, 
were always on the spot to van(|uish the Russian battalions, 
and the chiefs of which, knew bow to add to martial courage, 
that S|)irit of foresight, which contributes to prepare for suc- 
cess, and insure happy results. Ife might have at least dis- 
pensed citing, to the disadvantage of tliis select corps, an 
incori*©ct fact. 



BOOK VIII. 165 

"The effort he had made to reach Moscow, had expended 
all his means of warfare." 

It may be perceived that the autlior is not very conversant 
with military affairs, if by the means of warfare, lie means 
men, we will answer him, that the French airny which had 
been joined by the division of General Pino, the liavarian 
cavalry of General Pressing, and several other detachments. 
Was nearly as strong as before the battle of Moskwa. As 
to artillery, tlic intermediate parks which General Lari- 
boisiere, had established between Mojaisk and Smolensk, 
had already in great measure supplied the place of the ammu- 
nition that had been used.* 

The Emperor remained at Pctrowsky, from the evening of 
the IGth, to the morning of the 18tli, at which time he again 
entere*! the Kremlin. It was in tliesc forty hours, that Mr. 
dc Segiir thinks that he ought to have decided on his future 
plans, and that without waiting for information of the move- 
ments of General Kutusof, and the rejily to a letter sent **by 
a superior officer of tlie enemy's, who had been found in the 
great hospital." After having said that, in this short space 
of time passed in the palace of Petrowsky, Napoleon was an- 
tonishcd and uncerlain, the autiior adds : ** He declared, there- 
fore, that he should march for St. Petersburg. This conquest 
was already marked out on his maps, hitherto so prophetic; 
orders were even issuisd to tlie different corps to hold them- 
selves in readiness. JJut his decision was only a feint j it was 
but a better face he strove to assume — so that lierthier, and 
more especially Hessieres, soon convinced him." 

We have often seen Napoleon reasoning with his officers and 

* In a letter of g'caeral orders written by order of the Emperor lo Marshal 
Hessieres, dated Moscow 27th September, 1812, relative to the military 
f.vcrits, which took place before tlie arrival at Moscow is the following: 
" Kutusof, acted properly in rclirinfjon Moscow, he tiu-ew up entrenchments 
• HI several fine positions, and endeavoured to make us believe, that we would 
liave a second battle, befojc we could enter Moscow. This measure was so 
good, that if the conveyances organisetl by I.ariboisiere, had brought up 
'20,000 charges less, the Emperor would have been checked, although the 
field of battle was one of the finest we have yet seen, as it was impossible to 
<^arry the rc<loubt8, without artillery and a great <j(ianti(y of ammunition. 



j[gg CliiriCAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

ministers, and endeavouring to enforce his own ideas on their 
minds, but we have not viewed him sporting with their cre- 
dulity, and playing the part of a juggler with them. Mr. dc 
Segur gives us this, however, wc suppose, as a variation. 

This writer supposes, that it was during the halt at Petrow- 
sky, that the Emperor was apprised, "thatKutusof had thrown 
himself between Moscow and Kalonga." Whereas, it was 
after his return to the Kremlin. Historic truth is not what 
Mr. de Segur searches for; it is of little importance to him, 
provided he can show off his fallacious reasonings. 

" He had so fully calculated on concluding a peace at Mos- 
cow, that he had no winter quarters provided in Lithuania." 
What has become of those " magazines as immense as the en- 
terprise?" What of the stores and fortifications at Wilna, 
Minsk, Witespk, Smolensk? &c. The officer of the palace 
ought to have informed us what he means by " having no win- 
ter quarters provided in Lithuania." 

Napoleon " therefore determined to return to the Krcmli])^ 
which a battalion of the guard had unfortunately preserved." 
Why unhappily preserved, since, a few lines back, the author 
allows that it would require eight days before Napoleon could 
i-eceive the answer of Alexander, " and to rally and re-orga- 
nise his army, &c." But perhaps Mr. de Segur was better 
lodged at Petrowsky than at the Kremlin, and therefore 
wishes that this lattei- palace had been burnt. As he gives us 
no reasons for his regret, this is the onl j one we can devise. 



CHAPTER VIIJ. 

The return of tlic Emperor to the Kremlin furnishes Mr. 
de Segur with a multitude of hideous pictures of our bivouacs, 
and of what passed in the city. 

We do not know why he conceals from his readers facts 



BOOK viir. 167 

published by our enemies themselves. **The first cares of 
Napoleon, on returning to the Kremlin, were devoted to the 
unfortunate of all classes. He ordered that they should name 
syndics to discover all who were without an asylum or means 
of subsistence. He opened hospitals for the reception of the 
burnt, and promised to send them food. He proceeded to the 
foundling hospital, which had escaped the fire ', sent for the 
director general, Toutolmin; inspected the establishment j 
requested the director to make his report to the empress-dowa- 
ger, and sent it by a courier ; this report remained without a 
reply. 

** Napoleon next attended to the state of the hospitals, the 
greater number of which had been preserved. But what was 
his astonishment, when it was reported to him that these es- 
tablishments were in the greatest want of aid, without physi- 
cians, without medicines, without nurses ; that they contained 
a prodigious quantity of dead, besides tliat of the 10,000 
wounded, recently arrived from the army j the half had pe- 
rished from want of assistance, and that the remainder were 
struggling with want and death ! An order was immediately 
issued to all the French surgeons to establish an administra- 
tion for the succour of the sick, to remove tlie patients to pro- 
per situations, and to make exact reports of the state of these 
un^brtunate people. 

* In the other hand. Marshal Mortier, governor general of 
the c ty and general of division. Count Milhaut, commandant 
of the place, received orders to organise a municipality, and 
an administration of police, to restore order in the city, and 
procure provisions, &c." 

These details, of which we know the truth, with the excep- 
tion of the number of wounded Russians, which, instead of 
10,000, was more than 25,000,* are extracted from tbe letter 
of the Abbe Surrugucs, already quoted. 

This same Abbe Surugucs, curate of St. Louis, at Moscow, 
in another part of his letter says, "Napoleon placed 50,000 

* It is true that more than the half of these 25,000 wounded Russians, pe- 
rished in the flames, in consequence of the atrocious act of Count Rostopchin. 



jgjj CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

roubles at the disposition of the Syndics, cntrust(?d with the care 
of the indigent. The division whicli was made, assigned 9(i 
ronbles to each, but the diiliculty of carryinj^ olF such a weight 
having exacted trouble and time inconsistent with the precipi- 
tate departure of the French, this distribution was almost 
without cft'ect." 

It is to follow a celebrated adage, which Beaumarcliais puts 
in the inoutli of one of his chai'acters, that Mr. de Segur com- 
mences by accusing our ])i{;ked troops, and even our ollicei'S, 
of " hastening to plunder," and endeavours afterwards to ex- 
cuse, by saying *' it was not fi'om covetousncss, for they did 
hoard, believing that one hand washed the other, ami that they 
had paid for every thing with danger." Is not the justifica- 
tion worse than the accusation ? Why thus gratuitously revile 
his countrymen ? This severity, as regards them, has it not 
been suggested to our author by the recollection of an indivi- 
dual who, curious in sliawls and India goods, entered the cel- 
lar of a tradesman's shop in the Bazaar, by an opening made 
in the vault? Fiom this cellar he handed out to the soldiers 
all the goods he could find ; they, thinking that these goods 
were as nnich Iheir's as his, disapiu'ared with them, leaving in 
the cellai' him whose cupidity bad induced him to descend. 

Nevertheless, this amateur plunderer had not for excuse that 
he believed " oiu'i bantl washed the other, and he had paid for 
every thing with danger." For he never was exposed to it, 
from our knowledge, the only risk he had encountered in this 
campaign, was the remaining in the cellar. 

I'here is, besides, a very great dillerence between ;)ifmi(/mw^ 
and svi/:jing ■provmims. I'hat Mr. de Scgur, who had twice a 
day his meals with the ollicers of the Emperor's palace, was 
not obliged to search for provisions, may readily be supposed. 
IJut when he finds it anuss, the poor regimental ollicers, who 
had not this advantage, an<l who, when they saw a shop or 
liouse biii-ning, should take a few bottles of wine and some pro- 
visions, that he terms this plundering, it is an abuse of words, 
and a severity which cannot be justified. 

The author should have said without scruple, and without 
any oratorical evasions, that the mode of warfare novf adopt- 



BOOK VIIL 169 

ed, being carried on with immense armies, whose prompt and 
rapid movements concentrate sometimes in one day 200,000 
men on a point, renders it absolutely impossible to issue regular 
rations to the troops, that foreigners have proved it in Germa- 
ny and France, where they have plundered and pillaged at the 
same time ; what should be avoided is ill-treating the inhabi- 
tants, and that on this head, no troops in Europe have shown 
more humanity than the French ; complaints of murder and 
violation being almost unknown in countries occupied by our 
troops, and on the contrary, all foreigners, and particularly 
the Russians, have been accused of both, in all the villages 
through which they have passed, even in Germany, among 
their allies. It is, nevertheless, this Russian army, that Mr. 
de Segur paints to us as *' having attained real glory," whilst 
he brings constantly before the reader, accounts of the plun- 
derings of our unfortunate soldiers, taking merely flour and 
pork.* 

* The letter of the Abbe Surrugues, curate of the parish of St. Louis, in 
Moscow, which we have already cited, contains the following passages, re- 
specting the plundering in this capital. The testimony of this emigrant priest 
is less to be suspected, as it is that of an enemy to Napoleon. 

«* Nevertheless, the populace broke open doors, and forced the cellars of 
those shops which were menaced with the fire. The sugar, coffee, tea, were 
soon pillaged ; afterwards, hides, furs, cloths, and in fact every article of luxu- 
ry. The soldiers, who at first were tranquil spectators, soon took an active 
part ; the magazines of flour were pillaged, the wine and brandy inimdated 
the cellars, &c. In fact, the project of burning the city once estabhshed as 
a measure of war by the Russian government, pillage became an inevitable 
reprisal on the part of the enemy. 

" It may be remarked that the populace of Moscow played a deep part in 
the pillage ; it was they that opened the most secret, cellars to the French 
troops, in order to partake of the booty; it was they who introduced the 
Cossacks into the houses of individuals after the departute of the French, and 
the peasants of the environs who took part in the general plundering, carried 
off and hid allthey could. 

" A circumstance well worthy of remark is, that the pillage provoked by 
want was excited and fed by the infidelity of servants, who foi- the most part 
betrayed their masters, in indicating the klodowoie and the secret cellars, in 
order to partake of the booty, arid after the departure of the French, the 
populace of Moscow and its neighbourhood left ineffaceable traces of their 
insatiate avidity. ' 

Y 



170 OKITICAL EXAMNATION, &c. 

" But," adds he, " people have been too much astonished at 
the virtues, as well as the vices, of that army : the former were 
less praise-wortliy, and the latter less reprehensible ; inasmuch^ 
if I may so express myself, enjoined hj example and circum-v 
stances." 

As there are no conventual virtues or vices, and that virtue 
and vice always exist, a fresh attack on the reputation of tlie 
French army may be perceived in this reflection. 



CHAPTER IX. 

KuTusoF, on abandoning Moscow, retreated on the road to 
Kalouga. The 15th of September the Russian army halted 
at Panki, four or five leagues from Moscow ; the 16th it cross- 
ed the Moskwa, at Boraskoe. Kutusof then resolved to as- 
sume an offensive position, on the flank of the line of opera- 
tions of the French, and to cut off their communications ; this 
would enable him at the same time to cover Kalouga and the 
southern provinces of Russia. The position of Taruntino, he- 
hind the Nara, which would give him the advantage of me- 
nacing the central road from Moscow to Kalouga, at the same. 

" The French, thanks to the safe -guard that was given us on their arrival, 
respected our dwelhng. It was untouched until the arrival of the Cossacks, 
who followed them, and over whom there was no authority to control. I was 
happy, as regards myself, in escaping with the loss of a few pieces of plate, 
bottles of wine, &c. 

*' Thanks to heaven ! the church of St. Louis escaped pillage, but it did not 
escape the Cossacks on their return. 

"The unhappy losers went to Petrowsky to implore the Emperor Napo- 
leon's assistance ; he appeared to bewail their lot, and promised to devise 
means to remedy it. Upwards of 400 of them were relieved with great zeal 
and generosity in the house of Zapatof, at the Porte llouge, and found there, 
not only a safe asylum, but also provisions and attentions. 

" Many went to the hotel of the Count Razomowski, inhabited by the King 
of Naples, and were received by this latter with humanity ; he distributed 
succour to them, but it was insufficient fol.such a number," 



BOOK VIIL 



171 



time enable him to advance by the two other two great roads, 
which pass by Zerpouchow and Malojaroslawitz, was chosen 
as a halting place by the Russian army. '■■^ 

The King of Naples at first believed that the enemy had re- 
tired directly on Occa, but as soon as he learnt the real move- 
ment of the Russian army, he followed in its new direction. 
Some military men are surprised that Kutusof, if he had not 
the intention of engaging in a second battle, before abandoning 
Moscow, should have retreated on this capital, and afterwards 
take from thence the route to Kalouga j a movement he might 
have made, directly and with ease, from Mojaisk, it appears 
that the effects of his loss at the battle of Moskwa, completely 
deranged the plans of the Russian general, and that outflanked 
on his right by the Poles, he could only expect to make his 
flank movement with safety, by covering himself by the Mosk- 
wa, beyond Moscow. 

Mr. de Segur does not give any detail of military manoeu- 
vres ; he is fonder of giving sketches, which he. probably has 
copied from the Russians, or derived from his own imagina- 
tion, as is the greater part of his work. He supposes that the 
Russian soldiers heard the crackling of the Jlames at seven or 
eight leagues from Moscow. He says that " the fire of their 
sombre and threatening looks might be seen answering these 
flames, which they regarded as our work ; it already betrayed 
that ferocious revenge which was rankling in their hearts, and 
which spread tliroughout the whole empire, and to which so 
many Frenchmen fell victims." 

In the following page, we read on the subject of these same 
Russians, the following passages, which appear contradictory. 
** They have since claimed nothing, even in the enemy's capi- 
tal, which they preserved ; their renown has remained great 
and unsullied," &c. 

" Their sacrifice was complete ; without reserve, without 
tardy regrets;" and we have just seen it was the work of an 
individual. How did he succeed? It was in concealing from 
the inhabitants his fatal project ; in forcing them to abandon 
their city by the most violent threats ; in opening the prisons 
of the guilty ,* in placing torches in their hands, and in carry- 



172 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c, 

iiiJ^ away from the city all means of extinguishing the confla- 
gration. It was so little an act of patriotism on the part of 
the Russians, that the inhabitants who remained in Moscow, 
joined their efforts to ours to arrest the progress of the 
flames.* 

J complete sacrifice is sucli a one as that of the city of Sa- 
guntum, the inhabitants of which precipitated themselves into 
the flames, after having thrown into them their wives, their 
children, and their treasures ; such an action justly commands 
admiration. But the banditti who burn a city where they 
possess nothing, at the command of a man whom his fellow- 
citizens hate to such a degree, that for several years he has 
not dared to appear among them, can inspire but horror. — 
" Since they have claimed nothing," &c. Have they not taken 
their portion of the million imposed on France? 

" Their renown has remained great and unsullied, they have 
known true glory." Does true glory consist in massacreing 
prisoners, in exposing them naked on the snow, in putting 
them to death in horrible torments? Does it consist in pilla- 
ging, in violating our women, in burning'oiir villages, as they 
» 

* "During- this time the fire attacked the lower part of Patrowska, and 
consumed all the shops situated below the bridge of the Marshals. The flame, 
urged by the wind, threatened to surmount the width of the bridg-e, and con- 
sume all tiie shops which are beyond it, towards the Loubianka ; already the 
inhabitants of this quarter, each with his pack on his back, appeared to ex- 
pect this last sacrifice. In the church of St. Louis, all was in the greatest 
consternation; all the unfortunate refugees in this building, their bundle in 
their hand, and resigned to tlieir fate, came to me to receive the last absolu- 
tion. 1 begged them to wait, and promised to advise them when the time for 
it should arrive. I went immediately to the place of danger, and only suc- 
ceeded in reaching it covei-ed with sparks and flakes of fire. Nothing but 
the hand of heaven could have saved us ; it inspired the company of grena- 
diers posted in this place, endowed them with courage to arm themselves 
with buckets, and wet the roofs of the most exposed houses, with such acti- 
vity that they prevented their taking fire. This was the salvation of all this 
quarter, which is the only part of the town which remains untouched, and 
which comprehends all the height above the bridge of the Marshals, Rojest- 
kuka, the two Lobiankas, the post office, the bank, the Tschistiprout, and 
the end of Patrowska, situate between the two boulevards, as well as Mara- 
ceca." — Extract from the letter of Abbe Surntjues. 



BOOK VIII. 173 

did in all parts of Champagne ? Let the author ask the inha- 
bitants of our eastern provinces what they think of this re- 
nown, so great and unsulliedf and of the true glory of the Rus- 
sians? he will see how they will answer him. 

Mr. de Segur cites with eulogy the action of Count Rostop- 
chin, who burnt his palace in the country, declaring, that "it 
shall not be polluted by the presence of the French." 

Is it good taste in a Frenchman to repeat this gross insult? 
The after conduct of Mr. Rostopchin has not been in unison 
with his words, for a short time afterwards we see him come 
in the midst of these French, and marry his daughter to one 
of them.* 

We will not ask the author, who establishes himself as the 
apologist of Mr. Rostopchin, to inform us if this Russian 
count did not believe himself obliged to burn his country pa- 
lace, from the fear of incurring the reproach of appearing to 
have lost nothing by this great disaster of which he made him- 
self the agent. 

The officer of the palace is astonished, that after eleven days. 
Napoleon is still in Moscow, ** thus losing the time which he 
ought to have gained." It was natural to hope, that as the 
Russian army had been almost annihilated at the battle of 
Moskwa, the Emperor Alexander would make peace at 
Moscow. This capital h3,ving been burnt, Alexander might 
fear that Napoleon, paralyzing the army of Kutusof by one 
of those decisive manoeuvres, so familiar to him, would direct 
his march rapidly on Petersburg. All the information re- 
ceived from that city, announced the fear they had of this 
movement. Already were the archives embarked, and they 
expected to see the arrival of the French. It may be permit- 
ted to suppose, if Alexander had been left to himself, he would 
not have incurred these dangers, and would have signed a 
peace. He was prevented by the Russian high nobility, and 
by the English envoys, who mingled with corruption, t;he re- 
membrance of a bloody catastrophe. It was finally to attain 
this end, that these heralds of a perpetual war, employed the 

* To the nephew of Count Philip de Segur, 



174 ClUTieAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

Governor of Moscow to burn this capital, hoping by its de- 
struction to excite the national hatred, to deprive us of such a 
pledge wiien treating, and to oppose a powerful obstacle to a 
peace. The flattering opinion Napoleon had conceived at 
Tilsit and at Erfurt of the character and sentiments of the 
Russian Emperor, justified the hope which he entertained, that 
this sovereign, despising odious insinuations, would rather lis- 
ten to the ti-ue interests of his country, than purely personal 
considerations. 

Whilst Napoleon expected this reply from Alexander, he oc- 
cupied himself without intermission in resting his army, in re- 
pairing the losses of every kind which it had met with, in or- 
ganizing hospitals, in affording assistance to his wounded, and 
in collecting the provision of all kinds that was found dis- 
persed throughout the city. His cares did not cease with 
his troops. The unhappy inhabitants of Moscow who had re- 
mained in the city partook of them ; he employed his best en- 
deavours to alleviate their lamentable situation. The wound- 
ed Russians, who were found in the jiospitals and houses that 
the fire had respected, were treated like our own. His solici- 
tude extended even to religion ; he opened the churches which 
had not been burnt, he invited to them the popes and curates, 
who were dispersed ; and gave another example of his respect 
for the sentiments of a people towards their sovereigns, in in- 
viting them to pray for Alexander.* 

* It is due to historic truth to observe here, that the constituted authori- 
ties, instead of being opposed to the exercise of the lational rehgion, gave 
orders to find out the popes, and oblige them to resume their functions. — 
Some were discovered, but they avoided performing their duties under dif- 
ferent pretexts. Many, without doubt, had a legitimate reason, as their 
churches had been burnt down ; every necessary assistance was proffered to 
others, to enable thorn to re -assume the exercise of their ministry; but, 
whether from fear, or some other reason, only two or three could be indu- 
ced to do so, at the end of three weeks. 

"A solitaiy pope in my neighbodrhood, consulted me to know whether he 
might resume his functions, it was a foreign pope, chaplain to one of the 
regiments of horse guards, taken by the French before tlie departure of the 
Russian army. I begged him earnestly to do it. He obtained the necessary 
safe-guard from the commandant of the place, to undertake his office with 
respect ; the people flocked in crowds to the only church of their sect which 



BOOK VIII. 175 

The author here attributes speeches to several persons, with- 
out doubt to give them a reputation for frankness, courage, and 
above all for foresight. Napoleon wished to send a negotiator 
to Alexander, but the Duke of Vicenza, ** more capable of ob- 
stinacy than of flattery," refuses. Can persons who are ac- 
quainted with the Duke of Vicenza, put faith in such an oc- 
currence ? They well know that he had too high a sense of 
his duties, and of his own dignity, to reject the missions the 
Emperor deigned to offer him ; and if he had refused any, he 
would not liave commenced with that, which had for its object 
to check the effusion of blood. To enable us to form an opinion 
on these conversations, full of asperity, these marks of pride 
without an object, this want of decorum, we will call on those 
who have seen Napoleon abdicate his throne, and at tlie mercy 
of his enemies. — Who is it, even at St. Helena, ever dared to 
behave thus to him ? 

The last words of the Emperor to Lauriston were, " I want 
peace, I must have peace, I absolutely will have peace, only 
save my honour." 

The Emperor desired peace, since he had undertaken the 
war against his inclinations. He may have expressed his de- 
sire to General Lauriston, but he never could have made use 
of the expression, save my honour, since the honour of France 
was never compromised, and the proof of it is, notwithstanding 
our disasters, it never received a blemish. 

was open. It was feared that the pope would have been obhged to pray, not 
for the Emperor Alexander, but for Napoleon. An assurance was g'iven him 
in my presence, that he need not change a single word in his liturgy, and 
that he might continue to pray for his legitimate sovereign. He performed 
his office as usual, and sung the Te I)eum, it being the anniversary of the 
coronation of Alexander." (Extract from a Letter of the Abbe Surrugiifs.) • 



I 



'/ 



176 curncAL examination, &c. 



CHAPTER X. 



Mr. dc Sca;»ir, in inlbrininsj his readers of the arrival ol* 
General Liuiiiston, at the head quarters of Alexander, repre- 
sents this nei^'otiator as ph'ased " in breaking off a negotia- 
tion which he disa|)i)roved." If it had been so, General Lau- 
riston would have easily perceived tliat the Russians only 
wanted to gain time, and had no interjtion to make peace. 
Neveilhi less, his coi-respondence contributed as well as that 
of ihe kiiit:; of Naph's, to sustain the hopes of the Emperor. 
If the iiiitlitir is to he believed, Napoleon and the Ring of Na- 
ples alone paitook of an illusion that General Lauriston should 
have dissipated. 

<" Murat, tired of battles, anxious respecting their result, 
and, as it is said, rogrettini;' Ids throne, since he had no hope 
of a better, suffered himself to be charmed, seduced, and de- 
ceived." 

^ What does the author intend by this hope that Murat enter- 
tained of a better thi'one? Does ho mean to allude to that of 
Poland.'' IJut Murat never thought of changing the rich king- 
dom of Naples, for the deserts of Sarmatia, and there never 
was an intention he slutuld. If the kingdom of Poland was 
to be re-established, it would have i-ather been Prince Ponia- 
towski, than Murat, who would have reigned in Varsovia. 

This same Murat, wlio has no hopes of a throne better than 
that of Na|)les, is reprrsented, a few lines lower, as flattered 
by the idra of being " King id' the Cossacks." 

A battery of artilhry, belonging to an Italian division, was 
attacked on its route, by a partisan corps, who caused some 
tlisorder in the convoy i and l)lew up son»e caissons. On this 
\t>ccasion, the author, with one stroke of bis pen, disgraces an 
Wu-ei- w ith lln> ( iiarge of anvardicc. The truth is, the Empe- 
rbr in(|uired into the circumstances, and the result proved that 
the pllicer was more unfortunate than culpable, and the busi^ 
ness rested there. 



BOOK VIII. 177 

Who can give credence to tlic enthusiasm Mr. dc Sc.t!;iii' at- 
tributes to the Russian recruits? "JNonc (says he) had Tailed 
to obey the national a|)i»eal5 all Russia rose. Mothers, it was 
said, wept tor joy on learning that their sons had been select- 
I d lor sohlicrs; they hastened to accjuaint them with this glo- 
*rious intelligence, and brought them along themselves, to see 
them marked with the sign of the Crusaders; to hear them 
cry, 'Tis the will of God !" 

The condition of a serf is such, that the situation of a Rus- 
sian soldier, miserable as it is, appears a happiness to him. 
Nevertheless, since the discornfitMre of Alexander's armies, the 
terror and discouragement the French ai-mies had inspired, 
were such, that the recruits did not wish to march. To make 
them rejoin the camp at Taruntino, they tic^d them two and 
two, and conducted tliem by Cossacks, who beat them on with 
the staffs of their lane es. If Mr. de Segur had consulted the 
French ollicers, who had been prisonei-s, and who had been 
carried in the rearof *'.j Russian army, he would have learnt 
this. 

The author, whose imagination is always in the clouds, and 
who hi 3 already given as a presage, the account of a vulture 
caught in the chains of a steeple, gives us as a fatal omen, 
"those flocks of ill-omened birds, who appeared as if they 
meant to defend the cross of the steeple of the great Ivan." 
The tower of Ivan being the loftiest in the city, it was natural 
that it should constantly afford an asylum to a great number 
of ravens ; above all, after a fire, which had destroyed most 
of the other steeples. 

The author wishes us to believe, that this presage had sin- 
gularly affected the mind of the Emperor. He says, "that 
he was accessible to every kind of presentiment j he strove 
iiimself to perceive, and to make others recognize his star, in 
a brilliant sun ;* this did not amuse him. To the sullen si- 
lence of inanimate Moscow, was superadded the still more 
menacing silence of Alexander. It was not the faint sound of 

* A stur in the sun is curious enough. 

z 



.£'yy CRiriGAL EXAMINATION, &,c. 

the footsteps of our soldiers, wandering in this vast tomb, that 
could rouse our Emperor from his reverie." 

"His nights in particular became irksome to him. He 
passed part of them with Count Daru." The Count Dam 
must have been but little flattered by this, doubtless, involun- 
tary intrusion. 

AVc shall not follow the author in these conversations ; it 
may readily be perceived that they have been fabricated sinct^ 
the events took place. 



CHAPTER XI. 

Mr. de Segur, true to his system, presents the Emperor to 
us, as pleasing himself by self-abuse on the state of his affairs. 
** catching at every thing to keep up his hopes, when, all at 
once, the first snows fell? with them fell too all the illusions.'' 
The illusions of the Emperor did not fall with the snow, con- 
sidering that he had done all to effect a peace that bis dutj 
prescribed to him, that the hopes Murat and Lauriston had 
given rise to, were not realized, and that he had but one month 
of a:ood weather to act in, he decided on joining his reinforce- 
ments. The author reproaches Napoleon with not wishing to 
leave part of his artillery in Moscow. Tlie army around this 
city had still, at their departure, 601 pieces of field artillery, 
with a sufficiency of ammunition. The artillery teams had 
been reinforced by the horses of the pontoon carriages, which 
were left in the Kremlin. It, therefore, could never have oc- 
curred to the Emperor, to abandon to the Russians a part of 
his artillery ; it would have been a greater injury than if he 
had waited for another battle. But Mr. de Segur seeks after 
every occasion to exhibit Napoleon more as one who lias lost 
his reason than as a skilful general. 



BOOK viir. 179 

*' In this desert country the Emperor, says he, ordered the 
purchase of 20,000 horses." 

A number of individuals belongini^ to the army had more 
horses than was conformable to regulations. It was this ex- 
cess that the Emperor ordered to be p(irchase<l, in order to 
give them to the artillery and military ecjuipages. 

Thus, at Wilna, Witepsk, and Smolensk, the Emperor is 
shown surrounded with disapproving looks. " He opens him- 
self freely to Count Darn." He announces to him his project 
of crushing Kutusof, and marching upon Smolensk. But 
Count Daru, " who had before approved this course, replied, 
that it was now too late, that the Russian army was reinforced 
— that the moment his troops should turn their faces towards 
France, they would slip away from him by degrees, — ' AVhat, 
then, is to be done?' exclaimed the Emperor." 

The situation of Napoleon, reduced to advise with his minis- 
ter, is merely incongruous ; but this exclamation from a man 
whom we have seen so great and powerful, What is to be done? 
inspires compassion. Happily the quartermaster of the palace 
comes to his aid, by giving him his advice through Count 
Uaru. Here is this lion's counsel, " make one vast entrenched 
camp of Moscow, and pass the winter in it j" bread and salt 
will not he wanting, he would answer for it. The Emperor 
might have counted on it, if the administration had provided 
the army with food from the beginning of the campaign. 
" The rest foraging on a large scale would supply." The 
author who makes Count Daru talk so much to the purpose, 
forgets that he has said in the preceding page, " Napoleon ex- 
pected forage for two months to be provided on a tract where 
the most distant and dangerous excursions were not sufficient 
for the supply of the passing day." The poor horses would 
run a great risk of dying of hunger ,• but, be at ease for the 
cavalry ; " such of the horses for which they could not procure 
food," were to be " salted down," as Count Daru pro])oscd. 
** Here we might stay, till in spring our reinforcements, and 
all Lithuania in arms, should come to our relief," &;c. 

In making a man of such information speak thus, the author 
should have informed us what advantages this counsellor would 



180 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c, 

have found in the Emperor's remaining at Moscow, rather than 
moving upon Smolensk and Witepsk, to make his winter quar- 
ters and prepare for a new camjiaign. The quarter master of 
the palace doubtless forgets, that Rutusof's army, which daily 
increased, would have been in the spring in a still stronger 
situation than ours, even at that time, while ours, blocked up 
in Moscow, and reduced to its own resources, would have daily 
seen its cavalry and baggage horses perish. If to these mili- 
tary considerations, we join political ones which are obvious 
to all, does it not appear evident that there is not a word of 
truth in this conversation ? 

At the same time that Mr. de Segur depicts the Emperor 
** amid the dreadful storm of war and elements which was 
gathering round him, his ministers and aids-decamp saw him 
pass whole days in discussing the merits of some new verses 
which he had received, on the regulations for the Comedie 
Francaise at Paris — prolonging his meals to stifle thought by 
repletion — passing whole hours half reclined as if torpid, with 
a novel in his hand, &c. ? At the same time he shows him in 
so unfavourable a light, and pours disrespect upon him, he 
shows " Kutusof gaining that time we were losing — neglect- 
ing no advantage — at once bold and skilful, preparing slowly 
on impetuous war, &c. Rostopchin receiving a daily report 
from Moscow as before its conquest," &c. 

We recognise in this picture, a new trait of our author's 
impartiality, and the same spirit which presided over his in- 
terior scenes at Paris, Wilna, and Witepsk. 

An armistice had been agreed upon with the Russians after 
the movement of General Lauriston. Mr. de Segur has painted 
at full length the good understanding which existed between 
the outposts of the two armies, and in which he does honour 
to the extreme confidence of the King of Naples. However, 
to save the Russians from the charge of bad faith which they 
incurred by the unexpected attack of Winkowno, he pretends 
that Murat had declared to Mil adoro witch, that the armistice 
no longer existed; this assertion is entirely unfounded. 

The quarter master of the palace also supposes that Murat 
warned the Emperor, " that a woody country on his left might 



BOOK VIII. 181 

favour attempts against his flank and rear ', that his first line 
backed against a ravine, might be precipitated into it, that, in 
short, the position which he occupied in advance of a defile, 
was dangerous, and rendered a retrograde movement abso- 
lutely necessary. But Napoleon would not consent to this step ;" 
the motive which our author gives for this refusal is, that this 
Prince " dreaded the appearance of recedirjg. He preferred 
risking every thing." 

We are obliged to say here, that Mr. de Segur deceives 
himself by wishing to prove, that Napoleon being at Moscow, 
twenty leagues from Murat, directed minutely the position of 
his troops. The Emperor understood war differently, as we 
have already repeatedly shown, he gave a general order, and 
left the detail of its execution to whomsoever it was addressed. 

The Emperor had recommended to the.King of Naples to ob- 
serve the Russian camp, and to take the most suitable position 
for that purpose, without passing the Nava ; but he had not by 
any means prescribed the particular arrangements, which 
could solely be determined by circumstances.* If Murat had 

* The following letter supports what we have advanced : to this the King 
of Naples might have quitted Winkowno to retire on Worownow, if he feared 
an attack. 

The Prince of J\''evfchatel and Wagram to H, M. the Sing of JVaples. 

Moscow, Oct. 13, 1812, 2 o'clock, A. M. 

The Emperor, according to your reports and the observations you have 
sent him, thinks that the position of Worownow is fine, compact, and may 
be defended by infantry, which may easily cover the cavalry. If you are 
of the same opinion, you are authoTised to take that position. 

The Emperor has sent his horse this evening, and, after to-morrow, the 
army will join you, to move against and drive off the enemy. Three days 
are necessary for the army to arrive near you ; you will still have four or five 
days to pass, and in case the enemy attacks you, or the nature of things ren- 
ders it impossible for you to avoid the losses you have met with during eight 
days, you have the resource of taking position at Worownow. All the wagons 
j'ou have sent are loaded with provisions ; those sent this evening will also 
set forth to-morrow, &c. ' ^ 

In a letter, dated from Moscov/, 14th Oct., 1812, at 10 o'clock, P. M. and 
written by the Prince of Neufchatel, to the King of Naples, there is the fol- 
lowing passage : " Make the best examination you can of the defile by which 
you can move upon Mojaisk, so that if you retreat before the enemy, you 



182 cflllTlCAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

a wood on his left, it was necessary to free himself of it. If 
he had a ravine in the rear of his position, he should have taken 
a better one. Does our historian not know these first military 
notions ? or wouhl he thiow on tlic Emperor the surprisal of 
Murat in his position at Winkowno ? 

This last conjecture seems the more probable, as he says in 
the following page, that " young Berenger presently arrived, 
lie brought intelligence that Murat's first line had been sur- 
prised and overthrown, and his left turned by favour of the 
wood," k.c. in short all that he had foreseen, was realised ! 

The (piarter-niaster of the palace should have told us that the 
Russian general, i)rofiting by the confidence we had in his 
word, recommended hostilities suddenly, in the hope of destroy- 
ing our advanced guard j but the valour of the King of Na- 
ples and the troops under his command, disconcerted this plan. 
The enemy's loss was greater than oursj if we lost Generals 
Fischer and Dery, whose names are not mentioned by Mr. do 
Segur, the Russians lost Generals Baggowout and Muller. 
Bcnigscn, who appeared to have heen the promoter of that af- 
fair, gave thereby a new proof that he understood the revolu- 
tions of the palace better than military operations. 

What a singular opinion would strangers form from read- 
ing, that " no one durst apprise him that the report of cannon 
was heai'd towards Winkowno — some from incredulity or un- 
certainty, others from love of ease; dreading the first move- 
ments of his impatience, or fearful of being sent to verify this 
assertion, and to expose themselves to a fatiguing excursion !" 

"At these tidings Napoleon recovered the fire of his early 
years." 

The Emperor, who according to Mr. de Segur, was failing 

may be well acquainted with tliat route. Tlie Emperor supposes lliat your 
baggage, ]3ark, and the greatest part of your infantry, may retire witliout be- 
ing perceived by the enemy. 

*' Is it true, that in passing tlic defile of Worownow, your cavalry can be 
covered by your infantry, and in a loss fatiguing position than that it would 
be in on a level country, which keeps it continually on the alert? Under all 
circumstances, it is very important to jirocure sevenU days jn-ovisions for your 
troops. There ai'e at Moscow, some tliousands of quintals of Hour, and plenty 
of brandy at your disposal," &c. 



liooK IX. 183 

at 42 years old, while Kutusof at 80 had the energy of youth, 
had not waited for this circumstance to order the retreat and 
to awake from the pretended apathy into which the author 
plunged him. 

Several letters written by the Emperor during his stay at 
Moscow will be found in the appendix. This very small frac- 
tion of the great number of orders given by him relative to mi- 
litary affairs during that time, will suffice to show his activity 
and foresight. We shall he satisfied that Napoleon had not 
waited for the attack on Winkowno to organize and reinforce 
his army, secure his communications, complete tlie trains of 
his artillery, augment his stores of ammunition, (by the pow- 
der found near the German bai-rier, and the balls collected on 
the field of battle,) remove his wounded and useless objects, 
and be ready to move actively on any point he wished. Wo 
pass in silence the despatching of couriers, which occurred 
every day, for Paris, carrying instructions for all parts of the 
internal administration, politics, finances, war, &c. 

In one page, " tlie division Clarapede was on the route to 
Mojaisk," and in the next, he says, " Clarapede and Latour- 
Maubourg cleared the defile of Saskaflia." We ask of the 
author, liow the division Clarapede could be on the same day 
in two places, more than twenty leagues distant from each 
other? But in a vv^ork which swarms with so many important 
errors, we should not take up such inaccuracies. 

I 



BOOK IX.— CHAPTER L 

In this chapter, the Emperor himself gives the motives of 
his stay in Moscow. *' He had been obliged to allow time to 
the soldiers to recruit themselves, and to the wounded collect- 
ed in Moscow, Mojaisk, and Kolotskoi, to move off towards 
Smolensk. But, as if it were impossible to allow tlic Empe- 
ror to say two rational things sucrcssively, he hastens to add, 



184 



CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 



that Napoleon, pointing to a still serene sky, asked, <* If in that 
brilliant sun they did not recognise his star ?" 

This image of a star in the sun delights Mr. de Segur very 
much J it is often found in his book. In general he seeks to 
have it believed, that Napoleon had a puerile confidence in his 
star, and liked to testify it; which is absurd. Such a man as 
he was might count upon his genius, his talents, and profound 
meditations ; but he believed as much in his star as Csesar did 
in tlie sacred hens. 

All the preceding chapters show us this great captaift plunged 
in sleep and lethargy, and yet our author says, " Napoleon 
entered Moscow with 90,000 fighting men, and 20,000 sick 
and wounded, and quitted it with more than a hundred thou- 
sand combatants. He left there only 1,200 sick. His stay, 
notwithstanding his daily losses, served to rest his infantry, to 
complete his stores, to augment his force by ten thousand men, 
and to protect the recovery or retreat of a greater part of his 
wounded." 

In the middle of a long description of the equipages and 
train of the army, at its departure from Moscow, the author 
brings forward the gigantic cross of the great Ivan. 

This cross which was placed on the top of the steeple of 
Ivan Weliki, was SO feet high, and made of wood, covered 
with thin plates of gilded silver. Tlie sappers who were or- 
dered to remove it, let it fall and dashed it to pieces : the sfil« 
ver was stripped off and the wood abandoned. A small cross 
of pure gold, about ten inches long, was fixed in the middle of 
the great one. This alone was preserved and removed along 
with the treasure of the army. Thus the gigantic cross of Mr. 
de Segur, is reduced to ten inches. Half of his assertions 
should suffer a similar reduction. 

Succeeding to this cross, we see the Russian peasants with 
their beards, conducting or camjing our booty, oj which they form- 
ed part, (Sj-c. By saying this, does the palace ojficer mean that 
these peasants were enslaved, and justify thereby the infamies 
which the Russians committed on the unfortunate French left 
in the hospitals of Moscow, and recommended to their hu 



fc, 



BOOK IX, 185 

manity ?* It is false, that any peasant was reduced to cap- 
tivity ; some followed for the sake of obtaining what was 
abandoned by us, and others were hired as servants. 

The author has employed four pages to describe the sortie 
from Moscow, and but a few lines to the skilful movements by 
which the Emperor deceived the enemy, by turning his posi- 
tion from Taruntino, and moving upon Kalouga by Borowsk 
and Malojaroslawitz. 



CHAPTER II, 

On his arrival at Borowsk, in the evening of October 23d, 
the Emperor learned that the Viceroy occupied Malojaroslawitz, 
** but," says Mr. de Segur, " he went to sleep on this success, 
instead of entering it." He appears by this to reproach Na- 
poleon for not having immediately moved upon Malojaroslawitz. 
But this prince, having learned that the Russian corps of Doc- 
torolF marched upon his left, and was at Aristowo, could not 
have moved upon Malojaroslawitz, beforebeingquite sure that it 

* General William de Vaudoncourt, in his JMemoirs to sei've for a history of 
the War bettveen France and Russia, in 1812, a work superior to all those 
hitherto published on this campaign, both on account of the author's talents 
and the exactness of the facts related, states " that on the 23d of October^ 
the Russian General Ilowaiki entered Moscow, that he found there in three 
hospitals, about 400 sick or wounded Russians, and 650 sick or wounded 
Frenchmen, who had been too weak to be removed with their comrades. A 
part of the latter had, notwithstanding, been thrown into carriages to be car- 
ried to Twer ; but they all perished from cold and misery, or were assassi- 
nated by the peasants, charged with the conveyance of them, who cut their 
throats for the sake of their clothes. The rest were left in the hospitals witk 
the French surgeons, who remained to take care of them, but the Russians 
neither gave them food nor medicine." 

General Vaudoncourt having been taken prisoner jduring the retreat, has 
been enabled personally, to collect much information of the highest interest, 
which will make his memoirs valuable to all those who wish to have a just 
idea of the events of that war. 

A a 



186 OKITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

was not the whole Russian army which marched upon Borowsk. 
Moreover, what motive should have decided the Emperor to 
move on Malojaroslawitz, when, accordinj^ to Mr. de Segur, 
the division of Delzons had found it unoccwpied? This phrase, 
the Emperor slept upon this success, instead of entering it, sig- 
nifies nothing." 

The criticism of M. the palace officer, is owing to his not 
having consulted the maps, for he says, in speaking of Malo- 
jaroslawitz, " it was the only point where Kutusof could cut 
us of from the new road to Kalouga. Notwithstanding, at 
Borowsk we were in the same danger.^' 

The author has said, that our delay at Witepsk caused our 
misfortunes; then, that it was our march upon Moscow; and 
then, our delay in that capital. Here, however, on the subject 
of a datj sacrificed at the passage of the JYaxa and Marsh, he 
adds, " be this as it may, we may date all our calamities from 
that delay." 

An officer of Prince Eugene came to the Emperor to an- 
nounce, that Malojaroslawitz, not having been occupied, ex- 
cept by two battalions, the enemy had attacked them at day- 
light, and overcome this feeble body of troops. He added, that 
the Viceroy marched to the support of the division of Delzons. 
Mr. de Segur then says, " the whole army of Kutusof was 
hastening up — that his columns already placing themselves 
across the old road to Kalouga, which was open the preceding 
day, which we might have occupied and travelled if we had 
pleased, but which Kutusof would henceforward have it in his 
power to defend inch by inch." 

What M. the palace officer advances, is intended to support 
the reproach he has previously made on the slowness with 
which the Emperor moved upon Malojaroslawitz. We have 
already made known the reasons which prevented the Empe- 
ror from marching directly on it, before the enemy appeared. 
We may add, that according to the instructions the Viceroy 
had received, he should have occupied Malojaroslawitz strong- 
ly, and that instead of two battalions only, it was the entire 
division of Delzons he should have placed there. As soon as 
Napoleon received the news that the Russians were attacking 



BOOK IX. 187 

that post, he sent one of his officers* to Prince Eugene, to or- 
der him to hold Malojaroslawitz. He informed him that he 
was marching to his support, and directed him to secure the 
town by strong batteries on the right and left. Tlie Emperor 
had then foreseen and directed every thing that was necessary. 

Mr. de Segur coldly relates the loss suffered by the fourth 
corps in the person of Delzons. The intrepidity of this gene- 
ral, and the affecting death of his brother, might have afforded 
the historian of the grand army, some expressions of regret 
and esteem for these brave men. The Russian generals, even 
Koulnief, were eulogized by him : it is painful to see that he 
neglects to render the same justice to the French generals. 

According to his custom, at the same time he exaggerates 
our forces, he diminishes those of the enemy. The three French 
and Italian divisions, which, under Prince Eugene, conquered 
at Malojaroslawitz, consisted of but 16,000 men. The Russian 
army, consisting of sixteen divisions, had 70,000 men enga- 
ged. Our loss was about 3,000 men ; the enemy lost 8,000. 
This affair was one of the most glorious for the French and 
Italian troops, on account of their disproportionate number. 
Tlie author seems to reproach the Emperor, by saying, '*that 
so sanguinary a conflict might have been spared." However, 
had he reflected, he would have understood, that in consequence 
of the enemy's position, and the bad state of the roads, it was 
impossible that our march from Moscow could have been more 
rapid. The army could not advance in close columns; it 
marched in echelon. 

"The corps d'armee had remained out of reach of each 
other." The proof of the contrary is, that the corps of Mar- 
shal Davoust, which marched in the rear of that of the Viceroy, 
arrived at Malojaroslawitz on the morning of the £4th, and 
the Emperor arrived there at noon.f 

* The orderly-officer, General Gourgaud. 

■J- The Emperor left Borowsk early ; he was breakfasting two leagues from 
that town, with the King of Naples, the Prince of Neufchatel, and General 
Lariboisiere, when the reports of cannon were heard. He immediately 
mounted, and near noon he was with his staff opposite Malojaroslawitz, on 



1^8 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

Had the author acquainted himself with the marches of the 
army at Marengo, Ulm, and Eckmlilh, he would have recog- 
nized, that the same man and the same mind presided over the 
army at Malojaroslawitz. 



CHAPTER III. 

The quarter-master of the palace, commences in this chap- 
ter by an error, which though of slight importance, merits 
some notice. He insinuates, that during the battle the Empe- 
ror was on the right of the grand route, at the bottom of a ravinCf 
on the edge of a brook in the village of Gorodinia. During the 
whole of the battle, the Emperor remained upon the road which 
leads to the bridge of Malojaroslawitz, whence he saw the ac- 
tion, and gave his orders. It was thence that he made the 
division of Gerard pass the Louja, upon a second bridge, which 
was constructed below the Wore, and directed him to move 
from the right of Malojaroslawitz, and extend his right to the 
woods of Terentiewa. He also sent Compans' division against 
the left of Malojaroslawitz. He attempted himself to place a 
battery upon the left bank of the Louja, to support the right of 
General Gerard, from one bank to the other. It was only at 
night that the Emperor returned to the house, which Mr. de 
Segur says, was *' old, dilapidated, wretched, dirty, obscure, 
and divided into two apartments by a cloth." The most correct 
observations of our author, are those made in relation to the 
interior of the lodgings occupied by the Emperor. We do not 
contradict the author on this subject, but observe, it was not 
until after the battle, that the Emperor entered the hut. 

Marslial Bessiercs, \\hom Napoleon charged with recon- 
noitring the Russian position, came to tell him, " it was un- 

ati eminence above the Louja, on the left of the road, and perfectly situated 
for observing the movements of the enemy. 




BOOK IX. 189 

assailable! Oh heavens, exclaimed Napoleon, clasping his 
hands, are you sure you are right ? Are you not mistaken ? 
Will you answer for that ? Bessieres repeated his assertion ; 
he affirmed that three hundred grenadiers would suffice to keep 
in check a whole army." 

This theatrical consternation, and clasped hands raised to- 
wards heaven, contrast in a striking manner with the charac- 
ter of Napoleon. It is here especially that the author is ne- 
glectful of the rule prescribed to historians as well as poets, 
to make tlieir heroes act and speak in consonance with their 
known characters. The author has read somewhere, that the 
position of Malqjaroslawitz was forced with difficulty, to gain 
the route to Kalouga, and without considering, that from the 
evening we were masters of the bridge and town, which con- 
stituted its strength, makes Marshal Bessieres say, that the 
position taken by the Russians beyond that town, was unas- 
sailablct and that three hundred grenadiers would sivffice to keep 
a whole army in check. This assertion evidently proves that 
the author has not even seen Malojaroslawitz. Three hundred 
grenadiers could not oppose an obstacle to an army, except in 
an almost inaccessible defile; the true defile was the bridge 
and the town, and of these we were in possession. The Rus- 
sian position was so assailable, that on the evening of the bat- 
tle Kutusof retired with his army nearly a league, in order to 
establish himself behind the little brook of Korigea. 

Who, then, could have seen Napoleon at the end of this pre- 
tented report of Bessieres, " crossing his arms with a look of 
consternation, hanging his head, and remaining in the deepest 
dejection?" Who could have heard him say, "his army was 
victorious and himself conquered : his route was intercepted, 
his manoeuvre thwarted. Kutusof, an old man, a Scythian, 
had anticipated him. It was not his fortune then that had 
failed him, but he who had been wanting to his fortune?" 
These fine things, like so many others, are only related by 
Mr. de Segur j yet it is very improbable that he made a third 
person between the Emperor and Marshal Bessieres. 

Master of Malojaroslawitz, nothing hindered Napoleon from 
moving upon Kalouga, by passing the corps of Kutusof. On 



J 90 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

the other hand, if he wished not to join battle, what prevented 
him from amusing Kutusof before Malojaroslawitz, and send- 
ing the rest of his army, by Kremskoe and Medyn, to Kalou- 
ga. This movement had even been begun, since the corps of 
Poniatowski, according to Mr. de Segur himself, had been 
sent to Kremskoe. We may then say, that the stupor and con- 
sternation into wliich he plunges the Emperor, that feverish 
anxiety, that " cruel night during which he lay down, rose up, 
called out incessantly, &c.*' scenes so faithfully reproduced at 
Witepsk and Moscow, have flowed from the brain of an au- 
thor wlio delights in such conceptions. He has often heard 
that Napoleon was in the habit of rising at night; he thinks 
this very remarkable, and nothing was more common. Had 
he possessed a more perfect knowledge of what passed at the 
Emperor's, he would have known that when the army w^as in 
operation, it was the constant custom of this Prince to get up 
every night, from midnight till two o'clock in the morning, the 
hour about which the reports arrived, sent by the generals at 
the close of the preceding day. But Mr. de Segur, whose nights 
were peaceful, knew nothing that liappened during his slumbers. 

About five o'clock in the morning, an orderly officer* whom 
he had ordered to pass the night at the outposts, to learn as 
much as possible of the enemy's movements, came in. He in- 
formed the Emperor that the Russians appeared to occupy 
nearly the position tliey held in the evening ; but upon the 
right he heard, as did General Gerard, cavalry moving in that 
direction, and which were supposed to be marching upon 
Medyn. 

Napoleon then sent successively for the King of Naples, 
Marshal Bessieres, and Count Lobau, and said to them, *' it 
appears that the enemy remains, and that we shall have a bat- 
tle. In the present situation of the army, is it advantageous 
to fight or avoid it?" Bessieres and Murat had no doubt of 
our conquering the militia of Kutusof, for, said they, the Rus- 
sian army was destroyed at Moskwa. But a battle will disor- 
ganize the army ^ the artillery and cavalry horses have suffer- 

* Gen. Gourg^ud. 



BOOK IX, 191 

ed much by bad forage 5 new losses of horses cannot be re- 
paired ,• our wounded would be lost men ; to move upon Ka- 
loiiga would be a hazardous enterprise under existing circum- 
stances ,• what they thought better was to retire upon Smolensk. 
The Emperor having examined, in a few moments approached 
Count Lobau, and said, " and you. Sir, what is your opi- 
nion ?" " Sire, my opinion is to retire upon the Niemen, by 
the shortest and best known route, that of Mojaisk, and as 
promptly as possible," which he repeated at several times. 
Napoleon appeared shaken ; but said he would go look at the 
field of battle before he decided, and called for his horses. 

The recital given by Mr. de Segur of the rush of the Cos- 
sacks upon the Emperor, is full of error. As soon as he knew^ 
the Cossacks who charged the sutlers on the route, he moved 
to the left, saying, *^ Squadrons of the guard, forward I" 
But these squadrons had not mounted at the same moment with 
Napoleon. Three companies of the escort only had followed, 
one of chasseurs, one of lancers, and one of dragoons. These 
moved rapidly forward, and their presence checked tlie Cos- 
sacks. It is not true that they approached so near the Empe- 
ror that one of them thrust his lance into the chest of Rapp's 
horse. Neither is it more true that this general took Napo- 
leon's horse by the bridle. Some orderly officers, and the staff 
of the Prince of Neufchatel, advanced with the body guard at 
the same time that the Emperor retired towards the squadrons 
of the guard, which w^re seen approaching from a distance. 

It was in this skirmish that the chasseurs of the guard and 
the Poles had with the Cossacks, that at the moment of the 
arrival of the horse grenadiers, that Mr. Lecoulteux, having 
slain a Russian horseman, and taken his lance, was wounded 
by a sabre cut across the body, by a grenadier of the horse 
guards, who mistook him for a Cossack, because he had on a 
red cloak, which covered his dress. It is false that the Cos- 
sacks were bold even to insolence. It is false that they were seen 
retiring through the intervals of our squadrons, at a slow paces, 
tranqidlly reloading their arms; three weak companies were suf- 
ficient to disperse them. This was so much so that they has- 
tened to ford the Louja, across which they were pursued by 



192 CKITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

our cavalry. The orderly officers, Athalin, Lauriston, Cha- 
brillant, Montagu, Tiligniers, &c. were present with us at 
the affair. They can certify to what we have advanced, as well 
as Mr. Lecoulteux, who was so grievously wounded. Mr. de 
Segur was probably at Gorodinia, and made this description 
as he has done so many others, from hearsay. 

He terminates the chapter by saying, all this makes one re- 
Jlcct. What is much fitter to provoke reflection is the manner 
in which this fact, and so many others, have been brought for- 
ward. 

How can the author say that the Emperor " remained there 
half an hour, lost in astonishment that the enemy dared to at- 
tack him, and that too the very day after a victory ; and that he 
had been obliged to fly." What is there astonishing that head- 
quarters should be attacked unexpectedly by light horsemen ? 
Certainly the victory of Wagram was a great one, yet in the 
evening of that day, the Emperor was obliged, by a charge of 
cavalry, to take refuge amid his guard, who were formed into 
a square. We might cite numerous examples of similar rash 
enterprises. 

Mr. de Segur makes another horrible picture of the field of 
battle of Malojaroslawitz. Does he then think it possible to 
make war without losing men ? By his description of a battle 
field one would imagine he heard a Parisian shopkeeper, who 
found himself instantaneously transported to one. 



CHAPTER IV. 

" Can you forget, comrades, the fatal field which put a stop 
to the conquest of the world, where the victories of twenty years 
were blasted, where the great edifice of our fortune began to 
totter to its foundation ?" 

This chapter commences in this elevated tone. An idea 
quickly presents itself to the mind, which is, that if the brave 



BOOK IX. 193 

veterans of the grand army have lost every thing, there are 
persons whose fortunes have suffered few checks, and who are 
on the road to fresh honours. 

According to Mr. de Segur, Napoleon was situated " be- 
tween the two armies, his steps and his eyes wandering from 
south to west, along the roads to Kalouga and Medyn, both 
which were closed against him. On that to Kalouga, were 
Kutusof and 120,000 men." But on that of Medyn, we can- 
not see what was to stop us. The officer of the palace says, 
that Platoff was there with his Cossacks ; but however con- 
temptible an opinion he may entertain of the French army, he 
cannot suppose that the Cossacks ever could be considered as 
an obstacle to it. It is true, according to him, that ** they 
traversed this army tlirough and through." But these circum- 
stances did not thug occur. As we have stated in the preceding 
chapter, they had forded the Louja on our right flank, and 
plundered several sutlers on the road, but being charged by 
some platoons of the guard, they were forced to fly by the 
route whence tliey arrived. 

The author does not inform us, that the Emperor remained 
all day on the field of battle, before he determined to adopt 
the advice of those generals who recommended a direct retreat 
on Smolensk. The time he spent on the plain of Malojaros- 
lavitz, the repugnance with which he left it, gives reason to 
believe that lie foresaw that the Russian army, disheartened 
by the battle of the preceding day, would beat a retreat. The 
unanimous opinion was, however, that the Russians would give 
battle, and this was the strongest argument of Murat, Da- 
voust, &c. to induce him to regain the road to Mojaisk. 

Instead of alluding to the reconnoitres made by the Em- 
peror, Mr. de Segur brings him back to Gorodinia, where he 
supposes a council of war which never took place. He gives 
according to his plan, the speeches of Murat, Marshals Da- 
voust, Bessieres, Berthier, Eugene, &c. and makes them de- 
liberate on a retreat, when, before leaving the plain of Malo- 
jaroslawitz. Napoleon had already ordered his dispositions as 
to the direction the corps were to take in their march. But 
these conversations furnish Mr. de Segur an opportunity of 

Bb 



j«)l CltlTlCAL EXAMINATION, ."^r. 

iiialvins HcHsioi'CH ob«crvc, thai " neither the army nor the 
ti^imnl hail sulViciiMit spirit lor such ollorls ;" as if it was not 
uHowcul, «>v(Mi hy (>ur«niniiics, (hjil (his coK^hi'ated <-,orps never 
tarnished its reijututit>n in llio most ( ritical situations, and that 
the frrlin};' of hoimiii-, of (■t)nr;«_i;r, and of tidcliij, uhich ani- 
inutod it, coiihl <tnlv Iniish \\ iih it. Mai'shal lirssicrcs knew 
this corps loo wvU, was too proud in the command of it, to 
have said, *' It \vant(Ml spirit." 

At the termination of Uicso conversations, and the quarrels 
they induced, the authtu' liiMls nolhiuj;- better to do, tlian to 
inak(^ tiie bjuperor h)sc his rrasoji. *♦ Those who atltMuhnl him 
have asserted, that the report «»i" another warm ad'air w ith tiie 
Cossacks towards IJorowsk, a few' leagues in the roar of tlie 
urmv, was the hist shock wliich induced iiim finally to adopt 
(his i'atal resolution." 

'.riiis testimony of valeis-de-chamhres ou!;ht to Hatter the 
Cossacks (greatly, they shouhl be prmid of the part that our 
author makes IImmii play. 



('iiAi"n:i{ \ 

" Tt was alter the ,i;'reatest effort that of Malojaroslawitz, 
had been nKMl<\ and when he had nothini;- to do but to nuirch 
that he retieated." 

Here Mr. do Se.i^ur agrees wiUi us in contradicting the 
opinion he has placed in the mouth of ^larshal Hessieres, 
*• that the position of the Uussian army was unassailable, and 
that three hundred grenadiers would sulfu'e to keep in check u 
whole anu>.*' Siu h contradictions are found throughout the 
work. 

>Vo have already stated, in the prei e<ling chapter, (hat the 
intention of (he Kmjjeror was to olVer battle again to thoKus- 
sians. For, being sure of comiucring tliem, he w ould be ena- 



BOOK IX. 195 

bled to march on Smolensk, by Kaloii,«;a, Mcdyn, or Mojaink, 
willioiit i'oar of being piirHu<!(l. 

NotwitJiHlanding the asHcriions ol" Mr. di; Sef^iir, wc will 
again repeal, that it was only Ironi th«5 solicilationM of his prin- 
(^ipal generals that he decided on not giving battle. One of 
the most powerful motives which influenced him, was the, fear 
of the treatment his newly wouruhid would «;xjM!ri(;nce, if lie 
should be obliged to abandon them. 

The Kmjxuor liad judged j»r'op<irly ; the Ilussijin army re- 
treated. JJut when all th<! generals are opposed to tli(; opinion 
of the commander in chief, success may he douI)tful. Napo- 
leon often yielded to th<; opinion of otliers with a facility that 
has been censuriid. IJe has been lieard to observe;, that in 
situations much more dangerous, hut whicii it is useless to cite 
here, that he would have avoided great reverses, j)articularly 
towards th(! end of his career, if he had depended on himself 
alone. 

It ia worse than weakness to suppose, that "two affairs with 
the Cossacks had disgusted him." It «loes not merit a serious 
refutation. 

" From this moment, he had nothing in view but Paris, just 
as in leaving i'aris lie saw nothing but Moscow." 

The desire of r(itur-ning to I'jiris liad no influence on his de- 
termination. In conrpuui ng tlie Itussians and Ofxujiying Mos- 
cow, he had attained the first object <A' the war j the second, 
which was peac<;, not having b<'en aceoniplished, jirudcuice and 
his duty prescribed to liim to n'Join the remaindei' of his army 
and his magazines, in order to take up winter rpjarters, and to 
put liimself in train to re-commence the cam|)aign in the fol- 
lowing sjning. II" the winter, wlios<; I'igoui- and premature 
arrival had ballled all calculations, had nf)t surprised our le- 
gions, they would hav(5 ariive.d iininjuicd at the/ii' «piarters. 

In leaving Moscow, the Kmperor had no intention of esta- 
blisliing liitnself beliind the Uercsina, as the coi'ps of Macdo- 
nald, (d' St. iyyt'f and of Oudinot, on the left, of Sehwarzen- 
berg, Kegnier, and Uombrowsky, on the riglit, ought to keep 
in check Wittgenstein, Essen, l^itciiakof, and Tormasow, who 
were opposed to them. It was not until his airival at Smo- 



A 



196 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, Sec. 

lensk, that he decided to march on the Beresina, having learnt 
that the numerous reinforcements received by Wittgenstein, 
had obliged St. Cyr to abandon the Duna, and that tlie slug- 
gishness of Schwarzenberg had permitted Titchaliof to gain 
several marches on him in advancing on Minsk. If his orders 
had been executed, notwithstanding the slowness of Schwar- 
zenberg, our magazines at Minsk, Wilna, and Borisof, would 
have been saved, covered by the divisions of Dombrowsky and 
Soison, by the reinforcements which were at Wilna, and by 
the second corps. Thus the army, assured of the passage of 
the Beresina at Borisow, would have taken up position behind 
this river. 

How could a Frenchman write, that " the French army 
marched with downcast eyes, as if ashamed and humbled," 
when a corps of this army only 16,000 strong, were sufficient 
to beat the Russian army, of which, by the account of Mr. de 
Segur, the retreat resembled a rout. It is a want of truth 
and dignity. 

As to the criticisms he makes on the plan of the campaign 
of the Emperor, it is to be regretted that he did not communi- 
cate then, what he now lays before his readers. Napoleon in 
his debility would have been happy to have discovered a saviour 
in the officer of the palace. 



CHAPTER VI. 

Marshal Mortier was left in the Kremlin with but eight 
thousand men. " This Marshal was looked upon as a devoted 
victim; the other chiefs, his old companions in glory, had left 
him with tears in their eyes." The Emperor left the Kremlin 
on the 19th of October, in the morning, leaving orders that 
Marshal Mortier should evacuate it on the 23d. This Prince, 
marching on the road to Kalouga to meet the army of Kutusof, 



BOOK IX. 197 

Marshal Mortier did not consider himself a victim by remain- 
ing in the citadel. Twenty days' labour had so strengthened 
the fortifications as to render them susceptible of a long de- 
fence with one division of the young guard, and Mortier had 
only to fear the attacks of Winzingerode's Cossacks, and the 
Russian peasants. Where did Mr. de Segur learn that these 
Cossacks were the scouts of ten thousand Russians ? and what 
does he mean by the four days' resistance of Marshal Mortier 
in the Kremlin, where he was not besieged ? What proves that 
the garrison in this citadel was unknown to the enemy, is, that 
when Winzingerode and his aid-de-camp were taken prisoners, 
they were only guarded by a few horsemen, besides General 
Winzingerode had no Russian infantry with his corps. How 
could Cossacks, with their lances, attack the Kremlin ? Its 
thick and lofty walls would alone have prevented their en- 
trance, without there even being any garrison. The reproaches 
that Napoleon addressed to General Winzingerode, when he 
was brought as a prisoner before him, are exactly repeated. 
As to the distinction made by the Emperor, between a Russian 
fighting for his country, and a stranger hiring out his services, 
Mr. de Segur says, " a proof there was calculation even in 
his wrath." The words which he puts in the mouth of Gen. 
Winzingerode, "that Alexander had been his benefactor and 
that of his family, and that all he possessed he owed to him, 
&c." were both noble and just ; such sentiments do honour to 
those who profess them; it is a pity that the author does not 
feel their propriety. The Emperor, who is always presented 
to us as a man whose faculties are impaired, and having lost 
all jurisdiction, here at least displays an energy which should 
have commanded the respect of his censurers at head-quarters. 
These gentlemen tried to qualify the just reproaches address- 
ed by the Emperor to Mr. Winzingerode. " It was disap- 
proved, and each was eager to accost the captive General, to 
encourage, to console him." What truth is there in this ac- 
count? I appeal to the author. That the Emperor's express- 
ing his just resentment, displeased him, we must believe, since 
he acknowledges it. But that he or his friends testified their 



198 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

displeasure, by an affected disrespect to their chief, we may be 
permitted to doubt. It is very well to say so now, wheti we 
cannot see it in its proper light. 



CHAPTER VII. 

The author, in painting this memorable expedition, has co- 
vered his pallet with but sombre colours, and already antici- 
pates disastrous consequences, from the severity of the cold. 
Let him restrain his impatience, pictures will not be wanting ; 
but let him not hasten to assert, that the winter attacked the 
army three days after it left Moscow. Until the 6th of No- 
%^ember, that is, for sixteen or seventeen days, the weather had 
been fine, and the cold much less, than it had been in many 
months of the campaigns in Prussia and Poland, or even in 
Spain, (in the mountains of Castile,) during the winter cam- 
paign the Emperor made there in person, in 1808. 

Mr. de Segur gives as a decisive and positive fact, the re- 
port made by a Russian prisoner, on the 28th of October, that 
all the enemy's army had marched by Medyn on Wiazma, and 
he adds, that " the first impulse of the Emperor inclined him 
to neglect this notion." 

Notwithstanding the geographical knowledge the author at- 
tributes to this soldier, it was impossible that he could make 
such a statement to the Emperor j for at this time, Kutusof 
himself had no intention of advancing on Wiazma, as we shall 
prove by his marches. 

After the battle of Malojaroslawitz, Kutusof retreated on 
the road to Kalouga, and halted on the £6th, at Gonzarewow. 
From the movement that Prince Poniatowski had made to- 
wards Kreraskoe, the Russian general feared that Napoleon 
would advance by Medyn on Kalouga, and directed his march 
to Polotnianoizavod, on the route from Kalouga to Medyn. 



BOOK IX. 199 

Miloradowich, on learning that the French had left Maloja- 
roslawitz, fearing to find them already at Medyn, retreated to 
Adamskoe, situated between this city and Kutusof 's position. 
Thus Kutusof was at Polotnianoizavod on the 28th, and re- 
mained there till Napoleon was at Oupenskoe, near Mojaisk, 
full twenty leagues from him. He made this movement under 
the idea that Napoleon was marching on the Kalouga by Me- 
dyn. The Russian soldier, even if he had been the confidant 
of Kutusof, and supposing that he had traversed twenty leagues 
in the twinkling of an eye, could not have said, on the 28th, 
that the Russian army was advancing on Wiazma. Besides, 
Kutusof having learnt, on tlie 29th, that the French army was 
retiring on Mojaisk, wished to approach it, in order to follow 
it in its retreat, which, he believed, was directed on Witepsk, 
passing by Wolokolamsk, Zoubtzow, Beloi, and Souraz, and 
the 29th he commenced his march in two columns, and halted 
for the night at Adamskoe, in the rear of Medyn. The next 
day, the SOth, he arrived at Kremskoe, and it was not till then 
that he was apprised of the real direction of the retreat of the 
French army. 

We have entered into this detail of marches, to prove, sub- 
stantially, to Mr. do Segur, how much he is deceived, since at 
the time at which he makes his Russian soldier speak, Kutu- 
sof believed that the French army was advancing by Medyn 
on Kalouga, which decided him to manoeuvre, in order to pre- 
vent being cut off from that city. 

What the author afterwards advances, respecting Davoust,, 
who had sent in the Russian soldier, that his news might be 
disseminated, and to revenge himself, because the Emperor 
had not taken his advice, is a supposition unworthy of the 
character of this marshal. What necessity is there of de- 
faming both the Emperor and the French generals ? 

The metaphor " of the weather which had not been invited 
to his council, and which seemed to revenge the slight," is a 
play on words worthy of the Precieuses ridicules. 

It cannot be supposed that there was no bridge over the Ka- 
locza at the return of the army ; for all the trains of artillery, 
&c. which had arrived at Moscow, passed by it, there was a 



200 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, he, 

cantonment of artillery at the abbey of Kolostkow, and the 
eighth corps was stationed at Mojaisk. This incident affords 
the author an opportunity of censuring the Prince of Neufcha- 
tel, to whom, at least, he could not refuse a long experience 
and acquaintance with the details for a grand army. Mr. de 
Segur gives us to understand ** there was no staff, no general 
order, no common tie, nothing which bound these corps togeth- 
er." Even admitting that this bridge had not been repaired, 
the reproach should have been addressed to the eighth corps ; 
but it did not merit it, for the bridge was there. The great park 
of the artillery of the army was sent on the right of Borodino, 
by a bridge constructed for the purpose, in order that this pas- 
sage should not be encumbered. 

** After passing the Kalocza," says Mr. de Segur, **we 
marched on, absorbed in thought, when some of us raising our 
eyes, uttered an exclamation of horror — the cry of, it is the 
field of the great battle ! formed a long and doleful murmur." 

This proves evidently that the author has not examined the 
field of battle. He supposes that it was on the left bank of the 
Kalocza, whilst the grand redoubt, the three other redoubts 
taken by Ney and Davoust, the village of Semenowsky, car- 
ried by Friant, all in fact he alludes to, are on the right 
bank. 

If the reasonings of the officer of the palace after the battle 
of Moskwa, if the conversations he reports have not sufficient- 
ly demonstrated that he has not seen what he relates, we find 
a new proof in the description he gives of the field of battle 
on our return. But we do not envy him the pleasure he expe- 
rienced in viewing on his route, "30,000 half devoured corp- 
ses," which did not exist there. 

If the traveller he speaks of, takes him some day for his ci- 
cerone, he will run great danger of being led astray. 



BOOK IX. 201 



CHAPTER VIII. 

The author cannot resist his desire of relating an anecdote, 
of which lie has not even the merit of invention ; it belongs ex- 
clusively to Mr. Labaume. It is that of a French soldier, 
whose two legs had been shattered in the battle, who lived for 
fifty days in the body of a horse. In giving an account of the 
battle, our writer has already recounted to us a similar inci- 
dent, the only variation is, that the first soldier was a Russian, 
and the latter a Frenchman. 

Is not the imagination of the author wearied by giving birth 
to such disgusting pictures ? 

All the wounded iiad been carried off on the evening of the 
battle and the following days. The eighth corps had been left 
in position at Mojaisk, charged with this care. We may be 
assured that every thing to be found on the field of battle had 
been collected, even the bullets. The general of the artillery ga- 
thered up about 20,000, with which he renewed his ammuni- 
tion. 

The description Mr. de Segur gives of the hospital at Ko- 
lotshoi, appears to be an accusation against the military com- 
missariat. Multiplied orders had been issued at Moscow, and 
it was particularly to the attentions which should be lavished 
on the wounded, that the indefatigable activity of the Emperor 
directed itself. The artillery constantly provided for all its 
purposes, and instead of being in want of ammunition, the 
army was obliged to destroy a portion of it, on its retreat. 

Was it more difficult in the commissariat to procure medi- 
cines and bandages, than in the artillery to convey its ammu- 
nition ? The Emperor on leaving Moscow had expressly or- 
dered, that all carriages, his own not excepted, should be ap- 
propriated to the wounded which were capable of being re- 
moved. 

It was thus when in Egypt, on the return of the Syrian ex- 
pedition, after having employed the whole of the horses to car- 

Cc 



202 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, fee. 

ry the wounded, he was seen to march on foot through the 
sands of the desert, in order to give up to a wounded man the 
horse on which he rode. 

The author says, " an atrocious action was witnessed, com- 
mitted by the sutlers who threw the wounded who had been 
placed in their carts, into the ditches — only one survived." 
This is too much exaggerated. It is true that some miserable 
sutlers, urged by cupidity, sullied themselves with this crime, 
but it was punished as soon as committed, and severe menaces 
prevented a repetition of this disgrace. 

To efface from the mind of the reader the painful impres- 
sions that such an act of cruelty would necessarily excite, the 
officer of the palace ought to have cited the numerous exam- 
ples of that active humanity so characteristic of the French, 
and which was called forth by this unfortunate event. The most 
part of the wounded that had been placed by orders of the Em- 
peror in his carriages, and those of the army were saved. 
Among them was Mr, de Beauveau, lieutenant of carabiniers, 
who owes his life to the circumstance of his being accommo- 
dated in one of the imperial carriages. 

The fact respecting the bodies of Russian prisoners found 
lying in the route, is related with the same want of exactness. 
The following is the truth ; the Emperor, at the head of his 
staff, marched on the right of the great road from Smolensk. 
He remarked the bodies of two or three Russian soldiers, ly- 
ing not far from the road ; he called the aid-de-camp* who was 
before him, and oi'dered him to see what they were; this offi- 
cer brought him word that they were Russians. The Emperor 
appeared astonished, and said. What, the Russians before us ! 
The aid-de-camp replied, Sire, I learnt that the Spaniards and 
Portuguese entrusted with the escort of the prisoners, have 
shot several of them, who refused to march. The countenance 
of Napoleon became severe ; What, said he quickly, massacre 
the prisoners ! Berthier, what does this mean ? Berthier re- 
plied that he was ignorant, but that he would inquire into it. 
An inquiry was made : the Spanish soldiers pretended that the 

* Gen. Gourgaud. 



BOOK IX. 20S 

column of prisoners having found brandy, in a wagon aban- 
doned on the road, had drank immoderately, and that some be- 
ing drunk, endeavoured to disarm the soldiers of the escort, 
who in consequence fired on them. Measures were taken that 
such disorders should not again occur. 

** Napoleon kept a gloomy silence, but on the ensuing day 
these murders had ceased." What can we understand by this 
but that the Emperor was the author, or an accessary, to these 
murders ? This gratuitous outrage on the elevated character 
of Napoleon, can only excite indignation. His policy even was 
interested in not tolerating these cruelties, for the Russians 
were in a situation to make reprisals, and to a much greater 
extent. 

The author pretends " that these unfortunate people were 
then merely left to die of hunger ;" and he adds, a few lines 
farther, " but what could we do ?" What was done ? The cap- 
tive Russian prisoners lived as did oui* soldiers, on horse flesh. 
" We were cruel from necessity." We were not cruel and 
there was no necessity to be so. Two or three thousand dis- 
armed Russians, at liberty or prisoners, could add little to our 
sufferings or prosperity. These prisoners by degrees were left 
in the rear, and were picked up by their countrymen. 

" In one of the halts of that day, there, on the rough side of 
a frozen field, strewed with wrecks both Russian and French, 
Napoleon attempted, by the energy of his words, to relieve 
himself from the weight of the insupportable responsibility of 
so many disasters ; he had in fact dreaded tlie war, and he de- 
voted its author to the execration of the whole world. But 
the Duke of Vicenza, perhaps too impatient, betrayed his in- 
dignation by a gesture of anger and incredulity, and abruptly 
retiring, put an end to this unpleasant conversation." 

It is a painful task, always to be obliged to point out, this 
strange passion for presenting under a false light, the natural 
sentiments of Napoleon, in the situations in which he was 
placed, and which could not but be honourable to him. We 
must be unhappily constituted to suppose that perversity would 
be carried to the point of clothing a deliberate imposture with 
an appearance of sensibility. No, the tesponsibiiity of disas- 



204 



GIUriCAL EXAMINATION, &c. 



ters, unknown at the time our author alludes to, did not weigh 
on Nai)oIeou. " This war, which i»i fact he feared,'* (why did 
he not rather say, endeavoured to avoid) could not he imputed 
to him. 

The Duke of Vicenza, always chosen for the principal ac- 
tor in these nnj)leasant scenes, which only existed in the ima- 
gination of the atithor, certainly Mill not accept the part 
which Mr. dc Segur wishes him to pljiy. 



The Emperor remained at Wiazma to wait for Marshal 
Davoust, who executed his movement too slowly. The officer 
of the palace makes the corps of Friticc Eugene censure this 
marshal on this suhject, who replied, " that his horror of 
every kind of disorder, at first led him to attempt to introduce 
regularity into this flight.'' 

IMai'sIial Davoust could not have made use of this expres- 
sion. The French army never took flight from the Russians. 
From Moscow it could have marched on St. Petersburg, and 
certainly the author would not have called this march, a flight. 
The Emperor wished rather to return to Smolensk, in order to 
pass the winter in Lithuania. This march, voluntarily taken 
by Napoleon, cannot then be termed a flight. It was not the 
Russians he wished to avoid, but the winter in the middle of 
Russia. 

The taste of Mr. de Segur for metaphor, leads him to say 
that "■ in the march of Czarewo-Zaimicze, the sound of the 
enemy's drums mingled with that of his voice,'' (Davoust.) 
This could not ha])pen, since only a few Cossacks followed 
this marshal on this road, as the only infanti-y at this place, 
(that of General l\\schewitz) did not arrive at Gjatz, until 
night. That of the advance guard of General Milorado witch. 






1tT- 



BOOK IX. 205 

which followed our left flank, also did not arrive until the 
night at the height of Czarewo-Zaimicze. 

The author terminates this cljapter by a flattering slcetch 
of the Russian General Miloradowitch, and prepares us for 
his warlike deeds. But in the following chapter, at the battle 
of Wiazma, this general himself refutes the pompous eulogies 
which have been bestowed on him by the historian of the 
Grand Army. 



CHAPTER X. 

** On the third of November, Prince Eugene was proceed- 
ing towards Wiazma, preceded by his equipages and his ar- 
tillery, when the first light of day showed him at once his re- 
treat threatened by an army on his left, behind him his rear 
cut off*, and on his right, the plain covered with stragglers and 
scattered vehicles, fleeing before the lances of the enemy." 

It is false that the corps of the Viceroy had behind him his 
rear cut off". This corps advanced, followed immediately by 
that of the Prince of Eckmiilh, of which Gerard's division 
formed the rear guard. The communication between tliese 
two corps was always open. The author supposes that the 
artillery of the Viceroy was at Wiazma. This fact is also 
incorrect — the baggage of that j)rince only, was there; he 
would not have committed the fault of marching without his 
artillery. 

The account of the battle at Wiazma, so glorious for the 
troops of Marshal Davoust and Prince Eugene is strangely 
misrepresented, it may be seen that the officer of the palace has 
not comprehended it. The following is what passed : 

When Prince Eugene, in marching on Wiazma, followed 
by the corps of Davoust, perceived that the enemy who ad- 
vanced on his left, wished to cut him off from the great road 
near this city, he advised the marshal of it, and concerted his 




206 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c, 

movements with him. The corps of the prince were formed 
in column on the right of the great road, (facing Wiazma) one 
of his divisions rested its left on the road facing the enemy, 
who advanced on this side. The corps of Davoust continued 
its march on Wiazma. The division of Compans forming the 
head of the column, after having driven back the Russian 
troops, who obstructed his route, passed the ravine of Pru- 
ditcha, and immediately wheeling to the left, displayed in rear 
of this ravine, covering the city. The Italian division, form- 
ed on the left of the road, kept the enemy in check during this 
movement. When Compans had formed his line in rear of the 
ravine, as well as the other divisions of the first corps, this 
Italian division, and the others under the Viceroy, passed in 
turn, the ravine, in order to form on the left of the first corps, 
also covering Wiazma. Established in this position, our troops, 
whom the enemy hoped to drive back on the city, repulsed all 
his attacks and made a great slaughter. 

** Eugene and Davoust, heard another action in the rear of 
their right, they imagined that the rest of the Russian army 
was approaching Wiazma by the Yuknof road — the outlet of 
which Ney was defending — the noise of this fight in the rear 
of their own, threatened their retreat, alarmed them." 

This is a new proof that the author does not even remember 
the battle ground. Otherwise he would have known that Eu- 
gene and Davoust, from the position they held, could see per- 
fectly all the movements of the enemy opposed to Marshal 
Ney, and that they had nothing to fear from that quarter. 
The corps of the Viceroy stole away during the night by Wiaz- 
ma, covered in its turn by that of Marshal Davoust. The 
division of Compans did not pass through the town, but tra- 
versed the Wiazma on the outside, by a bridge which had been 
constructed there. 

The French army at this time was not in the state of disor- 
der and demoralization, that the French historian would wish 
us to believe : the best proof is, that the corps of Eugene and 
Davoust alone drove back the 25,000 Russians, who wished 
to obstruct their route, and who were commanded by this same 



BOOK IX. 207 

General Miloradowitch, so praised by Mr. de Segur in the 
preceding chapter. 

" Kutusof unconcernedly rested himself within hearing of 
the battle," and the English commissioner " excited him in 
vain — he called him traitor, nothing could induce him to stir." 
Among many reasons that the author gives for the inaction of 
this temporizer, as he calls him, he forgets to mention the re- 
collection of the battle of Malojaroslawitz, where three divi- 
sions of French had repulsed his army. 

He says, ** the Russians had penetrated into the town (Wi- 
azma) when Davoust attempted to pass in his turn." It would 
have been useful to have explained how the Russians entered 
Wiazma, between the corps of the Viceroy and Marshal Da- 
voust, which united on their march, and how they caused the 
skirmish alluded to. But Mr. de Segur does not undertake 
to justify all that he advances. Under his pen, our losses are 
exaggerated, and those of the Russians are not noticed. 



CHAPTER XT. 

The officer of the palace, who has exercised himself for a 
long time in figuring by anticipation the horrors of the win- 
ter, here says, " But on the 6th of November, the heavens de- 
clared against us." It is, indeed, from this fatal day, but only 
from this day, that may be dated the premature winter, which 
deceived all calculations, and overwhelmed the army with so 
much misery. In three days it would have arrived at Smo- 
lensk, where the numerous magazines would have furnished it 
with the resources it stood in need of, and permitted it to con- 
tinue its operations with new vigour. 

The author adds, " Trophies, glory, all those acquisitions 
to which we had sacrificed every thing, became a burthen to 
us." 

The French, in their misfortunes, did not hesitate to sacri- 



„i-;/;i 



SM 



.jQQ CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

lic'c vain fropliios, but thoy never found their glory a burthen. 
It niii^lit iippcarono io «(>nn> rpauhMlod rourtiers, who prdcr- 
ir«l Iho diistol' the ftaUory of 8t. Ch>ud, to that of ramps, but 
it never \voig;hcd down those who had really merited it. 



CHAPTER XII. 

T1115 author has said, that JVapokon was obliged to Jlijt ** that 
it waa a new npectach^ to see Napoleon constrained to yield 
and to fly." Hero Napoleon is *' ashamed at appearing to 
llee." 

The Emperor was not, in truth, insensible to the disasters 
of his army. Uut conld shanu^ rover his face, wlien <his arujy, 
wiMkened as it w as, but strong b^ his presence, demonstrated 
to llie enemy, tbat it was still able to make itself respected? 
Mr. de Segur confounds the fooling of shame with the grief of 
a groat mind, struggling with atlvorsity. 

•» llo found (at Dorogoboujo) tho hand mills ordered for the 
expedition." 

During the halt at INloscow, Napoleon, always provident, 
ha«l ordered the artiUor} to construct hand nnlls. The work- 
men of this corps finished several, of which the guard made 
use. Thoso of which Mr. do Scgur spoaks, had boon demand- 
ed by the commissary gomn'al, (hoir tardy arrival is ready 
proof of the conduct of this dei)artmont. 

'riio news of the atVair of MaUot, which an e\[)ross brought 
to tlio Em|)eror, servos as a pretext for sinister reUcctions to 
the author, who magnifies and distorts every event, to deduce 
from it the most fatal consoiiuoncos. 

The blind confulonco with which Mallet had plotted liis con- 
spiracy, the disproportion between tlu> weakness of his means, 
and the audacity of the attempt, would necessarily strike the 
Empemr. But what made the most impression on him, vv.is 



HOOK IX. 209 

not only tho little foresight, and absoluto want of pvescnw of 
mind and resolution, in tlic lirads of tin*, [lolirci, it was the, too 
evident proof tiiat nioiiarcliical principles, in their :ii)pli('}ition 
to Jiin dyiiaHty, Inid Hprcad their roots with ho littltuhpth, that 
the great funeti<niarieH, at the rn'WH of the «h',ath of the Kni|»e- 
vnVf forgot, that the .sovereign heing dead, tln'r<'. was another 
present to succeed him. It was also the lainentahie iniprudonco 
with which, without waiting his orders, they had caused the 
elocution of several olficei'S, whom fiilse appearances uiiglit 
have deceived, and wlio, in the hottoni of ilicir heart, itad no 
intention of coujrnitting a crime. Tho Emperor was heard, 
from the (irst moment, to expreiHs his wounded feelings. 

An aid-de-camp of M'arslial Ncy, itniioiiiices to Niipoleon, 
that this marshal was ohliged to ahandon Dorogohouje, and 
** that he was obliged to retreat precipitately l>eiiiiid the Dnie- 
per." 

The same day that tho Emperor had halted at Mikalewska, 
(the Gtli,) Marshal Ney ha«l jiosted his nsar guard hcyontlthe 
Osma, near (iorki. It was not till the 7th, that the Uussiari 
-eneral, Miloradowitch, attacked the rear guard near thi« 
liver, and followed it to Dorogohouje. '[''her-e Marslial N<*-y 
stctod firm, and ie|)uls(;d all the attacks of th(5 enemy, who 
seeing that he could not succeed in forcing him, niai'ched tho 
division of Prince Eugene of Wirtemherg, on his light, a 
movement which decided the mjirshal to ahandon Dorogohouje 
and retreat on (Jug(!a. "^riie enemy only followed him with 
Cossacks. Miloradowitch, after the brisk resistance lie had 
met with Dor'ogohouje, advanced on the left of the grand army 
of K-utuMof. Dow then could Marshal Ney inlorin tlie Knipc- 
ror, by his aid-de-oamp, that ho had retreated behind Uir, Dnie- 
per? Dorogohouje is situate/ on tin; left hank of thin river. 
Thus to relrcal prccipilately bchl7ul the Dnieper, Marshal JNey 
must have passed over to tho right bank, which he did not. 
The corps of Prince Eugene alone |)assed over this river. 'Vl\o 
Dnieper crosses the road fr(Hn Dorogohouje to Smolensk, at 
Soloniewo, the head quarters of the Emperor were established 
the same day (7th) near this place. I5ut it is false, that the 
corps of Marshal Ney arrived at this [loint on Ihis day; for, 

D d 




210 



CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c 



as wc have said, this marshal retired on the Ougea. Mr. dc 
Sei^ur, instead of making pictures, and supporting them by 
rellcrtions which only tend to mislead the judgment of his 
readers, had hetter have given ns details of this aftair, and of 
tlie glorious resistance Ney o])poscd to the superior force which 
attacked him in Dorogohouje. 

The aid-de-camj) of Marshal Ney was sent, says Mr. de 
Scgur, to inform the Emperor " of the disorder into which the 
corps that had preceded him had fallen, and to say, that after 
a dreadful night, in which snow, wind, and limine, had drivcH 
most of his men from the fires, the dawn had brought him a 
tempest, tiie enemy," &c. 

If the mission of this aid-de-camp had no other object than 
to inform the Emperor of the disorder of the army, and to 
commiiiiirate to him on this subject, sterile reflections, it was 
at least useless, and Mr. dc Segur might here have dispensed 
with giving two new pages of speeches, and have told us " that 
the eagles had ceased to protect — they killed." ]Na])oleon was 
too well aware of our misfortunes, but if the ofticer who had 
been sent to him, was furnished with means of remedying 
them, the autlior sh«>uld not have omitted them. 

AVh}- does he not make known that at Dorogohouje, the 
general commanding the artillery proposed to the Emperor, 
to order from Smolensk, fresh wagon horses to meet us ? Na- 
poleon instantly approved of this measure, the execution of 
which was very useful. Orders were also given to send pro- 
visions to meet us. 

" Napoleon was sensible that nothing could now be done, 
but sacrifice the army successively, i)art by part, beginning 
at the extremities, in order to save the head." *• As for Ney, 
he saw tliat a victim was required, and that he was marked 
out as such, he resigned himself." 

The Emperor never had the idea of sacrificing any part of 
the army, he proved it sulliciently by tlie solicitude he extend- 
ed to every part of it. Besides, the cold would kill the head 
as well as the extremities. The Prince of Eckmiilh had com- 
manded the rear guard to Wia/ma, he was relieved by Mar- 
shal Ney, who did not consider himself a destined victim^ be- 



BOOK IX. 211 

cause he was charged with the care of protecting the march. 
This reflection may be considered as an insult offered to the 
memory of this Marshal. He well knew that some one must 
command the rear guard, and certainly no one was better fit- 
ted for this post than Marshal Ney. These assertions are dis- 
proved, especially as from Dorogobouje, the rear guard was 
only pursued by Cossacks, and not by the enemy's infantry. 

" The Russians, however, advanced under favour of a wood, 
and our forsaken carriages, whence they kept up a fire of mus- 
ketry on Ney's ti-oops. Half of tlic latter, wliose icy arms 
froze their stiffened fingers, got discouraged, they gave way, 
justifying tliemselves by tiieir faint-iieartedness, on the pre- 
ceding day, fleeing because they had fled." 

These reflections are the more misplaced, as there was not, 
as we have already said, any Russian infantry on this route. 
If the author had once been witii the rear guard, he would have 
seen the Cossacks flying from armed men, and only attacking 
the servants and unarmed. Marshal Ney often amused himself 
in checking the advance of this light cavalry, by leaving 
across the road a caisson, to whicli was hung a lighted 
match. The Cossacks seeing the smoke issuing from the cais- 
son, dared not approach it until it had exploded, which re- 
tarded them some time. Where has the author seen the troops 
seeking pretexts to Jiy ? They might have been worn out by 
fatigue and cold, but never cowardly. Their constancy has 
made this retreat as illustrious, as their intrepid valour has 
immortalized our glorious campaigns. 

The thought "that Marshal Ney exposed his life, like a 
private soldier, with a musket in his hand, as when he was 
neither husband nor father, neither possessed of wealth, nor 
power, nor consideration, in short, as if he had still every 
thing to gain, when in fact he had every thing to lose," ne- 
ver approached the heart of this marshal. On c\cry occasion, 
in the fields of Fleurus, as inthose of Moskvva, such considera- 
tions never caused any hesitation in Ney, to place himself in 
the midst of danger. In these privileged souls, every thing is 
to be lost when honour is compromised, every thing to be gain- 
ed when fresh glory is to be acquired. 



212 CKiriCAL EXAMINATION, 8tc. 

Mr. do 8c:!i;ur ssiys, tli;it " his {^oncrals and his colonels, 
anjoiip; whom hr hinisoir rouiarkcd Fczcnzac, strenuously se- 
roiiih'd hiiu," in aidincj to detVnd a ('ortiiied Ijousc. If Mr. de 
Set^ui- Nvishod to cite Colonel Fezenzac, ho niiijjht have found 
a better ocMasion, than that of a niiserahlo attack of Cossacks, 
repulsed by a few nitisket shots. 

Yotin this chapter, the mind reposes for a moment, consoled 
for the injustice and disap]irohation 'avished on the French 
army and its headers, in seeing that one of its most illustrious 
generals has found favour with the ollicer of the palace, and 
that he praises his heroism without any restriction. 



CHAPTER Xlll. 

'Vnv. njisforlune whicli the army of Italy experienced at tlie 
passage t)f the Wop, a torrent, *• which wlien he crossed be- 
fore was a mere brook, lie now found a rivor," is described in 
vivid colours. It is charged witli that superabundance of dis- 
tressing details, which characterise the style of ourwi'itcr; 
but wc tind few praises of the couraj^c and constancy of the 
uidortntuite troops, who reduced to the point of considering the 
attacks of the enemy as notliing, struggled with pertinacity 
against the constantly increasing obstacles, which opposed to 
tluMu a nuirdering sky and an earth covered with ice. 

*• The Cossacks stripped the prisoners whom tliey took, and 
collecting them in troops, drove tlieni naked over the snow, by 
heavy blows from tl>e shafts of tlieir lances." 

Those cruelties exercised on our unfortunate prisoners, ana- 
logous to those the author relates, where he observes, •' they 
met with nothing but Cossacks, and an armed population, 
which encoutpassod, wounded, and stripped them, and then 
left thorn with ferocious bursts of laughter, to expire on the 
snow,*' contradict tlie eulogy he has elsewhere loadey of the 



BOOK IX. 213 

magnanimity of the Russians. Wc arc far from believing, 
that it was by order of the generals or other authorities, that 
these atrocities were committed, but why were they tolerated ? 
How can Mr. dc Segur reconcile such barbarities with his as- 
sertion, "that they alone have known true glory, and that 
their renown has remained great and pure ?" 

" Tlieir generals strove in vain to drive them off, they took 
their blows without murmur or opposition." 

The generals gave an example of submission to privations, 
to their soldiers, but they never struck them. Whatever the 
historian may assert, they would have blushed to have to shut 
themselves in houses, and to have defended all entrance to 
them, whilst the troops bivouacked on the snow. If there ex- 
isted such insensible egotists, to the sulFcrings of their com* 
rades, it was not among those who held commands in the 
army. 

" There was a moment, when this unfortunate army was but 
a shapeless mass, a mere rabble rout, whirling round and 
round." 

The army of Prince Eugene was never in the state of dis- 
organisation the autlior mentions. It soon proved at Kraso- 
roi, that it was not a "a rabhlc rout — nor a shapeless mass.^* 
The division of Broussicr, whicli formed the rear guard, had 
still with it two batteries of artillery in good condition. 

"Prince Eugene, nevertheless, contrived to save his rear 
guard. It was in returning with it towards Smolensk, that 
his stragglers had been driven back on Ney's troops." 

"When the head of the fourth corps reached Smolensk, Prince 
Eugene left in position the division of Broussicr, witii the Ba- 
varian cavalry, to check the advance of the Cossacks. This 
division did not incur any damage ; the Cossacks were cautious 
in attacking it seriously. As to what our writer Sij^s of the 
** stviii^f^lavH who were driven I^ack on JSTcy^s troops" the cir- 
cumstance is impossible. The road from Doukhowethina to 
Smolensk, which Prince Eugene followed, comes out at 
Smolensk, in rear of the position occupied by Marshal Ney on 
the road from Dorogobouje. Thus the stragglers of Eugena 




214 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

could not be driven on the troops of Marshal Ney, who cover- 
ed them in this direction. 

<* The colonel of the fourth regiment, the young Fezenzac, 
found means to relieve these men, who were half perished with 
cold." 

This officer, in all probability, was not obliged to use much 
eloquence, to decide the brave soldiers of the 4th to march 
against the Cossacks ; for, as we are obliged to repeat, this 
route was only followed by the enemy's light cavalry. The 
circumstance was not of sufficient importance to elicit the re- 
mark of **the superiority of the sentiments of the soul over 
the sensations of the body." Besides, this superiority of sen- 
timent is the lot of all those who think and act nobly, without 
distinction of rank. It is, w ithout doubt, by inadvertence that 
this common place maxim is to be found here. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

The officer of the palace, after having traced a heart-rend- 
ing picture of the disorder M'hich reigned among the unarmed 
soldiery, whom the governor of Smolensk would not receive 
in this city, before the arrival of the organised corps, says, 
that on the arrival of the guard, ** they execrated it. Were 
they then to be for ever sacrificed to tliis privileged class, fel- 
lows kept for mere parade, who were never foremost, but at 
reviews, festivities, and distributions?" 

If it were still necessary to prove that the officer of the pa- 
lace has c6mprehended nothing in the army, by the side of 
which he sometimes marched, what could we desire more than 
the opinion of the imperial guard he causes the stragglers to 
utter? What! this celebrated guard, which often of itself 
constituted an army, whose presence alone in the greatest bat- 
tles had insured victory, whose efforts, when it was necessary. 



BOOK IX, 215 

were never doubtful, even at the last extremity, when it wish- 
ed rather to die than to submit, was according to him, for 
mere parade ! a toy that Napoleon carried from one end of 
Europe to the other! Our historian should have informed us 
at what reviews, at what Jetes it had been present since leav- 
ing Moscow. This class, privileged only from its courage and 
discipline, was the soul, nay, the life of the army. What 
more natural than to make every exertion to preserve it. 

In the description the author gives of the disorder of our 
troops at Smolensk, we only perceive a criticism on the com- 
missariat. " Napoleon reckoned upon fifteen days* provisions, 
and forage for an army of 100,000 men. There was not more 
than half the quantity of flour, rice, and spirits, and no meat 
at all." 

The Emperor ought to have calculated on great resources 
at Smolensk, as since his departure from this city for Moscow 
(the 24th August,) he had given all the necessary orders that 
they should be procured. He testified great disappointment at 
this not having been accomplished. " The commissary saved 
his life only by crawling for a long time on his knees, at the 
feet of Napoleon ; probably the i-easons which he assigned did 
more for him than his supplications." 

Our author here alludes to a chief of the commissariat de- 
partment for fresh meat, who, by his statements, had sent to 
meet us, near 1000 head of cattle, when in reality he had sent 
nothing. The report made to the Emperor on this subject, 
informed him that this man had sold these cattle to the Jews, 
who had taken them to tlie Russians, and Napoleon ordered that 
he should be taken before a military tribunal. In truth, it 
was neither his reasons nor his supplications which saved him. 
The author would not have alleged so many reasons in favour 
of this unfaithful contractor, if he had known these details. 

During the three months that had elapsed from the Empe- 
ror's leaving Smolensk, it would iiave been very easy to have 
collected provisions, by drawing them as well from the im- 
mense magazines prepared in the rear, as from the resources 
afforded by the country. Lithuania had not been ravaged, it 
was well disposed to us, and no enemy's corps had remained 



216 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

there. At his departure from Moscow, Napoleon had every 
reason to calculate on finding a great stock of provisions at 
Smolensk. Messrs. Daru and Matthew Dumas were of the 
same opinion. 

*' For the rest, he was passionate, because he could not help 
it; he had not deceived himself in regard to the inadequacy of 
his supplies." 

The Emperor, in seeing his army in want of food, by the 
non-execution of his orders, was right in expressing his dis- 
appointment with bitterness. He was not passionate^ because 
he could not help it; he forgot to punish. 

*' The genius of Napoleon, in attempting to soar above time, 
climate, and distances, had, as it were, lost itself in space." 

How can we reconcile this opinion with that found in page 
4 ? ** Admitting even that the rapidity of his expedition was 
only equalled by its rashness, success would have probably 
crowned it, if the premature weakening of his health had left 
the physical constitution of this great man all the vigour of his 
mind," with that to be seen in another page ? " This enterprise 
was indispensable to the completion of a great design, on the 
point of being accomplished; its object was not out of reach ; 
the means for reaching it were not inadequate." He had ven- 
tured every thing " on a first movement of Alexander's." We 
have already refuted this accusation of imprudence and rash- 
ness, with which the author loads the memory of Napoleon. 
He had marched on Smolensk and Moscow, to defeat the Rus- 
sian army, and to force xllexander to a peace. 

" He was still the same man as in Egypt, Marengo, Ulm, 
and Esslingen." How often has he not attempted to prove, in 
the course of his book, by reasoning, or by distorted and of- 
tentimes false facts, that Napoleon was only " the shadow of 
himself; that age (forty-three years) had weighed him down," 
&c. Finally, does he not say, ** Where were now the rapid 
and decisive movements of Marengo, Ulm, and Eckmiilh?" 

" It was Ferdinand Cortez — it was tiie Macedonian burning 
his ships, and above all solicitous, in spite of his troops, to 
penetrate still further into unknown Asia." 

This comparison is difficult to explain ', independent of the 



BOOK X. 217 

resolution that such a determination supposes in a man who is 
deprived of it, " who has ho longer that prompt decision, va- 
riable and rapid as the circumstances which called it forth." 
What resemblance does there exist between the situation of 
Napoleon and of that of the conqueror of Asia? If after the 
passage of the Niemen he had destroyed his line of communi- 
cation, and abandoned all in his rear, to show his aimy that it 
must depend upon itself, the comparison would have had some 
foundation. Besides, who is the Macedonian that burnt his ves- 
sels? Alexander never destroyed his. When, after the con- 
quest of all Asia Minor, he left the borders of the sea, and 
quitted Miletus to continue his expedition, his fleet being use- 
less to him, he ordered it to return, and to be employed in con- 
quering Pontus and the neighbouring countries. But we need 
not be astonished that Mr. de Segur is ignorant of the history 
of Alexander, when he is so badly acquainted with that of the 
campaigns of Napoleon. Where did he perceive that in Egypt, 
at Marengo, at Ulm, at Essling, this great captain trusted 
all to fortune ? Before alluding to such great military combi- 
nations, the officer of the palace ought to have taken the trouble 
to have read the accounts of them, and studied them. 

The History of the Grand Jirmy is only the amplification of 
a rhetorician, whose vacillating and melancholy imagination 
delights in tracing sketches, in which the colouring is always 
false. The facts are never given frankly ; the reflections are 
strained and contradictory. Finally, that which the History 
of the Grand Army most wants, is historic truth. 



BOOK X.— CHAPTER 1. 

** On the same day, at the same hour, the whole of Russia 
had reassumed the oflensive. The general plan of the Rus^ 
sians was at once developed.'* 

This general plan of the Russians, which was suddenly de- 

Ee 




218 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

veloped on the same day, at the same hour, may very well be 
supposed, now that the events have taken place, but at that 
time Kutusof was only occupied in defending himself and re- 
organizing his army. 

** On the 18th of October, at the very moment that the can- 
non of Kutusof were destroying Napoleon's illusions of glory 
and of peace, Wittgenstein, atone hundred leagues in the rear 
of his left wing, had thrown himself upon Polotsk. Tchitcha- 
kof behind his right, and two hundred leagues farther off, had 
taken advantage of his superiority over Schwartzenberg, and 
both of them, the one descending from the north, and the other 
ascending from the south, were endeavouring to unite tlieir 
forces at Borizof. This was the most difficult passage in our 
retreat, and both these hostile armies were already close to it, 
at the time that Napoleon was at the distance of twelve days' 
journey, with the winter, famine, and the grand Russian army 
between them." 

To believe the author, the Emperor had not learnt by the 
attack of Kutusof, at Winkowow, that all hopes of peace were 
destroyed, and, nevertheless, the orders issued by this prince,* 
on the 5th, 6th, 10th, ISth, 14th, and 15th of October, demon- 
strated that he had already adopted measures for evacuating 
Moscow and retiring on Smolensk. 

The assertion of Mr. de Segur, in relation to Wittgenstein 
and Tchitchakoff, is entirely erroneous. Tchitchakoff was on 
the 18th of October at Brezecz — Litowsky on the Bug. On 

* On the 5tlTi of October, Napoleon wrote to the Major General on the sub- 
ject of canying ofl'the wounded from Mojaisk, the Abbey of Kolotskoi, and 
at Gjatz. On the 6th of October, Napoleon wrote to the Major General that 
Junot should transport all the wounded to Viazma, and that Baraguay d'Hil- 
liers should remove them from Viazma to Smolensk, ordering that in the 
course of eight days none should remain at Rouza, at the Abbey, at Mojaiskj 
or at Gjatz. The 6th of October, he wrote the Major General, ordering that 
no ti-oops should go beyond Gjatz, or Mojaisk. The 10th of October, Napo- 
leon wrote to the Major General to give orders that the detachments of infan- 
try, cavalry, and artillery, should halt at Smolensk. The 13th October is 
the date of the Major General's letter to the King of Naples, announcing that 
the army was about marching from Moscow to join him and drive ofl' Kutus- 
of. The 15th of October, the Emperor gave orders to the first, third, and 
fourth corps of the guard, to hold them'selves ready to march. 



iJOOK X. 219 

the same day Wittgenstein attacked Polotsk. From Polotsk 
to Borisof is five days' march, and from Brezecz to the same 
point, is at least twelve days' march. Thus these two gene- 
rals, that Mr. de Segur represents as uniting, were separated 
from eacli other seventeen days' march. In writing this pas- 
sage, the officer of the palace could never have consulted a 
map. How can he suppose that Kutusof, who was posted on 
the road to Kalouga, separated the French army from Bori- 
zof ? Moreover, this same day, the 18th October, when Tchit- 
chakoff and Wittgenstein are supposed to have united, Tchit- 
chakofF was beaten by Regnier in endeavouring to march on 
Warsaw. It was not until the 20th of October that he regain- 
ed his position at Brezecz. On the 28th only, after having left 
28,000 men under the command of Sacken, whom he ordered 
to watch Schwartzenberg, and to mask the movement he in- 
tended to make on Minsk, he took up his line of march upon 
this city, where the head of his column arrived the 16th of No- 
vember. Prince Schwartzenberg was reinforced by Durutte's 
division, making the number of men under his command about 
50,000. 

Tchitchakoff left Minsk the 19th, to advance on Borisof, 
which he took possession of on the 21st j and the 23d he order- 
ed Lambert's division to cross this river to obtain information 
of Wittgenstein. This division fell in with the corps of Oudi- 
not, which drove it back, and forced it to retreat to the right 
bank of the Berezina. Thus, more than a month after the pe- 
riod at which Mr. de Segur supposed the corps of Wittgen- 
stein and Tchitchakoff to have united, they had not yet met. 

Marshal St. Cyrhad occupied, since the 18th of August, an 
entrenched camp before Polotsk. " This camp showed how 
easy it would have been for the whole army to have taken up 
its winter quarters on the frontiers of Lithuania." The author 
praises the excellent construction of the barracks : " they were 
beautiful military villages, properly entrenched, and equally 
well protected from the winter and the enemy." 

Immediately afterwards, he says that during these two 
months the French lost many men, in searching for provisions ; 
" that they were continually betrayed by the inhabitants, aid 



220 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &,c. 

even by their guides." Then he adds, "in consequence of 
these checks, and of hiin£;er and disease, the strenajth of St. 
Cyr's army was diminislied one half — the Bavarians reduced 
from 22,000 men to 4,000." 

What has become of that facility of winterine^, if we had 
already experienced such losses ? And as if the contradiction 
was not stronj^- enough, he adds, on the next page, *' his works 
were only marked out, as much as was necessary, not to cover 
their defenders, but to point out the place where their efforts 
would he principally required." What then were those beanii- 
ful military villages^ properly ejitrenched? It appeared that 
their fortifications were only simple pickets, to mark the spots 
where the corps were to make a stand. This facility of taking 
up winter quarters, was not then as great as the author sup- 
poses. 



( UAPTER 11. 

How can the following passages be I'econciled ; •' Wittgen- 
stein was repulsed, Steinheil defeated, and 10,000 Russians, 
with six generals, killed or put hors de combat ;" with ♦* confi- 
dence and joy, and plenty reigned in the enemy's corps, sad- 
ness and scarcity in ours.'' Sadness, at what ? is it at having 
defeated the Russians, or melancholy at leaving a country 
where *' famine and disease reigned," to enter into a country 
abounding in all kinds of food and forage? Has the author 
forgotten, that on the arrival of the second corps at the Bere- 
zina, the regiments had abundance of provisions and cattle? 

Mr. de Segur gives a singular description of the retreat of 
Marshal St. Cyr; he pretends that it was made "by all the 
roads leading to Smoliantzy." The motive for this retrograde 
movement, according to him, was •• to find more provisions, 
to march witl^ greater freedom, and more concert." The mo- 
tive of finding more provisions is sufficiently good, had not the 



BOOK X. 221 

enemy followed him; but of dividing, to march in concert 
appears difficult to comprehend. Marshal St. Cyr, in retreat- 
ing on the corps of Marslial Victor, which was about 30,000 
strong, and who, in leaving Smolensk, marched on his right; 
and not being pushed briskly by tlie Russian corps, whom he 
just defeated, found little to impede his progress. In conse- 
quence, the only check he met with was on his left column. 

The author represents the Emperor at Mikalewska, hearing 
only of disasters. " His countenance remained the same, he 
changed none of his habits, notliing in tlie form of his orders ; 
in reading them, you would have supposed that he had still 
several armies under his command." 

The corps of the army were yet in a state of organization, 
composed of divisions, brigades, and regiments. The losses 
that they had met with on the road, had certainly mucli weak- 
ened them, but this was no reason that their orders should not 
be given to them in the ordinary form, since their organization 
was still the same. Moreover, until the passage of the Bere- 
zina, the Emperor had not even changed the denomination of 
his corps, and he acted properly in all resj)ects. For the ene- 
my seeing by the orders of the day which he intercepted, by 
the prisoners he made, by all the means he had of receiving in- 
formation, that tlie army possessed the same numl)cr of corps, 
and the same organization as at the opening of the campaign, 
could never believe in tlie great losses, we had experienced, and 
always considered us sti-onger than in reality we were. If, on 
the contrary, several corps liad hecn united, to form one or two, 
it would have revealed our weakness to the enemy, and at the 
same time only tended to put the whole in confusion. 

"As to Baraguay d'Hilliers, whom an ollicer liad just ac- 
cused, he had him brought before him, stripped of all liis dis- 
tinctions, and sent him off to Berlin, where he anticipated his 
sentence, by dying of despair." 

General Baraguay d'Hilliers had been honoured with the 
command of a division, which was formed at Smolensk; he 
had encamped his troops on the road from Smolensk to EInia. 
The approach of the Russian army in this direction, ought to 
have led him to unite his division, which he neglected. On the 




222 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

9th of November, one of his brigades was attacked by three 
Russian partisan leaders, and although 1600 strong, of which 
500 were cavalry, it capitulated, and laid down its arms. The 
remainder of the division fell back hastily on Smolensk. Other 
French posts, the most considerable of which was situated at 
Klemenstiewow, were also carried. The greater part of the 
wagon horses, which w^ere cantoned in the neighbourhood, at 
some distance, were also carried off by the Cossacks. The 
Emperor testified his anger to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, 
that knowing the approach of the enemy, he had thus scattered 
his forces. He deprived liim of his command, and sent him to 
Berlin. It is not true that this general was strip2)ed of all his 
distinctions; he had not yet been tried. For a general, so sen- 
sible of honour, and so good a Frenchman as General Bara- 
guay d'Hilliers, the misfortune of having merited a trial would 
have a fatal effect on his already impaired health.* 

Independent of the irreparable losses, in men and horses, 
that this oversight of General Baraguay d'Hilliers caused us, 
the Emperor was greatly hurt to learn, that a French corps, 
of 1 100 infantry, and 500 cavalry had lain dow^n their arms to 
partisan corps. Marshal Ney, some days previous, to demon- 
strate to his soldiers how little these troops of Cossacks were 
to be feared, had given an order to a captain of grenadiers, to 
take fifty men, and set fire to a village, situate about half a 
league from the road, and then retire on another village, which 
he pointed out to him, ordering him to rejoin him after this 
expedition. " You will be surrounded by five or six hundred 
Cossacks, or more ; but stand firm, you have nothing to fear." 
The captain went, and executed his order exactly. He was sur- 
rounded and harassed bv a 1000 to 1200 Cossacks. In vain 



* In a letter from the Prince of Neufcbatelto General Charpentier, Governor 
of Smolensk, dated Vlazma, the 1st November, 1812, he gives him an account 
of tlie movements of the arm)^, and charges him to make them known to the 
governors of Mohiloffand Minsk ; prescribes new measures to him relative to 
victualling; requires from him account of the state of the stores, provisions, 
and ammunitions, then at Smolensk : he adds, "Make the movements of the 
army known to General Bai-aguay d'Hilliers, &c. / have already made knoivn 
to you that this general must not commit himself: repeat this to him from me" 
(See Appendix.) 



BOOK X. 223 

the Russian commander dismounted half his men, he could not 
break through this handful of heroes. Marshal Ney then sent 
half a battalion to the support of these fifty grenadiers, who 
with their officer rejoined the column uninjured. 

Do not the reflections that Mr. de Segur, (who reverts in- 
cessantly to the past to accuse the present,) causes the soldiers 
to make on the thirty-four days at Moscow, and on the little 
care that was taken to provide for their various wants, evince 
a disposition to censure the Emperor? During his stay at 
Moscow, he lavished his cares on his army. On his departure, 
his solicitude was directed to the wounded^ all carriages, even 
his own, were appropriated to tliem. The orders given to the 
commanders of the different corps, instructed them to take 
twenty days' provision, which appeared sufficient to reach 
Smolensk before the cold weather. Troops and depots of pro- 
visions were expected to be found at Wiazma and Dorogobou- 
je. The author, therefore, accuses Napoleon wrongfully of 
imprudence. All our misfortunes were caused by the cold, and 
because the orders of the Emperor had not been executed. — 
(See the Emperor's Letters, in the Appendix.) 

Mr. de Segur terminates these long reflexions, by saying, that 
from Moscow, " it was always necessary to return, and nothing 
had been prepared, even for a pacific journey homeward." 
What ! if peace had been made, could we not have procured 
provisions, and retreated to our boundary line ? Would we 
have wanted resources ? Would not the Russians themselves 
have been interested in procuring them for us ? 

The Emperor hoped to find at Smolensk fresh troops, and 
considerable stores. Althougli his hopes were not entirely re- 
alized, Smolensk offered us some resources ; flour was issued 
to the corps, and whatever was in the store-houses was distri- 
buted. The Emperor at first thought of preserving this city, and 
of taking up a position towards the Duna and the Boristhenes. 
Having learnt that Admiral Tchitchakoff was advancing on 
Minsk, and that the reiterated orders he had sent to Victor, to 
drive Wittgenstein beyond the Duna, had not been executed, 
he decided on retiring behind the Berezina. 

The author appears to reproach Napoleon with having halt-- 




224 



CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 



ed five days at Smolensk, nevertheless the five days had been 
employed as usefully as possible for the army. The long 
marcli it had made from Moscow, w^ithout halting, had occa- 
sioned a great number of stragglers. It was hoped, that a 
few days rest would rally the greater part of them. Besides, 
all the corps had not arrived at Smolensk at the same time as 
the Emperor, and he was obliged to wait for the last before 
commencing his march. 

It may readily b^ supposed, that Mr. de Segur, who pos- 
sessed no knowledge of the plans of the Emperor, may have 
imagined that he wasted his time designedly. It may also be 
supposed, that among the rvisCf of whom he has several times 
spoken, and of which number he no doubt forms one, there 
should be some who would have wished to have retreated with 
all speed to Wilna, or even beyond the Niemen or Vistula, let 
what would happen to the remainder of the army. The officer 
of the palace is here, as elsewhere, the organ of the discon- 
tented, whose tattling he has carefully recorded. 

" It was known, that Ney had received orders to arrive at 
Smolensk, as late as possible, and Eugene to halt for two days 
at Doukhowtchina." The letter of Napoleon to the major 
general, which we shall cite, denies the part relative to Ney.* 
As to Eugene, he passed tlie Wop on the 9th, and arrived on 
the lOtii at Doukhowtchina; he halted there the 11th, to re- 
fresh and organise his troops, and it was not until the 13th 
that he reached Smolensk. 

Among otiicr reflections the author attributes to the French 
soldiers, is found the following : *♦ Was the Emperor ignorant 
of the joy of the Russians, when, three months before he stop- 
ped .to attack Smolensk, instead of marching to the right to 
Elnia, where he would have cut off the enemy's army from 

* Semlewo, November 3d, 1812. 
Napoleon to the Major General. 

My cousin, write to the Duke of Elchingen, that as soon as he takes the 
command of the rear guard, he will cause the army to file off immediately, 
for they are wasting- the fine weather witliout advancing. The Prince of 
Eckmiilh retains the Viceroy and tlie Prince Foniatowsky, to repulse tlie at- 
tacks of tlie Cossacks they may see, &c. 




BOOKX. 225 

their capital — Now, will the Russians imitate his error, which 
was so serviceable to them ?'* 

Who would believe, that it is a writer, hearing the title of 
general, that makes such an observation ? What ! the Emperor 
ought not to have taken Smolensk, but to have left this place in 
the power of the enemy, in his rear, in order to march to Mos- 
cow ! Peace could never take place till the Russian army had 
been defeated, and their capital taken possession of; the whole 
plan of the Emperor rested on this basis. Smolensk is, with rea- 
son, considered as the key to Moscow, since whoever is master 
of Smolensk can march upon Moscow without danger. If 
what the author asserts be the fact, why have the Russians in 
all their accounts spoken of the terror and depression through- 
out Russia, caused by the capture of this important point by 
the French ?* In our retreat circumstances were entirely dif- 
ferent. The Emperor, in marching to Moscow, was right in 
occupying Smolensk, in retreating to the Berezina lue could 
not retain this place. Kutusof ought not to lose his time in 
attacking it, but should endeavour to join the army of Tchi- 
tchakolF as speedily as possible, in order to cut off our retreat j 
he was in his own country and had nothing to fear in his rear. 

" Will not the cutting off Augereau and his brigade, upon 
that road, open liis eyes ?" General Augereau and his brigade 
were taken, not by Kutusof, but by the Russian partisans, De- 
nisof, Dawidof, and Seslavin, who united for this purpose. 

The author supposes, that the Emperor remained in Smo- 
lensk, for the pleasure " of dating his despatches five days, 
from that city, and thus giving his disorderly flight the ap- 
pearance of a slow and glorious retreat." Here the temper of 
those who wished to escape all danger, and avoid privations as 
speedily as possible at any price, is still evident. We are 
obliged to repeat, that the Emperor only remained at Smo- 

• The loss of Smolensk had spread consternation through the interior of 
the empire. If Napoleon could have pushed on a corps as far as Moscow, be- 
fore the Russian army was prepared for a general action, the consternation 
would have been complete, and that nation discouraged, would probably 
have regretted the sacrifices she had made for independence. 

{Bourtoiirlin, vol, I. page 304.) 

Ff 




226 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, kc. 

lensk a sufficient'time, to rally the stragglers, and send off his 
tvounded and sick,* to profit by the resources of this city, and 
to prevent his retreat from being converted into a flight, which 
would have taken place, if he had constantly marched without 
halting. A. proof that these five days were not lost to the army 
is, that, on leaving Smolensk, it again showed in the battles of 
Krasnow that it had not degenerated, and that after these bat- 
tles, Kutusof never again attempted to cut off the retreat, or 
even to pui'sue it too closely. 

The author attributes these sentiments, on the halt at Smo- 
lensk, to the officers of Napoleon. He adds, that they were 
** secret, for their devotion to him remained entire for two 
whole years longer." This confession is somewhat naif. What ! 
the attachment of officers to the Emperor only to last whilst 
he has gifts, honours, and money, to lavish on tiiem ! ! ! Not- 
withstanding the praises bestowed on Messieurs so and so, we 
doubt whether they are flattered by the opinion Mr. de Segur 
entertains of their attachment. 

After several eulogies on general Latour-Maubourg, the 
author says, " He always marched with the same order and 
moderation in the midst of the most immoderate disorder, and 
yet, what does honour to the age, he attained to the highest 
distinctions as quickly and as rapidly as others." 

We cannot exactly perceive, what there is in common be- 
tween the honour of the age and the rise of Mr. Latour-Mau- 
bourg. The Emperor held as a principle, to reward merit 
wherever he found it. It is but rigid justice to acknowledge, 
that he always put this in practice, and therefore to allow him 
all the honour. 

According to the officer of the palace, the French army, con- 
sisting of 100,000 men under arms, had been reduced, in twen- 
ty-five days, to 36,000, and these feeble remains were over- 
burthened witli 60,000 unarmed stragglers, which only sup- 

• On the 7th of November, there were in the hospitals of Smolensk, three 
thousand six hundred and seventy-eight sick, of whom two hundred and two 
were Russians ; on the 8th, nine hundred were transported to Orcha, and 
the remainder were removed thither while we remained in that city. 



HOOK X. 227 

• 

poses 4,000 killed, wounded, or left in the rear since the de- 
parture from Moscow. 

These remains of the corps " Kutusof was preparing to 
cut in pieces successively." This expression is revolting in 
the mouth of a Frenchman. Truly, if our soldiers " were cut 
in pieces by Kutusof," the Russians were cut in pieces by the 
French army, and this so eifectually, that we never again saw 
them. 



CHAPTER IIT 

The Emperor, on quitting Smolensk with his army, was 
obliged to make it move in succession, to avoid the confusion 
and incumbrance of the artillery, wagons, and stragglers. On 
the 13th, he sent off the division of Claparede, with the trea- 
sure and the baggage, and, on the 14th, he himself marched 
with his guard, leaving, at Smolensk, the corps of Davoust 
and Ney, wlio were mutually to support each other, and to 
evacuate this city on the I6th, first blowing up the fortifica- 
tions. 

Napoleon arrived at Koritnia, where he passed the night. 
The next day, Miloradowitch, at the head of 20,000 men, did 
not dare to impede his progress, contenting himself with dis- 
charging a few pieces of artillery on his troops. The Emjteror 
reached Krasnow. " The sight of Sebastiani, and of the first 
grenadiers who preceded him, had been sufficient to drive away 
the enemy's infantry." It was on the 14th that ClapaPede's 
division, arriving at Krasnow, drove from thence the light 
corps of Ojarowsky, which wished to post itself there. The 
imperial guard, with the Emperor, did not suffer, the enemy 
not having dared to attack it. " But, says the author, the 
Russians from their heights saw the wliole interior of the army, 
its weaknesses, its deformities, its most shameful parts, in 
short, all that is generally concealed with the greatest care*** 




228 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 



« 



The guard marched in order, and Miloradowitch feared to 
view too near these deformities, these shameful parts, as he 
dared not oppose its march. Mr. de Segiir, who has drawn 
so flattering a portrait of this hostile general, whom he com- 
pares to Murat, is forced to i-efute by facts, the eulogies he 
has showered on him. After the passage of the guard *' he 
became bold, concentrated his forces, and descending from the 
heights, took up a strong position with 20,000 men, across the 
high road ; by this movement he separated Eugene, Davoust, 
and Ney, from the Emperor, and closed the road to Europe 
against these three leaders." The imagination of Mr. de Se- 
gur, leads him to forget that the scene took place in Lithuania ! 



CHAPTER IV. 

Prince Eugene, who with his corps had slept near Korit- 
nia on the 15th, was three leagues from Krasnow, when the 
sti'agglers who marched before him, were attacked by the 
Cossacks of Miloradowitch. These men, generally unarmed, 
formed themselves into squads, repulsed these attacks, and fell 
back on the corps of which they had formed part. 

Eugene perceiving that Miloradowitch wished to obstruct 
his passage, posted the Italian guard on the right of the road, 
and the divisions of Phelippon and Bioussiere on the left. The 
third division was posted in the rear. In this position, and 
although they had but a few pieces of artillery, and that the 
enemy amounted to 20,000 men, he repulsed vigorously, all 
the attiicks of Miloradowitch. During the whole battle, the 
prince manceuvi-ed in menacing the right of the Russians, 
when night arrived, and he saw that they had considerably re- 
inforced their menaced right, he put his corps under march, in 
order to pass in the rear of the Russian left; by this move 



BOOK X. 229 

ment he turned the corps oppose<l to him, and rejoined during 
the night, the young guard, who were in advance of Krasnow. 
Our historian describes these movements in a diffuse manner, 
and mixes with them intemperate observations, that only tend 
to render the accouut obscure. What signifies " enemy's bat- 
talions which lined both sides of the road," on which the corps 
of stragglers advanced, in order to join Eugene, and who, 
"either from pity or admiration, called out to our men to lialt^ 
they entreated and conjured them to surrender." We will not 
accept this feeling o^ admiration, because it has a bad effect to 
praise and flatter ourselves, but we reject with indignation the 
expression of pity. It is a feeling, however, which is in har- 
mony with the idea of the yoke under which Kutusof made us 
pass, according to the officer of the palace. We must only ob- 
serve, without hyperbole or boasting, that the remembrance of 
Malojaroslawitz, and the determination of these heroes, awed 
their enemies. The author himself says a few lines afterwards, 
" Victory was so new to them, that even when they held it in 
their hands, they knew not how to profit by it, they delayed its 
completion until the next day." 



CHAPTER Y. 

Napoleon on arriving at Krasnow on the 15th, hnirnt that 
the Russian army was in the neiglibourhood, and tiiatthc corps 
of Ojarowsky was posted near this city, and menaced the left 
«f the road ; he resolved to prove to the Russians, by a night at- 
tack, that the French army, notwitstanding tiie misfortunes 
it had encountered, was still animated with the same courage. 
For this purpose, he ordered General Roguet, with his division 
of the young guard, to attack that night, the corps of Ojarow- 
sky. They were instructed to fall on the Russians with the 
bayonet, and without firing. This expedition resulted as was 



230 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

expected by the Empcroi*. Tlie Russians being surprised, lost 
many men. The most advantageous effect of this bold move- 
ment, was the circumspection with which it inspired Kutusof ; 
he immediately relinquished the movement which he had or- 
dered the corps of Tomasow to execute, to cut us off from the 
road between Krasnow and Liady. Such brave deeds ennobling 
the ihisfoitunes, which we owed to the inclemency of the 
(\eather alone, sliould have exalted the imagination of a French 
writer. 

The remarks that the author attributes to Kutusof, on his 
dilatoriness, are degrading to our army ; he supposes it captive 
and under the yoke of the Cossacks, who " would chastise it 
w henever they wanted to strike out of the high road." 

What he makes Wilson say, that the Cossacks might be 
heard to exclaim, that ** it was a shame to allow^ these skele- 
tons to escape in tliis manner out of their tomb," is as extra- 
ordinary. Kutusof would not attack the French army, be- 
cause, the whole Russian army had been vanquished at Mosk- 
wa ; that which he liad re-organised, had been beaten at Malo- 
jaroslawitz and at AViazma, although they had five times the 
numerical strength of the French. He knew that, if in the 
French army, he found soldiers marching separately and dis- 
couraged, that the courage of the remainder only increased 
with their diminution of numbers, and that Napoleon was at 
their head. 

That an Englishman should not have felt this, or if he did, 
not expi*essed it, may be conceived, but a Frenchman ! 

On leaving Smolensk, the Emperor had oi'dered Ncy to 
command the rear guard. This marshal was not to quit this 
city till the 16th, after having blown up the fortifications, the 
Prince of Eckmillh was directed to support him. On the I6th ; 
early in the morning, Davoust having left a division with 
Marshal Ney, took up his line of march with the four others. 
During the day, after having advised Ney of Prince Eu- 
gene's battle, he continued his maich on Krasnow. Mar- 
shal Ney supposing that he should only find Cossacks between 
him and Napoleon, would not march until the 17th. The po- 
sition that Miloradowitch had taken on the road from Smo- 




BOOK X. 231 

lensk to Krasnow, during the night of the 16 — 17th, separated 
these two corps from the Emperor. 

At the same time they learnt, that the Russians at Krasnow, 
whose movement on Dobroe the attack of General Roguet had 
checked, were disposed to re-attempt it. The position of Na- 
poleon was critical. On the one hand, he saw his retreat on 
the point of being cut off, and on the other, if he retreated he 
abandoned two of his corps. He sent for Berthier, Mortier, 
Lefebvre, and Bessieres, and stated to them that they must 
prepare to attack the enemy the next morning. These mar- 
shals replied to him, by detailing the state of their corps. No 
matter ! answered Napoleon, we must march without hesita- 
tion, to the assistance of Davoust and Ney. At day break, 
therefore, he put himself at the head of his guard, to bear 
down on the enemy. This bold movement of the Emperor's, 
who with a handful of men, marched against the whole Rus- 
sian force, produced its effect. Miloradowitch quitted his po- 
sition on the road, and approaching the centre of the Russian 
army, permitted Marshal Davoust's corps to pass, who imme- 
diately joined Napoleon. 

This chapter, with the exception of some passages, that we 
thought it right to notice, is in general written with a spirit of 
justice, the want of which is to be regretted in the other parts 
of the work. The army and its leader are less caricatured. 
With the exception of some faults of ill-placed censures and 
intemperate observations, the heroic attitude of Napoleon, the 
grandeur and nobleness of his resolutions, are faithfully repre- 
sented. After describing this wonderful movement, how can 
the author have permitted the odious accusation to remain in 
his book — " Napoleon felt that he must sacrifice the army suc- 
cessively, part by part, commencing with the extremities to 
save the head." Does he not perceive that he has himself vic- 
toriously refuted the reproaches of sluggishness, blindness, in- 
decision, and insensibility, with which he has loaded the Em- 
peror ? 



A 



232 (^KiriCAL EXAinNATION, &c 



( HAPTEU VI. 

**TiiEKU (at Llady) also wore unfortunately consumed all 
ihe papers, which ho lia<l collected in order to write a history 
of his life, for such was his intention when he set out for this 
fatal war." 

It is lidiculous to suppose that the Emperor, settin,af out for 
a war, should have carried all his papei-s, in oi'der to write a 
history of his life, as if he expected to have enjoyed ]»er(\?ct 
iH»st in Russia. This Prince had no papers rolatinji; to his 
history cotistimed, as he had carried none with luni. Besides, 
what does tlie author mean by this collection of pajjcrs? Na- 
poleon luid no occasion to take this trouble, as the acts of his 
life belong to tlio world. He had caused his correspondence, 
as commander in chief of the armies of Italy and Egypt, to 
bo enregistered. These registers never quitted his archives. 
His intention was, to have taken advantage of the repose af- 
forded him by a general i)eace, to digest a complete history of 
his campaigns and of his reigti. atid if he could have procured, 
at St. Helena, his precious materials, he would still have been 
bettor able to have eiTcted an imperishable monument to the 
glory of the French armies. 

The otlicer of the palace never permits an opportunity to 
escape him, of repeating, that it formed part of the Empei-or's 
plan to halt at the liorysthenes. How could he suppose, that 
in leaving Paris, he had formed the project i)f halting on the 
confines of Lithuania? He wished to force that peace they re- 
fused him ; but he could only accomplish this by destroying 
the Hussian armies. W his military plans had all succeeded, 
this peace might even have been obtained in Lithuania ; but 
then he would not have remained tliere for the pleasure of writ- 
ing his campaigns. Events having another issue, he could not 
in the niontli of July, go into winter quarters. 

Arrived at the Huna, he bad still fotir months to act in. Ho 
deinded to march to Moscow, certain that Russia would not 



BOOK X. 233 

give up tliis capital without a battle, ft was oji this battle 
that his hopes of peace were rournhtd. IJiit before iiridcrtaking 
this, he left the coi'ps of Macdoiiald, St. Cyr, and Oudinot, on 
the Duna; and on the frontiers of Volhyiiia, the corps of 
Schwartzonbere;, of Utsyiiier, and J)ombrowsky, to keep in 
check the ojjpositit^ liussian armies ; at the same time that con- 
siderable corps, that of Victor, and that of Augereau, were 
orijanisirig in his real", the one to form liis reserve, the other 
to insure a communication to the Rhine. 

Master of Smoh>,nsk, towards the middht of August, he con- 
tiniujd his march to Moscow, whicli was distant about ten days' 
march. The battle he sought took ])lacc ; the Russian anny 
was in part annihilated. 'V\\^^ capture- of Moscow ensued j 
every thing ])i'omis(id peace. Rut it would have been too in- 
jurious to England, and the burning of Moscow had been re- 
solved on, a sacrifice which indicted more injui-y on Uussia, 
than the most disadvantageous peace. To insure the success 
of so atrocious an enterprise, England placed herself between 
Alexander and Napoleon, and covered with, a Russian mask, 
put in play all the resources of her crafty jwlicy, in order to 
entangle Alexandei-, and to fortify liini against v.w.vy attempt 
at negotiation. It was thus that in Turkey she had deceived 
the Divan, by corruption and falsehood, and forced the Sultan 
to sign a peace. 



Mr. de Segur supposes that the Emperor, on his arrival at 
Orcha, was uncertain of the route lie ought to pursue ; he 
makes him call a council, in which General Jomini is conspicu- 
ous. It may be well to remai'k, that this General did not hold 
such a rank in the army as to entitle him to be called to a 

council. He was, at this time, only commandant of the little 

Gg 



A 



234 



CRITICAL EXAMNATION, &c. 



town of Orcha. If Napoleon had asked information from him,, 
it would have been solely on account of his office, and to learn 
what resources were to he fonnd in this city. Our historian 
attributes a plan to the Emperor, in order that he may make 
Gen. Jomini oppose it. Napoleon never declared, " that he 
meant to abandon his line of operations on the Minsk, unite 
with the Dukes of Belluno and Reggio, cut his way through 
Wittgenstein's army, and regain Wilna, by turning round the 
sources of the Berezina." 

If he had entertained this project, and had demanded the 
opinion of General Jomini, that officer ought to have added to 
the reasons he offered, that in manceuvring thus, Tchit- 
chakofF would arrive from Minsk at Wilna, long before the 
French army. But the whole project, and the council, are re- 
futed by the Emperor^s orders, dated, Doubrowna the 18th 
and 19th November, 1812. 

By his letter of the 18th, to the Major General, he gives 
him the following orders : "Write to the governor of Minsk 
that I will be at Orcha to-morrow ; let him know that I have 
ordered the second corps, with a division of cuirassiers, and 
a hundred pieces of cannon, commanded by the Duke of Reg- 
gio, to march as speedily as possible, and by the direct road, 
to Borisof, to make sure of this important postj and from 
thence to march to Minsk. In the mean time. General Dom- 
browsky will reach this place with his division, and will ob- 
serve the motions of the corps at Minsk. Recommend to him to 
send messengers to the Duke of Bassano and Prince Schwartz- 
enberg, and to write to you frequently." 

In a letter of the next day, at three o'clock in the morning, 
the Prince of Neufchatel wrote to the Duke of Belluno : " The 
Emperor will arrive at Orcha to-day at noon; it is necessary. 
Marshal, that you should take post nearer to Borisof, Wilna, 
and Orcha, than the enemy's array. Endeavour to mask the 
movement of the Duke of Reggio, and induce a belief, on the 
contrary, that the Emperor is advancing on General Wittgen- 
stein, a movement natural enough. The intention of H. M. is 
to march to Minsk, and when he is master of tliis city, to take 
the line of the Berezina, &c." 




BOOK X. 235 

In this pretended council, Mr. de Segur makes Jomini act a 
I'idiculous part. ** He then stated that he knew of a road to 
the right of that town (Borisof ) constructed of wooden bridges, 
passing through the marshes of Lithuania." According to 
him, it is the only road which would conduct the army to Wil- 
na, by Zembin and Molodezno. This discovery could not have 
required much topographical knowledge in General Jomini, as 
it is indicated on all the maps, and known to all the Polish 
officers of the Emperor's staff. The wagon-masters of the 
regiments of the second corps returned by this road from 
Wilna. 

In this short exposition, the true value of the succeeding 
details may be appreciated, and it may be supposed that Gene- 
ral Dode had not much difficulty in dissuading the Emperor 
from a manoauvre, which, as we have just seen, he had no in- 
tention of executing. 

Another error of Mr. de Segur is the order he says was 
given to ** General Ellees, to take eight companies of sappers 
and pontonniers, to secure the passage of the Berezina, and 
General Jomini to act as a guide." On the 19th the Emperor 
was at Orchaj the bridge of Borisof was not taken possession 
of by the enemy till the evening of the 21st. Thus it was not 
at Orcha, as the author states, but on the 24th, at Bohr, that 
the Emperor sent off General Elees. (See appendix.) 

The officer of the palace is also deceived in saying that at 
Orcha the disorder of the army augmented ; on the contrary, 
the magazines in this city allowed somfe rations to be issued to 
the troops. A thaw having succeeded to the severe cold which 
overpowered us since leaving ^molensk, the bivouacks became 
supportable. The ^rt^l.ery vijis still numerous, notwithstand- 
ing what !he author may asSeft. A park of artillery which 
had been posted here, supplied us with almost as much ammu- 
nition as Imd been u^^ and five complete batteries were dis- 
tributed ari*]|^^|ose%orps of the army which stood most in 
need of them. The ga^fi^on of this place, as well as the Po- 
lish cavalry which had been cantoned in the neighbourhood, re- 
united themselves to the army. Mr. de Segur himself says, 
" Shelter and the distribution of provisions had effected that 




236 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c= 

which threats had failed to do ; the stragglers were rallied/ 
&c. 



CHAPTERS YIII. AND IX. 

The intention of the officer of the palace in writing these 
two chapters, where he gives an account of the events which 
happened to Marshal Ney, since his separation from the army, 
events so glorious to the memory of this illustrious Marshal, 
deters us from giving several criticisms that this episode is 
susceptible of. We will only notice the following observation : 
** So much did he possess of the temperament of great men, a 
strong mind in a robust body, and that vigorous health with- 
out which no man can ever be a hero." A multitude of exam- 
ples contradicting this assertion, might he cited. It is weak- 
ness of mind which renders the body inactive ; a mind strongly 
tempered, in which dangers only tend to infuse a new energy, 
may sustain a feeble covering. Ney was one of these privi- 
leged men. Even had he possessed a feeble hody, he would 
not the less have been a hero. ^ 

It is to be regretted that Mr. de Segur has not given more in 
detail the brilliant action that Marshal Ney was engaged in, at 
the head of the third corps and Ricard's division.* Why has 
he not mentioned the impetuous attack of the 15th light infan- 
try, of the 33d and 4Sth who overthrew the Russian line three 
times, notwithstanding a terrible fire of fifty pieces of cannon ? 
Why has he not spoken of th6se brave companies of sappers 
and miners, commanded by Colonel Bouviers, who were de- 
stroyed in this battle ? Why has he no Aaid a wo^ of Gene- 
rals Dufour, Barbanegre, of Colonel P«et ^^l^^th, and of 
so many other officers, who, wishing to excel their soldiers in 

* Since the wound of General Friant, General Rlcard commanded his divi- 
sion, which had been detached from the first corps, and placed under the 
orders of Marshal Ney, at Smolensk. 



BOOK X, 237 

courage, fell like them, crying, Vive I'Empereur! Vive la 
France ! Why has he not made known that it was Colonel Pe- 
let, who, hloody as he was, decided Marshal Ney to pass the 
Dnieper on his right, instead of marching to Mohilow, on his 
left, as the Marshal at first intended ? 

The author should have apprised his readers, that the Empe- 
ror, at his departure from Doubrowna, had given instructions 
to Marshal Davoust, who commanded the rear guard to remain 
in that city as long as possible, in the hope that Ney would 
have retreated by the right bank of the Dnieper. In fact, a 
few moments after the departure of Davoust, which took place 
too soon. Marshal Ney presented himself before Doubrowna, 
but the bridge had been destroyed. Mr. de Segur, in general 
so profuse of details, has left us to wish for more on the satis- 
faction expressed by the Emperor, at the news of the re-ap- 
pearance of his brave companion in arms. This Prince was 
then at Barania, dining with Marshal Lefebvre, when an aid- 
de camp,* whom he had left at Orcha, to divide the artillery 
among the different corps, announced to him that some Polish 
officers had arrived in the city, demanding succours for Mar- 
shal Ney, who was a few leagues from thence. The Emperor 
immediately rose, and seizing the officer by his arms, said to 
him with the greatest emotion, *' Is this true ? Are you certain 
of it ?" This officer having replied that he was certain of the 
fact, that he had accompanied Prince Eugene, who, with his 
corps was marching in the van of the Marshal, having at last 
convinced the Emperor of the truth of his report, H. M. ex- 
claimed, " I have two hundred millions in the cellars of the 
Thuilleries — I would have given them to save Marshal Ney !** 

* Gen. Gourgaud. 




23S CRITICAL EXAMINATION* &c. 






BOOK XI.—CHAPTER I. 

" The army liiid thus for the third and last time repassed the 
Dnieper, a river half Russian and half Polish, hut of Russian 
origin." 

We shall not notice the Muscovite origin of the Dnieper, the 
question of knowing which existed the first, Moscow or the 
Dnieper, is worthy of occupying the meeting of a burlesque 
academy; it will be a companion for the famous question of 
the pre-existence of the chicken and the egg. 

The author states that " they marched from Orcha to Bori- 
zof, on the 22d, in melted snow, and through a deep and liquid 
mud. The weakest were drowned in it." 

It is a strange abuse of the hyperbole to say that the mud 
was deep enough to drown any one. The thaw certainly con- 
tinued after we left Orcha, but its progress was slow. The 
road was not in the least broken up ; only its surface of ice 
and snow was covered with mud and water ; the frost came on 
again on the night of the 22d — 23d. 

The author repeats his observations on the conduct of Na- 
poleon in this campaign. The precaution he makes use of, in 
putting them in the mouths of the leaders of the army, gives 
them neither more weight or probability. 

He makes some observe, " that like Charles XII. in the 
Ukrain, Napoleon had carried his army to Moscow only to 
ruin himself ;" others that " the hope of terminating the Avar 
in a single campaign had been well founded ; that in pushing 
his line of operation as far as Moscow, Napoleon had given to 
that lengthened column a base sufficiently broad and solid." 
But one of the principal objections of these, is, that he had not 
*' on the field of the battle of Moskwa profited by Marshal 
Ney's first successes." 

We have already shown that the reproach which Mr. de Se- 
gur makes to the Emperor oii the subject of the battle of Mosk- 






BOOK XI. 239 

wa, is unfounded : we repeat that the battle of Moskwa was 
attended with all the success that should have been expected j 
the taking of Moscow was the consequence — peace ought to 
have been the result. The flower of the Russian army fell 
there; from their own confessions the Russians lost 50,000 
men. Besides, after this battle, where has the Russian army 
conducted itself with the same vigour? Was it at Malojaros- 
lawitz, where three French and Italian divisions defeated it ? 
Was it at Wiazma, where our rear guard passed through the 
centre of Miloradowitch ? Was it at Krasnow, where Napo- 
leon with 1500 men drove back Kutusof at the head of 100,000 
Russians ? Truly, if these last soldiers had been similar to 
those who had fought so^ bravely in the field of Moskwa, we 
should not have obtained such results. How can the officer of 
the palace, who paints the French army as entirely disorga- 
nized, with the exception of the guard, which served it as a 
rallying point, dare still to reproach Napoleon with not having 
made use of this picked corps in the battle ! The utility of the 
guard during the retreat, is the best answer that can be made 
to him. If our army, notwithstanding the disasters with which 
it had been overwhelmed, could retire from Russia with glory, 
it is to the foresight of the Emperor that we owe it. 

What proves that the observations attributed to pur generals 
by Mr. de Segur, have been written since the events took 
place, is, that they are ill timed. They are not such as would 
then have been made by the leaders of the army, who had a 
full knowledge of the orders, measures, and recommendations, 
prescribed by the Emperor before his arrival at Moscow, and 
his halt there. They knew that his time had been usefully 
employed there, and upon what objects his provident mind had 
exercised itself. The impression of these useful plans were 
yet recent, but the mind of the author has not retained a trace 
of them. Results are every thing with him. A historian 
should see with other eyes ,• he should bear in mind, times, 
places, remark all things, and interrogate the past, that he 
may omit no circumstance which may elucidate his narrative. 
The detailed and exaggerated account he gives of our losses, 
would imply, that he had examined the circumstantial reports 



240 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, ScC. 

of the different corps, which would not have been made known 
till several months afterwards. How could the army have as- 
certained them at that time ? This is a new proof, added to 
many others, of the truth of this charming narrative. The 
same may be said of the movements of Prince Schwartzen- 
berg's army, which Mr. de Segur gives as related so minutely 
by the array, and which could not have been learnt for a long 
time after. 

The reproaches he addresses to Napoleon " of having com- 
mitted the direction of military affairs to the Duke of Bas- 
sano," are without foundation. The Duke of Bassano was at 
Wilna with his chancery and the diplomatic corps, who could 
not follow the army. He there transacted the affairs of his 
department, and exercised, at the same time, great influence 
in the government of the country. Orders for military move- 
ments did not pass through him, they were always sent direct- 
ly by the Prince of Neufchatel to the generals who were not 
immediately under the Emperor's eye. If the Duke of Bas- 
sano sometimes received communications on this subject, it 
was to advise him of tlve course of affairs, that he might take 
such measures as unforeseen occurrences rendered necessary. 
But his reports to the leaders of the corps of the army who 
were on the Bug and the Duna, were generally restricted to 
transmitting the information that he received from head quar- 
ters. The known activity of this minister, leaves no doubt on 
the exactness of these communications. But we are ignorant, 
if that at the same time tliat he urged the Prince of Schwar- 
zenberg to hasten his march and to advance, he endeavoured 
to avoid inspiring him with a hesitation, which would probably 
have detained on his frontiers an ally who was already too 
much disposed not to leave them. 

Does tlie officer of the palace, who here constitutes himself 
the interpreter of the opinion of the army respecting the Aus- 
trian general, wish to exculpate him by saying, that he had 
received contradictory and impracticable orders, and that the 
Duke of Bassano had given him false information ? If these 
are the only reasons that the Prince of Schwartzenberg can 
allege in reply to the heavy accusations^ of having abandoned 




BOOK XI. 241 

his line of operations on Minsk, where were situated his ma- 
gazines, and wbere our line of retreat passed, in order to 
cover Warsaw, posterity will judge of the merits of this jus- 
tification. 



CHAPTEH II, 

The instructions that Napoleon transmitted from Moscow, 
on the 6th of October, to Marshal Victor, " anticipated a warm 
attack from "Wittgenstein or Tchitchakof, they recommended 
Victor to keep within reach of Polotsk and of Minsk, to have 
a prudent, discreet, and intelligent officer about Schwartzen- 
herg, to keep up a regular correspondence with Minsk, and 
to send other agents in different directions." These instruc- 
tions should have prevented the misfortune of the capture of 
Minsk. The author censures the Emperor for not having re- 
iterated them : " they appeared to have been entirely forgotten 
by his lieutenant;" to justify the latter, he adds, *' Finally, 
when the Emperor learned at Dombrowna the loss of Minsk, 
he had no idea that Borizof was in such immediate danger, as 
when he passed the next day through Orcha, he had the whole 
of his bridge equipage burnt." 

As soon as the Emperor was apprised of the taking of 
Minsk, he ordered the second corps to march rapidly, with a 
division of cuirassiers, and a hundred pieces of cannon, to 
Borisof, where the division oj Dombrowsky was returning, 
and to march thence to Minsk, as ,the letter we have already 
cited fully proves. 

The Emperor had two bridge equipages which were at 
Orcha, burnt, in order to make use of the horses for the artil- 
lery which was in this place. Independent of the difficulty 
that would have been experienced in conveying bridge equip- 
ages to Borisof, Napoleon could not imagine, at this period, 
that notwithstanding the instructions and orders he had before 

Hh 



2^1^ Clinic AL EXAMINATION, Sec 

J2;ivcn to the Dukes of Mclliino and llej;j;'io, that the important 
post of IJorisol' woiilil Call so readily into the ciicmy's power. 
It ivS for this reason that he preferred conveyins; cannon rather 
than heavy boats, which appeared useless, and which, badly 
provided with horses, would have been abandoned on the road. 

The autlior introduces here a general of engineers, who 
" interrogated by Napoleon, declared, tliat he saw no means 
of escape but througli the middle of Wittgenstein's army." 
As Mr. de Segur does not name this ollicer, it is probable lie 
brings this new actor out to make him give this advice. He 
forgets, that, before this, he has made General Dodc of the en- 
gineers, reply to ISapoleon at Oirha, when ho wisiied to at- 
tack Wittgenstein near Smoliaidvy, that the position of Witt- 
genstein was unappi'oachahlc. It is to be regretted, that Gene- 
ral Iloguiat had not made the campaign in Russia; what a re- 
source the learned author of " Considerations on the Art of 
Tf'ar,^* would have heen to Mr. de Segur for all these conver- 
sations manufactured after the events have taken place. 

** The Eujperor pointed with his finger on the map to the 
course of the lierezina below IJorisof, it was there he wished 
to cross the river, but the general objected to him, the presence 
of Tchitchakoff on the right bank ; the Emperor then pointed 
to another passage below the first, and then to a tbird, still 
nearer to the Dnieper. Recollecting, however, that he was 
approaching the country of the Cossacks, be stopped short, 
and exclaimed. Oh, yes! Tultowa! that is like Charles the 
XII.' 

In order to believe the truth of this narrative, we must sup- 
pose a great absence of mind, either on the part of the Empe- 
ror, OK of the general of engineers, who communicated this 
anecdote to the author. JNapoleon endeavoured to ascertain a 
favourable spot for the passage above or below Borisof, and 
tiie two which were indicated to him, were those of Berezina 
and of Wcrolowo, his intention always being to march to 
Minsk or Wilna. According to the author, it would appear, 
that it was not Berezina, which is a long march from Borisof, 
but a point much lower down. But we only can perceive tliat 
of Bobrui^dv, a fortified place, and occupied by the Russians, 




BOOK XF. 243 

whicli, with the situation of Kutusof 's army, on the lower IJo- 
rczina, would not have facilitated our passage in that direc- 
tion. This hypothesis is already almost iiiadmissihle, hut Mr. 
dc Segur does not content himself witli it, he marches the Em- 
peror to Pultowa, that is more than 120 leagues from the spot 
•where he was, without douht that he may compare him to 
Charles XU., without considering that he adopts, in making 
this comparison, two situations totally dilTerent. 

To corrohorate this exclamation of Napoleon, he adds, that 
this idea made such an impression on him, " that his mind, 
and even his health, became still more seriously aftccted than 
they had been at Malojaroslawitz." lie cites, as testimony, 
*' a valet-de-chambre, who was the only ])erson who witnessed 
his distress." Nobody perceived it, and the author gives as a 
reason, ** that the strength of man most frequently consists in 
concealing his weakness." Thus, neither facts or reasoning 
are ever wanting in the olliccr of the palace to sup})ort his 
suppositions. 

Wishing to write a histroy, and wanting materials, he is 
forced to submit to all the disadvantages of such a situation. 
He was obliged to search for notes in all quarters. Every one 
furnished him with a morsel, which he hastened to register, 
and which he publishes without taking the trouble to verify. 

The conversation he supposes between Mes,srs. Duroc and 
Daru is unlikely. The absurd idea of the captivity of the 
Emperor as a prisoner of state, never could have occurred to 
them at this time. It could not have presented itself to the 
mind of the author until after 1815. How could they believe 
that the Emperor at the head of 50,000 soldiers, and with a 
numerous artillery, could think of suriondering.'' 

Added to whicl»p this chapter is sulHciently refuted by the 
actions of that i)riiice. The one is ideal, the other is positive. 
During the nights of the 9,9A and 23d of November, he a])- 
proved of the resolution of Oudinot, to march against the ene- 
my, and to drive them into the Berezina, in case the Russians 
should succeed in destroying the bridge of Borisof, he was to 
take possession of a passage on the right or left, and immedi- 
ately to construct redoubts, and two bridges. At the same 



211 



cmiic AT- KXAMINATION. »n . 



(iinc, Iir oitlcred (lull, tlio lu'tillcry horses, which wore atiarhod 
to i\\\\ olijor ("lU'riai^TS. should ho taken from (liom for <hc use 
of the piiHCs and <h^^ caissons of amnuniition. Some hours af- 
lerNVurds, niid (mi Ww sanu^ ni!;hl, of Iho 23d of Novcnihcr, 
hMiMiini;' (hat Iho ontMuv in his Hii;h( had hrokcn tho hridgc of 
I$(U'isof, he or(h>rod (ho iuajor-.!;vu(Mal to Nvrito (he foUoNving 
letter to Oudiuot: — 

*• M. the Duke of K(\i;'i;io. 1 received vonr hMter of (he '2Cd, 
du(ed tVom Nae/a. The Duke of Helhiuo will he at Roh)pc- 
iiilehi to-day, the ^2;>d. lie will nuireh to llaran on the '24th. 
Endeavour to make yourself master of the ford of Wcsotowo as 
soon ns possihie, and ( onsti'uct (here hridj;es, redouhts, and 
uhattis. to sjipport them. We can from thenee return to the 
liead of the hridj^e of Horisof, to drive olVthe enemy, or I'cturn 
to Minsk, or liiially, as vou propose, mareh on Weseika hy the 
road you have made, and whiiii you have found so i;'ood, &^c.'* 

We shall terminate these ohsorvatioUvS, hy citing a passage 
from the work of Colonel Uoutourlin, Taj^e ;>('>C, vol. '2. Wo 
(here see a Russian renderini;' more justice to the Em])eror than 
a Freurhmau. ♦* Yet, in this situation, (he most jterilous in 
which he, (Napoleon") e\er was placed, (his !;irat ca])(ain was 
woidiy of himself. Without sulferins;* hiniself to he shaken hy 
the imminence of (he dans;'er, he dared to measure it with (he 
eye of i»vnius, and still found resources, whei*c a general less 
skilful, or less de(ermincd, w i>ul(l imt have suspected the possi- 
hilitv of thoui," 



c uvrrKU ni. « 

TiiK Icttei- that wc have cited at the end of the preceding 
chapter, contains notliiui;- whii"h atnionuces an act of despair 
on the part of the Kujjieror. lie gave his orders tranquilly for 
the passage of the Berezina, yet the author says, ♦*K>er since 
the ^3d, Napoleon had hcen preparing for it, as for a desperate 
action.*' To suhs(antia(e (liis assertion, he adds, "And first. 




BOOK XT.' 215 

lie Iiiul llic ragles of the diflcrcMit corpH brought io liim, Jin<l 
burnt." This in fjilsc. Kvcn HiipprHinpj tliiit the Kmj)cn»r had 
fonncd thin idea, it was iuipriK-ticalMr, as these eagh's were ol" 
<:<)]>I)er. BeHi<le«, liow can it be supposed, that at the moment 
this prince was rallyiii]:^ the straj^t^h^rs, distrihutint^ to them 
muskets, c arhines, and ammunition ; when, by thi'.Juru^tion of 
the corps of Oudinot and Victor, with those who liad been at 
Moscow, h(; found himself at tlie hciad of ahout 5(),()()() men, 
and a formiihibh; aitiHeryj how believe, we say, that he would 
have adopted such a measure, which would but have served as 
a signal for disorganization, and which would have been the 
true cry of sdiivc qni jk'iU ? 

At the iM-ad of fH), ()()() men. Napoleon would pasH any where, 
and even if the passage of the ])ere/.ina had been impossible, 
rieitlu'r the firnperoi-, nor the ai'my, would have been lost. — 
'I'he author ajipears to have f<n-golt«n the g«-.nius of our chief, 
the bravery of our soldiers, and the battles of Malojaroslawitz, 
Wia/ma, and Krasnow. Moreover, he says himself, that aftei" 
leaving Smorgonia, the grcatei* part of the colonels still 
marched, with some ollicc^rs, surrounding their e-agle. Marshal 
Ney, in a letter to the I'riiicu of Neufchatel, daled the 9a\ of 
December, annouiues that he has sent the cai^ks in the rear of 
the guard.* 

* The Diikr of Klcliiiiffc;!! to llic I'riricc of Nciifcliatcl. 

JUaltve, Jjccvmhar 2d, 1812. 

My Ivorcl, — I li:iv<-. this rnoinciit I'cccrlvcd the Idtc-r your Hciumki IlighnnsH 
«li(l \nv, tlu: honour lo wtlli-, at otic o'clock \\\\h iiiorniiifi;', iiilormiiig' u\v. (hat 
the Maislial, Diiki; of llclhino, in charj^tul witli tlic I'cai" jfiianl. 1 have re- 
united licrc all tliat rcinaiiiH of the infantry of the Hecond and fifth corpH, aa 
well aH the hrigadcH of light cavalry of Generals CaHtex and Corbinoau, and 
the divinion of ciiiraHHiePH under (Jeneral Doninerc. 

I leave liie Duke of IJcdiiino (he cavalry, a hatlery of four pieces of 12, and 2 
liowit/.erH. I shall uiareii in the rear witii (he infantry, Ibi-ininj;- it soaslo ejiahle 
me to f^'uard (he hridi^c.s an<l defiles; I cannot hope, with about a tiiousand men, 
whicli ar« all I have lefl, (o form a reHcrve. I have Hent in the rear of the 
guard, the remnant of the thinl corps and the eagicH. 1 think my ijresencc 
here iu unncccusary, and tiiat I can, without dang'cr, leave (ieneral Maisoti in 
command. I cannot procure for your hi(;linesH any infornialion from the pri 
soners of war, aw they were immediately Kent to head-tjuartcis. 

I am, 6tc. 



246 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, 8ic; 

Mr. dc Segiir contents himself with citing cursorily, the 
sacred squadron, which he says was composed of ahoiit 500 
officers. In mentioning this circumstance, he appears to have 
no other object than to point out the misfortunes of our caval- 
ry. Yet the fidelity of these officers, who placed themselves in 
the ranks, taking care of their horses, going as videttes, &c. 
are well deserving of notice. 

The officer of the palace asserts, that we traversed the forest 
of Minsk in going from Tolaczin to Borisof, when this forest is 
situated in the government of Minsk, and on the right bank 
of the Berezina. He also asserts, that "the French army 
glided through this forest precipitately," on hearing the cannon 
of Wittgenstein on our right, ** this threatening noise hasten- 
ed our march," says he. He ought to have left such observa- 
tions to the Russian newspaper writers. 

After having given a frightful picture of the French army, 
which he makes defile before the second and ninth corps, ** the 
sight of so great a disaster stinick the second and ninth corps 
with discouragement, from the very first day." The conduct 
of these two corps, in the attack they sustained on the two 
banks of the Berezina, is the best reply to this accusation. 

After so much inconsistency and verbosity, our writer says, 
** That this army felt conscious that nature alone had van- 
quished it. The sight of its Emperor revived it — he w^as 
therefore cherished in the heart of his army like hope in the 
heart of man ; it seemed of all misfortunes, that of incurring 
his displeasure was still the greatest." These are the real senti- 
ments of the army, given by Mr. de Segur himself, we are 
thus obliged always to return to truth. 



CHAPTER IV. 

When it was learnt, by the return of General Corbincau, 
that the ford of Studzianka was practicable, this point was 




BOOK XI. 247 

fixed on for the passage. He had discovered two others. " It 
was then necessary to deceive and displace the enemy. Force 
could do nothing, recourse was had to stratagem." These 
words would lead us to believe that the author was ignorant 
how a river is passed by main force. For with the considera- 
ble artillery that we possessed, (that of the guard being still 
entire,) and protected as we were by the elevation of the bank 
we occupied at Studzianki, the Russian artillery on the oppo- 
site bank would have been silenced in a few moments, the 
passage might have been forced, but with a loss wliich the 
Emperor wished to avoid. If he made demonstrations on se- 
veral points, it was principally with the view of obliging 
Tchitchakoff to divide his force, and that the first troops who 
might pass, should not be attacked by the whole Russian army 
united. 

This passage would have been commenced on the 24th, if 
the props for tlie bridge, that Marshal Oudinot was to have 
provided, and whose construction had been confided to a colo- 
nel of artillery, had been properly made- Unfortunately there 
w^as so much negligence in performing this important work, 
that General Eble was obliged to burn these props, and con- 
struct others on the 25th. According to Mr. de Segur, the 
Emperor had taken no precautionary measures in relation to 
the establishment of bridges. 

Nevertheless, it was he who at Orcha, gave orders to trans- 
port in the two bridge equipages which were found in that city, 
all the tools, forges, utensils, iron, charcoal, &c. which might 
be wanted in the construction of bridges on tressels. These 
carriages were well provided with horses. The bridge equi- 
page, as we have already said, had furnished Iiorses for seve- 
ral batteries at Orcha. General Eble had with him seven 
companies of pontonniers, 400 strong, excellent soldiers, who 
had all preserved their muskets. 

It was not the sappers who plunged into the water amidst 
the floating ice, which filled the Berezina, but the ponton- 
niers. The sappers were only employed in the construction 
of the tressels. 

*' On this occasion the winter showed itself more Russian, 



A 



248 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, 8tc. 

than even the Russians themselves, the latter were wanting to 
their season, which never failed them/* We repeat what we 
have ali-eady said, that the Russians, even had they been more 
Russian than the winter, could not have prevented us from 
passing. A river of 34 toises in breadth, and whose depth is 
jiot more than six feet, is not an insurmountable obstacle to 
an army, occupying the most elevated bank, and who could 
fortify it with a numerous artillery. 



CHAPTER \. 

TiiK officer-of the palace has already observed in Chapter 
III. that Napoleon in preparing to cross the Berezina, " un- 
dertook it as a desperate action.'' He here says, " in leaving 
Rorisof, he imagined that he was setting out for a most des- 
perate contest." We have already replied to this idea, in 
Chapters III and IV. We will not again recur to what we 
liavc observed on this subject. 

Tlie author says, " Napoleon rejected as an infamous plan, 
as a cowardly flight," the proposition which he asserts was 
made to liim, by the King of Naples, to save his own j^crson. 
It is very doubtful if the King of Naples ever made such a 
pro])osition. Mr. de Segur adds, however, "he was not. 
however, displeased with Murat, probably because that prince 
had atVorded him an opportunity of showing his firmness." It 
is not the first time that we have remarked, the deplorable dis- 
position of mind, that leads the author to neglect truth and 
even piobability, to make a display of his knowledge of the 
human heart, as superior to every one else, and say that 
which had not been remarked by another. Larouchcfoucald 
in his .IfiJ.cniKs-, lias made personal interest the main-spring of 
the actions of men. Mr. de Segur goes further, he adds to 
it a savage egotism, and an entirely gratuitous injustice. In 
his pi-csumption of having alone understood the Emperor, of 



BOOK XL 249 

having learnt a secret deeply hidden in tlie bottom of his heart, 
he appears to represent him as a mysterious, incomprehensi- 
ble being, beyond humanity, such as the genius of Lord Byron 
has presented to us in Manfred. Napoleon testifies a noble 
and generous feeling, the author discolours it. Napoleon 
ought naturally to have been grateful to Murat for his wish ; 
but this would have been too common-place. According to 
Mr. de Segur, he would not exjjrcss it, because his vanity and 
egotism would have been comj)romised. This mania of thus 
torturing the thoughts and feelings of his hero, is worthy of 
observation. 

" The Emperor, however, impatient to get possession of 
the opi)osite bank, pointed it out to the bravest. The French 
aid-dc-camp Jacqueminot, and the Lithuanian Count Prcd- 
ziecski, were the first who threw themselves into the river." 

The constant aim of the author is to induce a belief, that 
every thing was done in the French army without order, and 
that at the time of passing this river, it thought itself lost, 
which, however, was not the case. The Emperor had no rea- 
son to jyoint out the river to the bravest, whom it would have 
been difficult to distinguish, without doing injustice to others. 
Besides, to testify courage, there must be danger to incur, and 
the only one in this instance was to pass a river in which some 
cakes of ice floated. Napoleon gave his orders, and from the 
marshal to the soldier under arms, every one hastened to exe- 
cute them. A squadron, (of Corbineau's brigade) each hoi^se- 
man of which carried a foot soldier en croupe, preceded by 
some tirailleurs, passed the first. These were a short time 
afterwards suj)ported by a part of the brigade which formed in 
line on the right bank, to drive off the Cossacks, and to facili- 
tate the labours on the bridge. The Emperor also ordered 
one of his officers='*= to swim across, to observe if the na- 
ture of the soil on the opposite bank, would permit the pas- 
sage of artillery, without being obliged to employ fascines. 
At the same time, by means of three rafts, some infan- 

* General Gourgaud. 

li 




250 CniTICAL KXAMINATION, &c. 

try wore trnnsporiod to tlin other h'hIo, to rloar away tliobru.sh- 
wood vvliicli rovorcd il, tiiul to ilrivo Iiark the ('oHMaclvH. 

Mapolcoii liad onhurd tlir (^oiiHlniction (if tlurr luidi^cH, two 
by tho artillery, and one by the cngiiuwrH. Rut the rlvor 
baviiii; boon (orind wider tlian Itad brcii HUpposfd, (^leiieral 
C'liaH,sr|oii|) of the <nii;'iinM>rH, diM'lai'cid be w»)ubl not bo aldti to 
conHtriiot the third bi'idftc, and delivered over the .sappers to 
flmeral KIdr, anil at tin? Hanu^ tinui f^avc him tlio tiTHsels be 
bad nia(b>. At one o'( lock, (the '-!("tth) I he upper bridge wa.H 
finiMlMMl ; it was intended for the infantry. Tlie Emperor im- 
IMedialely ordn-cd ()udin(»t'M rov])H lo pass <hr, (iist. 'I'hr bri- 
ji;ade ol" cavalry of CaHlox was (he lirst; i( was lollowed by 
Alberl'H brijjjade cd" iid'antry, then the remains of l^cf^jrand's 
division, and the whole of the second corps ; th»5se Iroops were 
full of ardonr. Two pi«MTS of camion also |)assod over this 
bridp;e. Marshal Omiinot |M>stc(l his iroops on the road from 
Horisof, covering that Crom /(Mnhin. 

The second bridge, <mic hundeed (oistvs IVom (In-! lirst, and 
which was destined lor (he eipii|)ages, was liiiished in lour 
hourSy and immedialely (he artillery of the second corps, that 
ol' the guard, (be grand paik,f and (hat cd' the other corps, 
passed in succession. Sevi'ral times (lu^ (ressels «d' this bridge 
\mn^ forced into tho bed ui' the river, caused interruptions to 
the passag<', and reipiired repairs, hut (he brave ])on(o)miers, 
stimulatetl by the |)ces«MH'e ol' (he liUipei-oi-, and encoui'aged by 
General Khlo and their olliccrs, (Messrs. Chapelle, Chapuis, 
fVyherimolll', /aherii, Delarue, ^(•.)| surmotinted all dilHcul- 
ties. IMunge«l in the IVeezing water to their shoulilers, they 
laboured with«nil lelaxation to rei)aii'and proHOrvc the bridges, 
an heroic devoiioil, and almost beyond hinnan power. Mr. 
de Scgur should have (dusidered (hat an aiiny ct)mposed ol' 
such soldiers, never could he van<|uished by the Uussians. 

*ThP {?'■♦'"' I'-'*'"'*' ^^'•'•' •■•"iip<>"i'l orilu-ii- liuu.Ind cnrri!>g'ci8, of which fifty 
were jilcoi'N orrunnt)!!, iimN-r the conuiiaiul of (i(-iioi'al NtM^TO. 

•)• Wo w^vrX tu)t huviiintlif power of vh\\\y; \hc nninos of all tho ofViCcrs, 
mihiiltcrns, Hntl poiitomiirrs, wlio ilosorvocl to be si};'ni(Usod by tht> jvnititiulc ot 
tho M'lny. Tlu'Hc iutivpid sohliorN, without hc\sitation, in unuiy r.uscs sucri- 
(iocd thrir Uvcm, iiuUicccl »doue by honovu* Rnd Ihcir high sense of ehjty. 






i. -.i v^^'VV: 



BOOK XI. 251 

lie HtsitcH, that Iho Emperor sceirij? Win troops mastcrHol' tli© 
ojipositc bunk, exclaimed, " Drlidld my star again appear !'* 
Napoleon, from tln^ inHtiuit lie placed liis piecc.s in battery, 
mi^bt regard bimsell" master of the op|»osite bank, since no 
ilUHHian battery could have resiHted our lire. It was not the 
inerr passage itself, which oire,red dangers, it was if tbe> corps 
of 'rchitchakoir had ojtpose.d wiUi vigour*, our <',rossing the 
bridge, or had only destroyed the numerous bridges which are 
over the marshc^s on the road to Zembin. Itut the battles wo 
had engagtrd in since that of Moskwa, and the brilliant charge 
that General Iterkeim had niflfHo on Lambert's division oC 
I'cbitchakoir'H corps, aflorded us the conviction, that we would 
not be checked by the, ItuNsians. 'VUv, Kmperor, therelon;, 
could n«)t have exclaimed, *' Heboid again my star!" besides, 
where has this author rvcr heard this prince s[»eak ol" bis star? 

ir Napoleon had placed that confidence in it, he would not 
have |U'o( laimcd it so loudly and constantly. 

The observation which IoIIowh a|>jttMieH to us to contain a 
contradiction : ** l^'or he was a beli<n'(^r in fatality, like all 
cmupierors, tiiose men who, having the larg(;st accounts with 
fortune, aini full}' aware how much they are indebted to herj> 
and who, mort-over, having no intermediate. |)owcr between 
tli(Mnseiv(vs and heaven, ft^d th(;mselves more immediately un- 
der its iirotection." If conriuerors believe in fatality they are 
superstitious. If they believe all due to fortune, or to acci" 
dent, they are materialists. II" they have no intermediate 
powers between them and he.aven, they should refer avavy 
thing to the divinity, but they cannot be superstiticnis, mate- 
rialists, and eminently religious all together. Thus in the 
whole course of the book, contradictions continually take place 
between the facts and the deductions. 



252 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 



CHAPTER YI. 

** Napoleon appeared pleased in proclaiming aloud, the 
news (of Schwartzenberg's victory over Sacken,) with the ad- 
dition that Schwartzenberg had immediately returned upon 
the heels of Tchitchakoff, and that he was coming to our assis- 
tance." 

The Emperor believed that^as soon as Schwartzenberg should 
have been apprised of the movement of Tchitchakoff on the 
Minsk, that he would hasten to follow him in that direction. 
We shall not attempt to explain the sluggishness that this ge- 
neral testified at that time, after events have sufficiently disco- 
vered the causes which directed the policy of the Austrians in 
this important conjuncture, the results of which had so fatal 
an influence on the misfortunes of the army. 

The officer of the palace insinuates that TcIiitchakofF only 
quitted the Bug in order to oppose our crossing the Berezina. 
It is only since those events, that it has been supposed that his 
movement took place with that intention. The truth is, that 
Tchitchakoff marched to Minsk and the Berezina to endea- 
vour to join Wittgenstein. On this account after he had taken 
Borisof, he immediately despatched Lambert's division over 
the Berezina to meet Wittgenstein. But this division having 
been driven back by the brigade of Berkeim, of Oudinot's 
corps, this check, on the one hand, and on the other the infor- 
mation of Wittgenstein, and the orders of Kutusof, which the 
admiral received at the same moment, decided him to descend 
the Berezina, and to approach the grand Russian army. 

In the whole of this chapter the author wishes to convince 
his readers that it is to the hesitation of Admiral Tchitcha- 
koff's manoeuvres, the successful passage of the Berezina by 
the French army is owing. Without intending to attack or 
defend the military operations of this general, we will content 
ourselves in saying, that if he, with all the force he could have 
collected, had posted himself opposite to the point at which the 
Emperor had resolved to cross, the passage would, neverthe- 



':^im 



BOOK XL 253 

less, have taken place, but the two armies would have lost a 
great number of soldiers. 

" Tchitchakoif could have overthrown, the next day, the 
27th, with 18,000 men, the 7,000 soldiers of Oudinot and Dom- 
brouski." 

To reply to this assertion, we are forced to repeat what we 
have already stated ; that our artillery was composed of more 
than 250 pieces, well supplied with ammunition. The right 
bank rises much above the left bank of the Berezina, and at 
this spot it is only fifty-four toises in width, our shot would 
have swept all the approaches to this river, and the enemy's 
batteries would have been obliged to have kept themselves out 
of the range of our fire, or tliey would have been destroyed. 

Hence the enemy could not have prevented the construction 
of the bridges, and under the fire of all our artillery, the army 
could have been formed in line of battle, on the o4her side of 
the river, to march against the enemy, if he had attempted a 
manoeuvre similar to that practised by Vendome to prevent 
Eugene from passing his bridge at the Cassano, In our situa- 
tion, it would have been an ordinary battle, of which all the 
chance of success was on our side, since the army could have 
displayed, and independent of the quality of our troops, and 
the courage they derive from circumstances, we would have 
been superior in numbers to the Russians. It would not have 
been against the 7,000 soldiers of Oudinot alone, that Tchit- 
chakofT must have struggled, but also against the imperial 
guard, the corps of Eugene, Ney, and Davoust, which would 
have presented an aggregate of force much greater than that 
of the admiral. Now that the events have long since taken 
place, it is, perhaps, to be regretted that Tchitchakoif had 
not made this manoeuvre. For his army would, in all pro- 
bability, have been destroyed by "ours, and, however great 
our losses might have been, it would have been better for 
us to have died as victorious soldiers, than to fall victims 
to the cold, a few days afterwards. The losses that we ex- 
perienced at the passage of the Berezina, are to be attribu- 
ted to the negligence practised in the execution of the orders 
which the Emperor had given to make the necessary prepara- 
tions for the passage, such as the construction of tressels. 




25. 1 t lanOAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

&,c. Wo have wseen Hbove that the corps of Marshal Oudiiiot 
oroiipiiMl the tbnl, two ihxys before the arrival of the Empwor, 
but the tressels had been iiia(K^ with so little care, that they 
were obliged to bo recommeiued. But from this circumstance, 
the ]vassag;e would have been elVected twenty four hours earlier, 
aiid without loss. 



CHAPTER VII. 

On the d6th of November Marshal Victor gained the i^oad 
at l<t>ohnii'/a, \vhith had been followed by the army retiirnins; 
from Mosiow. General Partouneaux was ordered to form the 
rear guard with his division. Victor, with his two otl^er diM 
isions, occupied Borisof. On the '27 th, at four o'clock in the 
morning, this marshal took up his line of marcli to gain Stud- 
i^ianka, when> he arrived early. General Tartouneaux re- 
placed him at Borisof. It would have been desirable that Mr. 
de Segur had informed us what instructions Mai*shal Victor 
left with this general, and at what time he was to leave Bori- 
sof. He asserts that Partouneaux •* was pi'eparing to quit it, 
when an order ivached him from the Emperor himself, to I'e- 
main there all night." This is incorrect ; the Empeiin' did 
not send an oinler to Partouneaux to remain the night at Bori- 
sof. This gtMieral liimself declares, that it w as an othcer from 
the Prince oi' NeutVhatel \n ho brought it. But then this otlicer 
ought to ha> e been cluu'ged with a written oixler ; for those of 
the major gTueral. when carried by any other officeis than his 
aides-de-camp, wei-e always wriiten. Besides, it was not the 
n^gular maivh, and nothing obliged him to change it. If Na- 
pohH>n had w ished that Partouneaux's division should have !•«- 
niained during the night of the •orth — -^Sth at Borisof, he 
\\ ould have oitleivd the Prince of NeutVhatel to piwscribe this 
plan to Marshal Victor, or if he despatched this oitler at once 
to General Parto\ineaux, he would have sent it by one of his 
aides-de-camp, or oitlerly otlicci*s, but neither i-eceiveU such a 
mission. 



BOOK XI. 255 

" Napoleon's idea, no doubt, was in that manner to direct 
the whole attention of the three Russian generals upon Bori- 
sof, and that Partouncaux's keeping them hack, upon that 
point, would allow him sufficient time to effect the passage of 
his whole army." Our historian has not given the dates we 
have just cited. If he had done so, the reader would have per- 
ceived himself the little foundation there existed for this pre- 
tended motive for Partouneaux's halt at Borisof. On tlie day 
of the 26th, the following night, and the day of the 27th, al- 
most all the French army had passed the Berezina, witli the 
exception of Victor's corps. 

The occupation of Borisof, during the night of tlie 27-28tli, 
by General Partouneaux, was then not only useless, but it 
might have tended to endanger the retreat of his division. For, 
as we have just said, this division retreating the 27tii, all the 
effect expected to have been produced by the French troops at 
Borisof, was accomplished. 

** A crowd of stragglers, who were driven back on Pai'tou- 
neaux, apprised him, that he was separated from the rest of the 
army," and decided him to evacuate this city to rejoin his 
corps. The enemy blocked up the road, Partouneax attacked 
them and was repulsed. He refused to surrender, " he wanted 
to make a last effort, and clear a sanguinary passage to tiic 
bridge of Studzianka, but these men, who were formerly so 
brave, were now so degraded by their miseries that they basely 
broke their arms." 

General Partouneaux had reason to hope, that he could force 
the corps opposed to him to open a passage, for this corps was 
between two fires. It is probable, that he would have succeetl- 
cd in this attack, if he had made it with the whole of his divi- 
sion ; it aj)})eai'S, that a false report had induced him to be- 
lieve, that the French army had passed the hridges and burnt 
them, which destroyed his hopes. It is not true, that his sol- 
diers basely hroke their armSf as a letter from this general 
proves, in which, on the cinitrary, he gives the greatest praise 
to his soldiers. This letter is in gur hands. 

" Concluding that he was aba^ndoned and given up." Gene- 
ral Partouneaux, hcUeving that the bridges were burnt, might 



256 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, 8cc. 

have considered himself as abandoned to his own resources, but 
certainly he never could have believed, that Marshal Victor 
would have wished to deliver him up to the enemy, and we do 
not fear to be contradicted by this general, in affirming, that 
he never believed that he w^as given up. In the critical situa- 
tion in wliich he found himself, perhaps he should have taken a 
better method of extricating himself. We shall not permit our- 
selves to make any observations upon this subject, convinced, 
that in doing what he did, he believed that he was acting for 
the best. 

" Of the whole division, a single battalion only escaped. It 
was reported, that its leader, turning towards tlie soldiers, de- 
sired them to follow all his movements, and declared, that he 
would shoot the first man who talked of surrendering. He 
then quitted the fatal road, glided through to the borders of 
the river, followed all its windings and turnings, and, pro- 
tected by the combat of his less fortunate comrades, by the 
darkness, and the very difficulties of the ground, escaped from 
the enemy, and brought to Victor the confirmation of Partou- 
neaux's surrender." 

This narrative is incorrect. This battalion was of the 55th 
regiment, and had for a commander Mr. Joyeux. He had 
been charged with the destruction of the bridges on the Ska, 
and to form the extreme rear guard from Borisof. On leav- 
ing this city, he had taken the left of the road which the army 
had followed, on which were carts and baggage wagons, and 
arrived without obstruction at Studzianka, bringing with him 
a piece of cannon and its ammunition wagon. The Emperor, 
anxious to see the division of Partouneax re-united to the two 
other divisions of Marshal Victor, to cover Studzianka, or- 
dered one of his officers* to go and meet it. This officer met, 
on his route, the battalion of the fifty -fifth. He inquired, if 
the division of Partouneaux was far off? How, the division of 
Partouneaux ! replied the commander of the battalion, it pre- 
cedes me, I am its rear guard. The officer, well aware that 
there were only Russians in the rear, returned with this disas- 
trous intelligence to the Emperor. This Prince seemed greatly 

* Gen. Gourgaud. 



BOOK XL 257 

astonished at this circumstance, which he could not under- 
stand. The loss of Partouneaux's division, ought and did not 
affect him deeply, since it was the only organized corps that 
had fallen into the enemy's hands from the beginning of the 
campaign. But it is false, that the word defection escaped from 
his lips. At this epoch, the word was unknown in the French 
army. Another proof, that Napoleon never considered the mis- 
fortune of Partouneaux's division as de/edion, is, that, in 1813, 
he named three of Partouneaux's children to situations in the 
Lyceums. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

The Emperor, says Mr. de Segur, refused to permit the 
equipages which covered the left bank of the Berezina to be 
burnt. This Prince had no urgent reason for burning the bag- 
gage wagons which remained on this bank. His only motive 
would have been, not to have left them as trophies for the 
enemy ; but what miserable trophies a few baggage wagons 
would have formed ! It was a trifling consideration, compared 
to the situation to which this loss would have reduced the 
wounded, and those families who had followed the army from 
Moscow, and who, even in falling into the hands of the enemy, 
might still preserve some resources. In every point of view, 
in a military sense, it. was perhaps advantageous to leave the 
approaches to the bridge encumbered after the passage of the 
army and its artillery, for it was to create a new obstacle to 
the enemy. The author adds, that it was " from a preference 
for the opinion which flattered him the most," (this is a remark 
as false as it is peurile,) " and from a wish to spare so many 
men whose misfortunes he reproached himself with." 

If this is an accusation directed against the authors of the 
war, it does not fall on the Emperor^ if it is directed against 
his conduct during this expedition, it is unjust and malicious. 

Kk 




258 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &(;. 

Besides, is it with these pedantic dissertations, and continual 
suppositions, that history is to be written ? 

The enumeration that our historian makes of the Russian 
and French troops at the battle of the 28th, diverges greatly 
from the truth. " Tchitchakof, with his 27,000 Russians of 
the army of the south, debouched from Stachowa, against Ou- 
dinot, Ney, and Dombrowski. These three could hardly 
reckon 8,000 men in their ranks, which were supported by the 
old and young guard, who then consisted of 2,800 infantry 
and 900 cavalry." 

The corps of Oudinot and the division of Dombrowski, con- 
sisted of 9,300 men, that of Marshal Ney, 5,400. The infan- 
try of the old guard, which, at its departure from Smolensk, 
was 5^777 strong, still consisted of 4,500, the young guard 
2,200, the cavalry of the guard 2,000, dismounted cavalry of 
the guard, under the orders of Colonel Daulancourt, (now 
a general,) 1,800 ; the corps of Marshal Victor, reduced to the 
divisions of Daendels and Gerard, consisted of more than 
11,000 men. This made with the corps of Eugene and Da- 
voust, and our numerous artillery, an arm,y of upwards of 
45,000 men, perfectly armed. 

** Among the losses of the day, that of young Noailles, Ber- 
thier's aid-de-camp, was remarkable. He was struck dead 
with a ball. He was one of those meritorious, but too ardent, 
officers, who are incessantly exposing themselves, and are con- 
sidered sufficiently rewarded by employing them." 

Mr. de Noailles was, without doubt, an estimable officer, 
but why praise him alone, among so many brave men, who 
distinguished themselves on this occasion ? The author does 
not say a word of General Legrand, who was wounded, and 
conducted himself with so much intrepidity,- of General Mai- 
son, who did not testify less ,• of General Cadras, who was 
killed; of Generals Merle, Grundler, Berkeim; of General 
Zajonczek, that Nestor of the Polish army, who had his leg 
carried off; of the brave Colonel Dubois, of the 7th Cuiras- 
siers, who contributed so much to the success of the affair. It 
is true that these officers bear names which glory alone has 
ennobled. Besides, when we cite it is just that we should cite 



BOOK XL 259 

properly* It is false that M. de Noailles was killed by a ball. 
He had just brought an order to the 23d regiment of Chas- 
seurs, and was speaking to Colonel Marlot, the commander of 
this regiment, when a charge of Russian cavalry took place. 
The horse of Alfred de Noailles fell, and two Cossacks were 
seen to drag this officer by the collar, and striking him. The 
23d made an effort to rescue him, but it was fruitless, and M. 
de Noailles, of whom nothing more was heard, was, in all pro- 
bability, massacred by these barbarians. 

In the account of this battle, Mr. de Segur has forgotten to 
make known the order that the Emperor gave to the division 
of Daendels, to repass the Berezina, and go to the assistance 
of Marshal Victor, who, with the division of Gerard only, was 
sustaining so disproportionate a struggle against the efforts of 
Wittgenstein, and that at the moment that the Emperor and 
the troops which had passed the Berezina, were violently at- 
tacked by the army of Moldavia. It is true, that in re- 
porting this occurrence, the author would have himself refuted 
the passage in his book, where he says, *' Napoleon felt that 
he had no other plan than to sacrifice, successively, the army, 
part by part, commencing with the extremities, in order to save 
the head." 

"Night came on before Wittgenstein's 40,000 men had made 
any impression on the 6000 of the Duke of Belluno." If, in all 
th€ narrative of this campaign, the Russians had furnished to 
the historian of the grand army an exploit as glorious as that 
of Victor's soldiers, he would not truly have been so sparing 
of his eulogies. 



CHAPTER IX. 

The officer of the palace, in this chapter, heaps horrors up- 
on horrors. It relates only to the last day of the passage j 
the bridges were then much encumbered, but the picture which 




260 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

lie presents is exaggerated beyond all measure. His predi- 
lection for disgusting scenes hurries him away. ** The more 
fortunate gained the bridge by scrambling over heaps of wound- 
ed women and children, thrown down and half suffocated, 
whom they again trod down in their attempts to reach it.'* 
There were in the army some female sutlers, and a few chil- 
dren. On our return from Moscow, several families having 
followed us, the number of these were augmented. The idea 
of women, of children struggling against death, has been a 
great resource to the authors who have described this cam- 
paign. But Mr. de Segiir has surpassed his predecessors, the 
Labaumes Puibusque, Ker Porter, 6cc. He reproduces this 
image every moment, and in three pages he repeats four times, 
the women and children, as if the number had been immense, 
and as if, instead of an army, it had been a wandering tribe of 
Tartars, carrying their families in their train. 

** The night of the 28-9th added to all these calamities. Its 
darkness was insufficient to conceal its victims from the artil- 
lery of the Russians. Amidst the snow, which covered every 
thing, the course of the river, the thorough dark mass of men, 
horses, carriages, and the noise proceeding from them, were 
sufficient to enable the enemy's artillerymen to direct their 
fire. About 9 o'clock at night, tliere was a still further in- 
crease of desolation, when Prince Victor began his retreat." 

This fanciful description appears destined by Mr. de Segur 
to serve as a completion to his picture. During the nights of 
the passage, the bridges were entirely clear. The mass of 
stragglers, who wished to pass during the day, retired at 
night to their bivouacs, from whence no order, no entreaty 
could draw them. If the Russians had fired during the night, 
the stragglers would have been eager to have profited by the 
clear passage of the bridges, to cross the river ; but it was not 
so. On the 28th, the day of the glorious action of the 9th 
corps, towards 5 o'clock in the evening, the fire ceased on both 
sides. At 9 o'clock. Marshal Victor commenced his retreat, 
and at one in the morning, the whole corps had passed in per- 
fect order, with all its artillery, leaving on the left bank only 
a feeble rear guard. About the same time, the two batteries 



BOOK XI. 261 

of flying artillery of Colonels Chopin and Serruzier passed. 
During the whole of this night, the enemy did not fire a sin- 
gle shot; the author demonstrates this himself, in saying, 
*' The multitude, benumhed with cold, or too anxious to pre- 
serve their baggage, refused to avail themselves of the last 
night for passing to the opposite bank." In vain were the 
carriages set ** fire to in order to tear them from them." Now 
if the Russians, as we have before said, had thrown a few bul- 
lets in the midst of these apathetic and thoughtless beings, the 
greater part of the stragglers would have passed the bridges. 

If, as the Emperor had ordered, the means of constructing 
the bridges had been ready on the day of the 24th, we sliould 
have passed on the night of that day, on the day of the 25th, 
and on the 27th, in the morning, all the French army would 
have found itself on the right bank of the Berezina. Thus 
the loss of Partouneaux's division would not have taken place, 
nor the attack of Wittgenstein on Studzianka ; in a word, we 
should not have to deplore all the misfortunes which occurred. 
This passage, which was effected in despite of all obstacles, 
notwithstanding the difficulties which occurred, was not by 
any means as disastrous as several writers, who are delighted 
to exaggerate our misfortunes, have endeavoured to make it 
believed. The men that we lost were not among the comba- 
tants ; three pieces of cannon only were left on the other bank ; 
finally, the number of prisoners that the enemy picked up (by 
^ the Russian account) did not amount to more than two thou- 
sand stragglers, wounded, sick, and sutlers.* At half after 
eight in the morning of the 29th, fire was set to the bridge, 
and it was not for an hour afterwards that some Cossacks ap- 
proached it. 

Our readers may be pleased, that we should make them ac- 
quainted with the opinion given by the Russian historian, whom 
we have already cited, on the conduct of the Emperor, at the 
period of the passage of the Berezina. 

"Invested on all sides, Napoleon never lost himself^ he de- 

* See History of the Campaign in Russia, by Colonel Boutourlin, volume 
2, pstge 383. 



262 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

ceived the generals opposed to him, by skilful demonstrations, 
and gliding, if we may so express ourselves, between the ar- 
mies, who were prepared to rush on him; he effected his pas- 
sage at a well selected place, where every advantage of ground 
was in his favour. The bad state of the bridges, the amelio- 
ration of the construction of which did not depend on him, 
was the only cause which, in retarding the execution, render- 
ed it so perilous. Tlius the great losses that the French ex- 
perienced, should not be attributed to Napoleon, and ought only 
to be placed to the account of the unfortunate circumstances 
in which his army found itself, and which it was not in his 
power to control." 

And it is a Russian who says this ! ! 



CHAPTER X. 

AiTER having given the description of the road leading to 
Zembin, which passes through the marshes, over which are 
bridges of several hundred toises in length, the ofiicer of the 
palace appears to regret that the Russians had not destroyed 
these bridges, and expresses himself thus ; " caught between 
the morass and the river, in a narrow space, without provi- 
sions, without shelter, in the midst of a tremendous hurricane, 
the Grand Army and its Emperor, would have been compelled 
to surrender without a blow." 

On the supposition that the bridges had been burnt, their re- 
paration impossible, finally on that of the marshes of the Gaina, 
through which the road passed, not being sufficiently frozen to 
bear men and horses, the Grand Army and its Emperor would 
not have been forced to surrender without a blow. The au- 
thor says truly, that we were caught between these marshes 
and the Berezina, but he does not say that the third side of this 
triangle was occupied by the Russians. How could a man who 



BOOK XL 263 

bears the title of General, think that in such a situation, the 
Grand Army and its Emperor, would not have marched 
against the Russians and cut their way through them, to gain 
the road from Borisof to Minsk ! ! 

After the exaggerated descriptions that Mr. de Segur gives 
of the weakness of the French army, this expression of grand 
army here employed, has a signification which might be pro- 
per from the mouth of a Russian newspaper writer, but which 
sounds ill in that of a Frenchman. 

In retracing to us, as is his custom, the passage of the Be- 
rezina, the romantic author had forgotten one of his favourite 
subjects, a forced storm ', we find it here. This hurricane 
ought to be diminished to a little wind and a few flakes of 
snow. As to the severity of the cold, we can appreciate it on 
learning that the Berezina was not frozen. 

Mr. de Segur in speaking " of an elderly nobleman of the 
times long passed, when light and brilliant graces held sover- 
eign sway," makes allusion to the Count of Narbonne. ** This 
general officer of sixty," says he, ** was seen sitting on the 
snow-covered trunk of a tree, occupying himself with unruf- 
fled gaiety every morning, with the details of his toilette ; in 
the midst of the hurricane, he had his hair elegantly dressed 
and powdered with the greatest care, amusing himself in this 
manner with all the calamities, and with the fury of the com- 
bined elements which assailed him." Mr. de Narbonne, not- 
withstanding his age, went through the Russian campaign with 
the ardour of a young man. Is it good taste in Mr. de Segur 
to endeavour to throw ridicule on this estimable general, who 
always faithfully served the Emperor and France, and died 
at Torgau, charged with the defence and government of that 
place. ^ 




264 CMTICAL EXMINATIONS, kc. 



CHAPTER XI. 

The only important subject in this chapter, is the first inti- 
mation which Napoleon makes to Messrs. Daru and Duroc, of 
his resolution to set out immediately for Paris. His motives 
were powerful and undeniable. Those which Mr. de Segur 
puts in his mouth, were not the principal. There were others 
which materially influenced his determination. A Russian his- 
torian has better understood them than the French author. 
** Napoleon," says he, (Boutourlin, vol. II. page 392) " was 
not only the leader of the army which he left, but as the des- 
tiny of all France rested with him, it is clear that in this con- 
juncture, his first duty was less to assist at the last struggles of 
the wa'eck of his army, than to watch over the safety of the 
great empire which he governed. He could not better fulfil 
this duty, than by returning to Paris, in order to hasten by 
his presence, the organization of new armies, become necessa- 
ry to replace those he had just lost." 

He left the chief command to the King of Naples, to Count 
Daru the administration, and the Prince of Neufchatel re- 
mained Major General. 

Mr. de Segur states that a violent and secret scene took place 
between the Emperor and Berthier, in which he makes this 
old companion in arms of Napoleon, play a humiliating part. 
Our writer should have told us how he obtained a know^ledge 
of it. A particular conversation certainly took place between 
the Prince of Neufchatel and the Emperor, which he has since 
related. It was on the question of making choice of a com- 
mander for the army ; Napoleon was decided in confiding it to 
Eugene. The Prince of Neufchatel insisted for a long time in 
favour of the King of Naples. He testified in his arguments, 
a force and obstinacy which did not belong to his character. 
He finished by declaring, that if the Prince Eugene command- 
ed the army, he would not remain under his orders. We can 
pardon this veteran of the French military glory, whom the 



BooKXt. 265 

Emperor had raised so high, and allied to sovereigns, by mar- 
rying him to a princess of one of the oldest reigning families 
in Germany, this fatal repugnance to serve under a chief who 
did not wear a crown. Mr. de Segur should have known of 
this long conversation, which took place in a room adjoining 
that, in which were the officers of the household. He learnt 
vaguely, that the Prince of Neufchatel had refused to remain 
with the army. There was nothing more wanting, to give 
scope to his imagination, in reporting the secret scene he men- 
tions. It is the characteristic manner of this author, and it 
may well be supposed that it was thus he composed the greater 
part of this history. 



CHAPTER XIL 

This chapter contains the account of the glorious deeds of 
the French troops, who formed the rear guard under the or- 
ders of Marshal Ney and General Maison. In speaking of a 
battle which took place before Malodeczno, the author men- 
tions, that the enemy not being able to repulse the troops op- 
posed to him, directed a part of his force " to another en- 
trance," and that "as good luck would have it, Victor with 
about 4000 men, the remains of the ninth corps, still occupied 
this village ;" it would have been very extraordinary that Ge- 
nerals Ney and Maison, who made head against the enemy be- 
fore Malodeczno, with a few hundred men, should have been 
ignorant that this village was occupied by Victor and 4000 
men. The latter was there with his corps in consequence of 
an order from the Major General.* 

* The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Belluno. 

Malodeczno, Dec. 4, 1812 — 4 o'clock in the morning. 
Duke of Belluno, Sir, — You will to-day continue your retreat, and come 
on and take up your position at Malodeczno, taking care that the carriages 

LI 



266 



CIUTICAL EXAMINATION, kc. 




This chapter terminates with a quarrel between Marshals 
Victor and Ney, on the subject of the command of the rear 
guard. Mr. de Segur represents Ney ** as giving way to his 
passion in the most violent manner, without producing any 
effect on the coolness of Victor." We do not clearly under- 
derstand the cause of this quarrel, as the letter of the Duke of 
Belluno* to the Major General, proves that this marshal com- 
manded the rear guard. 

and stragglers are all kept in advance. The second corps, wliich will main- 
tain this city until your arrival, will then be placed in the rear. The head 
quarters will be atBienitza, by the route of Markowo. If provisions had been 
found here, they would have halted ; but the first considerable magazines 
are at Smorgonl ; these are, bullocks, brandy, and biscuit; make this known 
to your stragglers, that they may rally at these magazines. If you have any 
ammunition wagons, send them to Smorgoni for provisions. At all events 
we shall endeavour to send you ten thousand rations of biscuit and beef ; 
this will enable you to halt where you may find it necessary, without the 
apprehension of your troops disbanding. If the means of transport do not 
allow of your receiving provisions in the course of to-morrow, you must con- 
tinue your march to Smorg'oni, that is to say, till you reach the stores, and 
there you will halt. Send out a proclamation to call together the stragglers, 
and dii-ect them on to Smorgoni — let the drums call them together, and let 
an officer of the staff read it to them. 

Signed— ALEXANDER. 

* The Duke of Belluno to the Major General the Prince of Neufchatel and 

Wagram, 
Bivouac, 5th Dec, 1812 — 4 o'clock in the morning. 
My Lord, the battle maintained on the 4th by the rear guard, was the last 
it could effect against the enemy ; the troops which composed it are now so re- 
duced, and those that remain are so exhausted, that I am obliged to with- 
draw them out of the reach of the enemy, and to avoid every chance of fight- 
ing. The i-eport which my first aid de-camp must have made to your Se- 
rene Highness, on the situation and state of my troops, is the exact truth. 
The advanced guard of the corps which follows us, ai'rived yesterday at Bie- 
nitza, as soon as we did, although we marched in the night, and that the 
bridges of Malodeczno were destroyed. It was 11 o'clock; if I had wished 
to maintain Bienitza, I must have given battle or sustained another disadvan- 
tageous attack, from the great disproportion of my troops to those of the 
enemy. 1 have therefore taken the only feasible step, that of retrograding, 
and going to rest in a village two leagues from Bienitza, and four from Smor- 
goni. Our videttes and those of the enemy, can see each other. I shall pro- 
bably be followed as closely to-day as yesterday, and I think that it would be 
better if his majesty were at a greater distance from us. The stragglers op» 



BOOK XI. 267 



CHAPTER XIII. "mF 

"We here find fresli observations on the feelings of the army 
towards the Emperor. The officer of the palace says, "it is 
true that a seditious movement was impossible." 

This remark is idle ; to whom would an idea of sedition oc- 
cur ? There was a reciprocity of feeling between the army and 
its chief, which renders this supposition impossible. 

The pliability that Mr. de Segur attributes to the Emperor 
towards the marshals, " whose approbation of his project he 
gained, some by his arguments, and others by his confidential 
communications," is in contradiction with the character of 
Napoleon. All the army desired it, and learnt with joy the 
determination he had adopted ; they felt that the safety of all 
rested in him, that they might lose men, cannon, provinces, 
but that in losing him, they would lose every thing. 

The confession that our historian causes him to make be- 
fore his officers, is still more ridiculous, and in what terms 
does he make it ? " If I had been born to the throne, if I had 
been a Bourbon, it would have been easy for me not to have 
committed any faults." The design is inexplicable. Does the 
author wish it to be believed, that the Emperor only under- 
took the expedition to Russia, to fix himself more firmly on 
the throne of France ? Does he wish to make him pointing out 
the dangers and misfortune of trusting to his destiny, or to 

press us greatly; they are very numerous. The habit they have acqmred of 
only marching in the day, enables the enemy to take a great number, vi^hether 
they do not care to take them, or that they mistake their columns for regular 
troops, they follow them with great circumspection. I believe, however, 
they took several yesterday. I expect to arrive at Smorgoni about nine 
o'clock this morning ; I shall, I conclude, be obliged to go furtlier to sleep, 
unless indeed, I should find some troops to support me. Those of General 
de Wrede would be very useful in that case. I think the Emperor has given 
them orders to relieve us, or march with us. — Signed 

The Marshal of BELLUNO. 



268 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

give him a fore-knowled,^e of the great catastrophe which in- 
duced his fall ? If such be the case, it must be allowed, that 
Mr. de Segur would have the gift of prophesying after the 
events. It may be asked, where he procured such information ? 
Is it probable, tliat this idea presented itself to the mind of the 
Emperor at that moment ? Is it possible that he would have 
expressed it ? Has not the absurdity of this idea struck his 
historian ? The heart of Napoleon was torn by the sight of 
the calamities of his army, but no one was better aware than 
himself of the causes which had produced them. 

We cannot conceive how an officer of his household could 
have erred so stupidly, as to attribute thoughts and speeches to 
this prince, which are in so complete contradiction to his po- 
sition and character. 

But, nobody can misunderstand the aim of such an insinua- 
tion. 



BOOK XII.— CHAPTER L 

The opening of this book proves the incoherence of the au- 
thor's ideas. "Having arrived at the departure of Napoleon, 
I flattered myself that my task was completed." Yet, when 
he assumed the pen, the events were gone by, and the facts, 
which ouglit to have furnished the subject of his work, well 
known. Why was not his plan put a stop to ? 

"I had announced myself as the historian of that great 
epoch, when we were precipitated from the highest summit of 
glory, to the deepest abyss of misfortune." The historian of 
that great epoch, has not fulfilled the task he imposed on himself. 
He has made himself the poet of the calamities and disasters, 
and not of the great occurrences which took place in this me- 
morable expedition. In saying that we were precipitated from 
the highest summit of gloi'y, the author does not express his 




BOOK xn. 269 

own idea. "We rather hope that he wished to say from the 
highest summit of prosperity. If this expedition was disas- 
trous, it has been fruitful in deeds of heroism and fidelity, 
which have shed an imperishable lustre on the French army. 
All that we have hitherto read, withers the soul, and yet Mr. 
de Segur tells us, " that nothing remains for him, but to re- 
trace the most frightful miseries." He again addresses himself 
to his comimnions, and demands of them, " Why should we not 
spare ourselves ; you the pain of reading them, and I the sad 
tasking of a memory, which has now only to rake up embers, 
nothing but disasters to reckon, and which can no longer 
write but on tombs." 

Here our task becomes irksome, and we feel the fulfilment 
of our duty more painful than ever. Why did not the writer 
listen to this happy idea of here terminating the melancholy 
efforts of that memory, which ought, in fact, to be fatigued in 
raking up embers? We will follow him to the end, surmount- 
ing our repugnance, and that which should discourage us, will 
serve as a fresh stimulus. 

In the situation in which the necessary departure of the Em- 
peror placed the army, it of course felt the immense void that 
was left. But, perhaps, the misfortunes which occurred after 
his departure, would not have arrived, if less eager to reach 
Wilna, they had made shorter marches. It was to these 
marches, at a time when the cold had redoubled in intensity, 
(being at £8 degrees,) that the corps of the army owe their 
disorganization. 

" Most of the colonels of the army, who had hitherto been 
such subjects of admiration, and had marched on, with only 
four or five officers or soldiers around their eagle, preserving 
their place of battle, now^ followed no orders but their own, 
each of them fancied himself entrusted with his own safety ; it 
was almost a general cry of sauve qui pent." 

The unhappy condition of the army cannot absolve the au- 
thor from the imputation he casts on the colonels, who, during 
the campaign, had to support so many moral and physical 
evils J far more severe than those of a general only charged 
%vith a civil service in the household of the Emperor. That 



270 CmTICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

which it would have been just to have said, is, that Marshal 
Ney, who had in the rear guard, platoons composed of colonels 
and superior officers, having seen many of these officers cut 
down by a discharge of grape, found that their services were 
purchased too dearly by the loss that the army would hereafter 
experience in them ; he thought, with reason, that it was pre- 
ferable to have some hundreds of men less at this time, and to 
insure the future re-organization of the army, by rescuing the 
colonels, superior officers, and otliers, from the effiscts of their 
own fidelity, who, having lost all their soldiers, determined to 
remain with the rear guard, to share its battles. He, there- 
fore, ordered all officers without men to retire, and to gain the 
Niemen. He even sent off the scrjeant-majors, and the quar- 
ter-masters, and in the troops that remained with him, he only 
wished to retain officers and subalterns proportionate to the 
number of the soldiers. Mr. de Segur has not praised a single 
colonel, he censures them in a mass. We are willing to believe 
that he was ignorant of the order issued by Marshal Ney, but 
in his uncertainty, he should have abstained from censure. We 
have had so many occasions to remark omissions, and errors 
produced from ignorance of facts, in this work, that this last 
ought not to have astonished us. But wanting proper infor- 
mation, he has had the temerity to undertake to write a his- 
tory. 

The anarchy and disorder are painted with the same exag- 
geration. There were no doubt great traits of selfishness, as 
we may always expect to find in great misfortunes, but there 
were a multitude of acts of generosity and fidelity. Friends, 
comrades divided among each other their miserable food, their 
clothes ; soldiers, servants carried tlicir officers or their mas- 
ters; General Legrand was thus carried by his grenadiers. 
General Zayonczek saved by his soldiers, the young St. Croix,*' 
who lost his lower limbs at Mojaisk, was saved on the retreat, 
by his friends ; Colonel Marin, (of the artillery of the guard,) 
was transported by his artillery men, kc. Why only point out 
the most disgusting parts of the picture ? Does the author fear 

* Brother of the general of that name. 



BOOK XIL 271 

that he will not attain the end he intendetl, if he permits ns to 
see the bright side ? 



CHAPTER II. 

The march of the French army to Wilna, is the subject for 
new scenes, where the officer of the palace redoubles his efforts 
to surpass the horrors of the preceding cliapters. Neverthe- 
less, the state of the army was deplorable enough, without the 
author's abandoning himself to the melancholy pleasure of 
overcharging the picture. " The light of the fires attracted 
some of these miserable wretches, whom the excessive severity 
of the cold had rendered delirious ; they ran in like madmen, 
gnashing their teeth, and laughing like demons ; they threw 
themselves into these furnaces, where they perished in horri- 
ble convulsions. Their famished companions regarded them 
undismayed j there were even some who drew out these bodies 
disfigured and broiled by the flames, &c." The pen refuses 
to transcribe the remainder of this passage. The distinctive 
character of this extreme misery was, that although no one 
attempted to avoid death, none sought it voluntarily. The 
anthropophagy never took place. Was Mr. de Segur a wit- 
ness of one of the incidents of this nature which he quotes ? — 
From whom did he receive his information? He knows that 
the extravagant, the marvellous, and the horrible, please the 
generality of readers, and he takes advantage of it. Ought 
we to expect, after such accounts, to meet with a grave dis- 
sertation on the uncertainty of omens ? to see cited " the pre- 
dictions which announced an invasion of Tartars, as far as the 
banks of the Seine?" and the tale "of the pretended storm, 
which had signalized our entrance on the Russian territory," 
repeated ? 

How can he thus abuse the sensibility and credulity of his 
read 



272 J^Rl-nCAL EXAMINATION, &c. 



CHAPTER in. 

The disorders which took place at Wilna cannot he attri- 
buted to the Emperor. At the time of his leaving the army, 
(Smorgoni, the 5th of December,) he had every reason to hope 
that the reinforcements of men it would receive, and the quan- 
tity of provisions which were laid up at Smorgoni, Ochmiana, 
and AYilna, would enable the corps to re-organize themselves. 
Under this idea he wrote the following orders to the major 
general, dated Bienitza, 5th December. 

*' My Cousin — I herewith send you instructions for the re- 
organization of the army ; the King of Naples will make such 
modifications in it as circumstances may exact. I neverthe- 
less think that it is necessary also to organize the Lithuanians 
at Kowno, tlie fifth corps at Warsaw, the Bavarians at Grod- 
no, tlie eighth corps and the Wurtembergers at Olita, the small 
depots at Mcrecz and Olita, and to direct the dismounted ca- 
valry to Warsaw and Koenigsberg, as well as the stragglers 
and the military equipages which have no horses. All the re- 
mounted cavalry must be sent to-morrow from Wilna to Koe- 
nigsberg, the diplomatic agents must be despatched the day 
after to Warsaw, and also all the wounded generals and of- 
ficers must be sent to Warsaw and Kcenigsberg, making them 
understand the necessity there exists to clear Wilna, in order 
to accommodate the active part of the army. We are assured 
tliat the treasure of the army is considerable; give an order 
that it be sent to Warsaw and Kcenigsberg, where it is want- 
ed ; which will clear Wilna in some degree. Finally, all the 
orders wliich may tend to disencumber AVilna should be given 
to-morrow, as it is necessary on many accounts. 

" Instructions. Rally the army at W'ilna ; keep possession 
of that city, and take up winter quarters ', the Austrians on 
the Niemen, covering Brezc, Grodno, and Warsaw, the army 
at Wilna and Kowno. In case the enemy's army advances. 



BOOK XII. 273 

and you cannot maintain yourself this side of the Niemen, the 
right covering Warsaw, and if it can be done, Grodno, the re- 
mainder of tlie army in line behind the Niemeii, guarding the 
bridge at Kowno; have great stocks of flour laid up at Koe- 
nigsberg, Dantzic, Warsav^^, and Thorn: let Wilna and Kow- 
no be cleared of every thing, that your movements may be free, 
the most valuable articles must be sent to Dantzic." 

There were at Wilna four millions of rations of flour, three 
millions six hundred thousand rations of meat, nine millions 
of rations of wine and brandy, forty-two thousand pairs of 
shoes, and considerable magazines of beans and forage, cloth- 
ing, harness and equipments, thirty-four thousand muskets, 
and an arsenal well stocked with ammunition of all kinds. It 
maybe seen that the reproach of improvidence, which the of- 
ficer of the palace applies to the Emperor, is wholly unfound- 
ed. According to him, ** not a single commander ventured to 
step forward and give orders for distributing these provisions 
to all that came for them." This is an attack on the heads of 
the commissariat j perhaps they hoped, by only making the dis- 
tributions in regular form, to oblige the stragglers to rallyj 
but it was a great misfortune. 

The author gives a revolting picture of the hospitals at 
Wilna ; it is a fact, however, that the numerous hospitals in 
this city had been put, by the exertions of Doctors Desgenettes 
and Marie de St. Ursin, in as good a condition as possible, but 
in consequence of the disorder which resulted from the crowd- 
ed state of Wilna, the administration could do nothing more. 
Mr. de Segur has assumed this extraordinary situation of af- 
fairs, as the consequence of a neglect which did not exist. His 
prejudice could not have had a finer field. 

^' At last, by the exertions of several of the commanders, 
such as Eugene and Davoust, the compassion of the Lithua- 
nians, and the avarice of the Jews opened some places of re- 
fuge," 

Officers had been posted at the gates of Wilna, to point out 
to the soldiers of the different corps, convents and other build- 
ings, which were to serve them for barracks, and where they 
might rally and receive their rations. But the soldiers were 

M m 



274 CRITICAL EXAAUNATION, &c. 

more desirous of traversing the city in all directions, and 
of entering the houses. 

In consequence of the orders that the Emperor had sent from 
Zelitska to General de "NVrede, this general marched from Vi- 
lieka to Slohkchomska. On the 8tli of December the King of 
Naples ordered him to Ruckoni with his Bavarians, amount- 
ing to two thousand some hundreds, to relieve the Duke of 
Belhmo, ^ho had formed the rear-guard, and to place himself 
under the orders of Marshal Ney, to whom that command was 
again confided. The Bavarian general, after liaAing been at- 
tacked in this position by the corps of Cossacks wlio preceded 
the Russian advance guard, and who had some pieces of artil- 
lery, was driven back to AMlna, w hich caused a great disorder 
among the stragglers, sutlers, kc. They beat to arms, but the 
Cossacks were not willing to enter that day into a city where 
there was still some organized infantry. General de Wrede, 
hrf^lng with him about sixty Bavarian light horse, went to 
Ney. After having formed his troop in line before his 
door, he entered the marshal's quarters, having still his sword 
in his hand. " Marshal,*' said he, " the enemy is in pursuit. I 
come to offer you my sixty liorsemen as a safeguard on the 
road to Kowno.*' Ney was leaning against the fire-place. 
He took Wrede coldly by the hand, and led him to a window^ 
which overlooked the street, and showing him the disorder 
which prevailed there, and the unarmed mob that was hasten- 
ing to fly, said to Jiim, *• General, do you think that a mar- 
shal of the Empire can mingle with such a mob ?" The Ba- 
varian General was silent for a moment, then he observed to 
Ney that if he remained longer at Wilna that he risked falling 
into the power of the enemy. The marshal replied, " No, no, 
general fear nothing for me, I have here in my house fifty 
French grenadiers, and all the Cossacks in the world cannot 
dislodge me befoi'e to-morrow at eight o'clock." 

*♦ Wilua might have been defended for twenty 'four hours 
longer, and many men might have been saved.'' 

It might have with ease, been maintained for several days. 
The cold had caused almost as much destruction in the Russian 
as in the French army j it marched slowly. The garrison of 



BOOK xn, 275 

Wilna and the imperial guard, could have defended the city 
against all the attacks of the Cossacks. Although the orders 
of the Emperor to put this city in a state to resist a serious at- 
tack, had not been wholly executed ; some palisades had been 
erected. By holding Wilna twenty-four hours longer, it would 
have been easy, by means of distributions of all kinds to the 
stragglers, to have rallied a great number of them, and if the 
evacuation became necessary afterwards, it could have been 
made in some order. It is bitterly to be regretted that in these 
great crises, the Emperor could not have been at the same time 
at the head of his troops and at Paris. After the passage of 
the Berezina, the army having reached its magazines, and ap- 
proached its reinforcements. Napoleon thought was the most 
favourable moment for him to return to France. If the in- 
structions he had left in departing had been followed, the mis- 
fortunes which took place after his departure, would not have 
happened ; they w^ere for the most part caused by the rapidity 
with which the army hastened to reach Wilna. It was not suf-' 
jficiently considered that these continued marches and the exces- 
sive severity of the cold, could only tend to accomplish the 
disorganization of the army. 

" In that city, as at Moscow, Napoleon had given no regu- 
lar orders for retreat." At Wilna, as at Moscow, Napoleon 
had ordered every measure that circumstances exacted. As 
soon as the communications had been established between the 
army and Wilna, he never ceased giving orders, to gather to- 
gether provisions, that the place should be freed of all bag- 
gage that was not wanted by the army, which was at Smorgo- 
ni and Ochmiana.* The letter of the Emperor to the major 

* See in Appendix. 

1. Letter from the Prince of Neufchatel to Prince Eugene. Staiki, De- 
cember 2d. 

2. Letter from the same to the same. Selitze, December 2d. 

3. Letter from the same to General de Wrede. 3d December. 

4. Letter from the same to General Dalbignac. Malodecthzno, 3d De- 
cember, 

5. Letter from the same to the Duke of Belluno. Malodecthzno, 4th De- 
cember. * . ' 

"*> Letter from the same to the Count of Kreptowicze. Malodetchzno. 



276 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

general, under date of Bienitza, 5tli December, 1812, which we 
have already cited, prescribed measures as well for the re-or- 

gauization of the army, as for the evacuation of Wilna of all 
that could be useless to an active army. It terminates thus : 
•• Finally, all the orders for clearing Wilna must be given to- 
morrow, as it is necessary on many accounts.*' 

It is inconceivable, that notwithstanding these incontroverti- 
ble proofs, that Mr. de Segur will persist in his system of re- 
viling. For he might have been convinced by the letters we 
have cited, that, if the orders of the Emperor had been ex- 
ecuted, (and there was nothing to prevent it,) this enormous 
incumbrance of wagons and baggage would not have taken 
place. 

The author, in speaking of the defile of Ponari, says, ** Here, 
in fact, it was, that money, honour, and every remains of dis- 
cipliiie and strength, were completely lost — A covered wagon 
of treasure, which burst open, served as a signal, every one 
rushed to these carriages." 

The following are the facts : the morning of the day in ques- 
tion, a director of the post-office came to Marshal Ney, at 
Wilna, and informed him, that for want of horses, he had been 
obliged to abandon his wagon, in which was a considerable 
sum of money belonging to the government. The marshal 
demanded of him, if, before abandoning it, he had distri 
buted tlie money among the unfortunate soldiers with whom 
tlie road was lined ? On a reply in the negative to this ques- 
tion, Ney expressed a regret, that this money had been left to 
the enemy. The next day, the marshal, leaving Wilna with 
the rear guard, and arriving at the foot of the mountain of 
Ponari. saw a long file of carriages and wagons of treasure 
stopped. Judging that it was impossible to save it, as the ene- 
my was in close pursuit, he ordered that they should be open- 
ed, and that the money which they contained should be given 
to all who wished to take it, his order w as executed. This dis- 
tribution of the treasure is to be regretted without doubt, but 
circumstances called for it. Mr. de Segur, perhaps, would 
Lave rather that the Russians had jprofited by it ! Why need 



BOOK XIL 277 

lie have made it a subject of accusation against the honour of 
the army. 

** On the most exposed part of the mountain, an officer of 
the Emperor, Colonel the Count de Turenne, repulsed the 
Cossacks, and in defiance of their cries of rage and their fire, 
lie distributed, before their eyes, the private treasure of Na- 
poleon to the guards whom he found within his reach. These 
brave men, fighting with one hand, and pollecting the spoils 
with the other, succeeded in saving them. Long afterwards, 
when they were' out of all danger, each man faithfully restored 
the depot that had been intrusted to him. Not a single piece 
of money was lost." . 

It may readily be supposed, that the officer of the palace 
would wish to mention with praise one of his colleagues, the 
Chamberlain Count de Turenne,* keeper of the robes to Na- 
poleon; but how is it, that the exuberance of his imagination 
has not furnished him with something more flattering to Mr 
de Turenne, than representing him as distributing the Empe 
ror's toilet articles,! when the rear guard, commanded by 
Marshal Ney, dispensed him the trouble of keeping off the 
Cossacks. 

Besides, this anecdote, at the same time that it amuses the 
reader, gives him, in the midst of all these disasters, one 
consolation, which is, that after the passage of she defile at 
Ponari, none of the brave soldiers of the guards were de- 
stroyed. 

* The four civil officers of the Emperor's household, who were in the army 
under the orders of the grand marshal, were Mr. de Segur, marshal of the 
chambers ; Ganouville, idem ; Turenne, chamberlain, master of the robes ; 
Beausset, prefect of the palace. 

f These are, no doubt, what the author terms the treasure of their chief; 
the Emperor had no private treasure, that which was distributed at the ino\jin- 
tain of Ponari was the treasure of the army. 



278 CRITICAL EXAmNATION, kc. 



CHAPTER IV. 

The mode of Ney's retreat was not, as is related by the author,. 
He supposes that this marshal made his troops march during 
the night, and fight during the day. If this illustrious war- 
rior had adopted so fatal a system of marching, it is very cer- 
tain that no soldier could have borne it, particularly when we 
consider, that few regular rations were distributed, and that it 
was only during the tiiiie of the bivouac that the soldiers went 
in search of food. 

The melancholy observations that the officer of the palace 
attributes to the army after the passage of the Niemen, in 
casting a last look on that river, contain a recapitulation of 
our misfortunes, presented in a narrow frame, in order that 
they may be in better relief. He adds, *' Two kings, one 
prince, eight marshals, followed by a few officers, generals on 
foot, dispersed and without any attendants j finally, a few hun- 
dred men of the old guard, still armed, were its remains, they 
alone represented it." 

His habitual exaggeration, and his prejudiced manner, may 
be remarked in this short analysis. The following is the real 
enumeration, made at this time, of the force of the French 
army ; 

Troops which repassed the Niemen to Kowno, 

on the 15th December, - - - - 36,000 men 

Tenth corps, - - . - . - 30,000 

Polish corps, under Prince Poniatowski,* - £0,000 

Seventh corps, Saxons and French, under 

Regnier, ..---» 15,000 

Austrian corps, ,....- 26,000 




127,000 men. 

* Prince Poniatowski arrived at Warsaw, the 25th December, bringing 
back 30 pieces. of cannon and his corps, (Manuscript of 18l3j by Bavon 
Fainj voL I. page 30,) 



BOOK XIL 279 

In each regiment they bad a tolerably correct idea of the 
number of men, killed, wounded, and in the hospitals, but no'K^^ 
of those who died by the cold, but they had some information 
of those presumed to be prisoners. Why is it, that, since 
1814, there has been a total silence respecting the number of 
those who have returned, and, that it is said, were so gene- 
rously given up by Alexander ? Not only some return, at the 
present time, but great numbers have remained in the different 
provinces of Russia. Mr. de Segur is far from presenting our 
misfortunes with these consolations. 

As to the guard, at the time of its re-union, ^( 15th Decem- 
ber,) at Wirballen, where it remained the 16th> it was still 
numerous, particularly in men. In the cavalry, the regiment 
of Polish light-troops, alone counted 412 men and upwards and 
200 horses, all good and fit for service, and others that were 
wounded or sick. A great number of the men belonging to 
this regiment, having lost their horses, directed their retreat 
through the woods of Lithuania to Warsaw, where they ar- 
rived, protected as well by the inhabitants as by their know- 
ledge of the language of the country. 

This chapter terminates with a merited eulogy on Marshal 
Ney, who displayed in this memorable campaign, all the 
strength of mind, and fidelity of a hero, and who never aban- 
doned the undertaking till it abandoned him. 



CHAPTER V. 



When the army had reached Gumbinnen, three days' march 
from the Niemen, the Russians slackened their pursuit. Their 
distress was almost as great as our own, and when they saw 
us out of danger from the cold and hunger, they became more 
prudent ; this permitted the King of Naples to afford some rest 
to the troops. Mr. de Segur, in speaking of a council held by 




280 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c, 

this monarch at Gumbiniien, puts in his mouth, words which 
•v^'-erc, says he, the frst symptoms of his defection. He repi*e- 
sents him as "filled with anger against the Emperor, who 
had left him the responsibility of the retreat — and in despair 
for having rejected the propositions of the English." To these 
inconsiderate speeches, Davoust replied with as much force as 
reason. The author adds, '* Murat w as disconcerted, he felt 
himself guilty." 

" This first spark of treachery was then stifled. It is .with 
regret that history commemorates it, as repentance and mis- 
fortune have atoned for the crime." 

It is unfortunately ascertained, that the King of Naples 
was not equal to the circumstances and mission with which 
he was charged, on the departure of the Emperor j few-men 
are endowed with the power of being equally great in misfor- 
tune as in prosperity. From the commencement of his mili- 
taiy career. Napoleon had not experienced a real check ; he 
had not, therefore, as would have happened if his fortune had 
varied, an opportunity of discovering, among his generals, 
some of those singular beings, whose element appeal's to be 
adversity, and who only rise by misfortune. 

This Prince was obliged to content himself with studying 
characters in the chances of w'ar. Murat had always been 
without rcpi-oach, and it required extraordinary events to show 
him in another character. 

But, every thing considered, his defection is not more incon- 
ceivable than those which took place in 1814, from March to 
tlie middle of April, and notwithstanding his acuteness, the 
Emperor could not have foreseen such a blindness. 

All that a sovereign ought to do, to attach to him those who 
serve him, Napoleon had done. He had united them to his 
fortune by two of the most powerful ties, those of interest and 
self-love. No prince, no government could offer them advan- 
tages equivalent to those they enjoyed from the Emperor. 

Besides, Napoleon had studied history too attentively, not 
to be aware of the lot which attends unfortunate princes. He 
knew that there existed, in modern nations, a very influential 
mass of individuals wholly employed with their wealth, their 



BOOK XII, 281 

ease, and their pleasures ; that these men are neither capable 
of a firm constancy in misfortune, or of heavy sacrifices ; that 
their attachment to a government is always proportioned to the 
advantages they derive from it. Thus he was not astonished, 
after his reverses, to see the multitude avoid him, and hasten 
to prostrate themselves at the foot of the new power which re- 
placed his. 

But one circumstance he had no right to expect; it was that 
men who professed noble opinions, who spoke with emphasis 
of their spirit of independence, and who pretended alone to 
have preserved the national feeling, should make his person, 
his actions, and his government, the butt of their attacks and 
their calumnies. 

Let the mighty shado of Napoleon be appeased ! Whilst in- 
grates outrage his memory in the very palaces he bestowed on 
them, the people, who, during his reign, supported almost 
wholly the burthen of the conscription and taxes — the people 
know how to render him justice — they revere his memory, 
and, in the recesses of their huts, exalt his name. 



CHAPTERS YI. VII. VIII. & IX. 

Chapters VI. VII. VIII. and IX. contain the history of- 
the campaign of Marshal Macdonald, and the account of the 
ti'eason of General Yorck. The autlior makes us retrograde 
to the month of August. He praises highly the Prussian troops, 
who fought well. But it was not so with their leader, who, 
according to our author, " had higher views." He establishes 
a grammatical distinction on this subject, between defection 
and treason. The reader will judge which term the conduct 
of an allied general mei-its, who, commanding the rear guard 
of the army, profits by his situation to conclude an armistice 
with the enemy, without the knowledge of the commander in 

Nn 



282 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

chief; who calls secretly around him the remainder of the 
Prussian corps ; w ho escaped from Tilsit in silence and by 
favour of the night, and who thus abandoned, in the face of 
the enemy, the French corps, of which he formed the princi- 
pal force. The opinion of the French historian, on the con- 
duct of General Yorck, will not be ratified by those who value 
honour above all. 

The kind of convention, by which he appears to diminish the 
odious part of it, will tend to absolve all who think that con- 
tracted obligations arc no longer binding when they become 
burthensome, and that they may be abrogated without disgrace. 
We have too high an opinion of the nobleness of the senti- 
ments, hereditary in the family of Mr. de Segur, to believe? 
that if he had maturely reflected, that he would not have hesi- 
tated to brand an action so contrary to all honour- 

Wc are the better assured in our opinion, as he himself says, 
" Six hundred French, Bavarians, and Poles, remained dead 
on these two fields of battle ; their blood accuses the Prussians 
for not having provided, by an additional article, for the safe 
retreat of the leader whom they had deserted." 



CHAPTER X. 

*< In this sudden manner did our left wing tall. Our right 
wing detached itself irom us insensibly, and with the formali- 
ties required by its political position. On the 10th of Decem- 
ber, Schwartzenberg was at Slonim, presenting successively 
van guards towards Minsk, Nowogrodcck, and Bielitza. He 
was still persuaded that the Russians wei*e beaten, and fleeing 
befoi'e the Emperor, when he was informed, at the same time, 
of the Emperor's departure, and the destruction of the grand 
army ; but in so vague a manner, that he was for some time 
witliout any direction." 



BOOK xir. 283 

The Prince of Schwartzenberg was not vaguely apprised of 
the departure of the Em[>eror ; ho was instructed of it as offi- 
cially as possible, by Baron Sturmcr, his secretary, who was 
on a mission to Wilna, and who was sent back to liim with 
this information. Mr. de Segur must have had a very exalt- 
ed opinion of the good faith of the Austrian gcner-al, to believe 
that on the 10th of December, being at Slonim, and having an 
advanced guard towards Minsk, that he was ignorant that on 
16th of November, that is twenty-five days before, that Minsk 
had fallen into the power of the Russians, and that our retreat 
on this point was cut off. Ho adds, " in his embarrassment 
he addressed himself to the French ambassador at Warsaw, 
who authorised him not to sacrifice another man." Thus, 
without inquiring into the fitness of tlie motive of Prince 
Schwartzenberg's application to the French minister, the au- 
thor appears determined to absolve him on all points. 

Yet, he says, a short time afterwards, " and as the interests 
of the Russians agreed with tliat of the Austrians, there was 
very soon a mutual understanding." They understood each 
other so well, that towards the 21st of December, (Mr. dc 
Segur mentions it himself,) <« an order from Alexander sus- 
pended hostilities on tliat point. A moveable armistice, whicli 
was approved by Murat, was immediately concluded ; the two 
generals were to manoeuvre on each other, the Russian on the 
offensive and the Austrian on the defensive, but witliout com- 
ing to blows." 

They were really evolutions of parade, an assault of po- 
liteness and deference, which confined itself to the Russians 
and Austrians alone. "For the corps of Rcgnier, which form- 
ed part of the army of Schwartzenberg, was not included in 
the arrangement." . 

The war continued against this corps, reduced by this de- 
fection to 10,000 men, as it had with Macdonald, after the de- 
parture of the Prussians. But the officer of the palace un- 
blushingly continues, " Schwartzenberg persevered in his loy- 
alty — he covered the whole front of the French line with his 
Austrian troops, and preserved it. Regnier was, it is true, 
overtaken and surprised at Kalisha, but that was in conse- 



284 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c„ 

sequence of halting too long to protect tke flight of some "Po- 
lish hosts." These extracts afford another example of the 
spirit of justice that animates the author. How often have 
we been reduced to regret, in the course of our observations 
on his work, that he has not spared to the French army some 
portion of this treasure of partiality. 

After these faithful displays of the conduct of the Prussians 
and Austrians, follows a recital of the barbarities exercised by 
the inhabitants of Koenigsberg towards our unfortunate wound- 
ed, and a horrible description of the convent of Saint Basil, 
at Wilna, where the Russians permitted their prisoners to die 
of hunger and want, in the midst of the plenty afforded by the 
stores of provisions we had left there. But, in the narrative 
of the French writer, these horrors rouse the humanity (a little 
tardy, it is true,) of the Russian Emperor and his brother, 
who arrived thirteen days afterwards, to remedy them. 



CHAPTER XI. 

The author saySt that " the rallying of the army on the 
Vistula, had been completely illusory." 
The old guard had not altogether more than 500 effective men.* 
The young guard « - . scarcely any. 

The first corps ... - 1800 

The second corps _ - „ 1000 

The third corps - - - 1600 

The fourth corps * = = - 1700 

6600. 

* A detailed report, which we possess, of the five regiments of infantry of 
the old guard, makes the number under arms the 20th of December, 1812, 
1,471. The 15th of January, the young guard was ordered to Fosen, on the 
Shine, to re-orgnise itself, and the old guard went to Paris. 



BOOK XII. . 285 

And, adds he, ** the greater part of these soldiers, the re- 
mains of 600,000 men, could scarcely handle their arms." 

We have already given the state of the aimy on its leaving 
Kowno. Mr. de Segur, at tlie commencement of the cam- 
paign, had enumerated it at 445,000 men j afterwards he ap- 
proaches nearer the truth, in estimating it at 400,000 ; now 
he supposes it 600,000. In the remains he alludes to, he does 
not include the fifth corps, which had arrived since the 25th of 
December, at Warsaw, with 20,000 men and 30 pieces of can- 
non ; and he does not calculate the sixth, the seventh, the 
ninth, the tenth corps, and that of Schwartzenberg. In the 
following page, he says " the troops of Macdonald, and the 
completely fresh corps of Hendelt, preserved their unity. All 
these remains were speedily collected into Dantzic. Thirty- 
iive thousand soldiers, from seventeen different nations, were 
shut up in it." 

The author thus contradicts himself. Why then has he 
given 6,600 men as the remains of 600,000, if it is not to pro- 
pagate an error, and to enlarge our losses, already so great 2 
Was it with these 6,600 men, that a garrison of 35,000 men 
was formed at Dantzic ? Was it moreover from these 6,600 
men that garrisons of 6,000 men at Thorn, of 8,000 at Mod- 
lin, 4,000 at Zamose, &c. were furnished ? 

" Alexander arrested the march of his troops at Kalitch." 
Mr. de Segur, who has exaggerated so greatly the losses of the 
French army, ought to have informed us of those experienced 
by the Russians themselves. 

The army of Kutusof, which at the battle of Krasnow was 
100,000 men, after the evacuation of Wilna by the French, 
was not more than 35,000. The Russians, scarcely masters 
of this city, threw into the hospitals 18,000 sick, of which the 
greater part were from the severity of the cold. 

The author of a sketch of the campaign of 1813, published 
in German, at Weimar, in 1814, enumerates the Russian 
troops who had arrived at that time in Prussia, at 20,000 | 
and those who united at Kalitch, where the Emperor of Rus- 
sia had his head quarters, at 30,000. After having detailed 
the posts of the different Russian corps, he adds, "it is evi- 



286 • CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

dent from this account, that without tlie adherence of Prussia, 
Russia would not at that moment have hcen able to have pur- 
sued her successes, and would Iiavc been forced to limit her 
operations to the Vistula. 

Sir Robert Wilson, in his Table of the Russian power, says 
that there were at this time in the army of Alexander, several 
companies without a single man, and in a great number of bat- 
talions there were not fifty. 



CHAPTER XII. 

The conclusion of the officer of the palace is, tiiat '* the 
star of the north triumphed over that of the south — that the 
direction of the human race is towards the soutli ; it turns its 
back to the north — we cannot with impunity turn back this 
great current of men. — Russian armies have been seen on tlie 
Elbe, and shortly afterwards in Italy — they came to reconnoi- 
tre these countries, some day tliey will come and settle there — 
and that the invasion of the south by the north, recommenced 
by Catharine II. will continue.'* 

Here is an assertion formally established, and supported by 
specious reasons, although expressed in a strange manner. 

Then addressing himself to those whom he terms his com- 
panhms, observes to them, *'' whatever was the motive of our 
expedition, this was the point wliich made it of importance 
to Europe. Its object was to wrest Poland from Russia, its 
result would have been to throw at a greater distance, to Avea- 
ken the torrent, and oppose a new barrier to it.'' 

Here again Mr. de Segur is detected in a flagrant contrsi- 
diction ; the necessity of the expedition is proved by himself.—- 
It would be exacting too much to demand of him if he has as- 
signed the true cause of the war. 

Finally he adds, " was there a man, or a combination of cir- 



BOOK XII, 287 

cumstances so well calculated to insure tlic success of so great 
an enterprise ?" Here again, the confession that the moment 
of the expedition was opportune, breaks forth, and that the 
Emperor was the man who alone could have insured its suc- 
cess. 

Thus the author who endeavoured in the whole course of his 
work to present the Russian expedition as an unjust aggres- 
sion, as caused by the personal ambition of Napoleon, dis- 
avows in these few words, all that he has advanced, and jus- 
tifies the necessity, the aim, and the time of this memorable 
enterprise. But of what importance is this sort of tardy re- 
cantation ! What purpose do these vain eulogies serve, that 
only appear to escape him, to clear his conscience from the 
unjust aspersions with which he has sought to blacken the me- 
mory of this great man ? And has he taken the paijis thus to 
hold up Napoleon to us, as fallen from himself, given up to a 
shameful imbecility, deprived of energy, both moral and phy- 
sical, and to have harassed the mind of the reader by the hor- 
rible pictures scattered through a thousand pages, to return 
to the point at which he should have commenced, that is, with 
truth ! 

He thus terminates : " Comrades, my task is finished j it 
is now for you to render your testimony to the truth of the 
picture ; its colours will no doubt appear pale to your eyes 
and to your hearts, which are still full of these great recollec- 
tions." 

The veterans of the Grand Army do not recognise truth in 
this picture, where their illustrious chief, their sentiments, 
their constancy, their victories, arG so strangely disfigured. 

How can the author believe that liis colours will appear pale, 
Avhen his memory, as he himself observes, only gathers the 
ashes, only recounts disasters, and writes but on a tomb ? 

We can say with him, our task is finished : as much as de- 
pended upon ourselves, it has been painful. We have not un- 
dertaken to correct all tlie errors, or all the injustice with 
which the book abounds ; if so, we should have been carried 
beyond the limits we assigned ourselves. We have not point- 
ed out all the passages which prove that Mr. de Segur has 



288 CRITICAL EXAMINATION, &c. 

only endeavoured to flatter the passions of the moment, wlien 
he wrote his work, and which are extinguished daily. We 
should have hecn obliged to stop at every page, and besides, 
would it not be a calumny on the government, to suppose that 
a work which lowers the glory of our arms, and whicli only 
flatters foreigners, would be a title to military rewards. 

We have very seldom I'emarked the extraordinary style of 
Mr. de Segur, which fortunately will have no imitators ; our 
aim being tod liigh to notice these trifles. We have wished not 
to vindicate the memoi'y of a great man, which sufficiently pro- 
tects itself, and ^^ !*ose name will descend to the latest ages ; not 
to extol the glory of the army, whose renown is beyond our 
reach ; but to pay homage to truth, to cite facts, documents, 
and men, in testimony against a writer, who, abandoning him- 
self to the extravagance of an unregulated imagination, or 
speculating on the taste for violent emotions, contracted by 
the present generation, has sported in a book, romance, poem, 
or melo drama, in two volumes, with all that enjoys the re- 
spect of elevated minds, genius, courage, and misfortune. May 
the soldiers of Napoleon, may the friends of the French glory- 
appreciate the feeling which has directed our pen, and we shall 
feel amply rewarded for our efibrts. 



END OF Cr.ITICAL EXAMINATION. 



APPENDIX. 



NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL, 

^^. Thorn, June 4th, 1812. 

■^y Cousin, write to the Duke of Elcliingen, that when you gave Wm the 
order to obtain twenty days' provisions, you meant that it should be done re- 
gularly and without foraging- the country ; that the conduct of the Wertem- 
bergers has brought teri-or and desolation into Poland ; that it is time to put an. 
end to such actions ; that he sliall express, in the order, his majesty's displea- 
sure against the Wertembergers, and that he shall take the promptest mea- 
sures to prevent the devastation of the country, without which we shall find 
ourselves as in Portugal, &.c. 

NAP0LE6n to THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

mina, July 2d, 1812. 

My Cousin, send back the viceroy's aid, making known to the viceroy 
that, having no news, but aware of the general movement, it is ridiculous 
that he remains stationai-y at Piloni ; that since he knew the Cossacks 
were at Stoklitzi, he might send his light-horse forward to clear the country, 
obtain intelligence, and approach Wilna ; that the news given him by Gene- 
ral R , of 30 or 40,000 Russians being on his left, is destitute of common 

sense; that General R- — preteindshe told him upon hiS right ; that then, 
they were the hussars which were seen in the direction of Stoklitzi ; that all 
these delays vex the Emperor ; tliat the finest opportunities are lost, and 
that all the fatigues of the 4th corps are in consequence entirely fruitless. 

"Write to General R , that I see with surprise he is still at Jizmory ; that 

he must have lost his senses not to have continued on the route to Wilha s 
that, if his artillery was delayed, he might have left a guard of a hundred or 
150 men ; that he sent news to the viceroy of 30 or 40,000 Russians being on 
his right, and this absurd news has influenced the operations of the viceroy. 
Demand of him the reason for giving such information, and order him to an° 
swer without delay. 

Inform the viceroy, that I directed him, on the 28th, to move upon the 
right ; that he should push strong parties of cavalry upon Olita, to gain in« 
telligence of all that transpires ; that he shall approach Wilna with the 4th 
corps, and that he will have upon his right, that is between the Niemen and 
AVilna, the sixth corps, which will push parties upon Merecz arid OlkQniki, 60 
that a junction may be formed with the King^ of Westphalia. 

o 




390 APPENDIX. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Wilna, July 5th, 1812, 
My Cousin, write to the King Westphalia, that I only received to-day hss 
despatch of the 3d July, while I yesterday received his letter of the 4th. 
Inform him, that I am exceedingly dissatisfied that he has nofput all the light 
troops under the orders of Prince Poniatowski at the heels of Bagration, to 
liarass his army and arrest their march ; that, having ai-rived on the 30th at 
Grodno, he sliould have immediately attacked and vigorously pursued the 
enemy. Tell him, it is impossible to manoeuvre worse than he has done, that 
General Reynier, and even the 8th corps, were useless on that occasion ; that 
he ought to have sent Prince Poniatowski with all his disposable foi'ce after 
the enemy ; that on account of his not having conformed to all the rules and 
his instructions, Bagration has had time to make his retreat at his ease ; that 
if Bagi-ation left Wolkowisk on the 30th, he could arrive at Minsk on theTtb.. 
and of what consequence would it be that the king should be there on the 
10th, since Bagration should have gained foiu" days march on him ? Tell him, 
that if Prince Poniatowski had but one division, he should have sent it ; but 
that every thing leads to the belief, that he could have sent the whole corps 
forward. He would not have been compromited, since Bagi-ation had neither 
time to fight nor manoeuvre, and that he only sought to gain ground, know- 
ing well, that he was cut off by the manoeuvres I have executed ; that tlie 
Prince of Eckmiilh is to-day with a part of his corps in front of Vologin, but 
will not be sti-ong enough to check Bagration, since the latter is not embar- 
rassed with anything. Tell him, that all the fruits of my manoeuvres, and the 
most excellent opportunity which has been oflered during the war, have beeii 
lost by this singulal- forgetfulness of the first notions of war, 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

mina, July 7\\\, 1812. 
My Cousin, inform the King of Westphalia, by a letter in cypher, of the 
position of the Prince of Eckmiilh yesterday at 6 ; you will draw it from the 
accompan3'ing statements. Repeat to him the order for hastening his march ; 
tell him, that the intelligence he has given in relation to Bagration is so im- 
perfect as to embarrass us ; that if he knows which way hfe has marched to 
inform us, 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL, , 

irdna, July 7t\i, IS\2. 
My Cousin, the guai'd must march ; its movement should take place on the 
9th, and continue the 10th and 11th. It is necessary that the bridge equip- 
ages, the corps of engineers, the artiller)', and all that accompany it, should 
take six dkys' lialf-rations of provisions with them, and should certainly have 
three quarters or a pound of meat a man. It is, therefore, necessary that, on 
the 10th, ninety thousand rations of bread should be distributed to the guard 
to carry in their knapsacks, which will assure their subsistence for six days, 
three hundred quintals of rice, to distribute a pound to each man, this will 



. APPENDIX. 2.91 

give the guard enough for ten days ; on the 11th and 12th, two convoys of 
bread, of thirty thousand rations each, must follow their^movements from 
Wilna, which will give them bread for four days more ; fini^lly, on the 9th, 
10th, and 11th, let convoys of bread be placed on the carriages at head 
quarters, on the auxiliaiy carriages, on those which have replaced the wag- 
ons of the ninth, tenth, and twelfth, battalions, on those of the eleventh 
battalion, and on all the carriages that arrive in time, so that during the 
days of the 10th and 11th, there may be in part, forty thousand quintals of 
flour in the rear of the guard, which will make three hundred and sixty thou- 
sand rations of bread, or ten days of certain provisions for the guard and 
head quarters ; this joined to the bread carried by the guard, will give twenty 
days' bread — should the army not march, other convoys will arrive ; if it does 
march, it will find resources in the towns ; but I cannot feel tranquil, until I 
am certain that the guard and head quarters have twenty days' provisions 
assured to them, since the guard will march the last, and should give an ex- 
ample of discipline. In this account, you must not include the forty wagons 
belonging to head quarters, containing biscuit, brandy, &c. these must be a 
last resource. — ^^As some biscuit has just come in, let the state of it be examin- 
ed, and fill the biscuit wagons belonging to head-quarters, tliis will be useful 
in any unforeseen event. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Wilna, Jtdy 9th, 1812. 
My Cousin, you must consider the last letter which I wrote to you for the 
Duke of Tarentum, as not having arrived, and substitute the following : — 
The Duke of Reggio has received orders to direct his march on Solok, the 
Duke of Elchingeu upon Kozatschizrta ; the King of Naples is at Widzy. — 
The enemy appears to be concentrated at Dunaberg. The Prince of Eck- 
mlilh is arrived at Minsk. The Hetman PlatofF, and his Cossacks, and the 
corps of Bagration, who were advancing on that place, have been checked, 
and are now marching on Bobruisk. The King of Westphalia is in pur- 
suit of them ; and was yesterday at Mir. The viceroy is advancing on the 
upper Duna ; the guard and the head quarters will leave this in a few days. 
The Emperor intends to march either to Moscow or St. Petersburgh, and by 
this means oblige the army at Dunaberg to go higher up, and free the whole 
of Courland and Livonia. The garrison of Riga, commanded by General Es- 
sen, whose corps has been broken up, is composed of thirty-three battalionSj 
some of them not more than two to three hundred men, all recruits of this 
year, and are not worth consideration. It is probable, that as soon as this 
place is menaced, a division from Dunaberg will be sent there ; for, from the 
information we have, the present garrison cannot properly defend it. The 
Emperor cannot give you positive orders, he can only send general instruc- 
tions, the distance is already very considerable and will soon be more so. — 
March on Jacobstadt and Frederickstadt, and threaten to pass the Duna, this 
movement will oblige the Russian army at Dunaberg to send a detachment on 
the right bank to defend the two passages, &c. 




292 APPENDIX. 



NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

« . Wilna, July 11th, 1812: 

My Cousin, reply to the King- of Westphalia, that it was with astonishment 
you received his letter of the 9tli of July, at two o'clock in the afternoon; 
that the order of the oOth is positive and expressed in these terms, " Tou 
vnist march on JMinsk ; General Herimer will advance on J\'ies-a<J ; but still con- 
tinuing to cover JVarsmc." This means, that tlie first object of General Key- 
nier is to cover AVarsaw ; secondly, should tliere be nothing to fear for the 
Grand Duch)', and the enemy should retire his troops from Volhynia, then to 
march to Nieswj. But as everj- thing seems to prove, that the enemy has left 
.two divisions in Volhynia; it is therefore necessaiy, that General Reynier 
should not lose sight of his principal object, that of covering Warsaw. Check 
therefore his movement on Slonim ; the Prince of Schwartzenberg will pass 
on before him to Nieswj, and then towards the Duna. Let General Reynier 
send some troops to Pinsk, and place tliem in detachments in such a manner 
as to attack in flank any attempt on W:u'saw, should it be menaced. When 
the enemy is aware that they ai'e on the roads to Pinsk, and their corps 
prepared to fall on his flanks, and that he has to fear our arrival in Volhynia, 
it will be too imprudent to venture in the neighbourhood, if he does, it will 
not be with impunity. General Reynier should send back to Praga the i-egi- 
jnent destined for the garrison of that pince, and which has been improperly 
removed. The position of General Reynier in the rear, is therefore useful. 
His majesty is not surprised that you do not comprehend, that instructions 
given at tlie distance of a hundred leagues should appear contradictory, but 
events will elucidate them ; of tliis he does not complain, but that in lieu of 
attending to bis instructions, you pay no respect to them. To cover Warsaw 
it is not necessary to be on the Bug ; if it were so. General Reynier's main 
object being to cover tliis duchy, he ought to have left troops on the Bug, if 
be leai'nt that the enemy had left two divisions in Volhynia. But, as you are 
not informed of whM Bagration has left in Volhynia, as you are ignorant how 
many divisions he has with him, that you are not pursuing him, and that he 
has retreated as quietly as if there were no troops in his rear : all this being- 
contrary to the usages of war, it is not extraordinary that tlie rest is of the 
same nature. General Reynier, according- to the force left by tlie enemy in 
Volhynia, must judge, whetlier to return to Brezesc or ta remain at Sloninr, 
sending some troops to Pinsk. But the principal object, until the enemy re- 
treats from Volhynia, is to place a corps of observation so as to cover War- 
saw, and to attack whatever on the side of Volhinia may menace that duchy 
and the rear of the army. 

Order General Reynier to write directly to the Major General, and to send 
all the information he is possessed of. His Majesty thinks proper to order 
General Reynier to remain in observation for tlie purpose of g-aining- the 
Grand Duchy and not the Prince Schwartzenberg-, many reasons have formed 
his determination on this subject. The king should let Prince Schwartzen- 
berg know, tliat it is my desire that he marches on Nieswj, if Warsaw is not 
stx'ongly menaced. 



APPENDIX, 293 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Glubohoe, Jalij ^Oih, 1812. 
My Cousin, write to the Prince of Echmiilil that I am not satisfied with his 
conduct to the King' of Westphaha, that I only gave him the command in case 
that the re-union took place, and the two armies being on the field of buttle 
a commander would have been necessary, that instead of that he has made 
known this order before the re-union was effected, and when it scarcely com» 
municated Iiy some advanced posts, that after having done this, and after hav- 
ing learnt that the King of Westphalia had retired, he ought to have preserv- 
ed the command, and sent orders to Prince Poniatowsky — that I do not know 
now what is doing on my right, that I have given him a proof of the great 
confidence I have in him, and it appears to me that he has not properly fulfil- 
ed it, since, if he assumed the command, he ought to have maintained it, 
but he would have done better not to have taken it, as he has not joirted the 
King ; that at present, being at a distance, I am ignorant of what passes on 
my right ; that my affairs are suffering, whilst, if he had written to Prince 
Poniatowski, that the King having quitted the command, he would have given 
him directions and my affairs would not have suffered. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL, 

Glubokoe, July 22d, 1812. 
My Cousin, reply to General Reynicr that I authorise him not to send that 
regiment to Praga, and that I think it well placed where he has posted it. Let 
him know that the Duke of Belluno, with the ninth corps, 30,000 Strong, al- 
most all Frenci), will be^at Maricmburg the 1st of August, and that if circum- 
stances should be urgent, and the Duchy of Warsaw really menaced, whilst 
he, General lleynier, shall defend the entrenched camp at Praga and Modlin, 
he will write to the Duke of Belluno, to let him know the urgency of cir- 
cumstanccs, which will induce him to come to his relief. You will add that 
the events of the war are such, that already we menace Moscow and St. Pt- 
tersburg, find also that it is not probable that the enemy thinks of offensive 
operations with indiffci'ent troops, but that it is supposed that 10 or 12,000 
men of their battalions, who are good for nothing in line, may be sent with 
one or two regiments of cavalry to menace the Duchy. The enemy will 
never be mad enough to detach 15 or 20,000 men, of good troops, to War- 
saw, at the time that Petersburg and Moscow are menaced so closely, that 
besides, it is possible, that in a short time I carry tlie war into Volhynia, and 
that in such case they sufier from it. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Witepsk, 2d August, 1812. 

My Cousin, send an officer to Prince de Schwartzenberg to let him know 

that I put the seventh corps under his orders, that he must rally this corps 

and march on Tormasof and Kamenskoi, and give them battle, that he must 

pursue them every where, till he can effect this, Let General Reynier know 



294 APPENDIX. 

that I have given Prince de Schwartzenburg' the superior command of the 
two corps united. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Witepsk, August 3d, 1812, 
My Cousin, you must send to-day, before six in the morning, an intelligent 
and confidential Polish officer to Prince Schwartzenberg, with the duplicate 
of the letter that you wrote him by your aid-de-camp Flahaut, you will let 
him know, that, conformably to the intention manifested by the Emperor of 
Austria, that I wished his corps brought under my immediate orders, that I 
thought the corps of General Reynier would be sufficient to keep the army 
of Volhynia in check, intending also to send a considerable body of Poles by 
Mozyr, in Volhynia, as soon as Prince Schwartzenberg has commenced his 
march. But at present, as the enemy has so vigorously assumed the offensive, 
and the corps of General Reynier has permitted itself to be broken, my wish 
is that he should march with all diligence to repulse the enemy, and prevent 
him from ravaging that part of the country, and as it is cavalry that Reynier 
particularly wants, his cavalry must assume the van ; that 1 desire he will leave 
1000 horses, two batteries of artillery, and a brigade, altogether 4000 men, 
at Nieswj, in order to form a reserve, commanded by a general of brigade, 
who can act according to circumstances, that I leave it to his own judgment 
to increase this reserve to 7 or 8000 men, if he believes he can do it without 
inconvenience ; that Tormasof has a division at Mozyr, and probably two di- 
visions withjiim, that these two divisions can only be composed of third bat- 
talions, as those of Courland, which were overthi-own so easily by the Prus- 
sians, that 200 Italian horse of the Viceroy's also met four of these battalions, 
and overthrew them in one charge, that by the general organization of the 
Russian army, we know that Tormasof ought to have the 27th dinsion, which 
is a new one, and which would form his real force, but that I believe this 27th 
division has not yet joined him, and that in such case it is probable he has re- 
tained the 9th or 15th division, that it is necessary that he should take every 
means to ascertain what divisions the enemy has in Volhynia, independently 
of the third battalions of Tormasof, that we believe that Bagration has pass- 
ed the Borysthenes with six divisions, this being the case, there will remain 
at most, in Volh)^nia, independent of Tormasof 's, three battalions ; that I 
therefore desire that he will march rapidly, attack and overthrow the enemy, 
Kamenskoi and Tormasof, and carry the war into Volhynia, that besides the 
events which may occur, and the precise information he may acquire on the 
number of regular divisions of the enemy in Volhynia, will enable me to 
make known my ulterior intentions. 

P, S. — That the general of brigade, whom he will leave at Nieswj, has or- 
ders to correspond with head-quarters, and the general commandant at 
Minsk, to inform them of whatever mav occur. 



APPENDIX. 295 



NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Witepsk, 12th August, 1812, 
My Cousin, write to the Duke of Castiglione, that you do not understand 
his saying that he has not a single horseman, as he has a fine Saxon regi- 
ment of 700 men, which will be furnished him as soon as he needs them, but 
that at present it is made use of as the guard of the King of Saxony, that he 
has a regiment of Hanoverian dragoons, already 800 strong, and which will 
soon be 1600, that as to expeditions of 60,000 men, it is absurd, that the 
English and Russians have other things to think of, than making descents, that 
Sweden, if she wished to attempt any thing, would attack Norway, that at 
all events this power could not spare more than 15,000 men, that it is always 
necessai-y for him to inspect the coast, that he review the troops, and make 
himself acquainted with the localities. 

THE MAJOR GENERAL TO NAPOLEON. 

Smolensk, 2\BXAugxist, 1SV2. 
Sire, I have the honour to acquaint your majesty that although there are, at 
present, 600 men employed in interring the bodies, this operation is still far 
from being finished; it is almost indispensable to accelerate it, to employ the 
Russian prisoners. I beg your majesty to permit that 200 may be employ- 
ed ; they shall be formed into companies, with officers and subalterns at their 
head, and guarded in such a manner that none of these prisoners will be able 
to escape. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Smolensk, August 24th, 1812, 
My Cousin, You will find enclosed an order on the intendant to furnish 
the Prince of Schwartzenberg a second advance of 500,000 francs. Commu- 
nicate to the prince my satisfaction at the victory he has gained, that to-mor- 
pow I advance on the enemy, who appears to have the intention of taking 
post twenty leagues from here on the road to Moscow, that I desire that he 
will take measures that the troops that the enemy has in Volhynia, do not 
march against me, that I recommend to him to keep them occupied. Write 
to the same import to General Reynier. Let the Prince of Schwartzenberg 
know that I have demanded of the Emperor of Austria, that the promotions 
be made in his corps, and that he will grant them rewards, that on my side I 
oblige myself to grant them according to the report he will make, that I ex- 
pect his propositions. Write to the Duke of Tarentum to let him know what 
has passed, and that I am about advancing. Write also to General St, Cyr ; 
let him know that I am waiting his propositions, in order to grant rewards to 
his corps, that it appears from the Russian bulletins that Wittgenstein has 
only two divisions, formed of battalions of reserve, which are only cognposed 
of recruits, 



29(i APPENDIX. 



NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENEUAL. 

Doroffobonje, Aug^mt 26tli, 1812. 
My Consul, Write to the Duke of Bcllunoto g'o in person to Wilna, to see 
the Duke of Massano, anil to inform himself on alfairs and the state of things, 
that I shall be tlie clay after to-morrow at Wiazma, that is five clays march from 
Moscow, that a battle will probably take place there, which will conduct us 
to Moscow, that as it is possible in this state of things, that the communica- 
tions may' be intercepted, some one must take the command, and act accord- 
ing to circumstances, that 1 have ordered that the 129th regiment, the lllyrian 
regiment, the VVestphalian regiment, which was at Kocnigsberg, and the two 
S?axon reginieuts, be directed to Minsk, that 1 have, besides, posted between 
Minsk and Mohtlow, the division of Dombrouski, 12 battalions strong, and 
u brigade of light cavalry; that it is important that his corps, should appi-oach 
Wilna, anil (bat he sliould direct himself according to circumstances, to be: 
prepared to succour Smolensk, Witepsk, Mohilow, and Minsk, that the divi- 
sion of Dombrouski ought to be sufficient to mainta,in the communication 
from Minsk by Orcha to Smolensk, as it has only to keep in check the Rus- 
sian division of General Hartel, which is at Mozyr, 6 or 8000 strong, the 
most part recruits, and against which lien. Schwartzcnberg also can act, tliat 
the new reinforcements I send to Minsk can also assist if they arc needed, 
and that at all events the movement of the Duke of Bclluno on Minsk and 
Oucha, and fVom thence to SnuJlensk, appears to njc sufficient to maintain the 
rear, tliat I Itavc 4000 men in garrison at Witepsk, and as many at Smolensk, 
that the Duke of llelluno, thus taking post between the Dnieper and the Du- 
na, win, be in ready communication with me, can promptly receive my oi*- 
^dej'S, and will find himself enabled to protect the communications from Minsk 
and Witepsk, as well as those from Smolensk to Moscow, that I suppose that 
General tSouvion St. Gyx has a sufficient force of the second and sixth corps to 
keep Wittgenstein in check, and to have nothing to fear, that (he Duke of 
Tarentum can march on Riga to invest that place; finally. 1 order (lie four half 
brigades, forming 9,000 men, which formed part of Lagrange's division, to 
jiiarch (i) Konow, thus, except General Gouvion St. Oyr is defeated by Gene- 
ral Wittgenstein, and obliged to repass the Duna, the Duke of Belhmo need 
not march to his assistance, this case excepted, he will continue in the direc- 
tion of Smolensk, 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE 

OF BELLUNO. 

I 
■Shni'kotvo, 27th Jhtgust, 9 in the evenin^t 
My Lord, — You have received the order to go to Wilna on leaving Kowno, 
you ought to march in four columns; make each man at Kowno take 10 lbs, of 
vice, which each soldier will carry in a bag; and you will take care that he 
uses but an ounce per day. You will take biscuit for six days, independent of 
all you can convey in your rear in wagons. You will take at Wilija provisions 
to last till you reach Minsk, and from Miijsk to Uorisoli aud JUorisof to Orcha. 



APPENDIX. 297 

From Orcha to Smolensk, your corps must march by divisions, that it may 
reach it in three days ; the cavalry can take the van. Profit by your presence 
to collect all the provisions possible on the road from Wilna to Minsk and' Or- 
cha. The Emperor advancing- on Moscow, your corps cannot arrive too soon 
at Smolensk, in order to keep up our communications, and to act as a reserve. 
His majesty gives you the command of all the troops that arc in Lithuania, 
in the government of Mohilow, of Witepsk, and of Smolensk, that you may di- 
rect them all, as circumstances may exact, towards the general object, this ia 
to maintain the great communication from Wilna by Minsk and Smolensk, with 
head-quarters. You will liave the following troops in Lithuania; the division 
of Dombrowski, seven or eight thousand strong, which is employed to ma- 
noeuvre between Mohilow, Minsk, and Bobruisk; four lllyrian battalions, two 
battalions of the li29th, with their cannon, two battalions of the 33d light in- 
fantry, with their pieces, gone to Smolensk, a battalion of this regiment 
remained at Minsk. Kepeat the order to General Loison for them to 
march ; this will put at your disposal, with the division of Dombrowski, about 
twenty-four battalions. Four half brigades, which form Lagrange's division, 
are at Koenigsburg. I have ordered that tiiey go to Kowno, where these con- 
scripts will remain in reserve. 

The Polish regiments of cavalry and infantry of Lithuania, as they embody 
themselves, will remain in garrison at Wilna, and on the other points; many 
single battalions are at Wilna and Minsk, several detachments are on the roads 
from Glubokoe and Kamen; as soon as they are re-armed and arranged, send 

,them to Smolensk, except those who belong to the tenth corps of Macdonald, 
or the second and sixth. 

The third battalions of the fourth, seventh, and ninth Polish, ought not to 
be incorporated with 4:he line as soon as they arrive at Wilna ; you will direct 
them to Minsk, to keep garrison; they will not rejoin the division of Gerard 
till they are drilled in battalion mana-uvres. The three third battalions of the 
legion of the Vistula will arrive at Smolensk, which will have a garrison of 
five to six thousaiHl men, there will be as many at Witepsk. 

You must observe Bobruisk, until dispositions can be made to take it. You 
must maintain the comm»inication from Wilna to Smolensk, which the enemy 
is endeavouring to cut ofi" with his troops, which may escape Schwartzenberg ; 
this is the first object. You must protect the communication from Smolensk 
to head-quarters, if they are stopped, and advance to the assistance of the army 
if it is necessary, in order to form its reserve. It is not believed that the com- 
munication can be menaced on the Duna. The siege of Uiga will necessarily 
fix the attention of the enemy on the Lower Duna, St. Cyr appears more than 
sufficient to keep the enemy in check. Yet, in case of unforeseen occurrences 
tins object ought to fix your attention. You must also protect the territory of 
Witepsk, Smolensk, and Mohilow. We have five depots of cavalry, Kowno, Me- 
rezc, Glubokoe, Minsk, Lepel. You will form marching squadrons. Order a ge- 
neral movement of all that are in the rear of the army to Smolensk. You will 

•march to Minsk and Smolensk as soon as possible. 

1> p 





29g APPENDIX, 



IJAPOLEON TO THB^HAJOK C.ENEHAI,. 

• ff'iaznWf .•iii^-tmt 30tii, 1813. 

My Cousin, — Oi'der the Kingj of Naples to make :»n ovtlinary march to-mor- 
row, but so as to be within eig-bt or nine leagues of NViazma, and to be the 
next (lay at Gjat, It will be proper, in case of necessity, the Viceroy should 
turn the right of the enemy, and Prince Toniatowski its left, and that the 
three advanced guards should Ije so near, as to charge at the same moment ; 
this will spare blood, and put it out of the enemy's power to resist. Order the 
Viceroy to follow the enemy on the left, ai\d in such a manner as to turn their 
right; to place himself as high up as the King" ot Naples, who is at the village 
of Koslowo, and that to-monvw, the olst. he make a short marcli, to bring him 
vitlvhi eight or nine lejvguos from Winima. Inform the Viceroy, that with all 
liis cavalry, and a good advanced guard of infantry and artillery, he can turn 
the right of the enemy, and take a part in the caimonade, if there slunild be 
any; this will be the only means to spare blood, and accelerate the retreat of 
the enemy. Give the same order to Prince Poniatowski on the right; he 
should turn the left of the enemy. The Prince of Eckmiilh will order his 
jnaivJx so as to be a league in the rear of the king of Naples, and the Duke of 
Elchingen two le:>gues in the rear of the Prince of Eckniiilh. The Duke of 
Treviso will march at ten o'clock in the morning, to reach Fedorowskac in the 
rear of the Duke of Elchingen. The duke of Abrantes will repair to Wiazma, 
will psiss the bridges on the right of the city, aud take up a position a league 
in advjince. ^ 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOK GENEIUI-. 

Gii'.i^ Srptcmlier 2, 1^2. 
My Cousin, — The general stall" is of no use to nie. nor the provost-marshal, 
nor the wagot\ tnaster, nor the officers of the staff, mM\e ssjrve me as they 
sltould do. You have received my orilcr of the day tot; the bagg-agc ; take 
care that the tirst bagg-age 1 order to be burnt is not that o^hc general staifj 
if you have no wagon-master name one, and let all the baggage march under 
bis ilireclion. U is impossible fvu- any thing to be in worse oixlcr than it now is. 



NAPOLEON 10 THE MAJOR GENEUAI 

VJatf the 2(/ St-pu-t'ii'fy, 1$12. 

My Cousin, give orders to the King' of Naples, lo the Prince of Eckmiilh, 
to the Vicerv\v, to Prince Poniatowski, to the Duke of Elchii\gvn, to take 
rest to-day, to rally the troops, at three o'clock let the rc>lls be c;Uled, and 
inform tne of the exact number of men fit for action, let the arms. Civrtridg-es, 
Mtillery, and ambulances, be inspected, and let the soldiers know that \ve 
(u>e ott the eve ivf a battle, and that they must be prepared for it. 

It is necessary, tliat before ten o'clock in the evening, I h.ive st,-itcinents, 
to inform mc of the number of men, infantry and cavalry, the number of 
pic>.'es of .irtillcry, their c.ilibn\ the -number of discharges they will be jvblc 



APPENDIX 299 

to make, the cartridg'es in the caissons, tlic numbef of cartridges per sol- 
dier, the number of flying caissons belong-ing to the regiments, division^, or 
to the corps of urtillory, tlie number of surgeons, the number of dressings 
they will be ablo to make ; these statemlints must also inform me of detach- 
ed men, who will not be present at the action, if it takes place lo-morrow, 
but w'ho will be able to join, if it does not occur for t,wo or three days, indi- 
cating the place where they are, and means of putting tliis into effect. 

These statements must be made witli great attention, as from their result 
my determination will be made up ; they must first comprolipnd all the men 
present at tlie roll calls, and then all those wlio will be present at the battle. 

You will also add, (that I may be informed,) the number of horses which 
ai-e unshod, and the time it will take to shoe the cavalry, and place them in 
a state for action. 

The King of Naples can, if he thinks proper, change his position, by ad- 
vancing his light cavalry and his small guard some wersts; Prince Ponia- 
towski and the Viceroy will also alter their position. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENEUAL. 

Moja/nh, 11th September, 1812. 

My Cousin, write to the Duke of Bclluno, that the 8th Westphalian regi- 
ment, the Saxon regiment of Low, that of Kechteu, the 3d regiment of In- 
fantry formed at Kocnigsberg, the third battalions of the 4th, 7th, and 9th 
Polish regiments, the 8lh, 9th, 10th, and 11th regiments of cavalry, must all 
be directed to Smolensk', that the enemy, attacked in his most vital part> does 
not attend to his extremities ; that he is doing every thing to prevent us from 
entering Moscow, and evinces a resolution to di'ivc us from it as soon as he 
can. It is, tiiercfore, from Smolensk to Moscow, that the numerous troops 
in the rear must be brought up, those of the grand duchy of Lithuania being 
sufficient to protect the rear. It ia also necessary that the Duke of Belluno 
should hold himself in readiness, with his corps united, to advance from Smo- 
lensk to Moscow, in order to reinforce the army, according as the enemy re- 
inforces his. Witepsk is in want of none ; with the few troops it has, the 
enemy, will not disturb it. I will retain no one there, as soon as my hospital 
shall be cleared. 

The Duke of Bclluno mudt, therefore, direct every tiling, squadrons, bat- 
talions, artillery, unattached men, to Smolensk, to come from thence to Mos- 
cow. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Suburb of Moscow, 15th September, 1812. 

My Cousin, order the Duke of Dantzick to come with the young guard to 
the Kremlin, where he will be exclusively charged with the police of that 
quarter. ' 

General Durosnel will fulfil the duties of governor of the city. 

The King of Naples will cause, from the road of Kalomna to the road of 
Troitzka, to be occupied by Prince Poniatowski and hia cavalry. 




goo APPENDIX. 

The Viceroy will establish his head quarters at the barrier of St. Peters- 
burg, and will occupy the road from Troitzka inclusively to that which he 
has possession of. 

The Prince of Eckmiilh will inter-^ept all roads, from that in possession of 
the Viceroy to that of Prince Poniatowski. 
■ The Viceroy and the King of Naples will send out strong parties on the 
road to St. Petersburg and on that taken by the enemy, in order to obtain 
news and pick up stragglers. 

NAPOLEON TO GENERAL LARIBOISIERE. 

Moscow, 18th September, 1812, 
General Lariboisiere, I desire that the two companies of the marines of the 
guard shall each have six pieces of twelve and two howitzers. You will take 
the pieces from the arsenal at Moscow. The caissons are also to be found in 
the arsenal at Moscow. I^he horses and the drivers are to be taken from 
those attached to the caissons you wish to send back. By this means the re- 
serve of the guard will be augmented 16 pieces of cannon. It is equally 
necessary to augment the reserve of the Prince of Eckmiilh with eight pie- 
ces of cannon, six of twelve, and two howitzers, and, if it is necessary, you 
will have them served by the two Prussian companies, who are now attached 
to the old guard. The Prince of Eckmiilh, having a corps of five divisions, 
sixteen pieces in reserve are not sufficient. Report to me, that I may be in- 
formed, when the reserve of the guard is as great as when it left Paris, and 
■when all that were dismounted at Wilna shall have been sent off. There are 
200 small caissons in the arsenal at Moscow. I desire that they may be used ■ 
they can be employed with great rapidity in the bad roads, and can be 
drawn by the horses of the country. 

Make a general report to me on my artillery, and on the means of replac- 
ing all the losses. My intention is not to lose a single piece, but to preserve 
my organisation complete, which is not now too strong. Finally, see if it 
will be possible to establish powder mills at Moscow. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE KING 
OF NAPLES. 

JMoscoru, 22d September, 1822. 4 o'clock in the afternoon. 
Your aid-de-camp has just delivered to the Emperor, your "letter of this 
day, at 5 o'clock in the morning. You will find herewith, a second report 
from the Duke of Istria. The Emperor expects, with impatience, positive 
information. The Cossacks have appeared on the Smolensk road, six or se- 
ven leagues from this. Thirty of them surprised a convoy of fifteen caissons^ 
which they burnt. His majesty has just dictated to me the enclosed letter 
for General Sebastiani. It decrees the penalty of death to every officer who 
shall parley with the enemy's advanced posts, without authority. His majesty 
wishes that they should not correspond with the enemy, except by their can- 
non and muskets. I repeat to you, that the Emperor is very impatient to 
know what to think of the enemy's movements. 



APPENDIX, 301 



THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE 
OF ISTRIA. 

Moscotu, 22d September, 1812, 4 o'clock in the afternoon. 
Marshal, I send you a report from General Sebastlani, just sent by the king, 
and which states that the enemy wiU continue his movement on Kalomna. 
The King' of Naples will have arrived at his advance guard; he wiU attack 
the enemy briskly ; thus in the night we shall have positive information. The 
Emperor desires, that during the night, you will also send him information of 
every thing you may learn, and, particularly, news of Prince Poniatowski, 
and the reports he has made to you of what he has learnt of the Russians, 
You should know what passed on the road from Mojaisk ; but it was nothing 
more, than forty Cossacks surprising, in a village, fifteen of our caissons, 
which they blew up. The Emperor has sent out Major Letort, with 250 dra- 
goons, on the road from Mojaisk, where we slept. Major Letort has orders 
to stop all cavalry on the march, which will speedily give him 1500 to 200O 
men, with whom he will protect the road. All the army is ready for a move- 
ment, and the Emperor Ims decided to di'ive back the enemy behind the 
Oka. Ulterior information, that will be received during the night, from the 
King and yourself, will determine the steps that his majesty will pursue, if 
the army will march upon the road to Tula, or that to Kalomna. If that of 
Tula be taken, the cavalry that you have, that of the guard, the Poles of Po« 
niatowski, the division of infantry of Frederick, will, from your position j. 
form the advance guard. Send us, above all, information as speedily as pos- 
sible. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE 
OF ISTRIA, 

« Moscow, 23d September, 1812. 4 o'clock in the morning: 

I laid before the Emperor your letter of yesterday, of 11 o'clock in the 
evening. Consequently, his majesty expects fresh information before put- 
ting the army in motion. Prince Poniatowski ought to have arrived early 
yesterday at Podolsk, and if you have not information of it, it arises from the 
Cossack scouting parties. The movements you have ordered your cavalry 
to make, ought infallibly to bring you news of the Poles of Prince Ponia- 
towski. His majesty also expects the reports the King ought to have made 
yesterday evening, but which cannot arrive till towards 5 or 6 o'clock in the 
morning, from the advance guard. His majesty approves of all that you pro- 
pose to do. Clear Desna, The five or six hundred Cossacks, who have in- 
fested the road from Mojaisk, have done us much damage ; they have blown 
up fifteen caissons, and taken two squadrons of cavalry, that is, about 200 
horses ; these squadrons belonged to a column that General Lanusse wasi 
bringing up, who imprudently trusted them on his right. They also wished to 
attack a larger train of artillery, but a brisk fire drove them back. As I informed 
you. Major Letort marched yesterday to the palace of Prince Gallitzin, on 
the Mojaisk road, with 200 horse. From the information in your last letter, 
"and that from the King, liis majesty h^ just ordered General St. Sulpice to 




302 APPENliix. 

set out with all his dragoons, to support Major Letort, if it is necessary ; this 
will probably be superfluous, but is no disadvantage, as the marches you are 
making by Podolsk and Desna will entirely drive back the Cossacks from the 
Mojaisk road. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE KIN* 
OF NAPLES. 

Jifoscow, September 23, 1812 — i o'clock in the morning. 
Sire, — The Emperor has received your letter of the 22d of September, at 
eight in the evening. He expects with impatience news from you, as well as 
from the Duke of Istria. Particular information leads us to believe that the 
enemy is no longer at Podolsk. If this is true. Prince Poniatovvski should 
have arrived there yesterday evening, and your majesty will know what mea- 
sures to adopt. The Duke of Istria, on his side, ought to be at Podolsk to- 
day. Private information also states, that the enemy will have evacuated 
Desna, and have retreated to Serpuchow and'Kalouga. Your majesty should 
have but one object, tliat of following with your advance guard the traces of 
the enemj'', &c. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR 'GENERAL. 

Mosco-u), 2od of September, 1812i 
My Cousin, write instantly to Smolensk, to General Baraguay d'Hilliers 
and the Duke of Abrantes, to inform them that the cavalry and artillery which 
compose each convoy, must march together, bivouac in square battalion 
round the convoy, and not separate from it under any pretext whatsoever ; 
that the commander of the convoy must bivouac in the centre — that every 
commander who shall neglect these irtstructions, will be punished as negli- 
gent, and culpable of the loss of tlie convoy. 

Reiterate the oi'ders, that no convoy must leave Smolensk, without it is 
commanded by a superior officer, and escorted by 1,500 men, infantry and 
cavalry, (not comprising in this number, the soldiers of the convoy, whether 
artillery or engineers, or military equipages) for I see with displeasure that 
convoys have been sent off without sufficient troops for their escort. In con- 
sequence of what I have prescribed, issue an order of the day, as to the man- 
ner in which the convoys are to bivouac, and send it to the commanders of 
the 5th an4 6tli convoys. Independent of this order of the day, lay before 
me the orders for the convoys and their escorts — it appears to nie that they 
are very precise on the mode in which convoys are to be guarded — in that 
case, these orders must be re-printed, in order to send them to all comman- 
dants of places, from Kowno to this city. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Moscow, 24ith September, 1812. 
My Cousin, announce to General St. Sulpice, the receipt of his letter ; in- 
form him that I attach great inportance, and rely on him to keep the road 
from Mojaisk to Moscow free?— that he must encamp where he is, it being a 



APPENDIX, 303 

central position, and open a communication.with the Duke of Abrantss, who 
is at Mojaisk ; that I order him, when couriers shall pass, to send out patroles 
to protect them — that Colonel Letort will return again under his orders, and 
that I leave him to keep his troops in detachments, in the place that appears 
the most suitable, that the occupation of Desna will probably drive back the 
enemy. * 

Recommend to him above all, to see that there are patroles sent out to pro- 
tect the couriers. It will be necessary that he should endeavour to ascer- 
tain if there are any detached parties of Cossacks, and to pursue them. I 
suppose that he will have two or three hundred men at the place where Ge- 
neral Lanusse was defeated a few days back, if he has not, let him do it. Co- 
lonel Letort will set out to-day or to-morrow, this will always insure a patrol 
on the road. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE 
OF ISTRIA. 

Mosco-w, 26th of September, 1812. 
Marshal : His majesty cspcctjed to receive news of the King of Naples, be- 
fore sending back to you, your aid-de-camp. We have this moment learntj 
that the King arrived yesterday at 5 o'clock, at Podolsk, where he was joined 
by Prince Poniatowski. You will have been informed of it, and that it will 
have determined the enemy to evacuate Desna, of which, we trust you are 
master at this time. Place the corps of Prince Poniatowski and the third 
corps of cavalry, under the orders of the King. As regards yourself, the Em- 
peror desires that you will take post as a corps of observation, with Colbert's 
brigade, the light cavalry of the first corps, and the division of infantry, com- 
manded by General Frederich, to march to the assistance of the King of Na- 
ples, if it be necessary, and to intercept all roads that the enemy can make 
use of, to advance on our line of obversation, which may have been over, 
looked by the King. Another corps of observation,; composed of the dra- 
goons of the guard, and 1000 infantry, is at the palace of Prince Gallitzin, 
where the Emperor slept. General Guyot, with the chasseurs of the guard, 
two brigades of Bavarian light cavalry, Broussier's division of infantry, and 
six pieces of cannon, is posted half way from Moscow to the palace of Prince 
Gallitzin, to be in readiness to march wherever it may be required. The 
cannonade you heard yesterday morning on your right, was occasioned by an 
attack, in a reconnaisance of the dragoons of the guard, who were badly led 
into action by Major Martod, who was taken or killed. We have lost in this 
pitiful engagement, some dragoons of the guard taken or killed, the major, a 
captain, an adjutant major, and twenty dragoons wounded ; we also lost a 
few infantry. This badly conducted reconnaisance, was surprised by 3000 of 
the enemy, who' had cannon. Open a communication, if you can do it with- 
out inconvenience, with the corps of observation which is on the road from 
Mojaisk to the palace of Prince Gallitzin. (I have, however, strongly re- 
commended to General St, Sulpice, not to compromise the dragoons of the 
guard.) The Emperor orders the King of Naples to pursue the enemy, in 




304 APPENDIX. 

order A drive them several days march from MoscoWj and to determine hun 
to take up his cantonments beyond the Oder. Keep up a constant corres- 
pondence with the King-j and send us information of all you learn, until the 
enemy be driven back. The corps of observation you command is very im- 
portant. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE 
OF ISTRIA. 

JMosco-w, '27th of September — 7 in the morning. 

The Emperor is displeased that you received at your head quarters, the 
two envoys who brought letters. In future you must not receive any one 
from the advance posts ; the letters that are sent to the prisoners, can be re- 
ceived by the videttes, and the bearers sent back immediately. All parleys 
with the enemy, turn to our disadvantage, and serve the end of those who 
propose them. The Emperor thinks that the movement of the enemy has 
only one object, that of covering Kalouga, and to place himself immediately 
on the road to Kiow, by which he hopes to receive his reinforcements. The idea 
of marching to Mojaisk, appears to his majesty as mere boasting— a victorious 
army, says he, would not consider itself in a proper condition to attempt such 
an undertaking ; how then believe that a conquered one, that has abandon- 
ed its fine city, would think of such a movement. 

As to the retreat of the enemy to the Kalouga, after the battle, that would 
have been evidently to invite the French army to march to Moscow. But 
Kutusof has acted properly, in retreating by Moscow ; he threw up entrench- 
ments in several fine positions, and endeavoured to make us believe, that to 
enter Moscow, we should have another battle. This measure was so good, 
that if the caissons under Lariboisiere had brought up 20,000 charges for the 
artillery less, the Emperor must have halted, although the field of battle 
might be the finest that we have seen^ as it would have been impossible to 
carry redoubts without artillery, and much ammunition. 

The Emperor finds what the envoys say, is ridiculous ; that they only lost 
1000 officers, in a battle where the Russians had 40 general officers killed or 
wounded, and 40 to 50,000 .of their best troops put hors de combat. His ma- 
jesty obser\-es, that the greater part of the officers are frorh Moscow, and that 
in all the conversations with them, they have shown a desire that the capi- 
tal should have been defended ; this not having been done, demonstrates the 
weakness of their army. 

The advance guard of our army was wrong in concluding a kind of 
suspension of hostilities with the advance posts of the Cossacks, it appeared 
evident to his majesty that the enemy has advanced his cavalry on his left, 
to do us some injury ; the road from Mojaisk may even be intercepted for se- 
veral days. The enemy has not rested there ; he has posted cavalry on all 
the roads, to be prepared and advised of our movements. 

If the enemy remains in position on the Fakhra, the intention of the Em- 
peror is to march and order him battle ; but it is expected that he will accept 
it, as he has no other object than to ascertain if all our army is before him;, 



*-W'' 



APPENDIX, 



305 



The Emperor desires, 1st. That you will detain the two envoys till the King 
of Naples has passed the Pakhra ; then you will send them ofF in the nighty 
to the advanced posts of the King of Naples, from which they can return to 
their army. 2d, That you will receive no more envoys, but only the des- 
patches which they may bring ; and that you pursue the same conduct as 
regards the letters you may send. The wish of the Emperor to spare his 
troops fatigue, leads him to wish not to march the ai'my to dislodge the ene- 
my ; let it generally be believed that his majesty is arrived at the head of the 
whole army. 

It will be proper, when you parley with the envoys, that you should tell 
them that the Emperor was very desirous that their army had marched to 
Mojaisk, as in such case it would have found itself between two fires. 

Warn all the Generals, Labroussaye, Chastel and Girardin, that they must 
not bring in from the out-posts, either officers or soldiers, who may be sent 
as envoys ; they must merely receive the letters, saying that answers shall 
be returned. 

1 have already advised you, that General St. Sulpice was at the palace of 
the Prince Gallitzin, with the dragoons of the guard ; that General Guyot, 
with the chasseurs of the guard, six pieces of artillery, two brigades of Bava- 
rian cavalry, and Broussier's division of the fourth corps, was in position on 
the road from Mojaisk, half way from Moscow to the palace of Prince Gallit- 
zin. I order the Viceroy to send General Ornano with 500 horse additional, 
and 6 pieces of artillery, to reinforce the brigade of Bavarian cavalry, at pre- 
sent 'with Gen ;ral Guyot, and to take the command of it. 

If any unforeseen events occur, you are authorised to write to General Or- 
nano and General Broussier, to advance on the old road from Moscow to Ka= 
louga, beyond you, either to Fredozino or Szarapowo with their cavalry, in« 
fantry and artillery. As to General Guyot, the chasseurs of the guard, and 
his artillery, they must remain in position on the Moscow road, half way to 
Prince Gallitzin 's palace, the same place they at present occupy, 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL 

Moscoiu, 27th of September, 1812, 
My Cousin, General Paraguay d'Hilliers, may dispose of the Pohsh regi- 
ment as he pleases, so many detachments arrive from the rear, that he ought 
to be enabled to give a severe lesson to the peasants. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE KING 
OF NAPLES. 

Moscoto, 28«A of September, 1812-^2 in the afternoon. 
The Emperor has just received yqur letter of yesterday, 27th, of nine in 
the evening. His majesty has ordered the army to hold itself in readiness to 
march during the night, as it is 2 o'clock, and it will be too late for it to take up 
the line of march to-day ; besides, from this till night, the Emperor will re- 
ceive your information, and that of the Duke of Istria, and these despatches 
will determine him as to the necessity of the army's marching. The Duke 

Qq 




300 APPENDIX. 

of Istria also wrote yesterday, at nine in the evening, from his head quarters, 
four wersts in the rear of GOrki — thus your majesty cannot be turned by Des- 
na. Your majesty must be aware that his despatches are expected with impa- 
tience. The Duke of Istria says also, that the enemy is before him. Gene- 
ral Labroussaye is at Batukinka, behind Gorki. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL TO GENERAL LARIBOISIERE. 

Moscotn, October 1, 1812. 
Count, — the Emperor has just ordered the following plan for the armament 
and fortifications of the Kremlin, 

ARMAMENT. 
The twelve first pieces of cannon to be placed on the Kremlin,- must be 
placed to-day and to-morrow, in the following spots : 
1 piece in tower No. 2. 
3 - - - 4. 
1 ... 8. 
which will protect the river side, 350 toises in length, 

1 piece on tower No. 1. 

2 - - - 16. 
1 - - . 14. 

This will protect the opposite side, 420 toises. 

The other side of the trapezium is neai* 500 toises, you will place on it 

2 pieces on tower No. 12. 

1 - - - 11. 

1 - - - 9. 

These 12 pieces, howitzers of 12 and 3, can be brought to bear on the 

whole circumference of the enclosure, and will defend it entirely. 

Eighteen other pieces are intended to finish the armament of the Kremlin: 
you will point out where they are to be placed. 
FORTIFICATION. 
The most important works to be accomplished at the Kremlin, are 

1. Demolish the building wliich is situated between towers No. 1 and 2. 

2. Open four of the five gates, and surround them with a half moon, so 
that these gates may serve to enter and make sorties from, at the same time 
they are protected from cannon shot, by the palisades and works in ad- 
vance of them. 

3. Cut through several of the interior walls, that the circuit of the place 
can be rapidly made. 

4. Rebuild the lunettes H. K L. joining them to the walls, let^them be 
strongly palisaded, in such a manner that they will bear much artillery. 

5. Finish the gates, and establish kind of covered ways, and small 

on the side of the enclosure, between Towers No. 11 and 8, the parts 
which appear to be the weakest. 

6. Demolish all the buildings, which are around the Kremhn, particularly 
those which are between Towers No. 14 and 8, and more especially a mosque 
with several towers. 



APPENDIX. • g07 

Concert with the general of engineers, as regards the execution of all that 
telates to the Emperor's orders. 

NAPOLEON TO GENERAL LARTBOISIERE. 

jyioscoxv, October 3d, 1822. 
Count Lariboisiere, — I visited yesterday the Work-shops. I saw but little 
activity or energy ; all the information we have procured leads us to believe 
that the enemy had a hundred thousand bullets belonging to this park, and 
they are supposed to be thrown into the water. It bfeing a pond, it will be 
easy to drain it. You must, therefore, work actively at a ditch for this purpose, 
and recover these sunken balls. There has, in the fifteen days we have been 
here, only been tnade ten thousand bullet cartridges, I desire that the day 
after to-morrow you will make your arrangements for completing six thousand 
cannon cartridges a day, which you will store in the Kremlin as fast as they 
are made. Independent of a supply and a half, attached to the corps d'armee 
you must have in reserve half a supply in readiness. I was surprised not to 
find there any of the superior officers of the park. I saw two hundred small 
Kussian caissons ; do you mean to use them or not ? in case they are not used 
for the artillery, they can be used to transport ammunition. Prince Peniatow- 
ski complains of having a hundred caissons too many, and having a larger sup- 
ply of ammunition than is necessary. I desire to know what number of pieces 
lie has, and what ammunition. It appears that he wants to get rid of a hundred 
full caissons. On this I pray to God to have you in his holy keeping. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO HIS MAJESTY 
THE KING OF NAPLES. 

Mosco-w, October 4th, half past four in the morninff. 
His Majesty would have wished, that the horses taken from the carriages 
following the cavalry had been used to draw the caissons which have been left 
behind, his majesty having more occasion for artillery than for wagons for the 
troops. The Emperor has granted the wishes of the fifth corps— he has seen 
with pleasure the good conduct of the Poles. His majesty has received 
your letter of the 2nd of October, at nine o'clock at night ; he is pleased to 
find that you have occupied Woronowo. As you announce your intention to 
write on the morning of the 3d, the Emperor awaits your letter to answer it 
His majesty having determined to send one of his aid-de-camps to the Rus- 
sian commander in chief, desires that you will have a letter written by the 
chief of your staff, to the general commanding the advanced guard of the ene- 
my, in these terms. — " The Emperor having determined to send one of his 
aids-de-camp general to the general in chief Kutusof, it is desired to know 
the day, the hour, and the place where this general will receive him." This 
letter must be addressed to the commander of the Russian advanced guard, 
and a receipt must be required. As is proper. Sire, the Emperor leaves to 
you the choice of the time to take this step, that it may be done at a favoura- 
ble moment, and not in any way have the appearance of being induced by 
circumstances. The aid-de-camp that his majesty intends sending, will pro- 
bably^ arrive this night at your heaS quarters. 




808 • APPENDIX. 

NAPOLKON TO THE MAJOR GENEKAL. 

Moscow, Octobef 5, 1812. 
My Coustin,— The accounts of the inlciulaiit general appear to me to be 
wrong. I can scarcely believe, that it will reiiiiire forty-five tlays to remove 
the wounded from Mojaisk and the convent of Gjatz ; for I will only remark, 
that if nothing is done durinj;- these forty -five days, some must die, and some 
recover; tliereforc, it can only be the remainder that are to be removed, and 
experience has proved, that three montlis after a battle, only a sixth part of 
Uiose w^ounded remain. Thus, reckoning six thousand wo\mded, there wouhj 
only be atihe end of three months, one tluiusand to remove. It is my deter- 
ininatioii to remain master of my line of operations, and to remove the wound- 
ed, &.C. Eic. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Moscow, October 6, 1812. 
My Cousin, — Make known to the Duke of IJclIinu), that 1 have not yet given 
the orders for l>is movement, because it must depend on the motions of the 
enemy; that the Russian army of Moldavia, of three divisions, or 20,000 men, 
infantry, cavalry, and artillery together, passed the Dneiper on the iirst days 
of September; that its object may be Moscow, to reinforce the army of Kutus- 
of, or Volhynia, to reinforce that of TormasoH'. The army of Kiitusof, beaten 
at the battle of Moskowa, is now at Kalouga, whicli induces a belief, that they 
expect reiulorecments may come to them from Moldavia, by the road of Kiow ; 
that in this event, the Duke of Helluno will receive orders to join the grand 
army, either by the route of Jelnia and Kalouga, or in some other way ; if, on 
the contrary, the 20,000 men from Moldavia are gone to sustain Tormasoff, 
this reinforcement will make him 40,000 strong ; but that our right, command- 
ed by Prince Schwartzenberg, will be of equal force, since this Prince, with 
the Austrians, Poles, and Saxons, has abovit 40,000 men : besides, 1 have de- 
manded of the Emperor of Austria, that the corps commanded by the Austrian 
general Reuss, at liCmberg, should be ordered to march, and that Prince 
Swartzeuberg should receive a reinforcement of 10,000 men i on the other 
side, the Emper6r Alexander is reinforcing, as fast as possible, the garrison of 
Riga, and the corps of Wittgenstein, to drive St. Cyr from Polosk, and the 
Duke of Tarcntum from Riga and Dunaberg ; that letters received from 
Prince Swartzeuberg, dated the 24th of September, induce a belief that the 
army at Moldavia, instead of marching on Moscow, has joined the army of 
TormasolV, and reinforced it ; it is therefore necessary to know, what are their 
intentions; that in this state of things, I order the Duke of Rclluno to post his 
troops from Smolensk to •)rcha; that he will keep up a constant correspon- 
dence by all his coTU'iers with tlic Duke of Rassauo; that this minister may 
write and give him all the news that he may learn from the dillerent points , 
that he places a sensible, discreet, and intelligent oflicer near Prince Schwart- 
zenberg, and General Reyuiei- ; that this c^fliccr may learn from the prince and 



APPENDIX. 309 

General Kcynler, what is paBsing, and the true state oi' things ; that he main- 
tain a rej^uhir correspondence with the Governor of Minsk; and, finally, to 
send agents in diflerent directions to learn what is passing ; tliat the division 
of Girard sliall he jjostcd on the side of Orcha, al tlie distance of four or five 
marches from Minsk, three from Witepsk, and four or five from Poh)Kk : that 
Hhe other division, which will be between Orcha and Smolensk, may easily 
support it, and that the third division must be stationed near Smolensk ; by 
this arrangement his troops can rest, and Readily procure provisions ; they 
must all be placed at the upper side of the road, to leave the comnnniication 
open for other troops which may arrive, that this position will tenable them 
cither to m«rcl> on Minsk or Wilna, if the centre of our conmmnications and 
clepotH are threatened, or Marshal St. Cyr is driven from Poiosk, or to execute 
onlcrs he may receive, to come to Moscow by the n>utc of .lelnia and Kaloiiga ; 
or, if the capture of Moscow, and the new slate of things, bave decided tlie 
enemy to reinforce itself witli a part of tiie troops from Moldavia; thus the 
Duke of Bclluuo will form the general reserve, either to succour Marshal St. 
Cyr, or to cover Wilna, or to succour Prince Scliwartzenberg, and cover 
Minsk, or nuarch to Moscow to reinforce the grand army; tliat General Dom- 
hrowski, who has a division of eiglit thousand infantry, and twelve hundred 
Polish horse, under his command, which will make liis corps of four divisions ; 
that the brigade of reserve at Wilna, composed of four regiments of Westpha- 
lians, two battalions of llcsse DarmstacK, who will arrive at the end of tlu8 
month from Swedish Pomerania, together with eight pieces of cannon, will 
also be under his orders; finally, in the course of November, two new divisions 
will unite, one at Warsaw, this is tbe thirty-second division, which will be aug- 
mented by three battalions from Wurtzl)urg, and will remain under the coin- 
mand of General Durotte ; the other at Ka;ningsbevg, this i« the thirty-fourth 
division, which was in Pomerania, under the command of General Morand, 
which also augmented by some battalions, will be e<jually under the command 
of General Loison. Thus, whetlier to march to the siipi)ort of Prince Scliwart- 
zenberg, or to succour General St. Cyr, the Duke of Melluno can 
always unite a mass of forty-thousand men, to wliich, as corresjjondence by 
express is rapid, I shall always be able to give orders ; it must only be in case 
that Minsk or Wilna are threatened that the Duke of Uelluno, should march 
on his own authority to cover tlic grand depots of the army. 'I'he 
Duke of Helluno having the general command of Lithuania, over the Go- 
vernors of Smolensk and Witepsk, should virge activity to the administra- 
tion, and above all, take the necessary measures that tlie reipiisitions in forage 
and grain are brought in ; that there are ovens in Mohilow, Orcha, kasasna, 
and Dubrowna; that plenty of biscuit must be made, and must place himself in 
such a situation, as to have thirty days' jjrovision certain, for his troops, without 
taking any thing from the military stores, or the convoys which may arrive 
from the army. Tbe Duke of Uclluno will lake care to keep up a correspon- 
dence with Witepsk, and he must judge, whether or not to send troops to 
support and maintain this jjoint. He can pt^rsonally inspect the ground, and 
jnake the administration of Mohilow, Witepsk, and Smolensk, exert themselves, 
tf, by any accident the commvinicutioii with Moscow should be cut efl", he will' 



310 APPE^Di*. 

take care to send cavalry and infantry to open it. His head-quavtel'S must b^ 
at Smolensk. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Moscow, 6th October, 1812. 
My Cousin, the Duke of Treviso demands provisions for the police depart- 
ment, also for the foundlings and the Russians who are in the hospitals, for 
the inhabitants who are sick, &c. All these demands are proper, but it is im- 
possible to comply with them. The Russian municipality must form a Rus- 
sian company, who will go by detachments to the villages and take provisions, 
but paying for them. The intendant general will grant the necessary money, 
out of the funds 1 have placed at his disposal; we will furnish to tlie munici- 
pality a magazine, which shall be appropriated for the city, and stocked as I 
have just mentioned. This company may be called the company of the po- 
lice, and if it succeeds, two or three similar to it can be formed, who shall 
scour tlic environs and bring in, but paying for them, all that is necessary for 
the inh.abitants, and above all, for the hospitals ; this is the only method to 
supply them all; speak of it to the Sieur Lesseps, and let n6time be lost. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Moscow, 6th October, 1812. 
• My Cousin, having provided men sufficient for the Duke of Abrantes and 
General Baraguay d'Hilliers, to render them masters of the whole surround- 
ing country, my intention is, that the consequences shall follow. Order,"on 
his responsibility, the Duke of Abrantes to send all the wounded to Wiazma, 
and General Baraguay d'Hilliers to transport them from Wiazma to Smolensk. 
For this purpose, the Duke of Abrantes and General Baraguay d'HiUiers will 
scour the country for ten leagues round, and collect a sufficient number of 
wagons to effect the above purpose, the military wagons which may arrive 
at Mojaisk, may also be employed, provided they are loaded witli flour only, 
and not with clothing and hospitals stores. The flour is to be used for the 
hospitals, ajnd for daily rations, and the wagons are to assist in the transpor- 
tation of the wounded fi-om Mojaisk, Ruzii, and the Abbey, to Wiazma. 

I'hus, the orders to retain the military store wagons, should only be given 
to the Duke of Abrantes, and to the Adjutant commandant Simonin, who 
commands at the Abbey ; these are to employ the wagons to Wiazma, and 
afterwards send them empty from Wiazma to Moscow. Let the intendant 
know of these changes, which will modify the orders he has given. Finally, 
whatever may take place, my will is, that in 8 days from this, there shall 
not be a wounded man at Ruza, at the Abbey, at Mojaisk, or at Gjatz ; inform 
the g'onerals, that this is of the greatest importance. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Mosco-w, 6th October, 1812. 
My Cousin, write to the Duke of Belluno, that hereafter, my will is, that 
the regiments formed of unattached men, either at Koenigsberg, or Witepsk, 
shall not be inti-usted with escorting convoys of ai'tillery. These convoys 



Al'i'ENUlX 311 

ouffht to be cacoi'led by the bftttalioivH, pr parts of battalions, that arc well 
organized. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GRNERAI., 

Moscow, iUh October, 1812. 
My Cousin, inform General Baraguay d'Hilliers, of all the diaiiositions 
which regard the orf^^unization of tlic nintii corps, and the position he must 
maintain. Let liiin know tliat 1 agree willingly to tlie demand he has made, 
to have a Htroiig corps at Wia/.ina, one at (ijatz, and another at DorogoUouje, 
that in conHcquence, i order liim to retain the following troops, whicl» you 
will tell the conunarulant of (ijatz, not to permit to pass that city, and to tin: 
Duke of Abrantes, not to pennit to pass Mojaibk, If they have not already 
passed these points. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

My (Joiisin, the route from Smolensk to Mojaisk being worn out, it will be 
proper for you to write to (ienend Paraguay d'Hilliers, to order the c(jm- 
manduuts oi' I)orogol)ouje, (;jatz, Wiazma, &c. to lay out two roads parallel 
to it, two or three leagues to the right, where he will have resources, as the 
detachments arriving by these roads, touch at Dorogohoujo, Wiazma, and 
Mojaisk, but leave the main road to search for otherw, where there are vil- 
lages and shelter, 

NAPOJ^EON lO rriK MAJOR GENERAL. 

Moiicow, lOth October, 1812, 
My (Jousin, write to the Duke of Belluno, that my will is, that on the re- 
ceipt of the jiresent order, the detachments of cavalry, infantry, artillery, 
military equipages, convoys of artillery, clothing, 8oc. shall he detained a<: 
Smolensk, so that no more shall arrive by the road from Wiazma, and Mo- 
jaisk, which is destroyed : generals and ollicers, who arc coming to the army 
to take their commands, must also halt at Smolensk, except those who arc 
specially ordered on. 

There must Ijc formed at Smolensk, a division of 12,000 infantry, and 4000 
cavalry at least, to whom must be allotted five or six hundred caissons, mili- 
tary ctpiipagcs, convoys of clothing, and artillery, among which must l)e at 
least twelve pieces of cannon for their defence ; they are to be commanded 
by a general of division, three generals of brigade for the infanti7, and three 
generals or colonels of cavalry. This division, consisting of 16 to 18,000 
men, must take provisions at Hmolensk for ten days, and hold themselves in 
reacUnesB to march, not by the old road from Wiazma, which is destroyed, 
hut by a new i-(»ute, which [ will ihtsignate. 

lly tills means, nolliing more will arrive by the old road, neither convoys 
of artillery, milllary e(piipages, clothing, nor detachments of infantry or ca- 
valry, but only couriers, the mail for tiie army, some ofhcers of the general 
staff on service, and a few necessary articles, such as five hundred hand 
mills expected from Paris, the first convoy of which ought to have arrived at 




3^2 APPENrHX. 

Smi^I^UMk. f l>*» rti»d wiU ftlao he upen ft)V the wounile*! iivoyn U»e honjutttls 
Hnd *W Ih*? vlotaohtnt!i\ts goin^ IKnn tl>e aj'in)' to Siuokuwk, but nothing invtiti 
p«aa by it t\H»m Smolensk to Moaoow. Thus^, t«\Iw oau HjjHla be. vsitHblisheil 
oi\ thia TOiul, tttui I shall not bo nnilci- ftppivhtinaious of the dotachnieutM of 
inlUntry i>i" oavnln' con)t\»g' to thc^ avui) , (.utVtrinti' in tht^r jnunh, lUcry nvonth 
ji convoy is* to be- sent oil' by tlie new vovite, (\n\ except ftt the sptit ocoupieil 
by the enemy, WH)0 men can traverao it without danj»e»>. 

Dvttsv luvt the list ot" the ♦ii'st cohunu, ;wiHMshni>' to the intWmativui you hwvf 
ivoeiveU ftnnn SmoteoAk, and h^t «ue know when it will be ready to maivh. I 
«lr«!inly know that it has, lat. Thwe h»l(" bvig-ades fonniug ft,000 nwn } v\l 
tho 4thj 51h, and 6th reghnents \it' infUntry i'wnted at Ka>nij>abei"g', making 
about t\tHJO men ; 3d. two battaliona, i'tu-med of meu ft\Mn the Ivuspitals of 
Witepsk an<l Smolensk, who may he estimate»l at i.CHK). 

bulependent *>f these, I will aee if it will be proper to add to it two bat 
lalions of the lv9th, and oi' the lllyrian ft»^in>eut. This corps, with the de 
taohmeuts oi' all kinds of troops which may ariive at Su»i>leu!*k, ought lo fovn* 
above 15,U0U infaatvy. As to the cavalry, the artillery and military emiipai^es, 
I havts not at pre^ient the detaUs. There will b«? a sutticieut number of i?yne 
r«dii of diviaiona *nd bri^adea to oomtnattd this oM'pa. 

tiSene*"*! lUmii'uay dHiilUera appeai-a out of place at \Via»m:». ^v^ud U>e»v 
gHsneral of brigade, Charriej-e, fwmerly ^^l>lonel of the cV?th, who, beinj*- ai 
live and aealoua, will l>e pn>per tUr that post, he wiU have a colonel w K(\itt< 
tant-couuuandant at i\\MA vuul<*»* his onlers. 

You nwy onler IJenej'al Bax'a^uay vl'UilUera to Smole«ak» to take ctanmand 
ivf the division which is forming- theiv. 

NAPOLEON Tt^ OKNRRAl. lAUlBOSltlKR, 

i.oowal I v>vvUn that ihv.: J.i v.-mi-auu-. v)f Artillery which are at Krftjrt, 
Magxleburji', Spandeau, tUo^iavi, tUiatriu, Stettin, Stralsuad, Thorn, Uant^ick, 
riUavi, auil Kowno, jvjoin the army as ao^nii as they are i-elievevl by the v^J 
i'A>»«pan»ea that I have oixleivd funn the interiw of V'Wknce s by thia you will 
have thea© S2 compames abottt to u»awh, anvl the U> companies which a>v in 
ti,»rris<»n, and you will dispv\se pf then* in the tbUowing- manner ; Three con>- 
paniea tW the ji'uawl, one tVr tl^e third corps, t^ur ft«" the SiXl and S4th divv 
siona i»f iufa«t\y, two *\wthe i)8th 4>vlw«n, two fw the battery ttf J"eaerve ab 
bitched to the ninth ewpa, tw<» \u be aent to \Vil«a, e«e to Minak, three to 
Swolenak. this will mi^ke IS eompxHuies, the ivniaindv'>i' \vill seifve ft>r the ^- 
neral park and supply alUleftciencies, 

mK PmNCK OF NKUFCIUTRL ANP WAORAM TO TUK KING OF 

NA»'l.KS. 

»V»wow, tiot*^ lSth» I813'» 2 in «A* m^t'mn^. 
The Kmpew>r, tVom your reports, and ftxiasn the iutbrmation that ha-* been 
*ent him, thinka that the poaition of >Vm\kno\vo is j;vik1 and oivnn\iand»njji, and 
eau be detruded hy the iirfsvntvy, which will easily cover the cavahy. If yw 
iiu' of the sanve opinion, you are authorised to take \ip that poaitloft- 



APPKNDit. a IS 

t'lir l<jiii|>(M-oi' NtMil oil' lii» liiii'ui'M Hum t)Venll\g't liUtl llu- <luy ultiM' (o luoi- 
row the lu'iiiy will nrrlvt! with yon, t(» utlviiucr; oii the enemy ami Urivi? ihom 
hao.lc. It will rr«]iiirtSi Ihi'Cf tluya (or (h« urniy t<> rvav.U you, hence you will be 
iihliB'etl to i-enmin live ov slJt clftys, but U' you IVur that the enemy will ftttRofc 
you, or thiit the nwture of thini^s venibra it inipoHHihle fov you to uvoUl the losses 
you liHve ejfperlencetl I'ov cig-ht duys |)ust, you hiivf. the reiouwe of tiiking' 
poHt ul Wovonowo. All the wiij^'ons lluit you have sent are luuilt-il with pro- 
visions, Ihowr wiiiih aiTiv»'(l this evcnliif^' will also be dt- spattticd to-inoiTOW. 
'I'he Kinpt-i'or la Vf I'y tifidii'oua that thing's should he so avriuiged, that youi: 
ni'fny should no longer experience the lossus it has hidierto done. Cannot, 
you imke the oommftntlers of coi'ps responsible i' 

riiK I'niNt K OK Nr.iitiiiAi'Ki, and wauuam to the kinq or 

NAI'IdiH. 

Jflurnxm, Qcfsbnv I4th, 181^, IQin /ho evmiitff, 
'I hr I'.niiiniii III rtvrd yuur IcUei' ol' yepteftlfty at noon, the movement on 
Uoj'ouhIv Mppcurs to the I'luipej'or a dillUudt one, ii' Ihc t-neniy hw adviwrd of 
it, since you prrrtcut him yoio> llaidc I'oi" a whole day, I'rinco Ponialowski 
has tO"ilay sent 100 Mick to Moat'ow, tln'y will ln" tiuuiaportnd to Mojaisk, 

The rjupt^i'in- m sending' oil' his vvoumliid to Hniohmsk, at tin- sauiti tiiiia 
thtit h^ is I'tU'lilyiuij; the Kn^udin, in ordi'.r to have no tmiliai'rassnuMds iii I^OM* 
•QWi, Bend, to Mojajsk tht; mh and wouudeil, utul any othecs that may b^ in 
the way, forming' \\\tm into a convoy. Iteconiiolti-e well the road whieh will 
tttfce you to Mitjaisk, that W you are ohiig'ed to retreat belbre the enemy, you 
may be perleelly conversant with Iho route. The Kniperor supposes, that 
your hnK'H'i^K*'" y^""" l'»''l' "•' arlilUiry, and the greatest (tart of your inl'uutry, 
nitty retreat hel'ore \:Uk eiu-my is apprised ol' il. ^i 

In it true, that in repassing the titilllr of Woronowo, your cavalry can b« 
covered by your inl'untry, and in a pomtiou less latii^uiny' than that ii> which 
it wowU Uoiu aleveloountry, wliero it is obliged always to be on tiie alert,^ 
At ttU eventu, it iH very important to procure seve^pftl duys' provisions lor your 
troops i there is at Moscow l.O'iO fpiintals of Hour and much brandy at your 
disposal i order all the wiigons lIuU you liuvo at c<»n)mancl to come for these ar- 
ticles, 'I'hc Duke of (ile.hing.'ii and a part of tlu- Viceroy's corps are not yet 
ftl'rived, added to which, llie Kmpe.ror before piiUing the army in motion, 
wIhUhh tu feel assured that (here will be no conlUsion in Moscow. 
NAI'OI.KON TO Tlir- MA.IOH (lENMItAI., 

y^^o>,L■lrw, itith Oc/ohev, 1818. * 

My tloiisin, repeat (he onler to the Duke of Uclhrid, llm( llin .'rtlDepy send 
horwrs to Wia/.ma, lo recover the <:iiissiinsand ciuTiugetthtloiigingto the arlJ' 
lery, whicii have been ubandonedoii the road, and to convey IhniTi to SmoleuSlJ:, 
NAl'Ol.r.ON I <» INK MA.IOH tlKNl'.UAl,. 

JliiHvuw, lUth iklohur, 1812, 
My <!ousiii, let (he Diiku ol'Treviso know, timl I set out with the army to. 
morrow in pursuit of llw t-neniy, ihui my will is that tlic Duke of Treviso tiik«!S 
lip hii iiuurtew wt the Kremlin w iih ilu» followinjf troops. 




314 APPENDIX. 

1. Laborde's division. 

2. General Charrier's brigade, composed of 4 battalions of dismounted 
cavalry, about 4,000 strong. 

o. Two companies of sappers, 

4. One company of artillery. 

5. Artillery of Laborde's division. 

Finally, one brigade of cavaky 500 sti'ong. With this force the Duke of 
Treviso can guard the city, but using, proper precautions. The intendant 
\vill leave a director, several commissaries of war, and chiefs of his depart- 
ment. The general of engineers will leave a superior officer in command. 
The general of artillery will leave a superior and several other officers of 
artillery. The Duke of Treviso must labour with the greatest activity in 
arming the Kremlin, and will place the pieces he finds there in batttery ; he 
will construct a small breastwork on the level ground; and place in it 4 field 
pieces, to enable him to command the stone bridge, he must keep a strong 
force at the conventof the Prince Echmiilh, the position ofwhich is important 
as it commands the bridge over the Moskwa. All the sick which are here 
must be taken to the Foundling hospital, thei?e are about 3 or 400, they must 
therefore be guarded by a strong force. The magazine of brandy near the 
stone bridge must also be protected by a strong detachment. All the magazines 
which are distant, the Duke of Treviso must have removed to the Kremlin. 
The commandant of the place and the intendant may continue to lodge in the 
governor's quarters, and that occupied by the Duke of Treviso near the 
Kremlin. The generals, superior officers, the superior officers of the ad- 
ministration who remain must lodge in the Kremlin. The Duke of Treviso 
will see if the convent of Marshal Ney requires a guard. It would be useful 
to guard -^ith a detachment the prison entrenched by the Vicei'oy on the 
Petersburg!! road. As for the other places he will guard them if necessary, 
always giving the preference to those nearest the Kremlin. 

To-morrow when the army shall have marched, he will cause a proclamation 
to be made through the municipality, to announce to the inhabitants that the 
rumours of an evacuation are false, that the anny is advancing on Kolouga, 
Tula and Briansk, to take possession of these important places, and of the 
factories of arms which are situated there ; to engage the inhabitants to pre- 
serve the police of the city, and to prevent the enemy from accomplishing the 
ruin of the city. He will commence the works on the Kremhn to-morrow, 
and take care that they be pursued with the greatest activity; he will send out 
strong patrols through the city, pai'ticulai'ly one the side of the Mojaisk and 
Kalouga gatcvs, in order to protect all convoys or regiments that maybe on 
the road from Mojaisk to this place. Roguet's division will remain here all 
tormorrow, it must march to-morrow evening escorting the treasure and the 
staff of the intendant general. The Duke of Treviso must keep up a severe 
police, he must shoot every Russian soldier found in the streets, and give or- 
ders to all those who are in the liospitals not to leave them. He must not 
place weak posts in any spot, to avoid any danger from the malevolence of the 
peasants, or attacks from the Cossacks. Finally, the Duke of Treviso must 
collect all the provisions possible, he must have a great quantity of biscuit 




APPENDIX. 



315 



made, he must insui'e himself provisions for a month at least, in flour, pota- 
toes, sour-crout, brandy, &c. He must keep these provisions for urg-ent cir- 
cumstances, grinding in all the mills to supply the daily consumption. 
Take care to give the Duke of Treviso a cipher, that the correspondence 
with him may be free and ceitain. 

NAPOLEON TO GENERAL LARIBOSIERE. 

18th October, 1812. 

General, I fix my head-quarters to-night at the Kalouga gate, vi^here all the 
army will bivouack. To-morrow I shall commence the march in search of 
the enemy. 

The Duke of Treviso, with 10,000 men, will remain in the city, and under 
all circumstances will defend the Kremlin. It is therefore necessary, that all 
the caissons, and carnages of every description, must be collected to-morrow 
morning at the Ki'emlin. It is possible I may return to Moscow : therefore, 
nothing of value must be destroyed, such as powder, musket and cannon 
cartridges, lead to make balls; but the saltpetre and sulphur may be burnt, I 
have a sufficiency of powder,- the store houses and magazines which are 
around the city may also be burnt. The Russian caissons and other materials 
which cannot be transported to the Kremlin, must be burnt to-morrow at eight 
in the morning with the sulphur and saltpetre. 

The Duke of Treviso commands at Moscow. A superior officer of artillery, 
with some magazine keepers, must be left there ; also, a company of artil- 
lery for the service of the pickets which act as a rampart, and four officers of 
artillery attached to the Kremlin for that important service. 

It is necessary to have as many caissons as possible with the army, where- 
fore the 400 horses belonging to the bridge equipages, must be attached to 
the caissons we have, and follow the army. The general in chief's staff will 
set out to-morrow under escort of a division of infantry. 

Write to the Duke of Treviso, to let him know of the colonel, officers, and 
company of artillery you leave him, and all the details relative to the artillery 
in the Kremfin. The company of artillery must be employed to-morrow and 
the next day in strengthening the defences of the Kremlin, charging obuses, 
bombs, and grenades, and taking every measure which may insure the de- 
fence of that place. 

The officers of artillery charged with blowing up the Kremlin, when it will 
be time, will remain at that place. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Krasnoto Pachra, 21st October, 1812. 
My Cousin, Let the Duke of Treviso know, that as soon as his operations 
at Moscow shall have been finished, that is, on the 23d, at 3 in the morning, 
he must commence his march, and arrive at Kublnshoe on the 24th, that from 
that place, instead of going to Mojaisk, he must direct his march on Wereia, 
where he must arrive the 25th. He will thus act intermediately between Mo- 
jaisk, where the Duke of Abrantes is, and Borosk, where the army will be ; 




316 



APPENDIX. 



he had better send officers to Fominskoe, to give information as to his march. 
He must take with him the adjutant commandant, Bourmont, the Bavai-ians, 
and the Spaniards who are at the palace of Gahtzin, all the Westphalians 
from the first and second posts, unite them, and send them to Mojaisk. If 
they are not in sufficient numbers, they must be protected by cavalry. The 
Duke of Treviso will instruct the Duke of Abrantes on every thing relative 
to the evacuation of Moscow. It is necessary that he should write to us to- 
morrow, the 22d, not by the route of Desna, but by that of Szarapowo and 
Fominskoe. The 23d he must write by the route of Mojaisk. His officer 
must leave the road from Kubinskoe, to arrive at Fominskoe ; head-quarters 
will probably be at Borousk, or Fominskoe, on the 23d; Whether the. Duke 
of Treviso begins his operations to.-morrow, the 22d, at 3 in the morning, or 
on the 23d, at the same hour, as 1 afterwards ordered him, he must pursue 
the same course. By this means the Duke of Treviso will be considered as 
the rear guard of the army. 

I cannot too strongly recommend to him to place the men who remain In 
the hospitals, on the wagons of the young guard, on those of the dismount- 
ed cavalry, and upon all he can find ; for as the Romans gave civic crowns to 
those who saved their fellow citizens, the Duke of Treviso will merit one, if 
he shall save soldiers; that he must mount them upon his horses, and those of 
all his officers, that it was thus the Emperor acted at St. Jean d' Acre, that he 
ought to adopt this measure the more, as the moment the convoy shall have 
rejoined the army, wagons and horses will be allotted to them, which the con- 
sumption of the load of provisions will have rendered useless, that the Em- 
peror hopes that he will have the satisfaction of testifying to the Duke of Tre- 
viso his gratitude for having saved for him 500 men, that he must, of course, 
commence with the officers, then the subalterns, preferring the French, that 
he must assemble all the generals and officers under his command, to make 
them sensible of the importance of this measure, and how much they will 
merit from the Emperor by having saved him 500 men. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Fominskoe, 23d October, 1812. 

My Cousin, Write to the Prince Ponlatowski, that all the marching regi- 
ments of infantry, cavalry, the batteries of artillery, and other matters, that 
the Duke of Abrantes will send to Wereia, will be under his command, and 
that when he receives the order to march he will leave nothing behind him, 
but carry every thing with him until he rejoins the army. Let him also know 
that he must not send his sick and wounded to Mojaisk, which would impede 
this route, already too much encumbered, that he had better keep them with 
him. 

Write to General Teste, who commands at Wiazma, and send your letter 
by the officer whom you will send to Prince Poniatowski, who will forward 
it to the Duke of Abrantes to transmit ; in this letter you will inform General 
Teste of the intention of the Emperor that General Evers, with a column of 
from three to four thousand men, infantry, cavahy, and artillery, selecting es- 
pecially the marching regiments, who are going to rejoin the army, should di- 




APPENDIX. 3j^7 

rect his march from Wlazma upon Jukhnow, eigli*een leagues from Wiazma, 
and from thence push his posts on, to the intersection of the roads to Zna- 
manskoe. The general will carry with him the couriers wlio shall have ar- 
rived from Smolensk ; he will place at each post, that is to say, at Sosowa, 
Trofimowa, and Andriewka, detachments of infantry of a hundred men, and 
a picket of cavahy, under the orders of the commandant of the place, who 
will entrench themselves in the houses to avoid the attacks of the Cossacks 
and peasants. Order General Teste to write to Smolensk to give information 
that the army is directing its march onKalouga, and from thence will take up its 
line of operations on Jelnia. Give ordei-s to General Teste to retain all the 
expresses which may be passing from Wiazma to Juhknow, where it is pro- 
bable the junction will soon be made, that is to say, from the 25th to the 

srth. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Borosk, 24th October, 1812. 

My Cousin, Write to the Duke of Belluno, in cipher, because he cannot 
receive the letter before the 26th, and then he will have seen General Nan- 
souty. Let him know that being still without couriers, I do not know the late 
situation of affairs on his side ; that I am ignorant if events have forced him 
to make a movement, that in case he has not, and that the division of Girard 
is disposable, as well as the light cavalry, I desire that he may immediately 
march with his troops towards Jelnia, and push them on the road to Kalouga, 
to meet the army, for the purpose of forming our junction, if they can begin 
their march on the 26th, they may by the 30th be within five marches of Ka- 
louga, where I shall establish my line of operations, first by Wiazma, Jukh- 
now, and Znamenskoe, until we form a junction with him ; then I shall es- 
tabUsh it by Smolensk and Jelnia; in thus overrunning these forty leagues, 
he must be careful to organize this part of his route, by placing at each post 
a commandant, a detachment of an hundred men, and a relay to serve as 
couriers ; but this must not interfere in any way with liis decision, should any 
unexpected event arise. 

Explain clearly to the Duke of Belluno that the army has united at Borosk ; 
that Moscow has been evacuated after blowing up the Kremhn, and that the 
army is advancing on Kalouga ; that the province of Kalouga is one of the 
most abundant in Russia, and that in fact we haVe here plenty of every thing, 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO GENERAL 
CHARPENTIER. 

Wiazma, J^ovember 1st, 1812. 
The Emperor orders, General, that you send an officer of your staff to 
Marshal St. Cyr and the Duke of Belluno, to inform them that the army, 
which is now, the 1st of November, at Wiazma, will be, the 3d, at Doro- 
gobouje ; that we expect with impatience to hearfi-om them ; his Majesty sup- 
poses that the Duke of Belluno will have already taken an offensive position, 
and driven the enemy from Polotzk. You will also send an officer to the go- 
vernor of Mohilow to inform him of the movement of the army ; you will 




318 



APPENDIX. 



** 



add that this is a volunlai>j%novement, that it is a manoeuvi'e to enable us to 
reach the armies which form our wing-s ; that sinc^ our dei)arture from the 
environs of Moscow, we have no iutcDig-ence of the enemy, except through 
some Cossacks. Order him, from me, to forward as much provision as possi- 
ble to Smolensk. 

Make known, also, the movements of the army, and the motives of them, 
to the governor of Witepsk ; order him to have a great deal of bread pre- 
pared, because part of the army must be provisioned there. Make known to 
General Baraguay d'FIillicrs the movements of the army, &c. Stc. 1 have be- 
fore told you tluit this general must not commit himself; renew to him, from 
me, tliis advice. 

Inform the governor of Minsk that the army is manoeuvring to approach a 
hundred leagues nearer to its wings, with the ol)ject of reaching Poland, and a 
friendly country. Send me by to-morrow night, or on the 3d, in the morning, to 
Dorogoboujc, a statement of the amount of provisions, grain, flour, &c. ar- 
tillery, harnessed or unharnessed, and of the munitions of every kind to be 
found in Smolensk. Let me know, in all its details, the news, direct or indi- 
rect; that you can obtain of the movements of the Duke of IJclluno, Gene- 
ral St. (yyr, and I'rince Scliwartzenbcrg. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Jfiazma, JVovember 2d, 1812. 
My Cousin, Write to the Duke of Reggio, that 1 have learnt with a lively 
satisfaction, that his wound is healedf and that he was in a state to re-enter 
the service ; it is, therefore, my desire that he returns to the command of the 
second corps. Inform the Duke of Belluno that I aro acquainted with the 
events in Polotzk, and his march on that quarter, that I hope Wittgenstein 
is repulsed, and that he has regained Polotzk. Write to him in cipher that 
the army is in march, as I have already informed him ; tliat the winter is too 
long for me to ])ass it at a distance from my flanks ; that it is possible I shall 
place my right on the Duna, and n)y left on the Uoryslhencs, and by this 
means we shall find ourselves in contact. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE 
OF BELLUNO. 

Mihakwka, JVovember 6th, 1812, 
Duke of BeUuno, 1 have just placed before his majesty, the Emperor, your 
letter of tlic 2d of Novcmlier, wliieh reached nic this moment by express. 
His majesty cannot conceive vi'hy, after uniting to your troops the second 
corps d'armce, you did not take the oflcnsive vigorously. By halting before 
the enemy, you have risked losing every tiling, from the supei-iority of his 
light cavalry, enal)ling him to cut off our communications. The Empei'or 
orders you to marcii on General Wittgenstein, and drive him over the Duna, 
to retake PoU)tzk, and force Wittgenstein to abandon this bank. The Empe- 
ror will be at Smolensk the day after to-morrow, anjiounce to him your vic- 
tory, wliich is undoubted, with the troops you have.. 



Mm 



^j.:^,.h}ms%i 



APPENDIX. 319 



PRINCE OP NEUFCHATEL AND WAfillAM TO THE DUKE OF 
liELLUNO. 

Mikaleioka,. JVovember 7th, 1812. 

I have placed before the eyes of the Emperor your letter of the 2d. — As 
llie army will be at Siuolensk to-morrow, it Ls nccessaj-y that you should ma- 
nojuvre, 

Ist, To drive the enemy 1)eyond the Duna. 

2d, To maintain a constant communication with the Emperor and the ar- 
my. YoM must be sensible of the importance and necessity of this. 

THE PllINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGIIAM TO THE DUKE 
OF BELLUNO. 

Smolensk, JSToveinber 9th, 1812 — at night. 
Duke of Belluno, I received your letter of the 4th, at Smolensk. 1 placed 
it before the Emjjcror; liis majesty has seen with rcgTct tliat you were un 
certain of marching. Tliis uncertainty has already been injurious. I inform- 
ed your adjutant commandant All)ignac, that it was the intention of tlie Em- 
peror tliat you should niarch direct to the enemy, in the direction of Polotzk 
— and that you should drive him beyond the Duna. Tlie greatest part of 
Wittgenstein's troops are militia, who have not been six weeks drilled. His 
majesty expects to hear from you. Let us know who occupies Bcszenkhow- 
iczi and Ula. You have not a moment to lose in marching on the enem}', 
and it is highly important that you do so. Your principal instructions were 
to defend Minsk and Wilna, in which are the magazines of the army ; this 
also is very important. Two couriers to tlie Emperor are missing, which 
arises from the retrograde movement you made towards Senno, and which 
has uncovered the whole t)f the country to the enemy. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE 
OF BELLUNO. 

Smolensk, Uth of J^ovcmbcv, 1812. 
Marshal : Adjutant commandant d'yVlbignac, carried you the orders of the 
Emperor, under date of tlie 7th of November, an officer of the stall' oi" Gene- 
ral Charpcntier, took them in duplicate the 9tli. Your aid-de-camp. Colonel 
Cliateau, has this moment arrived and handed me your letter of the 9th. His 
majesty has seen with pleasure the advantages that yo\ir advance guard have 
obtained over the enemy, in the alf'air of posts, and on your report, has named 
General Fourrier a general of division. 'I'hls mark of the Emperor's good 
will, ought to stimulate him to merit others, in the battle wiiich will take 
place soon. His majesty is about to march with a part of the army to Orcha, 
but this movement can only take place slowly. It becomes the more urgent 
that you should attack Wittgenstein ; if this general has fixed his camp in an 
advantageous position, where it will be difficult to give him battle, it is easy 
for you to manoeuvre in .such a manner, as to cut off his retreat and his com- 
nuuiications on the Duna. You milst give up the idea that Wittgenstein will 




320 APPENDIX. 

not permit Jiirnselfto be cut off from that river. With the troops you havcj 
the Emperor is not doubtful of your success j it will be of the greatest im- 
portance, if it takes place^ speedily, it will enable the Emperor to occupy 
Witepsk, and to take up winter quarters, between that city, Orcha and Mohi- 
low, and along the Duna to Polotzk. Winter quarters tluis established, 
ought to give us peace in the course of the winter, or prepare us for certain 
success in the next campaign, in openly menacing St. Petersburg. If, on the 
contrary, you are tardy in attacking Wittgenstein, General Kutusof, will have 
time to unite with that general at Witepsk, and then we cannot dislodge 
them from that position but by a general battle, which cannot be undertaken 
this winter ; we would therefore be obliged to take up winter quarters, in 
leaving the Duna and a part of Lithuania to the enemy, and hence in the next 
campaign, the enemy will be placed in a better military position than we. 
You perceive, Marshal, the consequences of these dispositions. 

The grand armies, both French and Russian, are fatigued — they may take 
positions by marching, but neither the one nor the other is in a condition to 
enter into a great battle for the advantage of a post. Your army, on the con- 
trary, and that of General Wittgenstein, are under the necessity of engaging 
before going into winter quai-ters- — the sooner the better. The victory will 
be complete for you, if you oblige Wittgenstein to repass the Duna, and that 
a French corps can occupy Witepsk. If your corps is beaten, which is not 
probable from the organisation of Wittgenstein's corps, composed in part of 
recruits, then his majesty will i-esolve on his winter quarters. Wittgenstein 
has every thing to gain by I'emaining in position, and you every thing to lose. 
Communicate this letter to the Duke of Reggio, and concert together on 
giving battle, which will be of the greatest importance as regards future ope- 
rations. Tlie Emperor, Marshal, trusts to your fidelity, your zeal, and your 
talents, in a circumstance where your success over the enemy is of so great 
importance, as regards the winter quarters of the ai'mies, and the advantage 
of operations in the next campaign. , 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Smoleiisk, 14th November, 1812. 
My Cousin, write to the Duke of Elchingen, that I am going to Krasnow — 
that it is necessary that he should continue to form the rear guard — that the 
Prince of Eckmiilh will support him — that he ought to remain in the position 
he at pi'esent occujnes, all to-day — that to-morrow the 15th, he will take 
post at the convent and suburb ; and that on the 16th, he will blow up the 
city on leaving it, or he must simply take post at the head of the bridge, and 
not blow up the city till the 17th. — If all is not ready, that it is necessary he 
should concert with the Prince of Eckmiilh, and that I recommend to him 
above all, to take measures to insure the destruction of the cannon and am- 
munition, and that lie leaves as few stragglers as possible in the place. 



APPENDIX, 321 



THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE PRINCE 
OF ECKMULII. 

Smolensk, 14:th JVuvember — 7 in the morning. 

Prince : The Emperor's wish is, that you should support the Duke of El- 
chingen, in the retreat he is making with the rear guard. The Viceroy set- 
ting out to-morrow the 15th, for Krasnow, you will relieve and occupy such 
of his posts as appear necessary, and which the Viceroy will be enabled to 
evacuate. 

The Emperor's intention is, that you fall back, with your corps and that 
of the Duke of Elchingen, on Krasnow, making your movement the 16th or 
17th. General Charpentier with his garrison, composed of the third Polish 
battalions and a regiment of cavalry, must leave the city. Before you leave 
it, blow up the towers on the walls of Smolensk, by setting fire to mines al- 
ready prepared — you will see tliat the ammuniiion is destroyed, and burn all 
the caissons that cannot be carried off, as well as the muskets. As to the 
cannon that cannot be brought away, let the artillerymen saw off the trun- 
nions, and bury them. Generals Chasseloupe and Lariboisiere will remain 
here to execute each in his own department, the above orders. 

You will be careful, Marshal, to order the patroles not to permit any French 
stragglers to remain. You will also take measures to leave as few sick in the 
hospitals as possible. 

PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF 
ABRANTES. 

Liady, 17th JVoveinber, 1812. 8 o'clock in the evenings 
My Lord, you must continue your movement, in order to reach Dubrowna 
to sleep to-morrow, from whence you will send an officer to where the Em- 
peror will halt, between Liady and Dubrowna, that I may despatch orders to 
you ; but still, if you do not receive any, you must, after to-morrow morn- 
ing, continue your march to Orcha ; there you must take post, taking care to 
guard the bridge ; you must endeavour to establish the greatest order in the 
city, and distribute rations to your corps In a regular manner to those under 
arms ; you must detain at Dubrowna and Orcha all unattached men, and class 
them by their corps ; you must hinder all kinds of pillage and all excesses 
committed by the stragglers ; make distributions to them in regular form, 
and if there are any who pillage and behave badly, have them taken before 
a military tribunal and shot, to serve as an example. We shall arrive at the 
line, where the army is to halt and re-organise ; we must therefore econo- 
mise in the provisions and resources." General d'Alorma and General Jomini 
are at Orcha ; they have similar orders to those given to you above. Over- 
look, Marshal, their execution ; the Emperor desires it particularly. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL, 

Dubrotona, \S>th JVozembery 1812, 
My Cousin, write to the governor of Minsk, that I shall be at Orcha to- 

Ss 




322 APPENDIX. 

morrow ; let him know tliat I have ordered the second corps, with a division 
of cuirassiers and one hundred pieces of cannon, commanded by the Duke 
of Regg-io, to march in all haste directly to Borisof, to insure this important 
post, and from thence to march to Minsk. In the mean time, General Dom~ 
browski will march to that place with his division, and observe the move- 
ments of the corps at Minsk. Recommend to him to send couriers to the 
Duke of Bassano and to Prince de Schwartzenberg-, and to be careful to 
write to you frequently. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE 
OF BELLUNO. 

Dubroivna, 19th JVovember, 1812. 3 o'clock in the mornings 
I send you. Marshal, by the aid-de-camp of the Duke of Reg-gio, the du- 
plicate of the orders that I addressed to you yesterday by your aid-de-camp. 
The Emperor will arrive at Orcha to-day at noon. It is necessary. Mar- 
shal, the position you will take be nearer Borisof, Wilna, and Orcha, than the 
enemy's army. Endeavour to mask the movement of the Duke of Reggio, 
and cause a belief, on the contrary, that the Emperor is advancing on Gene- 
ral Wittgenstein, a manoeuvre natural enough. The intention of his majesty 
is to march to Minsk, and when he is master of that city, to take the line of 
the Berezina. It will therefore be probable that you may receive an order 
to march to Berezina, to cover from thence the Wilna road, and to be in 
communication with the 6th corps. Study this movement and let me know 
your observations. 

As soon as you shall have informed me of the state of the artillery, which 
you can cede to the other coi-ps, I will send you orders as to the point where 
it may be sent. I have ordered General Nansouty to send you a cipher. I 
•think he may have left it with the Duke of Bassano, Avho perhaps may have 
sent it you • let me know if you have received it, in order that in the letters 
some words may be written in cipher, which will prevent these letters from 
being useful to the enemy, in case they fall into his hands. This measure is 
indispensable, from the great number of Cossacks, who are to be found 
every where. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL TO THE DUKE OF REGGIO. 

Head-quarters, near Kokha7ioxv, 22d JVovember, 1812. Half 
after 2 o'clock in the morni7ig. 
■ My Lord, I have received your letter of the 21st ; his majesty sees witli 
pleasure that you will be at Borisof to-day ; the Emperor hopes that the 
governor general of Minsk will have felt the necessity there existed for 
guarding the bridge, which affords the passage. General Dombrowski should 
have arrived the 20th, with a part of his division, and would place this im- 
portant point out of danger of any attack. 

If the enemy have taken possession of the entrance to the bridge, and 
shall have burnt it in such a manner that it cannot be passed, it will be a 
great misfortune, and General Dombrowski will be very culpable for the 




APPENDIX. 32S 

wrong direction he has taken with his division. It will be necessary that you 
should personally observe if there are means of passing the Berezina at any 
point ; and in case it would be dangerous, make aiTangements to march to 
Lepel. But the Emperor hopes that the governor of Minsk has not given 
up the passage to the bridge to cavalry, and that General Dombrowski will 
arrive, and afterwards your corps. Leave officers in the rear, at different 
stations, that the important news from Borisof may i-each us speedily. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Bobr, 2-od November, 1812. 
My Cousin, wi'ite to the Duke of Belluno, that he ought to be at Kolope- 
niczi this evening ; let him know that I am at Bobr, that the Duke of Reggio 
is at Borisof, that it is important that he intercepts the road from Lepel as he 
proposed, towards Baran, to be certain that Wittgenstein sends no troops 
against the Duke of Reggio ; that if he does, they must be vigorously at- 
tacked; that I hope that he has written to me; that I shall receive one of his 
officers this evening ; that it is probable I shall set out for Borisof to-morrow ; 
that as soon as I shall have seen the officer, which he will not fail to send, I 
will again write to him ; our rear guard is at Toloczin. 

TffE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE 
OF BELLUNO. 

Bobr, 25d J\i'ovember, 1812. 4 o'clock in the afternoon. 
Marshal, the Emperor has arrived at Bobr. The Duke of Reggio is at Bo- 
risof: it is important that you intercept the Lepel road, as 3'ou proposed to do 
towards Baran, in order to be certain that Wittgenstein advances no troops 
on Oudinot ; if he does, you must attack them vigorously. His Majesty hopes 
that you have written, and that he will receive one of your officers this eve- 
ning. It is probable, that the Emperor will march to Borisof to-morrow. As 
soon as we shall have seen the officer, which you surely will not fail to send, 
I will write again to let you know the intentions of his Majesty. Our real- 
guard is at Toloczin. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO LIEUTENANT 
GENERAL EBLE. 

Bobr, 24th JVovember, 1812. Half after 4 o'clock in the morni7ig. 
General, the Emperor orders that you set out before 6 o'clock in the 
moi'ning, to reach, as speedily as possible, the Duke of Regglo's head-quar- 
ters at Borisof, and endeavour to establish several bridges over the Berezina, 
for the passage of the army. Divide your force. If all your troops cannot 
march sufficiently fast, you must take with you those who are in the best 
condition, so that if you should arrive in the night, you may commence work 
to-morrow at day break ; the other part can begin by noon. Be sure to leave 
workmen on the road, to repair bridges and the worst spots of road. 1 give 
the same order to General Chasseloup ; j^ou will confer with him and the 
Duke of Reggio on the works to be erected over the Berezina, for it is in- 
dispensable the army should pass to-morrow at the latest. 



A 



324 APPENDIX. 

THE DUXE OF 1?EGG10 TO THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHA.TEL AND 

W A GRAM. 

Bnrisof, 24th JVovemher, 1812 — half after 5 in the morning. 

My Lord, As I had the honour of announcing' to your serene hig-hness, I 
sent to reconnoitre the ford at Studianka, which was occupied by the ene- 
my, as will be seen by the report of General Corbineau. 

There are two passages, one at Stakow, a mile above, the other at Ukholo- 
da, two miles below Borisof. The movements remarked yesterday evening, 
on the enemy's flanks, had th^ occupation of these passages for their object, 
which are all guarded. 

It has been impossible to make reconnaissances sufficiently exact during 
the night, to be certain of. the most favourable point to erect a bridge, but I 
propose to-day to make demonstrations on the three points indicated above, 
to try the passage, and erect my bridge during the night, at that which I may 
iix on. 

I have 20,000 men before me, who will dovibtless march on the point where 
1 may endeavour to effect m}^ passage ; I dare not guarantee the success of 
this enterprize, although determined to make every exertion for its accom- 
plishment. 

From the information that has been collected, it appears that the Russians 
are persuaded that the emperor wishes to pass the Berezina here ; yesterday 
the advance guard under Langeron arrived, and that of Admiral Tchitcha- 
koff is also announced, that Wittgenstein has spoken of his immediate junc- 
tion, that Prince Schwartzenberg follows General Muller closely, who com- 
mands the three divisions which the enemy left opposed to him ; this pursuit 
embarrasses the Russians. It is also reported that the troops which had been 
directed on Wilna, have been recalled. — I am, &c. 

THE DUKE OF REGGlO TO THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND 

WAGRAM. 

Borisof JVovember 24th, 1812 — 1 o'clock. 
My Lord, I have decided on the point of Studianka, where I expect to 
effect my passage to-night, and to-morrow morning I shall make demonstra- 
tions at Ukholoda, and Stakow ; the enemy is on the alert, his troops before 
us are in continual motion. He has even the appearance of bringing mate- 
rials to repair the bridge at Borisof, but his most decided movement ap- 
pears to be that making by his right, in the direction of Berezino. I have 
them followed and not lost sight of, but we all here think that this movement, 
made with so much ostentation, masks some other project, but it is always 
proper to inform your highness of it. 

Whatever may happen, I hope to-morrow to be on the other bank, and I 
expect to maintain it sufficiently long to insure the passage which his majes- 
ty may think proper to make afterwards, but it is not to be doubted that 
Wittgenstein and Steinheil, who are aware of it, will make every effort to 
thwart us. I have sent officers to the Duke of Belluno for information, and 
to inform him of my operations; I have not yet received an answer. I am 




APPENDIX. 325 

also about sending him information at Baran to let him know the march I pro- 
pose to make to-night. 

THE DUKE OF REGGIO TO THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND 

WAGRAM. 

Borisof, JVovember 24:th, — quarter before 5 in the afternoon. 
My Lord, Your serene highness will perceive from the annexed report from 
General Aubry, who returned from Studianka at the moment I received the 
last despatch, that the passage is far from being assured ; the enemy does not 
appear to have changed his movements, and it is now certain that Steinheil's 
troops arrived by way of Berezino, are before that ford ; this explains the 
movements towards his right that the enemy made yesterday. A peasant who 
yesterday served aS guide to a column of about 6000 Russians which were 
marching towards their left, and who escaped from them, declared that this 
column made an inverse movement to-day, but notwithstanding the obstacles 
which the passage at Studianka may oppose, I think that we could overcome 
tliem if I was promptly supported, for in a few hours 1 shall find myself be- 
tween two corps of the enemy. I have ordered my movement ; it ought to 
commence at 6 o'clock, but it appears to me of too great importance not to 
postpone it to wait his majesty's commands, particularly as they may arrive in 
time to allow me to move to-night, as we are only three leagues from the 
point of passage. 

I annex to this letter a rough draught of a reconnaissance which was made 
at Ukholoda, a village situated on the Berezino road, two miles from here, 
and that I have hitherto occupied. 

I have had the ford at Weselowo also reconnoitred by a party, who found 
that it was guarded by infantry and cavalry ; this ford is only a league above 
that of Studianka. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Losnitza, 25th JVovember, 1812. 1 at night. 
My Cousin, Send your aid-de-camp, Flahaut, to the Duke of Reggio, he 
must go as speedily as possible, and transmit by him the following letter. 

" By your letter of the 24th, at 5 P. M. you inform me, that you think you 
will have need of support to effect the passage of the river. The Duke of 
Treviso will be at Borisof early to-day with two divisions of the guard. The 
Duke of Belluno had an action yesterday, the 24th, which, judging from the 
cannonade, must have lasted some time, between Kolopeniczi and Baran, 
You have no doubt prepared tressels for at least two or three bridges. Ge- 
neral Ebl^ ought to have arrived at Borisof; if you have not passed over to- 
night, it becomes very urgent, in the actual state of things, to do so to-mor- 
row." 

THE PRINCE OP NEUFCHATEL AND WASRAM TO THE DUKE 
OF BELLUNO. 

Losnitza, 25th of JVbvember. 5 in the morning. 
I laid your letter of the 24th before the Emperor. You say nothing of a 
brisk cannonade which commenced yesterday at half after 3, and neither do 



S2Q APPENDIX. 

you state if you have observed any infantry. Your great aim, Duke, is to 
prevent General Wittgenstein from attacking Oudinot, and it has been en- 
joined on you to arrive as speedily as possible at Baran, to intercept the Le- 
pel road ; you have done neither ; hence General Steinheil has already join- 
ed the army of Tormasof, and delayed our passing the Berezina, which it is 
however important, in the situation in which we are placed, to effect prompt- 
ly. You have, you say, two divisions, which are at fifteen wersts from Kos- 
tritza ; join them as soon as possible, so as to reach Kostritza early ; observe 
all that occurs from Kostritza to Baran, attack vigorously any troops that pre- 
sent themselves, keep up a communication with Oudinot, who is at Borisof, 
where the Emperor is also going. It is necessary that you should send many 
officers in order to communicate your operations several times a day, and you 
can, on the night of the 25th — 26th, pass the Berezina, on the bridges about 
to be erected, with the Duke of Reggio, the imperial guard, and your corps, 
this passage must not be delayed longer. Your rear guard being more dis- 
tant, can continue to cover the army, the rear guard of which marches to- 
day to Bobr, from thence to Nacza, and by forced marches to the bridge, as 
soon as the passage is open ; if General Fourrier meets with an inferior force 
to his own, he must attack it. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKK 
OF BELLUNO. 

Oiie league from Borisof, 25th of JVovember, 1812. 2 in the afternoon. 

I received your letter of the 25th, of 10 in the morning. The Emperor is 
astonished that you have withdrawn the rear guard which covered the road 
from Bobr to Nacza, and that you have entirely abandoned the road from Le- 
pel to Borisof. Since you are on the Lonitza road, it is without remedy ; 
this increased embarrassment will injure your corps. It is to be lamented, 
when you were in the presence of the enemy, that you did not give them a 
severe defeat. If he follows you, and is ti'oublesome, overthrow him with 
your rear guard, and one of your divisions. To-morrow, before day, marcli 
with two of your divisions to Borisof, and from thence to the place of pas- 
sage. 

It would be dangerous to evacuate Ratuliczi in the presence of the enemj"; 
in such case you must turn against him with a force proportionate to his, and 
beat him ; if you do otherwise you will endanger all tlie corps which are at 
Krupki. The Emperor observes that the enemy has afforded you excellent 
opportunities for defeating him, and of which you have not taken advantage. 
I repeat the order of the Emperor, which is, that you attack the enemj^ if he 
be in sight ; this is of the greatest importance, if he is in a position to inter- 
cept our columns. The Emperor's head-quarters w'lM. be at Borisof this even- 
ing. The passage of the river must be effected to-morrow. 




APPENDI^f, 327 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Studianka, JVovember 27th, 1812. Half after 12 at night. 
My Cousin, order Marshal the Duke of Elchingen to pass the river with all 
the Poles, what he has collected of the third corps, and Claparede's division, 
which will arrive at day-break, and which I place under his orders, and with 
these troops to support Marshal the Duke of Reggio if he is attacked this 
morning. As soon as the Duke of Belluno shall arrive, he must also march 
to the support of the Duke of Reggio. Finally, the Duke of Treviso, with 
the young guard will pass the river also to reinforce the Duke of Reggio. I 
would wish this last movement to be retarded until the Viceroy's troops ar- 
rive here, in the fear that Wittgenstein's troops may make their appearance 
on this bank. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

Zanituhi, JVovember 28th, 1812, 9 in the morning. 
My Cousin, order General de Wrede, who is at Dokszitzi, to hasten to We- 
lieka, to collect provisions, take possession of the bridges, and to send par- 
ties on the road from Ilia, and the old road from Minsk, and to communicate 
at Smorgoni, with Adjutant-commandant d'Albignac. This letter is to be car- 
ried by the man who was sent here by General de Wrede (addressed to Ge- 
neral Zrazinski). If he delivers itin 15 hours, he shall have a reward of fifty 
napoleons, which shall be paid him as soon as he lets us know the result. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE VICEROY 

OF ITALY. 

Selifzka, December 3d, 1811, half after one in the morning. 

Sire, The Emperor orders, that you shall send a Pohsh officer to Dolhi- 
now and Dokszitzi to meet General de \^ede, to inform him, that yesterday, 
the 1st of December, General Wittgensfein was at Pleszeniczi, that the 3d 
we shall be at Malodeczno, that orders have already been sent to him several 
times to hasten to Welieka, that he maybe on our left. 

As soon as your highness shall have communicated with the Adjutant-com- 
mandant d'Albignac, the Emperor desires that you will let him know the 
situation of that officer's troops, and that you order him to send to us under a 
strong escort, the twenty couriers he should have with him. Recommend to 
him to post troops at all places, in order that the marauders do not destroy 
them, and that the service of the couriers and communications may be rapid 
between Wilna and Paris. 

The Emperor also desires, that your highness will inform him, if a short 
halt can be made on the line of the Wilia,^which runs to Weizyn and Rados- 
zkowiczi, if the adjutant-commandant^fSs with him convoys of provisions ; it 
is known there are some in the road from Wilna. 

During the days of the halt, all the wounded, the dismounted cavalry, and 
baggage not wanted by the army, must be sent off, but all must be subordi- 
nate to the obtaiiiing provisions. 




328 APPENDIX. 

The Emperor orders me to demand of your highness, what number of 
men have raUied, and if you have commenced a re-organization in your regi- 
ments. 

I send you an order for General Hogendorp, governor-general for Lithu- 
ania, and for General Bourcier. I beg your highness to send off a courier 
with them, and order him to use all possible despatch. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE VICEROY 

OF ITALY, 

Selitzka, December 2d, 1812, 2 in the morning;. 

Sire. I placed before the Emperor your letter, dated on the Malodeczno 
road on the 2d. The intention of the Emperor is, tl)at your highness should 
send a strong advance guard on the Minsk road, to ascertain what passes in 
that quarter, and if there are any news of the enemy. The Emperor hopes, 
on his arrival at Malodeczno, to find there the couriers. 

His Majesty orders, that your highness should send to Wilna under an es- 
cort, furnished from Adjutant-commandant d'Albignac's troops, the heavy 
baggage, the treasure, and all the wagons or carts with the sick and wounded. 

Your highness will also order the Duke of Abrantes to unite and march all 
the dismounted cavalry, by short marches, the most direct road from Malo- 
deczno to Merecz, without passing by Wilna. 

As to the Poles, the Emperor orders, that you also send them from Malo- 
deczno to Olita, without passing through Wilna. 

Send agents to Minsk for information, and despatch the baggage and 
wounded to Wilna, all the dismounted cavalry to the depot of Merecz, and 
the Poles to Olita. 

You must canton your troops in the environs of Malodeczno, the Prince of 
Echmiilh will also canton there his troops, that he may rally and rest them. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO GENERAL 
COUNT DE WREDE. 

Selitzka, December 3d, 1812, one in the mo)~ning. 

General. 1 received your letter of the 2d. Head quarters will be at Malo- 
deczno this evening, it will fall back, successively, till it reaches a spot where 
regular distributions can be made. The army suffers from its long privations. 

Send me a statement of the situation of your troops and artillery. If you 
can send us provisions, bread and cattle, to different points on the route, it 
will be the greatest service you can render us. We have a great number of 
dismounted men, let me know for what cavalry your horses are suited. 
Send your parks, your hospitals, and provisions to Wilna, as well as your 
cattle and magazines. Let me know the place where the Bavarian troops 
and the 10,000 recruits who left Munich several months since, are stationed, 
that measures may be taken to rally them all at the central position. 



APPENDIX. 329 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND W A GRAM TO ADJUTANT- 
COMMANDANT D'ALBIGNAC. 

Malodeczno, December 3d, 1812, 3 m the morning. 

Sir. The Emperor does not find your correspondence sufficiently explicit, 
you have not sent me a statement of the composition of the convoys you are 
escorting-, you do not mention of what carriages it is formed, hence I can give 
you no orders. 

Send back to Wilna all the clothing, they will be distributed at that city* 
Send quickly to meet us half way on the Markowo road, provisions to distri- 
bute to the army on its march. Let the magazines of Smorgoni and Ocbmi- 
ana be filled. Send the cattle to Wilna, that they may not be taken by the 
Cossacks, except what are necessary for the army for two or three days. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO COUNT KREP- 

TOWICTZ. 

JMalodeczno, December 4th, 1812, 4 in the morning. 
Count, the Emperor orders, that you take measures to send from the maga- 
zines at Smorgoni, 10,000 rations of biscuit to the Duke of Belluno, as much 
to the Duke of Elchingen, who commands the 2d and 3d corps. The Empe- 
peror's will is, that you also send to each of these marshals, 20,000 rations of 
meat, and 10,000 rations of brandy. Contrive that these provisions shall ar- 
rive as soon as possible, and if it can be ione, to-morrow, as the retrograde 
movement will cease at the spot where these provisions may be received. 

They write from Wilna, that there is at Smorgoni 60,000 rations of biscuit, 
20,000 are to be distributed as above, 30,000 given to the guard, who will be 
sent to take possession to-day, 5,000 to the Pi-ince &f EchmUlh, and as much 
to the Viceroy, double the quantity of meat not yet killed, and the same quan- 
tity of brandy to each of tliese corps. There is at Smorgoni 350,000 rations 
of flour, and we are assured, that the government of Lithuania has taken 
measures that a great quantity of bread be prepared. If all these details are 
true, and that the magazines of Ochmiana are as well furnished, the army 
will be rallied, and meat, bread, and brandy, issued to them in a regular man- 
ner. It is, therefore, necessary. Count, that you should inform the Emperor, 
as soon as possible, the real resources afforded by the magazines of Smor- 
goni and Ochmiana, and transmit an account of them to me. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO LIEUTENANT 
GENERAL COUNT HOGENDORP, GOVERNOR OF LITHUANIA. 

JMiedniki, December 7th, 1812, 7inthe evening. 
General. I hereby advise you, that the imperial guard will arrive at Wilna 
to-morrow ; his Majesty desires that cantonments may be provided for it in 
the suburb of Ochmiana, the cavalry of tlie guard will also an-ive to-morrow, 
and will take up provisionary quarters in the places which they formerly oc: 
cupied. The corps of the Viceroy and that of the Prince of Echmiilh will 
halt to-morrow at Riikoni. We hope that you have taken measures to de- 

Tt 



mA 



ggQ APPENDIX. 

pi'ive the stragglers and unattached men of their horses ; let them be con- 
ducted immediately to the convents or places you have chosen, to re-unite 
them to their corps. There must be patrols in the city to prevent strag-glers- 
We are desirous of learning tlie state of the villages which are situated two 
leagues around Wilna, and what resources they offer for the troops. The 
king tliinks that you should not lose a moment in sending off our sick and all 
the encumbrances of the administration. The six millions which are at Wilna 
must be sent away, two to Warsaw and four to Koenigsberg. As to the dis- 
mounted cavalry, they must be collected at the same place, and sent in troops 
of 500 to Kowno and Warsaw. General Bourcier will instruct you as to the 
number of men of each kind of troops that are to be sent to each place. I 
have already written to you to despatch all the remounted cavalry from Wilna 
to Krenigsberg. Numbers of soldiers will ask to be admitted into the hospi- 
tals. Endeavour to direct them immediately to Kowno. The number of 
horses and small carts that will be taken from the soldiers entering the 
city, will furnish more than is wanted to carry off the sick. Prepare for me 
exact and detailed statements of all that Wilna affords. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEI, AND WAGRAM TO GENERAL 
COUNT DE WHEDE. 

Wilna, 8th December, 1812, ^ve in the afteimooji. 
The will of his majesty, general, is that you quit your position at Slob Chom- 
ska, and marcli to Rukoni, Avhere you will receive orders from tke Duke of 
Elchingen, to wliom his majesty has confided the command of the rear-guard. 
The Duke of Elcliingen, with the troops of the second and third corps, will 
support you. It is important that you proceed, as soon as possible, to Rukoni ; 
on arriving there, your excellency will form our rear-guard. If there are any 
stragglers, protect them, and take great care to reconnoitre as far as possible, 
on your right and left. The troops of the Duke of Elchingen, who will sup- 
port you, will be in position at Niecmicza ; they are ordered to cover and re- 
connoitre the road from Rudomin. The Viceroy and the Prince of Eckmiilh 
will sleep to night at Rukoni, and will leave it to-morrow morning ; the corps 
of the Duke of Belluno is at Miedniki to-day, and will also fall back on Wilna 
to-morrow, leaving you the care of the rearguard. His majesty relies on your 
talents, and your zeal in this affair, where you are in a situation to render great 
services to the army. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF 
** ELCHINGEN. 

Wilna, December 8th, six in the ervening. 
Duke, — His Majesty thinks proper to confide to you this evening, the com- 
mand of rear guard of the army. You will have under your orders the second 
and third corps, Loison's division, which is so already, and besides, the Bava- 
rian corps of seven to eight thousand men, commanded by General de Wrede, 
1 have given orders to that general to instantly leave his position at Slob- 




APPENDIX. 



331 



Chomska, and march to Rukoni. I herewith annex a copy of the iiistnictions 
I have sent to him. I order the Duke of Belluno not to quit the position at 
Rukoni, until General de Wrede shall arrive; with the rest of your troops you 
must take post at Niesmicza, and cover the Rudomin road. 

You will, Marshal, give such instructions to General de Wrede as you may 
judge necessary. You must be sensible. Sir, that the safety of the army is in 
your hands ; his Majesty has every confidence in you, and I beg that you will 
communicate to me all the information your advance guard may obtain of the 
enemy in different directions. We will attempt to rally the first, fourth, and 
ninth corps, as well as the guard, to support you if necessary. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE OF 
ELCHINGEN. 

Wilna, December 9th, 1812. 

Duke. General de Wrede having been forced from his positions, and being 
at the gates of the city, and the division of Gratien,* not having afforded you 
means to check and repulse the enemy, the king has removed his head quar- 
ters to the Kowno gate, where he has collected the guard. The wish of his 
Majesty is to take up his line of march at four to-morrow morning with the 
imperial guard, in order to arrive as speedily as possible at Kowno, to rally, as 
much as possible, the sti*agglers and ranaM'ays, and to take post there. 

The intention of the King is, for you to continue to form the rear guard, 
and to protect the retreat with de Wrede's division, Loison's division, and 
all the troops you can rally. Send away, to-night, the artillery and all you 
can, especially the treasure. The will of the King is, that some caissons be 
abandoned and the horses be employed for the treasure. 1 have given orders 
to General Eble to blow up the caissons, that we are obliged to leave in the 
arsenal, and to destroy, to-night, the muskets. Under present circumstances, 
the King must march as speedily as possible to Kowno. 

His majesty leaves you master to march, as circumstances may exact, mak- 
ing the best of the disastrous occurrence, that the severe cold has complet- 
ed the disorganisation of the army. Burn, as soon as possible, all that can- 
not be brought away. Inform General Hogendorp, that he must not leave 
the city before you. The King authorises you to write before your depart- 
ure, to the general commanding the Russian troops, recommending our sick 
to his care. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO COUNT DARU, 

Wilna, 9th December, 1812. 
Count, the King has removed his head-quarters to the barrier of Kowno. 
The Duke of Elchingen conducts the retreat, and will set out to-morrow as 
late as possible. Send off the treasure during the night. I have authorised 
General Eble to give the artillery horses, if necessary. Every thing must be 
done to save it ; let it come to-night to head-quarters, at the barrier of Kow- 
no, where we will give it an escort. 

* Brigadier General Baron Gratien, replaced General LoisoH, who fell sick. 



332 APPENDIX. 

Distribute without the tedious forms of service, and abundantly, provi- 
sions and clothing to all those vi^ho demand them, as the position of the ene- 
my will not permit us to hope of retaining' Wilna all to-morrow. Rejoin head, 
quarters to-night, and put every thing in train to send to Kowno, all that you 
can. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO PRINCE DE 
SCHWARTZENBERG. 

Wilna, December 9th, 1812. 
Prince : The army is at present at Wilna, but every thing leads us to believe 
that his majesty has determined to repass the Niemen, and take up his winter 
quarters on this river ; this movement requires that you should manoeuvre 
with your corps and that of Regnier, to be in communication with us, in the 
new line we shall take ttp on the left bank of the Niemen. The intention of 
the Emper^br having been, that your corps and that of General Regnier, 
should cover the Duchy of Warsaw, his majesty orders me to order you to 
mancEuVre on Balistock, but at the same time to inform you that your move- 
ment must be made as slowly as possible, except you are pushed by those of 
the enemy, 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE 
OF TARENTUM. 

Wilna, 9th December, 1812. 

Duke, — the army is at present at Wilna and its neighbourhood. The in- 
tention of his majesty is, therefore, that you approach our new line of opera- 
tions, in advancing on Tilsit, that you may cover Koenigsberg and Dantzwick. 
But his majesty orders me at the same time to inform you, that your move- 
ment must be made as slowly as possible, except you are pushed by those of 
the enemy. 

The army will march to Kowno, which it will preserve as a key ; you must 
make your reports to that place. Send us news as often as you can. 

THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL AND WAGRAM TO THE DUKE 
OF ELCHINGEN. 

Kotvno, 12th December, 1812 — at noon. 
Marshal, — The King has received the verbal report which you have made 
to him. His majesty has learnt with pain, that the enemy pursues you so 
closely. I am about sending you six pieces of artillery of Loison's division — 
We hope that you will maintain to-day the defile of Rumsziki — you must be 
aware how important it is, that we should not be driven from here, where we 
have immense magazines. Under present circumstances, the king has 
thought that the first thing to be done is to send off every thing in Kowno, 
during to-day and to-morrow, — we have here, a key post, or a kind of en- 
trenched camp, armed with 12 pieces of artillery, a work in which we can 
maintain ourselves, unless the enemy's infantry appears in superior force. 
The King has ordered the dismounted cavalry, the whole imperial guard, in- 




APPENDIX. 333 

fantry and cavalry, the first and fourth corps to take provisions for eig^ht days, 
and to pass over to the right bank of the Niemen. Twelve pieces of artille- 
ry which were in the place, have been placed on the heights, on the left 
bank. The wish of his majesty is, that all who belong to the second and third 
corps, which includes Loison's division and the legion of the Vistula, who 
form part of the third corps, should remain in Kowno to defend the entrance 
to the bridge, and in a place where there is artillery, ammunition, provisions, 
and clothing. The head quarters of the King will probably be to-morrow on 
the left bank, with the troops of the guard, and those of the first and fourth 
corps. 

The King thinks that in this position he can check the Cossacks who pur- 
sue us so closely, but his majesty waits your reports before taking a decided 
step. Loison's division will find here all that it wants, thus we shall form a 
respectable body of infantry. 

NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR GENERAL. 

MoscQiv, September 25th, 1812. 
My Cousin, write to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, that I have given an or- 
der to the intendant general, to send 200,000 francs in roubles, (at the rate of 
a ruble in paper per franc,) along the line from Mojaisk, Gjatz, Wiazma, 
Porogobouje, and Smolensk ; and I have authorised him to purchase for all 
the points on the route, flour and meat, that I do not perceive that he has as 
yet, done any thing to organise the government of Smolensk. 



THE END. 




r 



